Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1960
- 1979)
WEDNESDAY 7 JANUARY 2004
LT GENERAL
ROB FULTON,
AIR VICE
MARSHAL STEPHEN
DALTON AND
MAJOR GENERAL
DICK APPLEGATE
OBE
Q1960 Mike Gapes: So the answer
is that we should not really have been doing UORs; we should have
been keeping as close as possible to the Americans and buying
from them? Is that what you are saying?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: No, because
by doing the UORs, we were able to be interoperable with them
to the limited extent that we could in the timescale that was
available. So the UORs gave us that limited capability.
Q1961 Mike Gapes: Because
we had fallen so far behind?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Absolutely.
There is no question that we had fallen behind because of the
amount of investment that is needed to keep up with the volume
of communications, not least of which is the number of satellites
you need.
Q1962 Mr Hancock: I am curious
about this issue about interoperability and the ability to talk
to each other and friendly nations working with you. The answer
you gave to Mike Gapes's question about whether we should buy
American was not, I do not think, very satisfactory. I am interested
in knowing whether or not you have done any assessment of their
communications set-up, whether it was satisfactory or whether
they themselves had significant problems. If they did not, there
is a substantial case to be made that it is a cheaper option simply
to buy what they are using. They have done all the research and
development, so we buy—this goes back to your point, General,
about when is the off-the-shelf version the cheapest option. I
was rather nervous about your suggestion, Air Vice Marshal, about
us buying other equipment which could be adapted to become compatible
with the American systems. Surely there is a case to be made to
simply buy what they are using.
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Two things.
First of all, they were not satisfied with their own communications
system in terms of the capability, the volume, and the rate at
which it could transfer information. They themselves are planning
to continue to put an extraordinary amount of money into improving
and increasing their communications capability. Because of the
demand, as General Fulton mentioned earlier on, for increased
volumes and rates and timeliness of those communications, we are
not looking to buy American per se. What I was trying to
say was that we are making sure that the equipment that we want
to buy, for instance, the Bowman land digitisation system and
radio, is probably the leader in the world at the moment in terms
of its capabilities in what has been designed to be introduced
over the next few years. What we need to make sure is that that
system, which will be with us for probably 10, 15 even 20 years,
is compatible with what the Americans themselves are purchasing
and have got in service.
Q1963 Mr Hancock: If it is
not, we have a big problem, do we not?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: That
is why we are making sure we are doing the work to make sure it
is.
Q1964 Mr Hancock: Surely we
should have been doing that talking before we got into the position
of making our decision to move ahead. Are you saying we have not
done that?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: To a
certain extent we have done that, as I mentioned, through the
NATO standards system, to make sure that technically they are
interoperable bits of equipment, but the rate at which the American
communications, particularly the strategic communications, have
moved ahead was outstripping anything we could hope to keep up
with.
Q1965 Mr Hancock: It is a
pretty worrying situation, is it not, something we as a Committee
ought to be taking very careful note of, otherwise we are going
to be in a position of some real difficulty if we were faced with
this five years from now?
Lt General Fulton: If I may say
so, I think you have put your finger on a very pertinent point,
which is that yes, we wish to operate alongside the United States,
but we cannot hope to match their investment in this area, and
therefore we have to ask ourselves some very searching questions
about what does operating alongside and with the United States
mean and how far are we actually going to be able to either operate
alongside and de-conflict from them, operate closely with them
or even integrate with them, because the further you go up that
tree, the more demanding it becomes and, clearly, the more expensive
it becomes. As is set out in both the White Paper and Lessons,
for future large-scale operations we do see ourselves operating
with the United States, but this brings with it some questions,
in particular in terms of exchange of information, of affordability
and the amount that we are able to do it. Technology is to a certain
extent coming to our help, because now, with the generation of
software programmable radios, it is possible to buy radios from
different sources but make sure that the wave form of one is programmed
into the other and therefore you can exchange information in the
same way as mobile telephones from different manufacturers can
work. So digital technology is taking us in a direction where
this is going to be easier, but nevertheless, the way in which
the Americans foresee themselves exchanging information in the
future is something that we cannot hope to match. What we have
to do though is to ask ourselves so what? What is the shape of
the plug that we need to have to fit into the American socket
so that we can take those bits of information that we need? Coming
back to Mr Gapes's point earlier, we do not need all their information,
but we do need the bits of information that are pertinent. So
it is a question of asking ourselves, "So what? What does
operating with the Americans mean in the future?"
Q1966 Mr Hancock: Are you
sure, General, that the Americans are prepared to give you the
knowledge to know what shape plug to buy?
Lt General Fulton: We have invested
a lot of time and effort in doing just that with the Americans,
making sure that the technology gap is not exacerbated by us waiting
until they bring something in and then us following, because actually,
as Air Vice Marshal Dalton has said, there are cases where we
are half a generation ahead. Our Bowman system is coming in half
a generation before their joint tactical radio system, therefore
we had committed ourselves to Bowman before they had made a decision
on the joint tactical radio system, therefore what we need to
do is get them to change—and they have been willing so to
do, at some expense to themselves. But I think the Americans would
also say that they do not themselves always operate in a direct
straight line, and one of the other questions we have to ask ourselves
is to make sure that we are not following them down a blind alley,
out of which they can afford to come because they got it wrong
and they want to go off in a different direction. So they themselves
say, "Be careful, don't follow us too closely," but
they are nevertheless willing to share the information with us
in terms of where they are going so that we can make a decision.
But there are still going to be some difficult decisions for us.
Q1967 Mr Hancock: Let us hope
that those words do not come back to haunt your successor in five
or six years' time, General. Let us hope that what you say is
right. The Chairman was good enough to ask the question I was
going to ask earlier, and you promised to write on combat effectiveness.
The question of combat identification is an important one because,
as you have said, Air Vice Marshal, there are four inquiries going
on at the present time, and you did invest quite a lot of money
in trying to overcome the issue of friendly fire. Were you in
the main—four incidents aside, and maybe some near misses
as well—happy with the progress that is being made in that
field?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Two things,
if I may. First of all, progress is being made. It would always
be advantageous, particularly when a conflict is just about to
come along, if we could move faster in making sure that we had
a combination, as I mentioned, of tactics, techniques, and procedures,
as well as the technical equipment that would enable us to be
as confident as we can that combat ID is something that we had
got pretty well sorted out. I must make the point though, of course,
that I do not believe we will ever have a situation where there
will not be instances of blue on blue, for a variety of reasons,
not least of which is the human factor in all of those situations.
So progress is being made, there is lots more progress needed,
some of which will be on the training side, some of which will
be on the technical side. It is very much a live issue and one
which has got very high-level attention in the Ministry of Defence,
not surprisingly, and which a lot of work is being put into now
to try and make sure that we progress things as quickly as is
possible, but there are some technological barriers and there
are some human factor issues that we need to get sorted out.
Q1968 Mr Hancock: Is there
a willingness among our possible coalition partners now and in
the future to work down the same road as us on that, so that there
is a compatible facility which is readily available to all forces
and can be put on aircraft and vehicles very quickly if the need
arises?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Yes indeed,
as was the case this time. A system was leased from the United
States to make sure we had better awareness in terms of where
our forces were and where the coalition forces were. On top of
that, we are doing specific pieces of work with the United States
and elsewhere to look at some technological demonstrators on pieces
of equipment to try and identify what is the best and most reliable
solution to the problem, to give us at least the technical end
of it, as well as also doing work with them to make sure that
the training and recognition aspects are taken care of with our
most likely ally.
Q1969 Rachel Squire: Helicopters.
Firstly, General Fulton, you have already praised the performance
of Sea King Mk 7 and how the Search water radar proved effective
not only over water but also over desert terrain, and we certainly
heard that from 42 Commando when we visited them yesterday. Can
I ask you whether that additional capability is something that
you are planning to exploit in the future, and whether it is considered
to be possibly a universal capability or perhaps one that is only
suitable either to the sea or the desert? Secondly, we are all
aware of the Sea King's vulnerability to ground to air threats,
particularly when it is carrying out that sort of desert terrain
surveillance. What are the plans to try and address that?
Lt General Fulton: If I could
pick up the point about land surveillance first, and then come
to vulnerability in a moment, one of the things that the Sea King
Mk 7 shows is something that comes through time and again, which
is that the true strength of the UK armed forces is the ability
of our people to take in equipment that was designed for one purpose
and apply it to another when the situation changes. The Navy,
3 Commando Brigade, the troops on the Al Faw, did not have anything
that was designed to achieve that, and nevertheless worked around
it. The first point I would make is that one of the fundamental
things that we have to do is to take that lesson—we already
knew it but I think it is a very good example of it—which
says that actually, capability only comes when you get equipment
plus people plus training, and therefore the equipment must be
sufficiently adaptable—we must try not to have equipment
that is designed just for one role and one role only—so
that good people can take it and apply it. That would be my first
point. My second point, to answer your question whether we would
do the same again, yes, of course and, as you heard earlier from
the Finance Director, we do intend to replace those two because
they are vital pieces of equipment in their primary role, but
also clearly, were there to be another circumstance, it would
be applicable. But we also know that that has been a weakness
in our inventory and therefore we already have the Astor programme,
which is due to come into service in 2005, which will provide
a similar stand-off picture of the battlefield, which would have
been better than the picture that they got from the Search-water
radar because that is what it has been designed for, and also
the Watchkeeper programme, which has been much discussed in this
Committee in the past, will also provide a very flexible way to
do the same thing. So yes, we understand the gap, and yes, we
have means in the programme to do it, but I come back to the basic
point, that I would guarantee that, were we to do another such
operation, we would find another example where good people took
something that was designed for a completely different purpose
and found that that was the way to solve the problem, which is
the importance of training, which therefore means that when we
look forward at what lessons we should learn, there will be some
difficult balances between whether the Department should spend
the money on the equipment or whether we should spend it on the
people or spend it on the training, because the people and the
training we can make good use of. Vulnerability: Sea King is vulnerable,
and has had a long life, and there is a limited amount that can
be done in order to make it less vulnerable. Therefore, we do
not think that a great expenditure on protection of the Sea King
is the right way to go, but rather to concentrate on using it
in such a way as to minimise its vulnerability. So we are trying
to limit its vulnerability through use rather than through technical
means.
Q1970 Rachel Squire: My second
question, coming back to the points being made about communications,
the Defence Aviation Flight Safety magazine reported that helicopter
communications in theatre were extremely poor. Can you be specific
on what action is being taken to improve helicopter communications?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: This
is on the Sea King. I will have to come back and let you know
on that one.[19]
But if I turn to the Chinook and Puma helicopters that were used
out there, there are different radio systems. New radio systems
have been put into those two particular helicopters to try and
overcome that particular problem, mainly because it is caused
by the heat and the environment as well as some limited effect
of terrain. It is mainly the heat and the environment out there
that reduces the range of the radio frequencies they are operating
at. Action has been taken, new radios have been put in, and in
fact ground services have been put in as well to try and make
sure that they are in communication for much longer. It is a known
physical issue. It is a technical issue that is going to be difficult
to overcome because of the law of physics.
Q1971 Rachel Squire: Finally,
can I come on to the Apache? A number of articles again have commented
on the United States' Apache helicopter's vulnerability to small
arms fire during Operation Telic. Have lessons been identified
for the UK's Apache helicopters in the light of that experience
and is action being taken or being planned?
Lt General Fulton: Very definitely.
We are very interested in what has been the American experience
of Apache and through UK liaison officers that are with the American
aviation forces back in the United States, we have gone through
their report with some care. I will ask General Applegate to talk
about the detail.
Major General Applegate: If I
expand a little bit on that, with the Apache, some of these articles
are quite interesting. The Apache was clearly tremendously successful
in 1991, in the first Gulf war, if you compare it. Some concern
was then raised over its employment in Kosovo. If you have read
General Wesley Clark's book, you can see that there are other
reasons why it may not have been employed, rather than problems
with the helicopter or the crew. There are clearly issues also
about the speed of deployment, etc, and I do not think that relates
particularly to what we are talking about in this operation. With
regards to the recent Gulf operation, really the main criticism
focused around one particular attack against elements of the Medina
division, in which a tremendous amount of damage was inflicted
on the Apaches. But I would point out, first, that although they
may have absorbed a lot of damage, all, except one, returned and
went back into combat two days later. It reflected the experience
in Afghanistan, when the Apaches were used in very close support
to infantry on this occasion, in the Shah Kthot operation, where
again they suffered a lot of damage. But to be frank, they won
the day in what was pointed out to me by an American as the most
intense and most sustained air assault operation since the Vietnam
War. Going back to this current Gulf operation, I think it is
important also to remember that apart from that one operation,
the Apaches were used both in further deep strikes, and in air
assault tasks, up to 500 km, for example, when going into Mosul.
It was used also in conjunction with ground forces for seizing
dams and other tasks. They also carried out, rather as one saw
with the Marines and their Cobras, close support to infantry or
other ground forces. So a wide variety of tasks. From our perspective,
a point I would emphasize is that I think the Apache has demonstrated,
particularly in Afghanistan and more recently in the Gulf, that
it is still appropriate to the new operational environment, and
we are getting a weapons system which is still the sort of thing
which we will use widely on operations. It has the ability, which
our current helicopters do not, to absorb a lot of damage. I would
also say that the one particular instance against the Medina division
also reminds us that there is no such thing as some "silver
bullet" type of equipment system: you have to use tactics,
techniques and procedures; you have to combine the effects of
other weapons; and you cannot necessarily just sail in and expect
that somehow you will roll over an opponent. There were clearly
problems with tactics, techniques and procedures on that day.
So, in summary, I would say that we remain very happy with Apache.
Over some two years we have also taken a number of measures, which
we have funded, to ensure that the Apache becomes even more capable
of being operated in these new sorts of operations we find ourselves
in. What I mean by that is the ability to more rapidly deploy
it over strategic distances; to get it into operation; to improve
some of the targeting systems; to make sure we have a capability
which is better than the United States to actually tune the defensive
aid suites on the helicopters very quickly to the threats in theatre,
and I think we are also looking at what we might be doing as the
system comes on in five or ten years to make sure it maintains
its edge. So in sum, a good weapons system, vastly over-exaggerated
through one particular report, and I can only wonder what agendas
may be running in the United States. But perhaps that is a question
you should ask some of the people who wrote those articles.
Q1972 Rachel Squire: Thank
you very much. I think you have explained very well why, in spite
of that vulnerability and the problem with the Medina division,
the United States army is intending to increase the number of
Apaches in each unit. However, I also understand, in spite of
the very strong case you have just made, that the MoD may be planning
to decrease the number of Apaches as a cost-cutting measure. We
can argue about that, but is that indeed the case and if so, why?
Major General Applegate: With
regard to that, at the moment the future army structure work,
which I think you are aware of, is ongoing. We are still buying
the same number. One of the issues is quite how they might be
employed in organisational terms to make best use of them and
what we might do as far as maintaining that fleet over time. Those
issues have not been resolved as yet, so I cannot give you a definitive
answer whether there will be two regiments, three regiments, four
and a half regiments, five regiments etc. Does that answer that
question? We are not reducing the purchase. We still maintain
the investment. We are trying to make sure that what we buy are
the best.
Rachel Squire: It is clearly an area
for a lot of argument in the weeks to follow this meeting.
Chairman: In terms of vulnerability,
we are now going on to a really vulnerable instrument.
Q1973 Mr Jones: Gentlemen,
can I ask about UAVs? Certainly they played a key role for our
allies in Operation Telic, and also in Lessons For the Future
they feature quite highly in terms of future operations. In terms
of Phoenix, I understand that there is an attrition rate of something
like 25%. Could you first tell us generally about how effectively
Phoenix operated, and secondly, is losing 23 out of 89 what was
expected and will they be replaced?
Lt General Fulton: In terms of
effectiveness of UAVs, yes, the Americans made a lot of use of
them. The Americans, as we know, have a much greater variety of
them and they have developed them much further than we have, but
nevertheless, there is a great deal of investment going in in
this country to improve or to increase the use that we make of
them. As far as Phoenix is concerned, Phoenix has been a much
maligned equipment in the past, but was identified by General
Brims as one of his war winners and he certainly found it extremely
useful, with all its known shortcomings. Yes, the attrition rate
was high. Eighty-nine air vehicles went, 138 flights, and 23 lost
or damaged beyond repair. I cannot do the maths in percentage
terms in my head, but that is significant. In terms of causes
of loss, technical reasons are believed to account for the majority
of those that were lost.
Q1974 Mr Jones: Is that because
of the theatre you were fighting in, the desert conditions?
Lt General Fulton: To a certain
extent, yes. I have not seen an analysis of what all the technical
reasons were. There were also on some occasions conscious decisions
to fly them to destruction, to get the benefit from them, and
sacrifice the air vehicle. There were a range of reasons, but
Phoenix is very much a last-generation air vehicle and a last-generation
system and, as was pointed out in the last session by the Finance
Director, we are not going to go out and buy more Phoenix. Watchkeeper
is due in service in 2005-06 and will provide a two-step change
in our capability in the information-gathering capability that
will be provided.
Q1975 Mr Jones: So have any
lessons been learned from the way you used Phoenix for future
operations, for example, how you used them or any adaptations
that need to be made to Watchkeeper?
Lt General Fulton: I am not aware
of any changes. I can answer the question more specifically than
that. We are very keen, for reasons which I have explained to
the Committee in the past, not to make changes to the Watchkeeper
requirement, so that we do not keep chasing the latest requirement,
and we do not fall into the same trap we fell into with Bowman,
which is every six months to change your mind, because that way
it will never be delivered. So we are absolutely sure that we
want to nail the Watchkeeper requirement and to make sure that
the companies deliver that which we have asked for. But clearly,
we have taken the lessons, not only of Phoenix but also of what
the Americans have learned from UAV operations, and incorporated
those in the Joint UAV Experimentation Programme, which is where
we are doing the work to look at what son of Watchkeeper or future
developments of Watchkeeper, future developments of UAVs might
be, what smaller variants, larger variants, might offer us for
the future.
Q1976 Mr Jones: There was
a report in The Times on 30 December 2003 that the MoD
had purchased US Desert Hawk and US Buster UAVs. Is this the case
and how do they fit into the Watchkeeper programme?
Lt General Fulton: They do not
fit into the Watchkeeper programme. We have been looking at whether
there are specific requirements related to current operations
in Iraq where a mini UAV, something very much smaller than anything
we have had in the past, might help the current forces out there,
but it is not in service yet.
Q1977 Mr Jones: Ten out of
ten for not answering the question.
Lt General Fulton: Yes, we are
buying something called Desert Hawk. No, it is not in service
yet.
Q1978 Mr Jones: Where does
that actually fit into Watchkeeper? Does it fulfil a different
need?
Lt General Fulton: We are talking
about a very much smaller air vehicle, very much less capable,
with a very much shorter range, very much lower, the sort of thing
that the American Marine Corps use, something that is therefore
man-portable, to see whether that can help with some of the surveillance
requirements that exist at the moment. But for exactly the same
reason I described earlier, it does not fit into the Watchkeeper
requirement which would provide the sort of battlefield surveillance
that Ms Squire was talking about earlier.
Q1979 Mr Jones: I accept that,
so where does it fit into the overall programme in terms of UAV
development for the British Armed Forces?
Lt General Fulton: It is a UOR
and so there is exactly the same question; in other words, it
comes with no support funding, it is a very small number of air
vehicles with a very small number of ground stations for a specific
purpose at a particular time. Then there is a discussion, which
the JUEP, Joint UAV Experimentation Programme, will look at to
see whether a micro-UAV has a part in the overall mix. If it does,
then, for exactly the reasons we described earlier, we will have
to decide where a micro-UAV sits in our priorities against all
the other lessons that we would like to learn out of the present
conflict.
19 Ev 433 Back
|
