Examination of Witnesses (Questions 2080
- 2090)
WEDNESDAY 21 JANUARY 2004
MR EDWARD
CHAPLIN CMG OBE, MS
CAROLYN MILLER,
AIR VICE
MARSHAL CLIVE
LOADER OBE AND
MR IAN
LEE
Q2080 Mr Havard: Our military
are going to be there for a period of time because there is going
to be a need for security and stabilisation whilst all these processes
continue, so they are going to be seen to be co-operating with
different groups of people currently. You can imagine how this
is going to potentially cause difficulty if it is not properly
handled, because as this process unveils are they going to be
seen to have been supporting particular groups of people or particular
individuals and then the process comes along and these individuals—To
be perfectly honest, it would seem to me that some of the current
CPA people might well not get elected under any new process, yet
they are working hand-in-glove. So there are those sorts of issues
and difficulties that have to be managed, particularly for the
military on the ground. Let me just press the point: if you are
doing all that, how are you creating institutions? One of the
other declarations is to promote private business and do all these
other things. We have had this discussion about contractors and
others and companies coming in, and another related issue I would
like to ask is, in all of that discussion how is an open, free
trade union structure being looked at in terms of being established
as part of the state processes? There are going to be large companies,
foreign and domestic, hiring all the workers or working with international
workers, and so on, and our military personnel relating to them.
How is that question being addressed?
Mr Chaplin: Can I pick up one
of your earlier points? I think the evidence is there (you have
seen it yourself) that the military and civilians of the CPA who
are engaging with local authorities are very alive to the risks
you have outlined and take every possible precaution to ensure
they are seen as objective and not favouring one faction over
another. The CPA, of course, is the Coalition Provisional Authority,
and that has nothing to do with Iraqi politics; it is the Provincial
Councils and the Iraqi Governing Council that have that responsibility.
As far as taking action, as the Coalition, on the future economic
structures or allowing trade unions to be set up, these are matters
where policy will be made by the CPA in Baghdad (this will not
be the subject of local initiative) and there are constraints—legal
constraints apart from anything else—on how far it is right
for the Coalition Provisional Authority to go in taking decisions
which, if you like, pre-empt decisions which properly belong to
the transitional and then fully legitimate Iraqi government. So
I think there are some real constraints on how far down that track
we could go.
Q2081 Mr Havard: We are looking
at it from the point of view of where the Ministry of Defence
fits into all of this. What we already see is that the military,
effectively, is taking on tasks that others ought to be there
doing, and that will potentially continue for some time. I can
see engineers from the British military still being in there,
working hand-in-glove; you are going to have all this mine clearance,
ordnance and all the rest of it, as well as the security on a
day-to-day basis, policing and all of the other things—terrorism
and so on. So there has got to be some sort of thought-out plan,
it seems to me, on how the military are advised and what the contribution
is of the military in relation to these evolving, developing plans.
It just seems to me that the question of nation building, quite
clearly, is more difficult than the fighting, in many respects—that
was the relatively easy bit, this is the difficult bit. It comes
back to the questions we were raising earlier, and the extent
to which planning is done and advice and proper relationships
are established in order to achieve these different objectives.
You have got to give us confidence that that is happening.
Mr Chaplin: I do not think I can
add much to the description of how the CPA and the military are
acting in this field in the period between now and the coming
into office, according to the timetable, of a transitional Iraqi
government. At that point the relationship will change and at
that point if the new Iraqi government requires continuing outside
assistance, as it certainly will, whether that is in security
or in setting up civil institutions or help in preparing a census
or help in preparing elections, it will need to ask for that assistance—probably,
in some of those things I mentioned, from the United Nations.
If they need continuing help from individual nations then I am
sure those requests will be looked at very sympathetically. Certainly
we will want to continue to play our part. The point is this will
not be us deciding, as the occupying powers, this will be us responding
to a request from a sovereign government, as we do elsewhere in
the world.
Q2082 Mr Havard: We have got
the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Department of
Trade and Industry and DfID. What is DfID's position in relation
to these matters?
Ms Miller: Obviously, getting
a good governance system is one of our priorities. We would target
our assistance at probably the next level down—getting ministries
up and running, getting public administration and getting good
economic governance. That is certainly one of our priorities for
support.
Q2083 Mike Gapes: The UN have
got people in Iraq today. There is a report in the newspaper this
morning that the American administration is re-thinking its attitude
to the timetable and that our Government is pushing them to do
so. Without giving any secrets away, I would be interested to
know whether you would prefer an election by the end of June so
that there can be a democratically elected and legitimate government
in Iraq from 1 July rather than have hundreds of thousands of
supporters of Ayatollah al Sistani on the streets.
Mr Chaplin: There is absolutely
no truth in the speculation that either the American Government
or the British Government is pushing for an extension of the timetable
which was laid down by the Iraqis, communicated to the Security
Council, following their agreement of 15 November. What there
is is a debate, and there was a meeting in New York on Monday
(the 19th) involving the Secretary General, the Secretariat staff,
members of the Iraqi Governing Council and members of the CPA,
including Paul Bremer and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, which was considering
what more the UN could do to help in this process. The UN, under
Security Council resolutions, already has a mandate to help in
all sorts of fields, including the political process, but the
question of course is going to be security. What this discussion
was about was whether they could help in advisory and other capacities
in the process between now and the formation of a transitional
Iraqi government. In particular, their advice is being sought
by the Iraqis in coming to address this question of what sort
of electoral process they should have for the formation of that
transitional national assembly.
Q2084 Mike Gapes: So that
is not yet a resolved issue, as to whether you have an appointed,
indirect system or you have some form of direct elections with,
perhaps, people having coloured dye on their hands—
Mr Chaplin: That is still being
discussed.
Q2085 Mike Gapes: There is
still a possibility. My question was, would you prefer a democratic
election by the end of June?
Mr Chaplin: I think we would prefer
as democratic a process as possible, but there are some real practical
constraints, in the time available, on what sort of direct elections
you have, given the security in some areas of Iraq and given the
lack of preparations, electoral law and so on. There are, as you
have referred to, other possibilities, using the food distribution
system, but there are problems with all those options. The question
is whether the UN can help to resolve those to the satisfaction
of all the Governing Council and whether any adjustments need
to be made to give even greater transparency and legitimacy to
the process. It is important we should have the maximum level
of legitimacy and transparency in the process that elects people
to come together in the national assembly which is going to do
some important things, including constitutionally.
Q2086 Mr Viggers: The Committee
was in Iraq last July and the experience there, and in Bosnia/Herzegovina,
is that we have seen just how effective military support in the
humanitarian area can be in immediate work on restoring water,
for instance, power, rebuilding the schools and so on. The budgets
in those areas are really very modest. I wonder whether lessons
have been learnt in Iraq and elsewhere as to whether it would
be appropriate to review, and possibly increase, the budgets for
military support in the humanitarian area. I can foresee a number
of areas of difficulty because troops do not go into the armed
forces to carry out humanitarian work.
Mr Lee: Yes, it is a road down
which we are moving. I think lessons were learned from Afghanistan,
for example, on how beneficial it would be to give the military
forces a budget from the outset which they could spend on what
they call Quick Impact Projects, which are essentially humanitarian
in nature—getting infrastructure going again as quickly
as possible. More money was set aside for this operation than
had previously been the case for exactly that purpose. In addition
to that, there was even more money set aside which would normally
be from DfID's budget (another £30 million, I think) which
could also be used in recognition of the fact that in the first
few weeks there would only be military forces on the ground and
they would need to take these sorts of actions. So the answer
is yes, we have learned from experience previous to Iraq and we
will be looking at the effectiveness of that system in the case
of Iraq. I am sure we will look to do something of a similar nature
if anything of this sort crops up in the future.
Q2087 Mr Viggers: The message
that the Committee brought back from Umm Qasr was "Where
is UK plc?" By that, the people putting the point to the
Committee meant "Where is DfID, where is the DTI, where is
British private enterprise?" Do you feel that lessons have
been learned from this experience and that, facing this problem
again, you would approach it in a different way? Has the situation
improved since July?
Ms Miller: We will certainly be
looking across Whitehall at the ability to deploy rapidly a range
of experts—related to what I was saying about the number
of people that we have available ready to deploy. So that is something
that we can learn. This was a slightly different situation in
that, clearly, you would have a wider range of other actors available
to do some of this work, but part of the problem is that a lot
of what DfID, in particular, had funded simply did not come under
that badge of "UK plc". The United Nations, UNICEF and
UNDP did a lot of valuable work very early on in restoring water
and electricity, which we funded. The ICRC, similarly, which we
also funded. Whilst, yes, we do need to look at how to get the
UK co-ordinated effort better placed in a similar situation, we
do have to remember that there was a lot of stuff being funded
by the UK which complemented and worked quite closely with the
efforts that UK troops and DfID and others were making on the
ground.
Air Vice Marshal Loader: To put
some granularity on that, General Brims was deployed with £10
million of Quick Impact Project money which, within the usual
sensible checks and balances, he was free to use as he saw fit,
and he very quickly did. If you want to win hearts and minds (I
know it is a slightly hackneyed phrase but, nonetheless, it is
entirely apposite) then him having the freedom to go and do that
worked very well. It is interesting how quickly that was followed
up, in fact, when General Lamb was in theatre. We very quickly
got beyond the scope of what the Royal Engineers and others could
do but we could actually start the process where other projects
were identified. The local tribal and religious leaders made the
point very strongly that if we wanted to maintain the consent
of the Iraqi people (and without that consent we could not stay
in the country) other things needed to be delivered, and then
the process very quickly kicked in, with DfID, of finding the
companies which would have to come in through the good auspices
of DfID to move those other projects forward which were now outwith
the capabilities of the deployed military. So there was a blend
of this process.
Chairman: Of course, it is very important
that locals are employed. One of the great virtues of the system
that you referred to, operated by the young man from BAe systems,
was that (a) he was teaching local contractors how to put in a
bid and convincing them you could win a contract without bribing
any of the people making the decisions, and (b) it was a great
opportunity for the local workforce. The guy was telling us that
the time taken to fulfil his contracts was very, very short because
there was so much surplus labour they would come in in vast numbers
and do the job in a couple of days that might have taken a normal
workforce much, much longer.
Q2088 Mr Havard: A quick,
mechanical question, really. Given the point you have just made
about the relationship between the military and DfID, what was
the process? Did DfID have embedded people, as it were, in the
same way as we had embedded journalists? There has got to be a
way of doing it. How does that organisationally happen? It seems
to me that however well it is happening maybe it is an area that
we ought to lay emphasis on in terms of embellishing, improving
or enhancing?
Ms Miller: We had people embedded
with the military before the conflict started, during the conflict
and after. In addition, we had people seconded to ORHA and the
CPA who were working alongside the military, working in ORHA and
the CPA. So as well as actually embedded people (and we were giving
advice more than anything else), once we had our own staff and
consultants deployed they were working alongside, in the same
structures and very closely with, the military. Similarly, contractors,
that we funded to get things up and running in the south, were
also, I believe, working very closely with the military, who were
doing some of that work.
Q2089 Chairman: Mr Chaplin,
taking advantage of your enormous expertise in the Middle East
and Iran, the question I want to ask is relevant but not entirely
based on the question that we have undertaken so far. It almost
sounds like an undergraduate essay. It is this (take your time
with the answer and if you have any after-thoughts please let
me know): what has been the impact on the Middle East and North
Africa—your area of professional competence—of the
war on terrorism and the war and the aftermath in Iraq? A: positive;
B: negative; C: no change? I can think of a positive—Libya,
Syria appears to be constrained and potential improvements in
Iraq, but I can see a negative side as well. I am sorry to throw
this one at you but could you give us some of your thoughts because
we are working in this general area?
Mr Chaplin: It is fair to say
that before the conflict took place there was a lot of anxiety
being expressed by governments right across the region about the
possible impact that that would have, particularly on the neighbours.
We did a lot of talking to the neighbours to make sure we understood
their views and could reassure them about what our intentions
were. They were very fundamental anxieties about, for example,
whether we were not going to preside over the disintegration of
Iraq and whether we really meant it when we talked about preserving
the territorial integrity of Iraq. So I think, in the aftermath,
they are reassured and all very happy that the Saddam Hussein
regime has disappeared, reassured that we do appear to be serious
about ensuring that not only territorial integrity is preserved
but that we are going to stay the course—because that was
the other anxiety; that we would leave prematurely and leave an
unholy mess behind which would impact on them—and ensure
there is a political process in place which has the best chance
of delivering a transition to a stable, legitimate and fully representative
Iraqi government. They have some fears about the impact that any
new political arrangements that may take place in Iraq might have,
and different neighbours have different fears about different
elements of that—for example, as regards the Kurds, whether
the Kurds will be able to win too much independence, and the impact
that would have. There have, as you say, been some positive results
as well. Probably the most positive is the signal it has given
of the determination of the US and UK Governments to actually
take action against a dictator that had ignored for 12 years Security
Council resolutions concerning weapons of mass destruction; that
it was simply not acceptable for that to continue. You mentioned
Libya, and although it is difficult to attribute precisely the
weight that the sight of that action had on the thinking in Libya,
it is probably reasonable to assume that that did play a part.
I think, nevertheless, there is continuing anxiety about the impact
of the continuing instability in Iraq and anxiety about what the
future may hold, particularly when it is combined with very pronounced
anxiety (and this is not new) about the continuing other major
unresolved conflict in the Middle East—the Arab/Israel conflict.
That does have a severe impact on all the countries of the region—certainly
on their thinking—and they are very anxious to see the international
community engaged more, and the US Government, in particular,
engaged more, in resolving that conflict. The more action that
can be taken to put that process back on track then the easier
it is going to be to pursue other objectives in Iraq as regards
the war against terrorism and, indeed, in encouraging the process
of modernisation and reform throughout the region. So I hope that
gives you a flavour of how I see the impact, both before and after,
in the region.
Q2090 Chairman: Ms Miller,
as your competence includes the Middle East, is there anything
you can perhaps add to what Mr Chaplin said? Is the Middle East
a better place or a worse place as a result of events over the
last few years? Certainly the perception of the UK and the US
has not gone up significantly amongst a large number of people
living in the region. That seems a pretty negative side.
Ms Miller: I think our main mandate
is to look at poverty and inequality across the region, and it
is far too early to see whether that has made any difference.
Obviously, however, we are very much concerned about overall political
instability. I would say the jury is still out, but certainly
as UK actors in the Middle East we are still seen as very credible,
having something to offer and I suppose one of our worries, that
this might affect our ability to work in the area, does not seem
to have been the case.
Chairman: Thank you all very much for
your two sessions—immensely interesting and very helpful.
In the next four or five months we will be going back to Iraq,
and if things go bad for you we may ask you to listen to our views—but
I do not think we will. Thank you very much.
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