Examination of Witnesses (Questions 2160
- 2179)
WEDNESDAY 21 JANUARY 2004
LT GENERAL
ANTHONY PALMER
CBE, GROUP CAPTAIN
BARBARA COOPER
CBE, GROUP CAPTAIN
NIGEL BEET
AND COLONEL
ANDREW COWLING
OBE
Q2160 Rachel Squire: Yes.
Group Captain Cooper: That is
quite separate to the Operational Welfare Package.
Lt General Palmer: But it is our
responsibility.
Q2161 Rachel Squire: And has
there been a review of certainly some of the complaints that were
publicised about problems with getting parcels out, or getting
them delivered?
Group Captain Cooper: I am not
aware that there were any problems with delivering. Can you be
more specific?
Q2162 Rachel Squire: There
was certainly media coverage of families complaining about, I
think, both the payment that was being initially asked, the limit
on the actual weight, and the fact that through e-mails and telephone
calls they were hearing from their husbands and wives that the
parcels had not yet got to them.
Lt General Palmer: I think this
comes back to expectation management. Two kgs is quite a big parcel,
and I think it was very justified and very welcome initially when
access to NAAFL, etc, was far less than it is now but we have
to think seriously about the cost of such a measure and whether
or not we can afford to go on doing this for free. The other point
is we are only doing this for Iraq but what about Bosnia and Afghanistan,
and what would be the overall cost related to the cost of introducing
an early entry package as part of the OWP? So all of this is being
looked at to see what is possible here. The other point about
the initial stages is that it did require a lot of extra manpower,
as you can imagine, to deal with the increase of packages—again
because it was all free—and in some respects putting a constraint
on in terms of saying, "Okay, you can send them but it will
be at a reduced cost, not be completely free", may be somewhere
we might want to go in the future.
Q2163 Rachel Squire: Just
out of interest, post Op Telic 1, was the parcels issue an issue
that the families raised with you as a priority?
Group Captain Cooper: No, it was
not.
Lt General Palmer: No.
Q2164 Mr Havard: We have had
a lot of discussion about kit, rations and everything else—there
are a lot of things affecting morale and having different effects,
not the least of which is money and pay. In terms of learning
lessons, if you are going to have expeditionary activities in
the future, it is particularly important to learn about problems
now in the general payment system, particularly with transfers.
In Soldier magazine there was an article, for example,
saying that there are something like 9,000 individuals who have
problems with their pay. I know mechanisms have been put in place
so they are not particularly disadvantaged, but this whole area
of activity has a particular resonance on the ground. I have had
reports myself from reservists, for example, that when they got
out there they were not understood, that very often the people
on the ground understood the regulars but not the reservists,
so there were problems in terms of administration at the time
and lessons to be learned from that. Now I know you are going
to set up some tri-Service structure and perhaps I could come
back to that later but, given that there were these problems experienced
and equally that the troops in Afghanistan are going to be out
there for some time, when are you going to solve this problem?
Lt General Palmer: Thank you,
and I acknowledge that it is a problem. On the reserve side we
have now as a result of lessons learned realised that we probably
should have sent a reserve unit for pay and administration out
much earlier so that the reserves would feel they had somewhere
in theatre that they could plug into and get their queries answered,
and that indeed will happen in the future. That was a local problem
that we have now addressed and I think you will find, and certainly
this is my information, that the pay of reserves—and we
have extensively debriefed them when they have come back through
the RTMC at Chilwell—has not been a major issue. As far
as the regulars are concerned this is a different non Telic issue
that is my responsibility, and it is something that the AFPRB
and Baroness Dean is also concerned about which is the level of
mispayment particularly in the Army—it is not a problem
in the Royal Air Force or Navy. This is partly associated with
change to Pay 2000 and partly due to fairly antiquated computer
systems that we have used for some time to pay people, and correcting
it is very complex. Now I could go on for about twenty minutes
on what we are doing, but what I would like to do is give you
a copy of the letter I have written to Baroness Dean on this subject
saying that this is a problem and this is what we are doing to
tackle it.[1]
Q2165 Mr Havard: That would
be extremely helpful but what we are concerned about is that Op
Telic came when it came, and the payment system being put in,
the tri-Service system, as I understand it, is not being put in
until 2005—
Lt General Palmer: It is rolled
out differently for each of the services, starting with the RAF.
Q2166 Mr Havard: Please write
to us about the detail, but the lesson we are learning here is
that the tempo at which this is happening now is different to
the past and the extent to which the systems are in place to support
the pay and allowances, whilst that new reality is in place, has
a material reality on the ground in operational circumstances,
so we are concerned that it is being addressed and that those
lessons have been learned for those reasons, as much as for welfare
and other reasons.
Lt General Palmer: I entirely
agree.
Group Captain Beet: If I may say
so I completely agree with that point, and I think that when the
forces deployed the reservists suffered because they did not have
a TA cell within the HQ Joint Force Logistics Component, but as
Telic went on it was established. There was a major and a sergeant
who set it up specifically, and that function now exists in the
National Support Element Headquarters as the focus for the TA
guys who are in theatre to work their problems through. In fact,
as Andy Cowling was leaving, when 1Div were handing over to 3Div,
that cell was then making an impact. You are right that in the
future there has got to be more of a reserve cell in that support
headquarters to be able to understand those pay issues while the
longer term issues are resolved.
Q2167 Mr Havard: You will
understand as well that whilst the letter you write will deal
with the payments issue, about which we will doubtless get more
and more concerns expressed in general, this is the first time
in modern circumstances we have had the compulsory nature of the
reserve callups, and that will happen more and more, and you have
made the point yourself in the past about the TA being used more,
so could you include those issues when you write to us?
Lt General Palmer: We will gladly
do that.[2]
Q2168 Mr Cran: Going on to
the question of desert clothing and boots, you said, Colonel,
in answer to an earlier question that "somebody was without
something somewhere", and it was perfectly clear that you
and the Secretary of State talked to one another because he said
to the Committee on 14 May that, "The occasional soldier
was not supplied with the right size desert boots on the particular
day that the story appeared in the Times newspaper, but
the truth is that when they went into operations all of our forces
were given the right boots", and that contrasts very much
with what the National Audit Office said about the whole procurement
of desert clothing and boots. It said the procurement was regarded
as of limited effectiveness because few troops received the full
complement and mismatches and sizing remained into the post conflict
phase of the operation. Well, I do not mind who answers but do
you think that, from a personnel point of view or an operational
point of view, is satisfactory? Whose arse, if you will excuse
me saying so, Chairman, was kicked?
Lt General Palmer: Again, there
are personnel aspects to people not having the right kit and morale
aspects and I acknowledge that those people who did not have the
right kit may have suffered from a morale spin but I do not believe
it was as significant as it has been made out to be, although
I acknowledge that it should not have happened. Again, however,
the pace of the operation was such, the inadequacies of the logistic
tracking system were such that it did happen, and no one is denying
that and no one is saying that we should not do better in the
future.
Q2169 Mr Cran: It happened
on a fairly large scale?
Lt General Palmer: The National
Audit Office report, as far as I am concerned as the personnel
guide, is the definitive document in this case but it also refers
to the success and the complexity of providing the degree of logistic
support that was provided in the very short timescale, so one
has to come to a balanced judgment here.
Q2170 Mr Cran: I am just bound
to say that for the first time I do regard that as a complacent
answer because, I do not know about everybody else but if I happened
to be one of the troops you are talking about and I was out there
and I did not have my desert clothing or my boots were the wrong
size or something else, I would expect something better than the
answer you have just given me. Would you like to say any more?
Lt General Palmer: No.
Q2171 Mr Cran: I will come
back to you then. Operationally, would you, Colonel, like to tell
us what effect this disgraceful situation had? Are you in a position
to tell us?
Colonel Cowling: Within the Division
at the start of the operation the majority of troops deployed
were in green combats and what I would call North European boots.
At that time the temperatures were not as high as they were later
on. As time moved on it got hotter and greater supplies of combats
and desert boots ever became available. At the time that the Division
crossed the start line, temperatures were not intense: by the
time we finished the operation from my perspective on July 12th
they were intense, and the need for combats and boots became ever
greater. As far as I am aware, when I left the theatre, with the
exception of a number of outsize individuals—
Q2172 Chairman: Careful what
you say now!
Colonel Cowling:—the supply
of desert combats was complete for the whole Division.
Q2173 Mr Cran: Just so we
may be absolutely clear about this, how does your answer square
with the National Audit Office's reference to limited effectiveness
because few troops received the full compliment and mismatches
and sizing remained into the post conflict phase? I need to be
able to marry that with what you have just said, because it paints
a wholly different picture.
Colonel Cowling: I cannot dispute
the figures but what I will say is that an ever decreasing amount
of individuals were without the kit and, as far as I was aware,
with the exception of a few individuals, by the time I got to
the end of that operation, we all had the equipment. I was one
and I was wearing green combats and green boots well beyond the
conflict stage but, at the end, I had the right kit.
Q2174 Mr Cran: General, the
Colonel is not able to tell me why the NAO's statement on the
one hand and his experience on the other do not come together.
Are you, as the, as it were, Director General Personnel in the
MoD, able to bring them together?
Lt General Palmer: No, I am not.
Although I have a real interest in this as the guy responsible
for personnel and to a certain extent obviously, therefore, morale,
etc, you have had evidence from the logisticians, you have had
the NAO report and I cannot add anything to the debate here. We
regret, and everybody from the Secretary of State downwards has
regretted, the fact that people did not have the right kit at
the right time but set against that is the NAO report which testifies
to the enormous success of the overall logistic operation, and
that is where the matter stands as far as I am concerned. I cannot
add any more to it, I am afraid.
Q2175 Mr Cran: Let's accept
that for the minute, but you did also say earlier on that, as
the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel), morale issues are
ones for you, without any doubt at all?
Lt General Palmer: Absolutely.
Q2176 Mr Cran: Could you tell
me what you have done to find out what the morale of our troops
was in the operation who did not have any of this equipment, if
the NAO is to be believed—and I do believe them.
Lt General Palmer: I have been
out post conflict, I have talked to members of your Committee,
I have talked to members of the Armed Forces and a lot of independent
bodies, and whenever the subject of morale comes up almost uniformly
they testify not only to high morale now but then. The fact is
that the significant operational success, in my view, and what
has gone on afterwards, could not have been achieved by soldiers,
sailors and air men and women without high morale, so, although
I accept at one level that if you do not have the right kit your
morale suffers, I do not in any way accept that this had a major
impact on the operational effectiveness of the force.
Q2177 Mr Cran: Well, there
is your answer, but I am bound to say that the Committee having
been in Iraq, these wonderful people whom we call our troops—and
there is no doubt they are wonderful and that is where you and
me and all of us would agree—in very understated terms made
it clear to us—individually perhaps but nonetheless—that
those who provided this equipment could have done better, and
I guess you would agree.
Lt General Palmer: I would agree
with that.
Q2178 Mr Cran: That is something!
Lastly on this, in relation to desert boots and those who were
not supplied them in time—and there is no doubt since joining
this Committee I have discovered that boots are a most extraordinarily
important item, far more than I would ever have imagined but there
we are—do we have statistics about the medical effects of
not having these boots?
Lt General Palmer: I would have
to get you that information.[3]
Q2179 Mr Cran: We would be
obliged.
Lt General Palmer: Behind me is
an officer from the medical organisation, and he will give you
the answer you seek.
1 Ev 442 Back
2
Ev 442 Back
3
Ev 443 Back
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