Examination of Witnesses (Questions 2280
- 2299)
THURSDAY 5 FEBRUARY 2004
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON
MP
Q2280 Mr Roy: And the higher
management of those reservists—have lessons been learnt
and are you now looking at ways of improving that management system?
Mr Hoon: Overwhelmingly I think
the real lesson has been about communication. I have mentioned
already the need to keep employers informed as to what their employees
have been doing. I also think there is a family dimension to this
because very often, unlike regular forces who are part of a unit
and have all of the right support elements in place to inform
family members, and I attended, for example, on one occasion essentially
a meeting organised for the families of a particular regiment,
all that is done as a matter of routine for the regular forces,
and often reservists were coming as single people, and I am not
talking about their marital status, but simply the way in which
they were deployed, and I do not think we did enough, in my judgment,
to ensure that there was communication with their families who
obviously and understandably were concerned about their welfare.
I think that is something that, consistent with the concept in
the SDR, we have to do because we have to make sure that someone
coming to join the armed forces in this kind of operation, who
does not have the back-up of a regiment or all the kinds of structures
that are in place, should have regular communication, and modern
communications should make that perfectly possible. It is something
that we have put in hand.
Mr Roy: I am glad to hear you say that,
Secretary of State, because every reservist has a family which
really needs, I think, to be treated a lot better in the future.
Q2281 Mr Crausby: You have
already told us, Secretary of State, that there were challenges
posed by switching our planning from the north to the south. You
said that in your opening statement. What can you tell us about
the problems that we faced as a result of that shift from the
northern option to the southern option?
Mr Hoon: I do not think it had
any necessarily detrimental effects in the sense that fortunately
our forces were not—I am not particularly sure they were
particularly under way and I am trying to remember whether anyone
was actually diverted and I do not think that they were. Essentially
they were on their way to the theatre. I do not think anyone went
astray or off route by the decision to go to the south, which
is a decision that I took very early as soon as I realised, having
been to Turkey and having discussed it in Turkey, that the option
of going through Turkey was not likely to be available to us.
I probably took an earlier decision than other people did because
having spoken to a number of members of the Government in Turkey,
despite the fact that they did not actually rule it out at the
time, I simply felt, as was proved correct, that they were not
going to agree. We then had to take a decision which had an impact,
consistent with Mike Gapes' question, on the plan that then evolved
because inevitably we needed different kinds of forces to participate
in an attack from the south, but we were able to make those adjustments
in time.
Q2282 Mr Crausby: The Committee
has been told that we proposed the northern option as opposed
to the Americans proposing it, and the initial proposal involved
5,000 fewer troops in the northern option than was consequently
the case in the southern one, so how far did that subsequent shift
to the south lead to the various equipment problems that we subsequently
heard about as a result of the fact that we deployed a three-brigade
division rather than a two-brigade division supported by the Americans?
Mr Hoon: Again I just want to
deal with the idea that somehow we had a bit of a plan and it
was different from the Americans' and we persuaded them. There
was a plan and the plan originally did involve a northern option.
It involved a pincer attack on Iraq and the idea was to give Saddam
Hussein more choices than he could deal with and the northern
option seemed to me sensible military planning. It obviously involved
a political dimension and, being an election in Turkey, there
was a change of government and it was necessary to gain their
approval for a long road crossing of southern Turkey. I judged,
I think, on January 8, but I am not precise as to the date, that
that political approval was not going to be forthcoming. No one
had actually gone further, as far as the deployment was concerned,
on the way to Turkey than was the case and indeed there have been
some suggestions that actually being able to continue down through
the Suez Canal to the south was probably easier than it would
have been to cross southern Turkey by road. That road, which I
have studied at great length at various times in this, is not
the easiest road. It would not have been easy to transport the
men and the equipment required and, therefore, in some senses
the decision to go from the south logistically was arguably easier,
although I am not a logistician, but I think that the general
feeling was that getting our men and equipment into theatre from
the south probably saved us some time.
Q2283 Mr Crausby: We also
understand that Jaguar reconnaissance aircraft could not be redeployed
from Turkish airfields. Did that make any difference to our operations
in the south?
Mr Hoon: It did not, but there
were obviously practical concerns because, as the Committee is
well aware, we were still continuing to conduct operations over
the no-fly zones, and the Jaguar aircraft made a significant contribution
to that, and we had to look at ways in which we obviously did
not contravene the political decisions taken in Turkey and making
sure that we had those aircraft available was important to us.
Q2284 Mr Jones: Secretary
of State, can I ask about personal equipment. There has been a
lot of media attention certainly around body armour and other
issues. Were you aware in May 2003 as to what extent troops in
theatre did not have the full complement of personal equipment,
certainly desert combats, boots and obviously enhanced body armour?
Mr Hoon: I think I indicated to
the Committee that there were shortfalls and I was also very conscious
at the time, being asked questions about boots, that there had
been some press speculation in particular about people not being
equipped with boots at all, or not of the right size and particularly
referring to reservists. I have indicated this morning that obviously
two weeks after the end of offensive combat operations our state
of knowledge was not what it was as the investigations into the
operation continued and we developed, as I am sure the Committee
have, a much fuller picture as those investigations developed.
Q2285 Mr Jones: I think that
is a brilliant Yes, Minister answer, but can I just remind
you of what you said to us on 14 May 2000 when, in reply to Jim
Knight, who is obviously no longer with us, you said, "All
the requisite number of boots, clothing and equipment were there",
and then you go on to say, "I am still waiting to see any
sign of an apology from individual journalists and editors".
Mr Hoon: That is precisely the
answer that I was thinking about when I answered your previous
question because I, and I know the Committee did as well, visited
Chilwell on a number of occasions, not least because it is only
a couple of miles from where I live, and one of the complaints
in the press was that Chilwell did not have the right size of
boots and clothing for reservists mobilising and I think that
was what was in my mind when I answered that question in the way
that I did.
Q2286 Mr Jones: Therefore,
the press comments and stories were actually correct and of the
individual soldiers that we have seen as part of this inquiry
both in theatre and also subsequently, the concerns about, for
example, people going into areas without the correct body armour
and boots, those stories are not just hearsay, but they are actually
true, are they not?
Mr Hoon: Again I am not aware
of any suggestion, I have not seen one which actually was true
that anyone went into Iraq without boots. I accept, and I think
I said at the outset, that there was concern rightly, and I understand
that it affected morale, of not having appropriate desert combat
equipment, but I think you will find that the entire American
marine expeditionary force got all the way to Baghdad in its green
combat kit. I do not judge, nor did military commanders, that
it was necessarily affecting operational effectiveness that all
of the desert kit reached the people when it needed to. That is
not to say that that is the same as the question of body armour
which I think ought to be dealt with separately.
Q2287 Mr Jones: Do you not
also think that if you are sending people into combat that one
of the important things is to have morale as high as possible?
Clearly if you have got people not going in with the requisite
equipment, for example and more importantly, I think, body armour,
then that is quite concerning if you have been asked to put your
life on the line for Queen and country?
Mr Hoon: I do not disagree that
those are important issues but I think there is a distinction
to be drawn between the effect on morale of not having desert
clothing as against clearly the risk to life, of not having sufficient
body armour, and that is why I sought to draw a distinction. The
military judgment was that the absence of desert combats for every
single member of the Armed Forces was not necessarily affecting
their ability to fight, and I gave you the illustration of the
American Marine Expeditionary Force who fought superbly all the
way to Baghdad. The issue of proper protection and the availability
of ceramic plates and so on is a separate matter about which,
as I have indicated previously, I am extremely concerned.
Q2288 Mr Jones: Can I say
one final thing about the effectiveness. If you have got a pair
of boots that are melting as you are walking, does that not affect
your ability to fight?
Mr Hoon: Perhaps that was one
of the stories that I was thinking of when I responded on 14 May.
I have not seen any substantiated evidence of boots melting, apart
from one person, I think he was a corporal, who had the wrong
boots with him. He had taken those particular boots and they were
not appropriate for the job that he was doing. That was the only
time I have been able to substantiate this story about boots melting.
I keep asking that question, I have asked it on a number of occasions.
I think the example is of someone from the RAF who had a pair
of light boots that were simply not the right boots in the circumstances
and he should never have taken them.
Q2289 Mr Jones: What about
instances of troops having foot problems because their feet were
sweating in the wrong type of boots? Are you aware of that?
Mr Hoon: Again, that is a consequence,
I accept, of not having desert equipment and that is why desert
combat boots are issued. I am not aware that was a significant
problem. There may have been some soldiers who suffered from that
but there is a judgment made about the temperature and the conditions
and that judgment is obviously made by commanding officers. This
is the importance of these equipment issues. The question is whether
this affected their ability to conduct the operations and I have
not seen any suggestion that it did.
Q2290 Mr Hancock: We were
told in evidence by an army officer who was responsible for chemical
suits, and I take you up on your point about things that were
of critical importance as against things for comfort, and you
talked about ceramic plates—
Mr Hoon: I was not dismissing
it at all. I did not suggest that for a moment.
Q2291 Mr Hancock: I did not
say you dismissed it, I said you separated the two issues, and
I agree with you that they should be, the ceramic plates and the
chemical suits are the separation points, I think. We were told
that there was a command decision made that the suits should not
be checked to see if they were effective because if they were
defective in any way there were no replacements and it would be
bad for morale if those suits were then taken away from people.
Were you made aware of that command decision being made?
Mr Hoon: No, I was not, and I
am still not aware of it.
Q2292 Mr Cran: Secretary of
State, my colleague, Kevan Jones, has highlighted the question
of personal equipment, which as we walk around the MoD estate,
as you would imagine, excites enormous interest and is of very
considerable importance. However, can I move us on to equipment
generally? You said in your own statement, "I think it is
clear that the performance of our equipment was good", and
of course you are on very strong ground when you say that because
the NAO's report said: "Service equipment operated effectively
in the austere environment in Iraq" and was equally effusive
in the rest of its document. By and large it operated effectively,
however Air Marshal Burridge identified communications as a significant
problem. That was reflected in your own document, Lessons for
the Future and, therefore, what I think the Committee is interested
in in relation to communications is (a) your concern and (b) what
the heck are we going to do about it, particularly because of
the gap that is opening up between ourselves and the United States?
Given the likelihood is that future operations, if there are to
be any, will be with the United States, that is a fairly critical
question.
Mr Hoon: I broadly agree with
what you are saying. The Department, as the Committee well knows,
has had a long history of difficulty with securing appropriate
communications. I am delighted that we are now beginning to get
that right and there is little doubt that the Bowman personal
role radio, for example, was an outstanding success, so much so
that I understand the Americans were not only borrowing our radios
but also purchased some for themselves, which I think is an interesting
aspect of the debate that has been about whether it is always
the Brits borrowing from the United States. We have to go on ensuring
that the communications equipment is rolled out, that the Bowman
programme is continuing successfully, and it has done very well
to date, not least for precisely the reason that you have identified,
to ensure that we can continue to work alongside American forces.
I would not suggest, and I am sure you were not, that the entire
American Army, for example, is digitised. Indeed, what is interesting
about the way in which the Americans have deployed their technology
is that different parts of the American Armed Forces cannot always
communicate one with another. What I think we have to do is to
ensure that in the development of technology we can inter-operate
with those parts of the US Armed Forces that we are used to dealing
with on a regular basis. I have referred already to the close
co-operation in the air. That is an area where vitally communications
need to be absolutely right in order to ensure that inter-operation.
I think it was one of the outstanding successes of the operation.
I think there is some more progress to make on the ground in particular
as we try and develop new and leading edge technology.
Q2293 Mr Cran: That is the
general answer, if I could go to the specifics.
Mr Hoon: Please.
Q2294 Mr Cran: If you take,
simply because Air Vice Marshal Dalton did, the Skynet 4, he said
there were considerable limitations with it. He then went on to
say: " . . . we are at the moment in the process of launching
the Skynet 5 system satellites, which will be up and running over
the next four to five years . . . " Great, but the problem
is what is going to happen between now and the next four or five
years? I think we may be allowed to hypothecate that we may be
involved in another exercise like the one we have just had.
Mr Hoon: I personally hope not.
Q2295 Mr Cran: So do I, but
on the premise that we might.
Mr Hoon: I think the answer to
that is to say that the equipment available to the UK Armed Forces
today is better than it has ever been. There has been a steady
process of improvement and I want that process to continue. Therefore,
whilst I would like every piece of equipment that we have on the
blocks available to use tomorrow, I recognise that particularly
in some of this leading edge equipment, and you have described
one example of it, it is going to take time, not only to ensure
that that equipment is successful and can be used and deployed
but obviously that forces are trained to deal with it. I am absolutely
confident the equipment available today is better than the equipment
available last year and better than the equipment available ten
years ago. It is an iterative process. One of the points I sometimes
make when I have these sorts of discussions in the Department
is that if we got to a certain level of equipment and then stopped
supplying new equipment we would have massive problems five or
ten years down the track. This is an experience we all have with
computer technology. In some ways the delay in supplying communications
equipment, and I will not ascribe the responsibility to that but
Mr Blunt knows what I am talking about, caused by previous difficulties
has now given us an outstanding system that ironically had we
purchased the equipment as planned by previous governments we
would now already be thinking about a replacement. We all know
that if you buy a computer today, in six months' time there is
usually a better model available and probably at a cheaper price.
Because of the failures of previous governments we are now in
a process of having state of the art equipment that will serve
us extremely well.
Q2296 Mr Cran: As in the last
time you came before this Committee, I do not know about other
Members of the Committee, you kept answering questions I did not
ask and this is another such example. I asked a much simpler question,
which is between Skynet 4 and Skynet 5—we are not going
to get to Skynet 5 for four or five years—what do we do
if we have a similar operation? Do we just make and mend?
Mr Hoon: I am sorry my answer
was too sophisticated. The answer is that we continue to use the
equipment that we have knowing that we are going to improve it
as we go along. I am sorry I did not put it as simply as that.
Mr Blunt: All the equipment that is working
so well was ordered by a previous Conservative Government.
Q2297 Mr Cran: Just one more
question. The general question arising out of Operation Telic
is what additional major equipments, or capabilities, or enhancements
to existing equipments do you foresee as necessary and will the
funds be forthcoming to achieve that? An unsophisticated answer
will be perfectly acceptable to me.
Mr Hoon: We set out some of our
thinking in the White Paper before Christmas and I think you are
right to concentrate in the area of technology, in particular
communications. If I can put it in a simple way, I think that
there is a similar lesson to be learned by the Armed Forces in
the use of computer technology as has been learned by most businesses
on the civil side. I think it is that level of change that we
need to anticipate and prepare for. I accept that is an expensive
business and I have to ensure that we have the funds available
but, as previous Secretaries of State have found, that is always
a challenge.
Q2298 Chairman: Additional
funds or shifting from one budget to another?
Mr Hoon: I think both. We have
been fortunate in receiving significant additional funds in each
of the four years that I have been Secretary of State. I recognise
that in planning for the future it is necessary to ensure that
existing equipment—I used the word "flexibility"
in the White Paper—is sufficiently flexible to cope with
the kinds of technology challenges that I have described. There
will be some equipment that is less flexible and less useable
and it would not make sense to maintain that equipment in the
light of the kinds of changes we want to introduce with the new
technology. As others will know, as I indicated earlier this is
not a process that stands still.
Q2299 Mr Viggers: But there
are severe budgetary constraints, are there not? The National
Audit Office identified an over-run of £3.1 billion on 18
separate projects. Will the extra money which will be needed to
fund that over-run need to come from other areas? Will it affect
your ability to put in hand the lessons of Operation Telic?
Mr Hoon: One of the things I have
learned in wrestling with the MoD's budget is that those kinds
of assessments are, of course, snapshots of the position today.
What I do not know, and there is an irony about this which I find
frustrating, is whether there will be any further delay in those
kinds of projects. I hope not. One of the challenges of Smart
procurement has actually been that by delivering equipment more
successfully and earlier, which is by and large the report's conclusions,
we have to pay for that equipment sooner and that has put a kind
of pressure on the budget which previous administrations did not
have to face because previous administrations made judgments about
the availability of funding for these projects on the assumption
that significant parts of the equipment programme would slip and,
therefore, in each financial year there was always going to be
an amount of money that was not committed. Smart procurement has
actually made it more difficult to make those assumptions because
as industry does more successfully deliver equipment on time—the
report makes this clear—the Ministry of Defence, not surprisingly,
has to pay for that equipment and that does put pressure on the
year-on-year situation. Although that is a disturbing snapshot,
it may not be the position next year or the year after, as I hope
these projects now are back on track and will be delivered on
time.
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