CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
1. The men and women of the Armed Forces
deserve the highest praise for their conduct and performance in
Iraq. The commitment required of them not only during the combat
operations but also in the subsequent peacekeeping and peace support
roles is of a very high order. (Paragraph 1)
2. We extend our deepest sympathies to the
families of those who lost their lives. (Paragraph
1)
3. We welcome the openness of MoD and the
Armed Forces in publishing its 'lessons learned' reports on operations
in Iraq and we commend them for the efforts they made to do so
promptly after the major combat phase had concluded. (Paragraph
6)
4. We regret that MoD has failed to provide
us with certain documents which we have requested and has demonstrated
on occasion less co-operation and openness than we have the right
to expect as a select committee of the House of Commons. (Paragraph
21)
Special Forces
5. The 'increasing role' of Special Forces
was demonstrated in operations in Afghanistan, and has now been
emphatically reinforced by the crucial role which they played
in Iraq. Their skills and professionalism provide a unique capability
to the total British military effort. (Paragraph 23)
Planning and Strategy
The debate within the Pentagon
6. The British, who had had embedded staff
officers at Centcom from September 2001, were the first foreigners
to be brought into the American planning process and appear to
have been influential in the overall shape of the plan. In this
the British-American relationship also drew on more than 10 years
of close collaboration between the RAF and USAF in enforcing the
northern and southern no-fly zones over Iraq. We are not, however,
able to define the areas in which the British made specific contribution
to what was essentially an American campaign plan, other than
in the consideration of the northern option and in niche capabilities
such as special forces operations. (Paragraph 43)
Effect of Operation Fresco
7. Although the Armed Forces commitment
to Operation Fresco did not prevent them from putting together
an effective force package for the operation in Iraq, it did limit
the total numbers. It also adversely affected some elements of
the force (by for example requiring high readiness units to move
at short notice from fire-fighting to deploying to Iraq). In the
longer term it could have undermined the Armed Forces' ability
to sustain combat operations. (Paragraph 56)
8. Overall, the demands that Operation Telic
placed on UK Armed Forces in the context of other operational
requirements were very close to the maximum that they could sustain.
(Paragraph 57)
Planning Assumptions
9. We believe that MoD should consider
whether for major equipment and capabilities the planning assumptions
process is sufficiently flexible to match the very wide range
of types and scales of operations which our Armed Forces may be
required to undertake in the future. (Paragraph 59)
The Northern Option to the Southern Option
10. From the evidence we have seen it
appears that the late decision to move from the north to the south
led to a requirement for the UK to deploy a significantly larger
force—at least one brigade, something over 5,000 troops.
This may well have been a contributory factor in complicating
the various logistical problems that were later faced. (Paragraph
69)
The force balance
11. MoD needs to urgently re-examine the
mechanisms, including the use of reserves, by which units are
brought to war establishment with minimal disruption in all important
preparatory phases of the operations. (Paragraph 71)
12. Overall, however, the signs are that,
above Brigade level (i.e. at Division level), UK Armed Forces
have become a one operation force—one operation which must
be followed by a lengthy period of recovery before they can be
in position to mount another similar operation, even within a
coalition. (Paragraph
74)
13. We are pleased to learn that according
to Lessons for the Future, MoD intends to review
the generation of force elements at readiness and the implications
for notice to move times. But we feel that MoD should be more
explicit in articulating what scale of forces can be offered for
expeditionary operations of choice in the future, while ensuring
adequate resources, equipment and training time.
(Paragraph 75)
Command and control
Higher Command Levels
14. The appointment of a deployed UK National
Contingent Commander worked effectively in Operation Telic.
(Paragraph 82)
15. We expect MoD to revisit the question
of the deployability of PJHQ, raised in the SDR, in the light
of recent operations, and we look forward to their conclusions.
(Paragraph 82)
Command relations with the Americans
16. We recommend that MoD considers whether
the highest levels of British command structures might be made
more adaptable so as to be able to operate more closely in parallel
with their American counterparts, when UK and US forces are operating
together. (Paragraph 84)
The Maritime Component
17. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary made a vital
contribution to the operation. MoD should ensure that the shortcomings
which were highlighted are addressed. (Paragraph 88)
Targeting
18. There is clear evidence of UK influence
on the air targeting operations of the coalition. Principally
this influence seems to have been applied to issues of perception,
specifically how attacking particular targets would be received
by European allies. The extent to which the UK persuaded the US
out of attacking certain targets on grounds of principle is less
clear. We asked MoD for specific examples of UK influence but
they failed to provide any, even on a classified basis. (Paragraph
98)
19. We feel that the shortcomings in the practice
and training of close air support by the RAF and land forces which
have emerged in recent operations must be urgently addressed.
This will require a reassessment of the numbers of and equipment
for Forward Air Controllers, both on the ground and in the air,
the provision of adequate targeting pods for individual aircraft
and significantly greater exercising of these capabilities in
a joint environment. Such exercises are likely to have to take
place overseas since, as we understand it, no UK based facility
exists for such training.
(Paragraph 104)
20. Effective and timely arrangements for
assessing battle damage are crucial for continuously informing
the campaign plan and for establishing whether the aim of minimising
damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure has been achieved.
We look to MoD to exploit the latest technological advances to
further improve the speed and accuracy of battle damage assessment.
(Paragraph 106)
Use of Reserves
Call-out and mobilisation
21. While we are pleased to learn that
for Operations Telic 2 and 3, MoD has been able to give most reservists
21 days notice to report, we are concerned that for Telic 1 reservists
were given 14 days notice to report, and in some cases considerably
less. We expect MoD to ensure that the appropriate lessons are
learned to avoid the need for such short notice to report, and
to recognise the impact of this on reservists, their families
and their employers. (Paragraph 116)
22. We expect MoD and the reserve organisations
to take appropriate action to ensure that reservists are made
fully aware of their liability for call out.
(Paragraph 117)
23. We recommend that MoD consider what action
can be taken to ensure that the substantial proportion of regular
reservists who failed their medicals return to being 'fit for
role'. (Paragraph 119)
24. Overall, it appears that the majority
of reservists mobilising through Chilwell considered that they
had received adequate training before being deployed. However,
we are concerned about the non-alignment of TA and Regular shooting
standards and expect MoD to address this issue as soon as possible.
(Paragraph 122)
Finance and compensation issues
25. We are concerned to learn that some
TA reservists experienced problems regarding their pay. We understand
that for future operations, where significant numbers of reservists
are deployed, PJHQ have agreed to the deployment of a Reserves
Cell whose role will include issues such as pay and allowances.
We expect MoD to ensure that this lesson is implemented
in full. (Paragraph 125)
26. It is clearly wrong that reservists who
are compulsorily mobilised for combat operations should lose out
financially. We note that to date only a small number of appeals
have been made by reservists dissatisfied with their individual
financial arrangements. We recommend that these be considered
sympathetically and that MoD monitor closely the numbers and outcomes
of such appeals over the coming months.
(Paragraph 126)
27. We expect MoD to ensure that the procedures
for reservists claiming financial assistance are streamlined and
less intrusive. (Paragraph
127)
Employment issues
28. We note that MoD has commissioned
a study to measure the degree of employer support for the mobilisation
of the Reserve and look forward to seeing the findings and the
lessons that MoD identify. But we consider that MoD needs to adopt
a more proactive approach to identifying cases where reservists
have experienced employment problems following a period of mobilisation.
Reservists need to be assured that they will not lose their jobs,
as a result of being mobilised, and that support will be available
if they encounter such problems. (Paragraph 129)
29. We are very concerned to learn that 11
members of the TA in Germany (over a quarter of the TA in Germany
deployed to Operation Telic), who form part of a key squadron
(the Amphibious Engineer Squadron), lost their jobs with civilian
employers on returning from deployment on Operation Telic. We
expect MoD and the reserve organisations to raise these matters
with the relevant authorities within Germany and with the civilian
employers of the TA reservists in Germany.
(Paragraph 131)
30. We are concerned that the requirement
on reservists to inform their employers of their reserve status
seems to have been announced ahead of the findings of MoD's own
study on employer support. There does not seem to have been prior
consultation with members of the Reserve. We recommend that MoD
set out why it chose to make this change at this time.
(Paragraph 132)
Impact on the reserves
31. It is unreasonable that reserve personnel
deployed on Operation Telic should have to do additional service,
on top of the six to nine months taken up by that tour, to qualify
for their annual bounty and we recommend that MoD waives this
requirement. (Paragraph 134)
32. MoD has identified a number of lessons
relating to the Reserve from the experience of Operation Telic.
We look to MoD to implement these lessons in full. We welcome
the announcement that, following Operation Telic, MoD is adjusting
the arrangements for the higher management of the Reserve and
that the Directorate of Reserve Forces and Cadets will come under
the direct command of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, which
reflects the importance of this key part of our Armed Forces.
(Paragraph 135)
33. Throughout our inquiry we have come into
contact with a range of reservists who served on Operation Telic.
As with the Regular service personnel, we have been impressed
with their dedication and the invaluable contribution they made.
We concur with MoD's conclusion that reservists 'showed the highest
quality and commitment… their value in all phases of an operation
has again been demonstrated.'
(Paragraph 136)
Defence Medical Services
Manning
34. We find it worrying that some five
years after the Strategic Defence Review the problems in the DMS,
in particular the problem of under manning, appear to be as bad
as they ever have been. We were alarmed to learn that for the
major specialties for war MoD had 'emptied the boxes' for Operation
Telic. Further deployments in the near future are only likely
to exacerbate the problems. (Paragraph 143)
35. We acknowledge that the manning issue
is not an easy one to address quickly, but we look to MoD, the
Department of Health, the NHS and the medical profession to support
the DMS in its efforts to find new and innovative solutions.
(Paragraph 144)
36. We recommend that MoD bring together the
Department of Health, the NHS and the medical profession with
the DMS in order urgently to identify solutions to the problem
of increasing specialism among surgeons in the NHS.
(Paragraph 146)
37. We are most concerned to learn that 47
medical reservists have resigned on returning from Operation Telic,
and that MoD is aware of further resignations from Army medical
reservists. The number of resignations represents some six per
cent of the 760 medical reservists deployed. We expect MoD to
monitor this issue closely, to identify the reasons behind the
resignations, and to take account of these in its recruitment
and retention efforts.
(Paragraph 147)
Impact on the NHS
38. This was the first operation where
all the medical personnel deployed came almost exclusively from
the NHS and it appears that the arrangements, such as the liaison
between MoD, the Department of Health, and NHS Trusts worked well.
However, thankfully, the number of casualties was low and the
arrangements for treating casualties in NHS hospitals were not
fully tested. (Paragraph 149)
Medical equipment and supplies
39. We are pleased to learn that lessons
about the need to have more medical supplies on the shelves rather
than over-relying on UORs have been recognised. We expect MoD
to identify the appropriate balance between holding items and
relying on UORs. We also expect MoD to review any cases from Operation
Telic where inadequate or insufficient equipment may have disadvantaged
clinical outcomes and, if any such cases are identified, to take
appropriate action to avoid such situations occurring in the future.
(Paragraph 152)
Deployment
Sea Lift and Air Lift
40. We conclude that deploying such a
large force to the Gulf in the time available was a significant
achievement. (Paragraph 155)
41. MoD should identify how the challenges
of limited landing slots for aircraft and small sea ports could
be addressed in the future.
(Paragraph 158)
42. We recognise the achievement of the DTMA
in securing the sea lift for Operation Telic. We recommend that,
drawing on the experience from Operation Telic, MoD should undertake
a review of ro-ro shipping to inform its future planning.
(Paragraph 162)
43. The action taken by MoD ensured that the
UK had sufficient lift, but the outcome could well have been different.
For any future operations, MoD needs to avoid competing directly
with the US for outsize lift and co-ordinate its efforts to secure
such assets. (Paragraph
163)
44. Recent operations have highlighted the
need for sufficient sea and air lift. We look to MoD to ensure
that those assets that have performed their task well are available
to our Armed Forces in the future. We regret that the A400M programme,
which is intended to meet the UK's Future Transport Aircraft requirement,
has experienced delays to its planned in-service date. We expect
MoD to ensure that the current forecast in-service date is met
and that any capability gaps from delays already experienced are
filled. (Paragraph 167)
Urgent Operational Requirements
45. We acknowledge that there were constraints
on when the UOR process could begin, but it is of real concern
that in some cases this resulted in Armed Forces personnel not
having access to the full complement of equipment, such as Minimi
machine guns and Underslung Grenade Launchers. (Paragraph
177)
46. Much of the equipment procured as UORs
made a significant contribution to the success of the campaign
and, in most cases, industry supplied equipment at very short
notice. However UORs are not the solution in every case. MoD needs
to be better informed of which types of equipment and capabilities
can be delivered in UOR timescales—there were a number of
cases where equipment was not delivered by the time required or
where users did not have a full complement. We do not consider
that MoD planning properly recognised that the delivery date for
a piece of equipment and the date by which a capability is achieved
are not the same. If personnel are to be confident and fully efficient
with their equipment there must be adequate time for familiarisation,
training and integration. Furthermore, given the desire stated
in the recent White Paper to be able to intervene anywhere in
the world at short notice, we believe that the risks of relying
on UORs instead of holding adequate stocks, are not sufficiently
well analysed or understood in MoD's risk assessment processes.
(Paragraph 181)
47. There are likely to be positive lessons
from the UOR process which have applicability to MoD's normal
equipment acquisition processes: for example, where UORs were
used to accelerate existing programmes. We expect MoD to identify
and implement these and reflect on the appropriateness of UOR
procurement becoming institutionalised. (Paragraph
183)
48. We expect MoD to evaluate fully the performance
of the equipment procured as UORs and the specific enhancements
they provided to the UK's military capabilities. This evaluation
must also take full account of the views of those members of the
Armed Forces who used the equipment in action. Disposing of useful
equipment cannot represent good value for money if it then has
to be re-acquired in the future.
(Paragraph 184)
The start of operations
From planning to operations—what was
found
49. The Committee congratulates the Royal
Navy for the success of the complex and demanding operation to
clear mines from the waterway to Umm Qasr and urges the MoD to
review, as a matter of urgency, the capability of the Royal Navy
to undertake mine clearance operations in shallow and very shallow
waters, given the likely need for increasing amphibious operations
in the littoral. (Paragraph 195)
The Approach to Basra
50. The operation to take Basra was a
significant military achievement. One measure of its success—and
in the context of an effects-based operation an important one—was
that just one week later there were joint UK/Iraqi patrols.
(Paragraph 202)
Major defence equipment
Overall performance
51. We are pleased to learn that in most
cases the major defence equipments performed well in the difficult
conditions encountered in Iraq although, given the nature of the
enemy, many equipments were not tested to the full. (Paragraph
209)
Availability of equipment
52. The availability of most defence equipment
was generally high during Operation Telic. However, it is disappointing
that an impressive capability such as HMS Ocean is let down by
unreliable landing craft and 'that there are difficulties with
the acceptance of the new landing craft.' We expect MoD to remedy
this issue as soon as possible to ensure that the capabilities
of HMS Ocean are maximised. (Paragraph 213)
Communication and Information Systems
53. It concerns us that for the next four
to five years we will continue to be dependent upon Skynet 4 which
has recognised limitations and which let us down on this occasion.
(Paragraph 215)
54. Operation Telic highlighted serious shortcomings
in the reliability, capacity and redundancy of the UK's communications
and information systems, which to a large extent are a consequence
of under-investment in the past. While we acknowledge that work
is in hand to address these shortcomings, we find it very worrying
that it will be some time before any real improvements will be
seen, particularly given the frequency with which UK Armed Forces
are now involved in operations, and the increased need to communicate
effectively not only within UK forces but also with our allies.
(Paragraph 218)
Combat identification
55. We welcome the overall finding of
the National Audit Office that on Operation Telic, the measures,
procedures and training relating to combat identification were
largely effective. We are disappointed that a copy of the review
of combat identification undertaken by the Vice Chief of Defence
Staff, which was provided to the National Audit Office, was not
made available to the Defence Committee during its inquiry.
(Paragraph 222)
56. We expect MoD to make available to Parliament
and the Committee the summaries of the conclusions of the reports
of the Boards of Inquiry into individual blue on blue incidents
as soon as possible and for the summaries to provide sufficient
information on the causes of the incidents and the lessons learned
in order to reassure the Armed Forces and ourselves that everything
practicable was done to minimise the possibility of such incidents.
(Paragraph 229)
57. We expect MoD to implement the lessons
from Operation Telic relating to combat identification. MoD should
push forward with the work with its allies to agree on a single
system. The latter is particularly important given that future
UK military action is most likely to be as part of a coalition.
We note MoD's view that the opportunities for fratricide in an
increasingly complex battle space are likely to increase, but
look to MoD to identify the required action and make the necessary
investment to ensure that such incidents are reduced to a minimum.
(Paragraph 233)
UAVs
58. We are pleased to hear that, despite
its chequered past, Phoenix made a valuable contribution to the
operation. We support the robust approach being adopted in relation
to the Watchkeeper UAV programme, which aims to 'nail the…
requirement and to make sure that the companies deliver that which
we have asked for' although we continue to be concerned that the
accelerated in-service date for the programme may not be met.
We will continue to monitor the progress of this key programme.
(Paragraph 236)
59. We consider it well worthwhile that MoD
is assessing the usefulness of man-portable UAVs for current operations
in Iraq. We expect MoD to reflect the results of this assessment
when deciding on the overall mix of UAVs for the future.
(Paragraph 237)
Apache
60. We conclude that there are key lessons
from the United States' experience in Iraq which MoD needs to
take into account when developing its tactics, techniques and
procedures for its Apache helicopters. We expect MoD to take the
required action to ensure that UK Apache helicopters are as capable
as they can be, given the new sorts of environments and operations
they are likely to be operating in. (Paragraph 240)
Sea King
61. The Sea King helicopter made a significant
contribution to the operation and highlighted the benefit of acquiring
equipment that is sufficiently adaptable. However, we are concerned
to learn that, at times, the Sea King provided the only dedicated
stand-off sensor coverage for 3 Commando Brigade's operations
on the Al Faw peninsula. We expect MoD to ensure that
the Astor programme meets its in-service date to fill the current
capability gap. (Paragraph 241)
62. We expect MoD to ensure that the lessons
identified to minimise the Sea King's vulnerability are fully
implemented. (Paragraph
242)
The Defence White Paper
63. We have announced our intention to
undertake an inquiry into the Defence White Paper. We will also
continue to monitor the progress of the FRES programme as part
of our annual inquiry into defence procurement. (Paragraph
246)
Personal equipment and protection
64. We are pleased to note that, following
its initial rejection of the concerns about personal equipment
and protection, MoD now acknowledges that there was a problem
which had a detrimental impact on service personnel. Robust arrangements
should now be introduced to gauge the views of more junior ranks
and specialists whose widespread concerns do not seem to be properly
understood, reflected and acted upon by more senior commanders
and officials further up the chain. (Paragraph 249)
Desert boots and clothing
65. The issue of the availability of desert
clothing and boots during Operation Telic has been both a confusing
and worrying story. MoD should clarify its position on the circumstances
in which desert clothing and boots are to be used and ensure that
all service personnel understand the position. MoD clearly underestimated
the impact on morale of failing to provide service personnel with
the clothing and boots which they required and expected. We find
it unacceptable that some two weeks after the start of the combat
phase 60 per cent of the additional clothing requirement that
had been ordered was not available in theatre. We understand that
MoD has now increased its stockholding of desert and tropical
clothing and boots up to a total of 32,000 sets. We expect MoD
to keep the level of stockholding under review. (Paragraph
257)
Enhanced body armour
66. Body armour is another example of
where MoD's in-theatre distribution and tracking led to shortages
in critical equipment. MoD should identify and implement solutions
to address these shortcomings and ensure that service personnel
receive the equipment they are entitled to. (Paragraph 262)
67. We will be interested to see the results
of the audit of previously issued body armour components and the
action that MoD plans to take in response to the findings.
(Paragraph 264)
68. Before any firm decision on whether enhanced
body armour should become a personal issue item is made, the views
of service personnel, as well as the logistic implications of
a change in policy, must be considered. If the conclusion is that
enhanced body armour is not required for all operations, efforts
should nonetheless be made to ensure that where it is required
it is issued to personnel before their deployment.
(Paragraph 265)
SA80 A2
69. The modifications to the SA80 have
provided UK service personnel with a more effective weapon system.
MoD must ensure that users of the weapon are kept fully aware
of the cleaning requirements for different environments and provide
the necessary cleaning material. Concerns about the weapon's safety
catch must be monitored and, where necessary, appropriate action
taken. (Paragraph 267)
Ammunition
70. Our examination suggests that there
were problems with the supply of ammunition when the fighting
echelon began operations. MoD accepts that in the very early stages
there were some problems and not all service personnel had the
right amount. We expect MoD to establish the scale of the problem,
to investigate any specific cases identified, in particular the
tragic incident involving the six Royal Military Policemen, and
to implement the necessary action to avoid any re-occurrence in
the future. (Paragraph 270)
Night vision capability
71. We understand that MoD is currently
reviewing the scales of issue of night vision equipment. We consider
that the ability to operate confidently and effectively at night
greatly enhances force protection and capability. We look to MoD
to examine the case for providing night vision capability to all
service personnel who are required to operate at night. (Paragraph
272)
NBC equipment
72. We find it alarming that MoD had to
'move Combopens around in theatre' to fulfil the requirement.
(Paragraph 274)
73. Given the potential threat posed by Iraqi
armed forces, sufficient chemical warfare detection and protection
were particularly important for this operation. However, there
were serious shortcomings in the supply and distribution system
and the required levels of detection and protection were not always
available to everyone. Indeed, while MoD ideally would have liked
each serviceman and woman to have had four suits available, only
one suit per person was available, which MoD judged to be sufficient
for this operation. Furthermore it is essential that personnel
have confidence in the effectiveness of the equipment with which
they are provided. It was fortuitous that service personnel did
not suffer as a consequence, but had the Iraqis used chemical
weapons systematically, as employed in the Iran-Iraq war, the
operational consequences would have been severe. The lack of armoured
vehicle filters seems to us to be a matter of the utmost seriousness.
The lessons identified need to be implemented as a matter of urgency
to ensure that servicemen and women serving on operations have
complete and justified confidence that chemical warfare attacks
will be detected in time, that their individual protection equipment
will save their lives and that operational success will not be
imperilled. This is particularly important given that UK service
personnel are more likely to be operating in such environments
in the future. (Paragraph
281)
Logistics and asset tracking
74. Given how critical logistics are to
operations, we expect MoD to implement the lessons identified
in its reports on Operation Telic, and also those lessons identified
by the National Audit Office. We intend to closely monitor the
progress of MoD's end-to-end review. (Paragraph 283)
75. We are in no doubt that one of the key
lessons to emerge from Operation Telic concerns operational logistic
support and specifically, the requirement for a robust system
to track equipment and stocks both into and within theatre—a
requirement which was identified in the 1991 Gulf War. The lack
of such a system on Operation Telic resulted in numerous problems
with the in-theatre distribution of critical items such as ammunition,
body armour and NBC equipment. MoD has told us that having such
a system is top of its logistics priorities and we understand
that proposals will be submitted to Ministers in the spring.
We urge Ministers to provide the necessary funding. However, we
find it alarming that a full system is unlikely to be in place
within the next five years. (Paragraph 291)
Accommodation and food
76. We are pleased to learn that the majority
of Armed Forces personnel in Iraq are now in satisfactory air-conditioned
accommodation. Such accommodation is vital in ensuring that Armed
Forces personnel can perform their roles effectively when they
are deployed to harsh environments. It should be a priority of
any operation that appropriate accommodation is made available
as quickly as possible. (Paragraph 296)
77. During our visit to Iraq we were impressed
with the quality of the food provided to our Armed Forces, particularly
given the difficult conditions, such as the very high temperatures,
in which catering personnel had to work.
(Paragraph 299)
Operational Welfare Package and Families
78. We regret the decision to withdraw
the free postal service in February 2004. (Paragraph 300)
79. The operational welfare package in place
for Operation Telic worked well and was well received. However,
we are concerned that early entry forces saw little benefit from
the package. MoD acknowledges that this is an area where improvements
are needed. We expect MoD to implement such improvements as quickly
as possible. (Paragraph
302)
80. We are pleased to learn that the needs
of families are being addressed and that there is now a families
element to the operational welfare package.
(Paragraph 305)
81. MoD is currently considering further ways
of providing improved information to families. Given how important
this is to families, MoD should implement the improvements identified
as quickly as possible.
(Paragraph 306)
82. The families of reservists have not, in
the past, received the same level of support as the families of
regular service personnel. We recommend that MoD takes action
to address this imbalance. This is particularly important given
the increased contribution which reservists are now making and
are expected to make to future operations.
(Paragraph 309)
83. MoD needs to ensure that service personnel
have access to the required level of life and accident insurance
while on operations.
(Paragraph 310)
Bereavement
84. We conclude that, overall, MoD's casualty
reporting arrangements worked well during Operation Telic. We
emphasise the critical importance of ensuring that next of kin
are informed of any casualty by the MoD and not the media. We
welcome the improvements in the revised arrangements introduced,
which now better reflect the needs of bereaved families.
(Paragraph 316)
85. We welcome the fact that widows' benefits
have been extended to unmarried partners of service personnel
who die in conflict, and that bereaved families can now remain
in their service accommodation until they are ready to leave.
We look to MoD to implement any further improvements which are
identified by the current tri-Service review of bereavement policy.
(Paragraph 318)
Training
86. The high number of operations which
UK service personnel have been involved in has had an adverse
impact on their training. We expect MoD to ensure that service
personnel returning from operations catch up with their training
as soon as possible and that promotion opportunities are not adversely
affected because of their operational deployment. But we recognise
that, in the short term, the most important point is for service
personnel to recuperate properly and that this includes the opportunity
to take the leave to which they are entitled. However, the Government
must recognise that the Armed Forces are simply not large enough
to sustain the pattern of operational deployment since the Strategic
Defence Review permanently without serious risk of damage to their
widely admired professional standards. (Paragraph 320)
Post operational health
87. We are pleased to hear that MoD has
commissioned research into the physical and psychological
health of personnel who deployed and that the initial research
is being followed up in a major study to commence early this year.
We look forward to seeing the outcome of this work and expect
MoD to take appropriate action in response to its findings.
(Paragraph 322)
88. We are pleased to learn that the take
up and use of the new medical form appears to have been high and
that, despite the increased administrative burden, it has proved
popular with users. We note that MoD is reviewing the format in
order to ensure even greater utility for future operations.
(Paragraph 323)
89. We welcome the measures relating to post
traumatic stress disorder which MoD introduced for Operation Telic.
We look to MoD to monitor this aspect closely and also other illnesses
experienced as a result of being deployed on Operation Telic.
We are disappointed by the delays to the publication of MoD's
paper covering the health lessons from Operation Granby and the
experience of Operation Telic. Given the level of interest in
these matters, we expect MoD to publish this paper as soon as
possible. (Paragraph
327)
Costs and recovery
Resource Accounting and Budgeting
90. Resource Accounting and Budgeting
(RAB) is a complex financial process and MoD needs to ensure that
its staff are appropriately trained in its application. We remain
concerned that the application of RAB may, perhaps through a misinterpretation
of its aim, have led to stock holdings being reduced too far.
We recommend that MoD undertakes a review which assesses whether
RAB is leading to poor decision making, in particular in relation
to stock level holdings. (Paragraph 333)
Cost of the operation
91. It will be some time before the costs
of the operation in 2003-04 are known—perhaps not until
late summer 2004 when they are published in MoD's Annual Report
and Accounts. MoD acknowledges that it has taken longer than expected
to assess the costs of stock consumed and equipment lost or damaged
during the conflict phase. We expect MoD to ensure this work is
advanced as quickly as possible and for the outcome to be reported
to Parliament as soon as it is completed. (Paragraph 339)
92. We expect MoD to recover costs owed to
them by other coalition partners as soon as possible.
(Paragraph 340)
Funding of the operation
93. We expect MoD to replace the equipment,
and the stores and supplies, necessary to restore the operational
capabilities consumed or lost during Operation Telic as soon as
possible, to ensure that Armed Forces personnel can undertake
their roles effectively. (Paragraph 344)
Transition and Reconstruction
Plans and preparations
94. Being a junior partner in a coalition
constrained the British Government in its ability to plan independently
for after the conflict. (Paragraph 355)
Constraints
95. We believe that it was a misjudgement
by the Government to have decided that planning to meet the needs
of the Iraqi people following a conflict was particularly sensitive—more
sensitive, even, than the deploying of military forces. This misjudgement
unnecessarily constrained planning for the post-conflict phase.
(Paragraph 357)
96. It has also been suggested that DfID's
role in post-conflict planning was constrained by the attitude
of the then Secretary of State towards the prospect of military
action. Although our witness from DfID denied that this was the
case, we remain to be convinced.
(Paragraph 358)
97. The poor co-ordination of planning within
the US Administration meant that better co-ordinated British input
into the process had less impact than it should have had.
(Paragraph 362)
98. The need to maintain a unified Iraq under
central control has been a constraint—usually a reasonable
constraint—on British freedom of action in the south-east
of the country. (Paragraph
364)
99. Perversely, the failure of the wider international
community to support the coalition's military action did little
or nothing to constrain that action, but did make it more difficult
for the coalition to restore law and order and to administer Iraq
once hostilities were over.
(Paragraph 365)
Planning assumptions for the transitional phase
100. The Government was right to plan
for a humanitarian crisis. Such a situation might have arisen,
and the Government would have been rightly condemned if its preparations
had been inadequate. (Paragraph 369)
101. For the Government to argue that it was
unaware of the extent of the repressive brutality of the Iraqi
regime strains credibility. It was widely known, not least because
of information published by the Government.
(Paragraph 375)
Insecurity and disorder in the transitional
phase
102. Much has been made of the many Iraqis
who were involved in looting and destruction in the immediate
aftermath of the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime. It should
not be forgotten that thousands more were locked up indoors, fearing
for their security and for their lives. (Paragraph 379)
103. The scale and shape of the force provided
were best suited to achieving the coalition's desired effects
in the combat phase, but not to carrying those effects through
into the post-conflict phase. We acknowledge, however, that the
scale of force which might have best achieved these effects was
beyond the Government's means.
(Paragraph 387)
104. A harsh critic might argue that coalition
planning assumed that it would be possible to employ elements
of the Iraqi police, army and administration to maintain law and
order, because the alternatives were too difficult to contemplate.
That assumption was not only incorrect, but incautious. A realistic
judgement, based on good intelligence, should have warned of the
risk of serious disorder.
(Paragraph 388)
105. It was indeed crucial to protect Iraq's
oil infrastructure from damage, as the main potential source of
future Iraqi wealth. But it was a mistake not to have identified
and protected (and to have been seen to be protecting) other key
buildings and infrastructure as a priority.
(Paragraph 390)
106. If 'a few more' troops were needed to
protect key sites, this should have been identified as a scenario
at the planning stage, and these troops should have been found
and deployed with this specific task in mind.
(Paragraph 392)
107. The Government should have taken more
care to identify in advance sites in Iraq likely to contain records
of use to the coalition, and should have ensured that forces were
provided to protect these sites from damage and looting.
(Paragraph 397)
108. While coalition forces successfully removed
Saddam Hussein's regime with remarkable speed, they were not able
to establish themselves on the ground with sufficient speed and
precision to avoid a damaging period of lawlessness during which
much of the potential goodwill of the Iraqi people was squandered.
(Paragraph 398)
109. None of these criticisms, however, should
be seen to detract from the thoroughly impressive way in which
individual members of Armed Forces personnel demonstrated their
ability to accomplish the transition between warfighting and peacekeeping
operations swiftly and effectively.
(Paragraph 399)
110. We commend the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) for the performance of its humanitarian
role in Iraq, before, during and after the combat phase of operations,
and we commend British forces for the way in which they co-operated
with the ICRC. (Paragraph
402)
Lessons for future campaigns
111. We recommend that the Government
should consider closely, in the light of operations in Iraq, how
the United Kingdom provides peace support capabilities, and in
particular how the transition is managed between warfighting and
peacekeeping. We further recommend that the Government should
consider whether either a dedicated part of the Armed Forces,
or even a separate organisation altogether, could be specifically
tasked with providing these capabilities. (Paragraph 407)
112. We are concerned about the continuing
requirement on the ground for specialists from the military in
areas which would under other circumstances be provided by civilian
organisations. Many of these specialists will be reservists, and
their prolonged deployment may have adverse consequences for retention
in specialisms which are already suffering from undermanning.
(Paragraph 411)
113. We agree that the provision of language
training will need to be re-examined if the Armed Forces are to
be more involved in expeditionary operations in the future. In
an effects-based operation aiming to win over hearts and minds,
an ability to communicate with the local population is vital.
(Paragraph 414)
114. Preparations should have been made in
advance of the military campaign to ensure that police advice
on maintaining law and order would be available as soon as possible
after the end of the combat phase.
(Paragraph 416)
115. While we support entirely the notion
that Iraqis should be encouraged to take responsibility for their
own security, we are concerned that local militias which have
been allowed to operate in the south-east of Iraq may represent
vested interests. There is a danger that these may seek to use
their position to pursue agendas which might not be to the advantage
of the people of Iraq more generally.
(Paragraph 417)
Reconstruction
116. The circumstances of the conflict
in Iraq were particular: operations without broad international
consensus in a country with a relatively advanced but extremely
decrepit infrastructure. While MoD is right to assess whether
a national capability to repair infrastructure is required, it
would be wrong to assume that a capability which might have been
useful in Iraq will necessarily be required in future operations.
(Paragraph 422)
117. Quick Impact Projects are, as one of
our interlocutors told us in Iraq, a 'band-aid' solution, which
cannot hope to approach the scale of the reconstruction effort
required in Iraq. But they have been a vital tool for showing
that there are immediate benefits from the presence of coalition
forces and the end of Saddam Hussein's rule. We commend all those
involved. (Paragraph
425)
118. Coalition efforts to clear unexploded
ordnance throughout Iraq will make the country a far safer place
for the people who live there. But the failure to provide sufficient
forces to guard and secure munitions sites in the weeks and months
after the conflict cost Iraqi civilian lives, and also provided
potential enemies of the coalition with a ready stock of easily
accessible weaponry.
(Paragraph 431)
119. The Government should look again at whether
the relatively modest funds that it has dedicated to supporting
the clearance of unexploded ordnance in Iraq are adequate for
the task at hand. (Paragraph
432)
120. Mistakes were made in identifying potential
local leaders, and without better intelligence and a better understanding
of Iraqi society, such mistakes were probably inevitable.
(Paragraph 437)
121. The Armed Forces have done their utmost
to fulfil their responsibilities to the Iraqi people as the occupying
power, and we applaud them. But they have been under-resourced
for this enormous task. It is unreasonable to expect the military
to have a fine-grained understanding of how an unfamiliar society
operates; but without this understanding, and without substantial
civilian support in the form of experts and interpreters to help
them to gain this understanding, mistakes were bound to be made
which would make it more difficult to construct the kind of Iraq
that the coalition wants to see: stable, secure and prosperous;
a threat neither to its neighbours nor to the wider world.
(Paragraph 441)
Information Operations
UK psychological operations capabilities
122. Our evidence suggests that if information
operations are to be successful, it is essential that they should
start in the period when diplomatic efforts are still being made,
albeit backed by the coercive threat of military force through
overt preparations. This would allow for the full potential of
information operations to be exerted in advance of the start of
hostilities and might even contribute to their avoidance.
(Paragraph 455)
Effectiveness
123. We believe that the British information
operations campaign did not begin early enough. We are concerned
that the lessons of the Kosovo campaign were not better learned
in this important area. It is disappointing that the coalition
is widely perceived to have 'come second' in perception management.
However, we recognise that 'coming second' may be inevitable if
a conflict of choice is being pursued by liberal democracies with
a free media. We are, however, persuaded that information operations
are an activity which can be expected to become of increasing
importance in future operations. There were a number of successes
which provide evidence of the potential effectiveness of information
operations. We recommend that the Government should consider significantly
enhancing our capabilities in this area. (Paragraph 465)
Role of the Media
124. We believe that the importance of
the media campaign in the modern world remains under-appreciated
by sections of the Armed Forces. The early establishment of a
robust media operations capability in theatre must be a priority
for any operation. Where an operation is perceived to be a 'war
of choice' the ability to handle multiple media organisations
in theatre with professionalism and sophistication is essential.
(Paragraph 477)
125. We strongly believe that the live broadcast
of the death of service personnel would be utterly unacceptable.
We recommend that MoD begin discussions as a matter of urgency
with media organisations to find a solution to this very real
possibility in a future conflict.
(Paragraph 480)
126. Overall the embedding of journalists
with combat units worked well. The experience is likely to be
seen as a precedent for future operations. Problems arose, however,
firstly with the shortage, particularly early on, of properly
trained and experienced media officers in some units and secondly
because of the inflexibility of the deployment arrangements of
the journalists. We recommend that MoD take steps to avoid these
problems arising in future operations.
(Paragraph 486)
127. Whatever the intentions, it is clear
that the arrangements to provide a broader context for individual
reports from embedded journalists did not work in Operation Telic.
In part this was a consequence of advances in technology and of
the growth in 24 hour news channels, both of which can be expected
to apply at least as forcibly in any future conflict. MoD needs
to consider how better to support the context setting of battlefield
information in the future.
(Paragraph 495)
128. MoD did not fully appreciate how the
embedding system, coupled with rolling 24 hour news programmes,
would undermine their ability to manage the information coming
out of the combat theatre. Nor were they successful in managing
the expectations of the different journalists in different centres
such as the Forward Transmission Unit and Qatar. We believe that
failure to support the media presence swiftly enough with enough
adequately trained and skilled media relations personnel was a
serious shortcoming and one that MoD should not allow to happen
again. It is also the case that this campaign went the coalition's
way most of the time—in the circumstances of a more difficult
military campaign it is not clear how the Ministry of Defence
would cope with the pressures of unfavourable coverage from the
front line. (Paragraph
499)
Cause and Effect
129. We welcome the fact that on this
occasion the decision to commit forces followed resolutions of
both Houses of Parliament, and believe that it should be seen
as an explicit precedent for future combat operations. (Paragraph
504)
130. The crafting of the targeting set to
minimise civilian casualties was not only a choice made by the
coalition in order to achieve a particular effect, or deliver
a particular message; it was also a requirement of international
law. (Paragraph 514)
131. The priority for military planning must
be the achievement of military objectives. We are concerned that
too great a focus on effects-based planning, and on the part military
action can play as one component in a spectrum of political and
diplomatic activity, may further complicate the tasks of military
planners and commanders who are already operating in an ever more
complex battle space and under more intense and intrusive scrutiny
than ever before. (Paragraph
517)
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