Select Committee on Defence Third Report


44. Britain deployed the largest force it had sent overseas since the 1991 Gulf War—some 46,150 service personnel out of a total coalition force of 467,100.[53] Some 32,000 of these troops were deployed to Kuwait. The forces broke down as follows: land, 28,000; maritime, 9,050; and air, 8,100. The final 1,000 were deployed to the national contingent headquarters in Qatar and elsewhere. The force included 19 warships, 14 fleet auxiliary vessels, 15,000 vehicles, 115 fixed wing aircraft and 100 helicopters. But these bald figures do not reflect the full extent of the British contribution. Most importantly, the UK provided a significant proportion of the combat power on the ground, including a third of the main battle tanks available to the coalition land component commander.[54]

45. According to MoD the size and structure of the force was based on an assessment of the mission and sustainability requirements. The size of the force was not in itself the focus of a decision: 'the figure of about 45,000 was simply the sum of decisions on the various components of the force'.[55] But some of those decisions were more obviously about components than others:

    The decision to fight at divisional level was taken for a variety of reasons…most importantly, the military estimate based on the mission analysis for both northern (attack from Turkey) and southern (attack from Kuwait) options demanded a divisional sized force in order to be successful. Furthermore, a divisional approach allowed the UK to have significant influence over the planning and the execution of operations in Iraq.[56]

Sir Kevin Tebbit argued that the main political criterion in judging the size of the British force was that Britain wanted to have a material rather than a symbolic effect:

    Political considerations were pretty general. The importance of having something which was appropriate and was more than a token, in other words that it could actually do a proper job in pursuit of joint objectives. If there were political objectives about the size of force—and I do not think we ever looked at it in that form—it would have been that it should be appropriate to what the UK could provide in the circumstances, while being sufficient to have a material effect rather than just a paper effect.[57]

46. The Secretary of State told us that the force fielded had its roots in the work of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), although he did note that it was larger than that prepared for under the SDR's planning assumptions.[58] As he later stated 'the scale of this operation was such that it went beyond what was anticipated, for example, in relation to the Joint Rapid Reaction Force concept of deployment…'[59] The SDR envisaged a Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) that would encompass all 'ready' forces, forming a joint 'pool' of forces from which elements could be assembled for rapid reaction missions. The aim was to be able to support up to a medium-scale operation (up to Brigade level) in two echelons of forces—a rapidly deployable spearhead, and a follow-on more substantial force (at 20-30 days' notice). The SDR envisaged the JRRF pool including about 20 major warships and 22 other naval vessels, four army/commando brigades, 110 combat aircraft and 160 other aircraft.

47. Exercise Saif Sareea II in Oman in 2001, which the Committee observed, was intended to 'demonstrate key aspects of the JRRF concept'—it did not test the JRRF because its scale was less than that of the JRRF; it excluded NBC capabilities; it did not transport the 40,000 tons of munitions expected in war fighting, and the deployment to Oman was not rapid but rather spread over three years to save money. MoD's appraisal of Saif Sareea II cautioned that 'strategic lift continues to be a limiting factor and concerns remain over the overall ability to sustain a medium-scale war-fighting force and operation at extended range' (where the report defined 'medium' as 15,000 personnel).[60] Lessons for the Future states that 'the deployment was at a larger scale and completed in shorter timelines than were allowed for in the way the Armed Forces are structured and resourced.' Working beyond the existing planning assumptions placed strains across the whole force. For example, even 16 Air Assault Brigade (16 AAB) (one of the UK's highest readiness forces) had to generate its forces in less than its mandated Notice to Move Timescales.[61]

48. The scale of the operation was also reflected in the large number of reserves that were called out to support Operation Telic—the largest mobilisation of reserves since the Suez crisis of 1956.[62]

49. The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Personnel), Lieutenant General Anthony Palmer, accepted that gaps existed in the force that was put together for Operation Telic:

    The force we put together was self­evidently sufficient to do the job. That does not mean to say there were not gaps we had to deal with at the time in some …specialties…and we did that either by using augmentation, taking people from other units to fill those slots, or we used the Territorial Army who are there exactly for that purpose.[63]

He revealed that at one stage almost two thirds of the entire Army was committed (ie preparing for, taking part in, or recovering from operations):

    To give you a figure, 62 per cent of the Army was committed at the maximum commitment level—historically we have never been higher.[64]

50. MoD admitted that the Iraq operation had been demanding and, while claiming that it had shown the SDR's force structures to have been robust, accepted that it also suggested a need for a rethink on the demands of multiple, and more frequent, small and medium operations:

    The New Chapter to the SDR identified a trend for our forces to meet an increasingly varied pattern of concurrent and sequential operational commitments, at small and medium scale. Experience suggests that for many assets, such as deployed headquarters and logistic support, conducting several smaller scale operations is more demanding than one or two larger scale operations. Therefore, in addition to retaining the capacity to undertake the most demanding, but less frequent, large scale operations, it has become clear that we should structure our forces with a focus on the demands of concurrent medium and small scale operations.[65]

51. Asked if a larger force could have been deployed, the Secretary of State said that there were 'areas in which we could have deployed more forces.'[66] The force was large enough to stay in theatre for a 'reasonable length of time' for combat operations and follow-on humanitarian operations, he added. If it had gone on for a 'very long time, going into many months,' judgements would have had to have been made about replacing in particular combat forces.[67] This could have been done but he would have preferred not to have had to.[68] It is not clear from these answers how difficult it would have been for MoD to have replaced these forces had a prolonged combat phase made it necessary.

Effect of Operation Fresco

52. During the run up to military operations the Fire Brigades Union was involved in industrial action in connection with a dispute over pay and conditions. During periods of industrial action, the Armed Forces provided a replacement fire fighting capability. This commitment was known as Operation Fresco. The Secretary of State told us that although 19,000 service personnel were earmarked for Operation Fresco, it did not affect the overall deployment to Iraq.[69] However, he did concede that one consequence of Operation Fresco was to reduce by 19,000 the number of troops to choose from in assembling the force for Operation Telic.[70] MoD officials explained how Operation Fresco played a role in shaping the force:

    The precise nature of the force and size of the force was something which evolved as a result of proposals from the military side in relation to a political willingness to be involved. The final size was a result of the interaction between the two elements and other things, like we still had the fire-fighters' strike going on, and the need to continue to hold back 19,000 troops against that contingency.[71]

Furthermore it would have proven problematic if reinforcements had been required:

    My recollection…is that it did not seriously affect the size of the military force which was sent but it was beginning to have, and would certainly have had if it had continued, a serious effect on our recuperation speed and our ability to continue to roule forces were it necessary to do so for a long campaign. The concern about the fire-fighters' strike was potential, as it happened, rather than actual. I do not believe we would have actually put together a different military force had we not had that obligation, but it was certainly something which affected consequence planning and recuperation times.[72]

Nonetheless, Operation Fresco and the need to have troops ready for a prolonged fire dispute did effectively put a ceiling on what Britain could offer:

    It more or less put a ceiling; it did not affect the package we had decided on. If the fire-fighter strike had been continuing it would not have been possible to put together anything much bigger than what we decided on, but it was not a constraint. Some of the individual units were shuffled—I cannot remember the date off the top of my head, but certainly the parachute battalion which actually went was taken off fire-fighting duties because it was thought it might form part of the force which would go to Iraq. There was some juggling of which people were actually designated fire-fighting duties, as opposed to which were more likely to be deployed to Iraq.[73]

53. Operation Fresco also meant that Rear Admiral Snelson was not confident of having more surface ships if required:

    The personnel factor did not affect the ships per se that much...Where personnel did affect us probably most of all was that had I required more destroyers and frigates for escort purposes then the demands of Operation Fresco, the support for the fire-fighting, and so on, would have curtailed the number of ships we could have had at some point, was my judgement.[74]

He also noted that Fresco duties would have constrained what additional units could be sent if needed:

    …there was not a direct impact on the front-line fighting forces that we had, but… [Operation Fresco]…impacted on the ability to draw forward more forces, had we needed them, against an enemy who had more capability himself at sea or was determined to fight back further.[75]

54. 16 AAB, which as we have noted is a high readiness force assigned to the Joint Rapid Reaction Force, was engaged on Operation Fresco duties in the winter of 2002/03, and only handed over these obligations to other units on 6 January 2003. They then shifted to begin pre-deployment training for Operation Telic two days later on 8 January. This late notice to move significantly constrained the time available for deployment and training.

55. The Royal Marines deployed with the whole of 3 Commando Brigade, less 45 Commando which was deployed on Operation Fresco duties (and in supporting Special Forces operations). Its numbers were made up by the attachment of a US Marine Corps (USMC) unit (see paragraph 89 below).[76] The stretched numbers also meant that the Royal Marines Reserves deployed almost 25% of their entire trained strength. It appears therefore that Operation Fresco did directly affect the deployment of 3 Commando Brigade to Iraq.

56. Although the Armed Forces commitment to Operation Fresco did not prevent them from putting together an effective force package for the operation in Iraq, it did limit the total numbers. It also adversely affected some elements of the force (by for example requiring high readiness units to move at short notice from fire-fighting to deploying to Iraq). In the longer term it could have undermined the Armed Forces ability to sustain combat operations.

57. Overall, the demands that Operation Telic placed on the UK Armed Forces in the context of other operational requirements were very close to the maximum that they could sustain.

Planning Assumptions

58. The maritime component arrived in theatre and was ready earlier than the land forces. Nevertheless it did not have all the capabilities it should have had under defence planning assumptions. Rear Admiral Snelson explained the shortages that he faced:

Mr Ian Lee, Director General, Operational Policy, in MoD, moreover, argued:

    The purpose of the defence planning assumptions that we have is for, it sounds obvious, defence planning, they are assumptions which are made in order to produce the overall force structure that we have across the Armed Forces. They are not, and never were, intended to be limits which we imposed on a particular operation, in respect of a particular operation, and it is always possible, given the circumstances, as in this one, that one can exceed those assumptions and put together whatever force is necessary for that particular task. Of course, it does mean that you have got then a recuperation period to go through, and you have to revise the way in which you restore your force structure to its original balanced position, but the planning assumptions themselves are not intended to limit or guide particular operational deployments in that way.[78]

59. Furthermore, Brigadier Seamus Kerr, Assistant Chief of Staff, PJHQ, told the Committee that the limit on how large a force could be deployed was not people but rather the sustainability of equipment and therefore how much had been invested over the years, particularly in armour. The Chief of Defence Logistics (CDL), Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger, also noted in commenting on the use of Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) that:

    …as we revisit the planning assumptions, which we do every year, then we have to factor in whether or not that is the right way in future to balance the equipment programme. I am sure that judgement will then come out as part of the white paper later on this year.[79]

We look at the effect of the planning assumptions on personal equipment below (paragraph 250ff). UK Armed Forces face a future in which a larger proportion of them will need to be deployable at greater speed and at higher operational tempo. This can be expected to place the planning assumptions and the judgements on which they are based under ever more strain. That in turn may undermine MoD's assertion that the planning assumptions are not intended to 'limit or guide particular operational deployments'. We believe that MoD should consider whether for major equipment and capabilities the planning assumptions process is sufficiently flexible to match the very wide range of types and scales of operations which our Armed Forces may be required to undertake in the future.

The Northern Option to the Southern Option

60. As noted above, initial planning envisaged UK forces entering Iraq from Turkey (the northern option). However, it was always planned that the Royal Marines Commandos would operate in the south. The Commander of 3 Commando Brigade, Brigadier Jim Dutton, explained that the original commitment for the south was fairly small:

The northern option was apparently a British proposal, which the Americans accepted enthusiastically (as General Reith explained):

    In the very early planning, the Americans had decided to attack only from the south, and militarily it made more sense to be able to attack on two axes, because there was going to be congestion logistically coming in through the south. That was suggested to the Americans, who seized it with both hands, and that is why there was thought then of putting an axis through Turkey. Of course, as it transpired, the Turkish authorities were unhappy with that, and we did not go through Turkey. So then we had to readjust the plan again to look at another way of doing the plan in the south, and so we participated in that and looked at what we, the UK, could best do in the south, and we assisted the Americans on that basis.[81]

61. Professor Bellamy argued that the Turkish resistance was a gift to General Franks because while talks continued to try to get agreement to enter from the North, it convinced the Iraqis that a northern front was essential to the coalition plan, with the result that they kept two corps in the north along with some of their best troops. Furthermore, the northern option would also have presented the British with some potentially enormous challenges:

    A large British contingent originally was going to go in the north…from Turkey down into Iraq…[to]…near Kirkuk or Mosul…and it is one very long, awful route involving a mountain crossing and a major river crossing.[82]

62. The Secretary of State told us that the essence of the plan was to present Saddam Hussein and his leadership with more options to think about than they could cope with:

    The idea…of a northern option was to give another situation to the regime that they could not handle. As it turned out, resistance in the North proved ultimately to be very limited and, indeed, the ability of the regime to move forces from the north to defend other parts of the country proved very limited so the overall force composition, in this case coming in essentially from the south rather than from the north and the south as perhaps at one stage was anticipated, did not particularly affect the level of resistance put up by the regime.[83]

63. The decision to move from the northern to the southern option came in late December/early January. Air Marshal Burridge set out the timelines as follows:

    The decision came initially out of discussion between the PJHQ and Centcom. Throughout that period at the end of December people were assessing the likelihood of Turkey agreeing to UK land forces going through Turkey. Given the circumstances, people involved in planning recognised that making that assumption was getting higher and higher risk and I think we all understand the Turkish position and have no difficulty with it. To say we should start planning now to go south emerged late December and early January. The Chiefs of Staff took it at a meeting as a proposition and endorsed it and the Secretary of State probably announced it some time around 20 January, but it was that timescale.[84]

We heard from others that commanders were informed of the likelihood of this decision on 18 December 2002 and had been planning for various possibilities even before this date. General Brims said that he was told of the likely decision in early January and that it came in late January.[85] General Reith told us that the final force package was agreed upon on 16/17 January.[86] Sir Kevin Tebbit said the British came to the view that the Turks would not allow them to use their territory earlier than the Americans did (and in advance of the vote in the Turkish parliament), but that MoD was still seeking permission to use their territory in January when he himself visited.[87] Mr Lee claimed that: 'It was shortly after that visit, in fact in mid January, round about 17 January, that it was decided that it was no longer viable to plan on our forces going through Turkey and therefore we would have to look for a southern option.' The Secretary of State, however told us:

    the decision to go to the south [was] a decision that I took very early as soon as I realised, having been to Turkey and having discussed it in Turkey, that the option of going through Turkey was not likely to be available to us. I probably took an earlier decision than other people did because having spoken to a number of members of the Government in Turkey… I simply felt, as was proved correct, that they were not going to agree.[88]

64. This sits oddly with Sir Kevin Tebbit's argument that the decision to switch to the southern option, was not a political judgement but rather a military judgement:

    It was really rather straightforward. Military commanders had to judge the probability of securing agreement from Turkey in the end. We had less flexibility than the United States, being smaller and having smaller force packages to offer. Therefore we had to move to a conclusion that we should go in through the south earlier than it was necessary for the Americans to conclude that. It was military advice which led the Secretary of State to conclude that it was more sensible to plan to seek to put forces in the south.[89]

    It was based on a military view of probability, which was put to ministers and taken on that basis. What I am saying is that there was not some sort of political judgement here. It was straightforward as to whether we were likely to get agreement in the end. The judgement of our military people was that it was unlikely.[90]

Lieutenant General Robert Fry, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments), in evidence to the Committee of Public Accounts stated:

    It was not until just about over the Christmas period that we actually gave up in terms of planning for a northern entry through Turkey and into the north of Iraq. Now, that would have had sets of implications for the force that we would have deployed. It would have been essentially armoured rather than infantry-heavy, so until that point we were still looking at the 1st UK Division probably in its original configuration being very armour-heavy and that would also explain why the UORs of the Challenger had been made earlier. It was only then during a fairly hectic planning period in the first part of January that we entirely redefined the plan and rescoped the force which would then need to be infantry-heavy because we were looking at fighting in built-up areas throughout the Al Faw Peninsula and into Basra.[91]

65. We discuss UORs below, but we are surprised at the suggestion that more tanks would have been sent under the northern option given that 7 Armoured Brigade deployed to southern Iraq with 116 Challenger 2s. Rather the major difference in the northern option appears to have been the inclusion of a mechanised brigade instead of 16 AAB, fewer troops but potentially more vehicles:

    The composition of the UK division was influenced by the decision to deploy to the south rather than the north, as originally envisaged. The UK role was not now to manoeuvre with a single UK brigade operating with a UK divisional framework (with much of the rear area held by the US), but to hold ground for a considerable period and potentially conduct operations in an urban environment. This required an additional brigade.[92]

66. The decision to give the UK forces the Basra sector in the south east 'emerged' from planning at Centcom where the British had embedded officers and from discussions between the Pentagon and MoD.[93] According to the Secretary of State—'that was something that we readily agreed to, not least because obviously it gave us much shorter lines of communication back to bases further south.'[94] Mr Paul Beaver said that the UK requested what was in its capability. Another factor that may have played a part was that the Americans may have felt that the Shia population of the south might have found British troops more acceptable given the perceived failure of the Americans to defend them in 1991. There was also the question of how far the British would have been capable logistically of doing anything more and of how far they would have been able to operate more closely alongside the Americans given the lack of communication compatibility. Air Marshal Burridge accepted the constraints that the British had faced in deciding an area for UK forces:

    …original planning had assumed a northern option. When we changed from a northern to a southern option in early January, then our time lines for deployment changed and the time it would take for us to arrive, bearing in mind that we did not know when this was going to start because at that stage the progress through the UN to a second resolution was indeterminate really. So we had to construct a plan that would make full use of our combat power, but would be sufficiently flexible not to constrain timing…The second point is that there is a limit to UK's logistics which yes, we could have taken an armoured brigade further north, but it is a limiting factor, there is no doubt about that.[95]

67. Air Marshal Burridge told us that there had been a plan to move 16 AAB north if it had been required.[96] We have heard that the Americans requested the British to supply troops from the Brigade to support the MEF in its northward advance by securing river crossings in An Nasiriyah, at the same time as taking Basra, but this was vetoed by General Reith as being too demanding for the size of the British force deployed. Another plan was for the Brigade to go even as far north as the river crossings across the Tigris, to release US combat power to push onto Baghdad.

68. The northern option would have been 'very challenging' but most of the logistical support would have been given by the Americans.[97] This would have worked as long as the British operated at a Divisional level, because it would have taken away most of the problems that could arise in mixing units within a brigade.[98] The northern option involved lines of communication hundreds of miles long through mountainous terrain that would have been testing for any country; coming from the south with its tarmac highways presented far less testing challenges.[99]

69. From the evidence we have seen it appears that the late decision to move from the north to the south led to a requirement for the UK to deploy a significantly larger force—at least one brigade, something over 5,000 troops. This may well have been a contributory factor in complicating the various logistical problems that were later faced.

The force balance

70. The UK force was configured for 'winning', the Secretary of State told us, not only for high-intensity war fighting at the initial stage but also for what UK forces expected to be engaged in shortly thereafter—peacekeeping and reconstruction. However, as the UK was contributing to a US-led coalition, the force balance had to fit in with the American force—for example the amount of British armour deployed was balanced with the armour available to the US.[100] Sir Kevin Tebbit argued that the structure was based on the desire to be flexible:

    … our ground forces were configured the way they were… partly because they were expected to have to do some serious war fighting initially, hence the armoured brigade, but also because it was uncertain how quickly it would be possible to secure Iraq as a whole, but there was still a hope that we could do it very rapidly and hence the light forces were there to be flexibly deployed, quickly if necessary. As it happens, we more or less stayed in the southern area, but there was always uncertainty as to how quickly we might have to move around the country.[101]

Mr Paul Beaver noted that the operation proved that:

    we can deploy up to a certain level an armoured division with its assets in place… [but] what did show up was that it was very lucky that we did not have to go very much further up the road than north of Basra because we do not have that capability and that sustainability, and the problem we have is that to put that deployment in place we had to rob Peter to pay Paul.[102]

71. To deploy one fully equipped armoured brigade the Army had to cannibalise the majority of the tanks in the remaining two brigades. There were severe problems bringing infantry battalions up to war establishment manning levels, with reliance on ad hoc reinforcement from other battalions. Other Arms and Services had similar problems. It is apparent that the Force Readiness Cycle at the heart of the SDR force structure, which was designed to enable seamless reinforcement to war establishment, does not work given the current level of commitments. MoD needs urgently to re-examine the mechanisms, including the use of reserves, by which units are brought to war establishment with minimal disruption in all important preparatory phases of the operations.

72. The British chose to deploy a formed British-led land force that fitted in with the Americans rather than supply a variety of units to join with American elements. Sir Kevin Tebbit explained that a brigade sized force was deemed to be the minimum scale at which the UK could sensibly operate in a major coalition:

    That is a general military view that the chiefs of staff hold, so it is a question of how many brigades one was to contribute on the ground. Our overall planning guidelines are for medium scale and basically following the strategic defence review that is broadly the sort of capacity we would expect to contribute to a military operation. The air and maritime packages were about that scale. The land package was slightly larger as it happened, but those would be the broad parameters within which we work. It was always going to be that the minimum would have been a brigade, a self-supporting brigade; in the event it was larger than that.[103]

Regimental and battalion sized American units, however, were attached or planned to be attached to British forces, as in the case of the Royal Marines and the Al Faw peninsula operation and the plan for the Northern option.

73. MoD explained that a number of force packages were explored during the planning phase including:

    the possibility of sending two 'triangular' Armoured Brigades (each comprising one Challenger 2 Regiment and two Warrior Battalions). This would not have meant deploying any more tanks, but would have included 2 additional Warrior battalions, an additional Engineer Regiment and Artillery Regiment, and associated Combat Service Support assets. The possibility of deploying 3 Armoured Brigades was not an option explored in any depth.[104]

The final scale and composition of the force was driven by what was thought most appropriate for the task, but other considerations that were taken into account included:

    the likely timescales for deployment and the availability of strategic lift, and the sustainability of additional vehicles and personnel deployment. A particular consideration was the requirement to ring-fence a brigade for deployment on stabilisation operations following military action. Also to be taken into account was the possible impact upon other operations, in particular Operation FRESCO, of the deployment of further assets and personnel.[105]

74. Overall, however, the signs are that, above Brigade level (i.e. at Division level), the UK Armed Forces have become a one operation force—one operation which must be followed by a lengthy period of recovery before they can be in position to mount another similar operation, even within a coalition. To deploy the forces to the Gulf it is apparent that MoD and its suppliers were making a maximum effort. They demonstrated great agility and adaptability. They also benefited from a number of highly favourable circumstances including host-nation support built up over many years in the region, the experience of over ten years of Operation Southern Comfort, the impact of Operation Desert Fox in 1998, the lessons of Saif Sareea II, and significant assistance given by the United States of America, the world's largest military power. As Sir Kevin Tebbit noted:

    to really be able to conduct expeditionary warfare with this size force more rapidly than we have managed on this occasion would be very expensive. That is not to say we cannot do it with smaller packages, 9,000 brigade level, medium scale, but this is a very large operation.[106]

75. We are pleased to learn that according to Lessons for the Future, MoD intends to review the generation of force elements at readiness and the implications for notice to move times. But we feel that MoD should be more explicit in articulating what scale of forces can be offered for expeditionary operations of choice in the future, while ensuring adequate resources, equipment and training time.

53   Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq-Lessons for the Future (December 2003), p 84. Back

54   Q 1 Back

55   Ev 391 Back

56   Ev 391 Back

57   Q 1755 Back

58   Qq 1, 48-9 Back

59   Q 48 Back

60   Directorate of Operational Capability, 'Appraisal of Exercise Saif Sareea II', of April 2002, Executive Assessment, para 5. Back

61   Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq-Lessons for the Future (December 2003) paras 2.1-2.2. Back

62   Q 1133 Back

63   Q 2100 Back

64   Q 2114 Back

65   Ev 393 Back

66   Q 7 Back

67   Q 69 Back

68   Q 70 Back

69   Q 74 Back

70   Q 8 Back

71   Q 1756 Back

72   Q 1764 Back

73   Q 1764 Back

74   Q 1469 Back

75   Q 1473 Back

76   Qq 1469-70 Back

77   Q 1464 Back

78   Q 894 Back

79   Q 1022 Back

80   Q 1463 Back

81   Q 885 Back

82   Q 126 Back

83   Q 6 Back

84   Q 344 Back

85   Q 547 Back

86   Q 895 Back

87   Qq 1710-6 Back

88   Q 2281 Back

89   Q 1714 Back

90   Q 1716 Back

91   Committee of Public Accounts, Evidence Session 21 January 2004, Ministry of Defence: Operation Telic-United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq, Q 9 Back

92   Ev 391 Back

93   Q 9 Back

94   Q 9 Back

95   Q 331 Back

96   Q 270 Back

97   Q 332 (Air Marshal Burridge) Back

98   Q 335 Back

99   Qq 337-43 Back

100   Q 5 Back

101   Q 1760 Back

102   Q 121 Back

103   Q 1757 Back

104   Ev 388 Back

105   Ev 388 Back

106   Committee of Public Accounts, Evidence Session 21 January 2004, Ministry of Defence: Operation Telic-United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq, Q 171 Back

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