House of Commons - Defence

Select Committee on Defence Third Report

4 COMMAND AND CONTROL

76. Political direction was provided at the highest level by the weekly Cabinet meetings during the months of the emerging crisis and then through almost daily ad hoc meetings from mid-March to late-April of a smaller group of Cabinet Ministers, usually chaired by the Prime Minister (the so-called 'war cabinet').[107] In addition, the Defence Secretary and Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) briefed the Prime Minister on an almost daily basis on the progress of the military campaign. There were regular discussions in Cabinet on the basis of reports from the Defence, Foreign and International Development Secretaries. The Secretary of State had daily meetings in MoD with CDS and others in the chain of command responsible for the operation, as well as the Chiefs of Staff. These meetings usually preceded the daily meetings with the Prime Minister.[108]

77. There were contacts with the field commanders through PJHQ. There were twice daily video link meetings between MoD and PJHQ. The Secretary of State said that his role was not to interfere in a detailed manner in the actual conduct of a conflict. He added that the whole thing worked as a process rather than as a compartmentalised series of teams and at high speed:

109

There was also regular (sometimes daily) contact with the Pentagon.

PJHQ

78. General Reith, explained the thinking behind the establishment of the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and his role as CJO:

The Chief of Joint Operations works directly for the Chief of Defence Staff, and he has responsibility for planning, mounting, directing, sustaining and recovering all troops on operations abroad, and I have a responsibility only for outside of the UK. So in that process my Headquarters does the operational level planning and gives politically aware military advice into MoD, and then MoD puts the strategic piece on top of the operational piece in the decision-making process that goes before ministers.[

110

The operational team at PJHQ directly working on Operation Telic was only 12 strong. It acted as the conduit to the various branches of PJHQ staff for support. During the operation some 50 per cent of all PJHQ's staff effort went into Operation Telic, reflecting the fact that other operations were still on-going, including in Afghanistan, the Balkans and Sierra Leone. The basic establishment of PJHQ is 460 staff, but following the attacks on the United States in September 2001, this was raised to 550.[111]

DEPLOYED COMMAND

79. The National Contingent Commander in theatre, Air Marshal Burridge, reported to General Reith at PJHQ, although both are 3* officers. General Reith told us:

I was the Joint Commander and I was delegated by CDS, and the single Services then put their troops under my command. As the Operational Commander, I had command, I delegated operational control to Air Marshal Burridge, and therefore he was controlling the operation as the man in theatre dealing with the detail.[

112

80. We asked why, given the scale of the operation, CJO himself had not deployed, in effect with a forward PJHQ.[113] PJHQ and the CJO are supposed to be deployable and General Reith's response accepted this point:

114

That said he believed he had made a useful contribution in taking some pressure off the land component commander, General Brims:

115

81. Air Marshal Burridge explained his role as follows:

116

While Air Marshal Burridge held 'operational control' of UK forces, CJO had 'operational command' and:

117

Separate arrangements applied to Special Forces.[118]

82. The appointment of a deployed UK National Contingent Commander worked effectively in Operation Telic. Nonetheless, it has been suggested, not least by CJO himself, that consideration should be given to deploying CJO and elements of PJHQ for specific operations. The SDR envisaged that PJHQ should be a deployable headquarters. Since then, however, UK forces have frequently found themselves committed to a number of concurrent operations. We expect MoD to revisit the question of the deployability of PJHQ, raised in the SDR, in the light of recent operations, and we look forward to their conclusions.

Command relations with the Americans

83. The role of the national contingent commander, according to Air Marshal Burridge, revolved around three main tasks: support (logistics); information (to military and political decision-makers in UK); and influence (amongst coalition partners, notably the US).[119] He told us that the UK was regarded as a kind of US conscience:

120

Air Marshal Burridge and General Franks had first met in April 2002, when the former was designated the UK deployable 3* commander. Their initial discussions were about Afghanistan. General Franks 'recognised from a strategic political sense the importance of the UK's part in this as a coalition partner and was very keen to make sure that what he did underpinned that'.[121]

84. The American military-political interface was much more direct than the British—going from the President to Secretary of Defense and then straight to General Franks, bypassing to some extent the chiefs of staff. The British chain of command had more components in that Air Marshal Burridge reported to CJO and occasionally the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The Secretary of State's main relationship was with CDS. During the operation he telephoned Air Marshal Burridge only once.[122] Air Marshal Burridge professed himself 'very happy' with the command arrangements, primarily because he was shielded from London. However, if more frequent operations with the Americans are to be expected (as they appear to be in the recent White Paper, Delivering Security in a Changing World), it might be argued that the British system should be able to adapt to deal with the more direct political-military interface practised by the Americans. Air Marshal Burridge's view was that the American system depended significantly on the personalities involved. Changing doctrine in the UK might therefore be a risky business.[123] We recommend that MoD considers whether the highest levels of British command structures might be made more adaptable so as to be able to operate more closely in parallel with their American counterparts, when UK and US forces are operating together.

85. Command and information systems (CIS) is an area in which the UK is significantly behind the US. This constrained co-operation at the command level and was of significant concern to Air Marshal Burridge. We discuss information systems in more detail below (paragraphs 214-18).

The Land Component

86. The individual UK component commanders came under American Corps command, although they were under UK operational control. As General Brims, the British Land Component Commander, explained:

I was the Land Force Component Commander, and nationally I reported to the National Contingent Command Headquarters, commanded by Air Marshal Burridge. Operationally, I was embedded in the 1^st US Marine Expeditionary Force, the equivalent of a corps, and therefore I was commanding one of the divisions within that US corps. That US corps was commanded by the Land Component Commander, General McKiernan, and his Land Coalition Component consisted of two corps, the MEF, the one I was embedded in, and 5^th Corps. So, although nationally I was a Land Component Commander, in military speak I was about a two-down tactical commander, which makes me slightly different from the UK Maritime and the UK Air Components.[

124

In practice, although he retained a national 'Red Card' (ie the standard authority to exclude British forces from operations of a type which he was not permitted by his UK superiors to conduct), he received his orders through two American Generals: the 3* Coalition Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC), General McKiernan, and his subordinate commander the 3* Commanding General of the 1^st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Lieutenant General Conway.[125]

The Maritime Component

87. The naval component commander, Rear Admiral Snelson, explained his role as follows:

My role during the operation was as the UK Maritime Commander and my staff and I were based in Bahrain alongside the US Maritime Commander, to whom I acted as the Deputy for the Coalition Maritime Force. The UK maritime forces under command comprised some 34 ships of the Royal Navy, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and contract merchant ships, plus three maritime patrol aircraft based in Oman, which were the lynch-pin of the maritime surveillance effort. The Royal Navy also provided two Tomahawk-firing submarines although, strictly speaking, these were kept under command directly from Northwood. Although the force provided transport support and the launch platform for 3 Commando Brigade, the Royal Marines were not under my command and I simply facilitated their deployment for Brigadier Dutton, …who worked for General Robin Brims.[

126

The arrangements built on established command relationships with the United States which had already been tested in operations in Afghanistan:

127

88. Two thirds of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary were deployed to the Gulf. Lessons for the Future reported that they delivered 'effective, flexible logistics support throughout the operation.'[128] Some limitations were highlighted during the operation, such as their ability to simultaneously re-supply several ships over sustained periods and their limited self-defence capability. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary made a vital contribution to the operation. MoD should ensure that the shortcomings which were highlighted are addressed.

3 COMMANDO AND THE AL FAW PENNINSULA OPERATION

89. During the initial stages of the operation a United States Marine Expeditionary Unit, or MEU (the equivalent in size to a British Commando unit) was placed under the command of 3 Commando Brigade for the Al Faw peninsula operation. Even before the northern option was closed down and the British focus moved exclusively to the south of Iraq, 3 Commando Brigade had been tasked with this operation. When the main British effort moved south, 3 Commando Brigade became part of General Brims's Division and the Marine Expeditionary Unit with it. After the initial Al Faw operation the MEU rejoined the MEF.[129]

90. General Brims explained how this relationship operated:

130

Having the US involvement with 3 Commando Brigade brought with it some useful capabilities that were not organic to the Brigade. Brigadier Dutton explained:

131

91. Close air support was facilitated by American liaison officers on the ground with the Royal Marines, the ANGLICO teams (US Marine Corps Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies teams). These specialist teams, which control air and naval gunfire, and artillery, were embedded at company, commando and brigade level and brought a degree of fire support expertise previously not available to the UK's ground forces. They were also embedded with other parts of the UK division.[132]

The Air Component

92. The Air Component Commander's command and control arrangement were broadly similar to those of the Land Component Commander, although UK air assets were pooled into a coalition force under American command:

we had a very established command and control relationship with the United States air force as a result of the no-fly zone operations, and we were really building on exactly that structure. What had changed was the creation of an in-theatre UK joint headquarters with Air Marshal Burridge as the National Contingent Commander. He had operational control of all of the UK assets committed to the operation. I had tactical command of all of the air assets, which basically meant that I allocated UK resources to specific tasks and I then gave tactical control of those assets for the execution of a particular task to the United States 3* air component commander.[

133

He denied that the relationship was one in which he in effect acted as deputy to the US commander (a role filled by a US Navy 2* officer). He pointed out that his deputy, Air Commodore Nickols, was one of three 1* officers who oversaw the day-to-day execution of the plan for the US Air Component Commander. Air Vice Marshal Torpy sat alongside this structure with his own headquarters checking that the UK resources were being used effectively.[134]

Logistics

93. The Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) was involved in the planning from 'day one' of the strategic planning options. They based their planning on what is known as 'CJO's estimate'.[135] We were told:

136

Logistics were provided within theatre by a British Joint Logistic Component, commanded by Brigadier Shaun Cowlam:

^rd

137

In chain of command terms, Brigadier Cowlam was a component commander in his own right and responsible for all three services:

138

While 3 Commando Brigade was part of the amphibious Task Group their logistics were part of the Maritime Component; when they came ashore they switched to the joint logistics chain.[139]

Targeting

94. Targeting was one area in which the British claimed to have specific and important influence. General Reith explained how the British were involved in the targeting process:

The air campaign had considerable flexibility within it. We were involved in a target list, there were over 300 targets which we cleared jointly with the Americans, and we went through a full process, over several weeks, before the campaign, ensuring that we were happy with the targeting.[

140

The command and control procedures were well developed and included a clear rule that if there was any British involvement (which extended beyond whether the aircraft themselves were British and, for example, also included whether they had launched from a British base) then the British National Contingent Commander could veto the mission:

141

Ultimate authority, however, rested with ministers, although, as Sir Kevin Tebbit explained their involvement was kept to a minimum.[142]

143

95. We were told that in Operation Telic, the Americans accepted British advice even where no such direct British involvement existed. As Air Marshal Burridge explained:

144

Indeed MoD claimed that there were no occasions when British advice on targeting was not followed.[145]

96. Air Marshal Burridge explained that the coalition's approach to targeting had to take in four major influences: the laws of armed conflict; proportionality (the use of minimum force); the extent of discernible military advantage; and the need to take 'all feasible precautions in making your judgements'.

146

97. The speed and tempo of decision-making required in the campaign was of a different order compared to the 1991 Gulf War, the Bosnia and Kosovo air campaigns, Operation Desert Fox or the Northern and Southern Watch operations. Given the nature of the plan, which was designed to overwhelm the command and control of the Iraqi regime through high tempo and high manoeuvre, decision-making on targeting needed to move from what had been 'sedate' to 'fast and furious'. This required a greater degree of delegation to Air Marshal Burridge and his targeting board.[147] Air Vice Marshal Torpy explained:

148

But Air Vice Marshal Torpy also highlighted the problem of integrating information in a network-centric environment:

149

We discuss the question of battle damage assessment below (paragraphs 105-6).

98. There is clear evidence of UK influence on the air targeting operations of the coalition. Principally this influence seems to have been applied to issues of perception, specifically how attacking particular targets would be received by European allies. The extent to which the UK persuaded the US out of attacking certain targets on grounds of principle is less clear. We asked MoD for specific examples of UK influence but they failed to provide any, even on a classified basis.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

99. The air campaign saw a significant change in the nature of the munitions delivered both by the coalition as a whole and by the RAF in particular, with a shift towards precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and away from 'dumb' bombs. The number of PGMs dropped was 85 per cent (679 out of 803),[150] up from less than 10 per cent in the 1991 Gulf War. We were told that some 90 per cent of PGMs hit their target. All British air power was pooled and the British forces were not able to rely on organic air support (that is air assets dedicated to support particular land forces) as Air Marshal Burridge told us:

151

One of the lessons from operations in Afghanistan was that the UK had to get better at close air support and this was underlined by the experience of working closely with the USMC in Operation Telic:

152

Air Vice Marshal Torpy accepted these problems, which were also about how well practised the RAF was in close air support:

153

100. An innovation for the RAF in Iraq was the use of 'kill-box interdiction and close air support' or KI-CAS, long practised by the United States' air forces (Navy, Marines and USAF). Air Vice Marshal Torpy explained the concept:

154

But we have heard that the targeting pods (the sensors that allow the pilot to identify a target) on British aircraft were not sophisticated enough to support the kill-box approach, which requires the aircraft to identify small targets from a medium to high altitude. The Air Component Commander conceded there was a problem:

155

101. He also accepted that more needed to be done in terms of air-land integration:

156

Worryingly we heard reports that there was a serious lack of air to ground communications capability, with RAF aircraft unable to communicate with the forces on the ground in the vast majority of missions flown. Additionally there was a lack of understanding on the part of land force commanders about the need to have cleared specific targets to be struck from the air through the appropriate channels. We heard reports of some one third of missions being aborted because of problems in the air-land interface. The intention is now to increase the RAF involvement in the BATUS exercises in Canada and to improve the use of targeting pods, extending it to all aircraft that engaged in KI-CAS and to exercise the whole command and control organisation from the Combined Air Operations Centre.[157]

102. During the ground campaign there were also some delays in the provision of air support. This was a matter of concern to some UK land forces. General Brims, however, believed that overall the system had worked well and particularly highlighted the work of the ANGLICOs discussed above:

158

Nonetheless, concerns have been raised that in a coalition, where aircraft may be reassigned when returning from other missions, there may be even less time to make decisions about the appropriateness of the targets from a national perspective.

103. Whether to rely on organic air support or to pool all air assets and allocate those assets from a central coalition air centre is a continuing debate. Air Marshal Burridge told us:

159

Air Vice Marshal Torpy argued that it would not be possible to support British troops just using UK air power:

160

104. The argument over whether forces should have their own organic air power or not is a debate that will no doubt continue on both sides of the Atlantic. Dedicated air power was attached to the USMC's MEF (which the British came under) and other discrete ground formations operating elsewhere in Iraq, which suggests that the doctrinal basis for the decision to pool the British air assets is not clear cut. Given the nature of the coalition action in the south eastern sector around Basra, using the MEF's organic air assets to support all the forces in the district and centralising the RAF's contribution in a coalition pool seems to have worked well. However, we feel that the shortcomings in the practice and training of close air support by the RAF and land forces which have emerged in recent operations must be urgently addressed. This will require a reassessment of the numbers of and equipment for Forward Air Controllers, both on the ground and in the air, the provision of adequate targeting pods for individual aircraft and significantly greater exercising of these capabilities in a joint environment. Such exercises are likely to have to take place overseas since, as we understand it, no UK based facility exists for such training.

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

105. Air Vice Marshal Torpy told us that 'one of the main underpinning objectives of the campaign was to make sure that we minimised damage to civilian infrastructure and civilian casualties as well'.[161] We asked how the extent of damage to a particular target was assessed and what use made of such assessments. He told us:

162

106. In terms of the process of assessing battle damage and how effective it was, Air Vice Marshal Torpy told us that MoD had a vast array of 'collection platforms and collection capability'[163], but joining the information together remained a challenge. He did not think the current system was 'perfect by any stretch of the imagination'[164], and it was one of the areas identified where a lot more effort was required. He considered that improvements should flow from employing network centric capabilities as:

165

Effective and timely arrangements for assessing battle damage are crucial for continuously informing the campaign plan and for establishing whether the aim of minimising damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure has been achieved. We look to MoD to exploit the latest technological advances to further improve the speed and accuracy of battle damage assessment.

107 The ad hoc meetings were regularly attended by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, the Leader of the House of Commons and President of the Council, John Reid, the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Secretary, Margrett Beckett, the International Development Secretary, Claire Short, the Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon and the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith. The Chief of the Defence Staff also regularly attended. Memo from MoD, May 2003, Ev 385. Back

108 Q 57 Back

109 Q 60 Back

110 Q 863 Back

111 Qq 868-9 Back

112 Q 864 Back

113 Qq 127-32 Back

114 Q 866 Back

115 Q 978 Back

116 Q 217 Back

117 Q 220 Back

118 Q 913 Back