Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence
(May 2003)
(Q57) The Political-Military Command Structures
from the Prime Minister Down?
The overall military campaign was US-led. The
UK as a major contributor was however in a position to influence
its direction through high-level political contacts, and through
the presence of UK officers embedded in relevant US headquarters.
Command authority was delegated by the UK Joint
Commander, through the National Component Commander, to the 2
component commanders, who conducted operations as part of a Coalition
effort under US 3 tactical command, in respect of tasks for which
approval had already been given through the UK Joint Commander,
who in turn reported to the Chief of Defence Staff and through
him to the Secretary of State. The US 3 Coalition component commanders
reported to General Tommy Franks, Commander Centcom, who received
strategic direction from the Pentagon.
The command and control structure developed
for the purposes of the military operation in Iraq established
a mechanism for the integration of UK forces into the overall
US structure. It also allowed us to reserve national direction
of our forces, allowing freedom of action within the US design,
and ensuring that our forces would only undertake specific missions
and tasks approved by UK commanders.
Cabinet-Level Decision Making
UK political direction was provided at the highest
level through collective Cabinet-level decision making. The emerging
crisis was regularly discussed at the Thursday Cabinet meetings
in the months leading up to and during the conflict; the Cabinet
continues to discuss Iraq.
There were almost daily ad hoc meetings from
mid March to late April, usually chaired by the Prime Minister.
Cabinet Ministers attending these ad hoc meetings regularly included:
— Deputy Prime Minister, Rt Hon John
Prescott MP.
— Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rt Hon
Gordon Brown MP.
— Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, Rt Hon Jack Straw MP.
— Secretary of State for the Home Department,
Rt Hon David Blunkett MP.
— Leader of the House of Commons and
President of the Council, Rt Hon Dr John Reid MP.
— Secretary of State for the Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs, Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP.
— Secretary of State for International
Development, then Rt Hon Clare Short MP.
— Secretary of State for Defence, Rt
Hon Geoff Hoon MP.
— Attorney General, Rt Hon The Lord
Goldsmith QC.
The Chief of the Defence Staff, as the senior
military adviser to the Government, also regularly attended.
The Secretary of State and the Chief of the
Defence Staff also briefed the Prime Minister on an almost daily
basis on the military progress of the campaign.
Secretary of State for Defence—Rt Hon Geoff
Hoon MP
The role of the Secretary of State for Defence,
following Parliament's approval for military action, was to provide
political scrutiny of the conduct of operations by UK military
commanders, and authority for any significant developments of
plans involving UK forces.
(i) Ministerial Briefings—The Secretary
of State for Defence met, normally twice daily, in the Ministry
of Defence with the Chief of the Defence Staff and others in the
direct chain of command responsible for the conduct of operations.
Usually the second of these daily meetings would also include
officials, and sometimes Ministers, from other relevant Departments
and agencies.
(ii) Chiefs of Staff—The Chiefs of
Staff Committee met more or less daily during the operation, including
with officials from other relevant Departments and agencies.
Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)—Admiral
Sir Michael Boyce KCB OBE ADC
Prior to military action, the Chief of the Defence
Staff assigned forces, made available to him by the Chiefs of
Staff, through the Joint Commander to the National Component Commander
for the purposes of conducting military operations in the Gulf
region.
During military action, the primary role of
CDS was to provide military advice to the Secretary of State for
Defence, the Prime Minister and the ad hoc Ministerial meetings,
to inform Ministerial decisions, and to communicate that authority
down through the chain of command.
Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)—Lieutenant
General John Reith CB CBE
As Joint Commander, CJO exercised command of
UK forces assigned to Operation Telic by CDS. CJO was represented
at the Coalition Joint Headquarters (CJHQ) by the National Component
Commander (NCC).
National Component Commander (UK NCC)—Air
Marshal Brian Burridge CBE RAF
The UK NCC co-ordinated the activities of UK
forces in theatre to ensure they were positioned and resourced
to carry out approved tasks. His role was also to identify any
potential changes to the plan that might impact upon UK forces,
and seek approval for any such changes from the Joint Commander.
Our forces only undertook specific missions and tasks approved
by UK commanders and consistent with plans approved by the Secretary
of State.
Command authority was delegated by the Joint
Commander, through the UK NCC, to the component commanders.
Component Commanders
The UK force deployed to Iraq was divided along
functional lines into a number of individual elements:
UK Maritime Component Commander (UK MCC).
Rear Admiral David Snelson RN (to 16 April).
Major General Tony Milton CB OBE (to date).
Delegated command authority by the Joint Commander,
through the UK NCC.
The UK MCC conducted operations as part of a Coalition
maritime component under US three* tactical command, in respect
of tasks for which approval had already been given through the
Joint Commander.
UK Land Component Commander (UK LCC)
Major General Robin Brims CBE (to May 03)
Major General Peter Wall CBE (to date)
Delegated command authority by the Joint Commander,
through the UK NCC.
The UK LCC conducted operations as part of a Coalition
land component under US 3 tactical command, in respect of tasks
for which approval had already been given through the Joint Commander.
Delegated command authority by the Joint Commander,
through the UK NCC.
The UK ACC conducted operations as part of a Coalition
air component under US 3 tactical command, in respect of tasks
for which approval had already been given through the Joint Commander.
The logistic elements worked as national components
but in close co-ordination with the US.
CBF Cyprus played a role as a supporting commander,
and was set priorities in support of Operation Telic by the UK
NCC.
(Q 47-8) The balance between the use of the
MoD's lift assets, both ships and aircraft, and chartered commercial
assets for Operation Telic, and what rates the MoD paid for the
commercial assets compared with peace-time steady state market
rates?
49% airlift (equipment and materiel, not including
personnel) by charter.
88% sealift (again equipment and materiel only)
by charter.
The rates paid were the normal market rates
on the day, but market rates did increase over the period of the
Operation, and these were subject to further negotiation.
(Q49) Details of the lease arrangements for
the C-17s and in particular the premium payable for additional
usage?
The C-17 lease contract has no limit on the
number of hours that may by flown. However, funding for support
of the aircraft was modelled on a total of 3,000 flying hours
per full year for the fleet of four aircraft. Since entering service
with the RAF the C-17 fleet has exceeded the modelled hours, largely
as a result of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This has resulted
in additional support costs.
(Q90) The steps taken by British forces in
Basra to secure munitions stockpiles?
The steps taken by British forces include:
(a) identification of munition stockpiles;
(b) securing of stockpiles;
(c) disposal of stockpiles.
Once stockpiles have been identified, either
by routine patrolling or by being brought to troops' attention
by locals, Brigades will where possible provide a guard until
such time that the stockpile can be removed or destroyed. Due
to the number of sites and potential force protection issues,
sites are prioritised for guarding according to their assessed
threat. Seven Armoured Brigade are currently using about 40% of
their manpower in the full-time securing of static sites, including
munition stockpiles.
Stockpiles are destroyed according to their
priority. Sites are given priority if they present an immediate
and unacceptable threat to UK personnel and operations and Iraqi
civilians.
(Q38) Details of how many of the 500 suspected
WMD sites were passed to UNMOVIC
As at 4 June 2003, Coalition forces had initiated
investigations into 140 sites within Iraq, from a master list
of over 500 sites which may be connected to programmes to develop
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Additionally, investigations
have been initiated into a further 67 sites identified since the
conflict began. We expect further sites to be identified as investigations
progress. This master list subsumes the 146 sites referred to
by the Prime Minister on 14 April 2003 and includes sites identified
by our Coalition partners. Some key locations may include more
than one such site, some sites may require longer investigations
than others or repeated visits, and investigations at one site
may lead to the identification of further sites. Therefore the
number of sites, and the proportion into which investigations
have been initiated, are not necessarily good measures of progress.
Furthermore, such sites are only one potential form of evidence.
Other evidence could include delivery systems, research, development,
production or storage facilities (some of which may be dual-use),
documentation or interviews with relevant Iraqi personnel. Coalition
forces have already encountered materials which may be related
to Iraqi programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction, including
vehicles which broadly appear to match descriptions of mobile
biological agent production facilities referred to in the document
"Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction" published on 24
September 2002, and as presented to the UN Security Council by
the US Secretary of State. Investigations continue. We expect
gathering and collating evidence from these sites and from other
sources to be a long and complex task. We will aim to release
further information concerning evidence of Iraqi WMD programmes
when and where appropriate, as we did before the conflict began.
A clear majority of the sites now on the Coalition
master list were already known to the UN, having been identified
by UNSCOM and the IAEA during their previous inspections. We therefore
focussed our efforts on providing the UN with information on the
minority of sites they may have been unaware of, and sharing details
of suspect activities at the known sites. Much of the UK's information
on Iraqi WMD programmes derived from sensitive intelligence sources
which need to be protected. Within this constraint, we believe
we were as helpful as possible to the UN, working on a presumption
of disclosure unless there were pressing security reasons not
to, and passing a significant amount of information, of various
types, to UN agencies under special arrangements. Specific instances
include:
Inspectors were briefed on suspect activities
and capabilities at about 60 known sites, and were further briefed
on around 40 additional sites of which we suspected the inspectors
might be unaware.
As of 30 May 2003, UNMOVIC/IAEA had been briefed
on over 150 different intelligence reports, including information
giving new details on previously identified sites, for example
recent possible concealment activities.
We also passed analysis and suggestions for
the most fruitful sites and individuals to investigate, although
the continued failure of Saddam's regime to provide individuals
for interview without monitoring limited the inspectors' ability
to pursue these.
It is likely that our Coalition partners, and
other nations, shared similar information with the UN concerning
possible WMD sites.
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