House of Commons - Defence - Written Evidence

Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence

Further memorandum from the Ministry of Defence on the role of the reserves in Operation Telic (October 2003)

In advance of the evidence session on 22 October, the House of Commons Defence Committee asked for further information regarding the use of reserves during Operation Telic. This imformation is set out below.

INTRODUCTION

The government has planned and structured the Armed Forces on the basis that any major war-fighting operation would draw on support from the Reserve Forces. The use of Reservists is a prudent approach that allows the maintenance of full time Armed Forces in no greater strength than is needed for normal peacetime activity and meet a limited range of contingencies. In addition, the more flexible use of Reservists gives the Ministry of Defence the opportunity to harness skills appropriate for operations, but which are not needed on a regular or frequent basis in peacetime and therefore not readily found within the regular Armed Forces.

CALL-OUT ORDER

Call out is the use of a legal power to bring Reservists into permanent service, that is, to mobilise them. It is authorised by the making of an Order under the Reserve Forces Act 1996. The call-out Order for Operation Telic was made under Section 54 of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 by the Secretary of State for Defence on 7 January 2003.

THE REQUIREMENT

In broad terms, the requirement for Operation Telic was about 5,600 (RN/RM 500; Army 3,600; RAF 1,500). This was the largest call-out of members of the Reserve Forces since the 1950s. In determining the number of people who would be sent call-out notices, allowance was made for possible wastage rates resulting from those who might not meet medical or dental standards medical failures and applications for exemption or deferment from reservists or their employers. In the event over 8,000 Reservists were called-out and over 5,000 were taken into service in sufficient time to be deployed and participate in the war-fighting phase of the Operation. The majority of reservists were drawn from the Volunteer Reserve Forces (Royal Naval Reserve (RNR), Royal Marines Reserve (RMR), Territorial Army (TA) and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force (RAuxAF)). A smaller number of reservists came from the Army and RAF Ex-Regular Reserve Forces (The Army Reserve and RAF Reserve (RAFR) respectively). Members of the Sponsored Reserves were also called out. A breakdown of the number of reservists mobilised for the combat phase of Operation Telic is given at Annex A to this memorandum.

The call out was undertaken in a number of phases. The initial requirement, announced to the House on 7 January (Official Report column 24), was for key enablers and certain units which had to be deployed rapidly. The requirement included:

The second phase of the call out was announced by the Secretary of State on 30 January and the additional requirement was for some 3,300 reservists for the Army, up to 300 for the RAF and 65 for the RNR. The Army requirement included 100 reservists from four Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (Volunteers), some 450 from 202 Field Hospital RAMC (Volunteers) and the TA element of 416 Parachute Field Ambulance. The remainder of the requirement was primarily for individuals who were needed to reinforce existing units and Headquarters. A large range of skills was required. In terms of numbers, the Army's main demand was for reservists from the following Corps: Royal Logistic Corps, the Royal Engineers, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and the Royal Army Medical Corps. For the RAF, the three critical trades in the second phase were drivers, vehicle mechanics and caterers—trades whose functions at many peacetime locations were usually met by civilian contractors. Ex-regular RAF personnel were recalled to reinforce these trades. Some 760 reservists from all three Services were called out to support the Defence Medical Services of whom 93 were doctors. A more detailed explanation of the requirement for medical reservists is set out at Annex B.

PERIOD OF NOTICE OF CALL-OUT

Although the mobilisation process was successful, we are aware of some cases where Reservists and their employers received call-out papers at very short notice. In some cases this was unavoidable if the reserves were to be ready in time, particularly those personnel required as early enablers who were called-out soon after the call-out order was made. Nevertheless, the matter of notice has been identified as an issue that requires careful attention in any future mobilisation.

TRAINING

All military personnel, including Reservists called-out to support operations, must be fit for role. This means the individual must be medically fit and suitably trained and qualified for the role they are to perform. Volunteer Reservists train for their operational role as part of their annual training commitment. Regular Reservists will have been trained while they were serving with the Regular Armed Forces. In addition, once called-out, reservists undergo a short period of pre-deployment training, usually five days. The aim of this training is to prepare reservists for the theatre to which they will deploy and provide refresher training in key areas such as weapons' handling, first aid and nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protection. Once this training is complete, reservists usually undergo further training in the UK or overseas to ensure that they are fully prepared for the role they are to perform and, where necessary, to acclimatise them to local conditions.

DURATION OF CALL OUT

At the time of the call out last winter, it was not known whether offensive operations would occur and if they did, how long the campaign would last. The length of the call out was therefore unknown. However, we recognised that employers and reservists needed guidance on the expected duration of the call out. Reservists of all Services were told to expect a six-month deployment plus two months of training and leave giving a total period of absence of eight-nine months. Civilian employers were informed that their staff would be absent for a similar period.

ROLE

The role of the reserves was to:

— Supply key enablers to allow the deployment of naval, military and air assets.

— Bring units up to war-fighting establishment.

— Provide volunteer reserve units or sub-units including those with capabilities in NBC, engineering, logistics or medical support.

— Fill posts that would have been filled by Regulars who were committed to other operations, for example Operation FRESCO (firemen's strike) had a significant bearing on the call out of RAuxAF personnel required for Force Protection.

— Provide individual specialists not readily available in the Regular Forces such as linguists and media officers.

— Provide medical specialists from all three Services to man field medical units.

POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

Once the combat phase of Operation Telic had drawn to a close, members of the reserve forces became involved with the stabilisation and rebuilding tasks. Generally they remained with the unit to which they were attached until that unit returned to the UK. However, a small number with skills that were in short supply remained in theatre to complete a deployment period of up to six months.

CONCLUSION

The call-out to support Operation Telic was in line with the tenets of the Strategic Defence Review ie that the Reserve Forces should be more integrated, relevant and useable, in a range of situations. The successful employment on Operation Telic of members of the Reserve Forces illustrated that the Strategic Defence Review's aspirations had been met. The legislation supporting the call-out of Reserves worked generally well and we pay tribute to the skills and professionalism of the reservists who were mobilised for the operation.

There are no indications to suggest that the recent call out of reservists to support Operation Telic has resulted in a significant increase in resignations from the Reserve Forces. A welcome by-product of Operation Telic was that nearly 10% of reservists who have been demobilised have expressed an interest in joining the Regular Forces or undertaking further full-time service.

BREAKDOWN OF THE NUMBER OF RESERVISTS MOBILISED FOR THE COMBAT PHASE OF OPERATION TELIC

	Call-out Notices Served	Reservists Reported for Service	Reservists Accepted into Service
Royal Navy	334	311	292 (0 were Regular Reserves (RFR))
Royal Marines	131	113	112 (0 were Regular Reserves (RFR))
Army	6,540	4,873	3,787 (214 were Regular Reserves (RAR))
RAF	1,487	1,181	1,030 (148 were Regular Reserves (RAFR))
Total	8,492	6,478	5,221 (362 were Regular Reserves)

THE REQUIREMENT FOR MEDICAL RESERVISTS

There is no question of British forces deploying on military operations without appropriate medical support.

Around 2,800 DMS personnel, including some 760 medical reservists from all three Services, deployed to the Gulf. Of the 760 reservists deployed, some 37 were GPs, 56 were Consultants and 378 were Nurses. It has always been Defence policy to call-out reservists when necessary, and the need to call-out reservists is kept under review as part of ongoing contingency planning.

It is recognised that there are manning shortfalls in the Defence Medical Services, particularly in certain key clinical specialities, such as surgeons and anaesthetists, and as such medical reservists were called-out to ensure that appropriate medical support was available for UK forces participating in military action against Iraq. Compulsory call-out was used to ensure that the appropriate numbers of the correct clinical specialties could be deployed to theatre.

The only Reserve medical unit deployed as a formed unit was 202 Field Hospital RAMC (V). The operational role of 202 Field Hospital RAMC (V) in Op Telic was to allow the return of personnel from 33 Field Hospital to the UK to reconstitute and have a period of respite prior to redeploying to Iraq to resume the medical commitment. During this period, 33 Field Hospital were designated to provide a high readiness capability to deploy from the UK and deal, if required, with potential mass casualties arising from the use of chemical or biological weapons. 33 Field Hospital were also available to provide a, high readiness, Role three (Field Hospital) capability for operations other than Op Telic if required.

All other Reserve medical personnel were deployed in smaller specialist groups in order to provide support to Regular formations, or as individual reinforcements within Regular medical units. Medical reservists were often deployed to theatre to relieve Regular DMS personnel.

In the case of Consultants, clinical governance guidelines limit the amount of time they can spend on operations. The time limit is primarily in place to ensure that they do not lose clinical currency or suffer "skill fade". On routine, low tempo, operations, the DMS currently aims to deploy any Consultant for no more than three months in any 12 month period. Due to operational commitments, this may not always be possible although the DMS seeks to avoid deploying them for more than six months at any one time, hence the need to deploy reservist Consultants. Reservist Consultants were deployed either within 202 Field Hospital RAMC (V) and as individual reinforcements within other Units.

The MOD worked closely with the Department of Health to try to minimize any disruption, as far as possible, with the removal of both Regular and Reserve medical personnel from NHS Trusts.



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