House of Commons - Defence - Written Evidence

Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence

Further memorandum from the Ministry of Defence on post conflict issues (February 2004)

(Q2005-2007) When exactly NGOs began to operate in Iraq, who was there, when they arrived, and where they were operating?

Before the conflict in Iraq, there were six international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating in central and southern Iraq. The Department for International Development estimate that in Northern Iraq, at that time, around 20 to 25 NGOs were implementing programmes. In the period before the conflict, the majority of international staff of these NGOs left Iraq for neighbouring countries. But a few emergency response NGOs retained a limited presence in the country throughout major combat operations. Many local staff of the international NGOs remained in country throughout and offered what assistance they could during that period.

As coalition troops moved northwards through Iraq from Kuwait, and the situation began to stabilise behind them, international NGOs began to establish or re-establish emergency assistance programmes. Many NGOs first set up around Basrah and the very South of the country, subsequently moving further North through central Iraq and Baghdad. Simultaneously, NGOs began to re-establish their international presence in the North via routes other than from Kuwait. NGOs were operational, many with DFID funding, in coalition-controlled areas whilst hostilities continued in Baghdad and elsewhere, including before the declaration of the end of hostilities. Given the small number of NGOs who had been present in Central and Southern Iraq prior to hostilities, many of the NGOs had no previous Iraq experience or support networks to draw on. The coalition offered assistance to those NGOs who were prepared to work with the military, and were able to assist NGO work through various information and coordination facilities.

We attach a list of NGOs who have operated in Iraq at some point since the outbreak of the conflict last year. The list is not exhaustive.

It is important to be clear about the role of NGOs in post-conflict situations. NGOs rarely have the capacity to meet all the humanitarian needs of conflict-affected populations. Primary responsibility for ensuring those needs are met falls to whichever body holds overall authority for the area in question. The role of NGOs in such situations is not as clearly prescribed, but usually involves complementing the efforts of those in authority, helping to meet immediate needs and filling gaps, often funded by national and international donors.

Most NGOs work to principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence, meaning that humanitarian action should not favour any side in an Armed Conflict. This approach suggests the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from political or military objectives where humanitarian action is being implemented. As a result, a number of NGOs did not want funding from the UK government or were cautious about receiving it. It also meant that some felt unable to work directly with the Coalition on security issues (many thought that doing so would, in any case, increase the risks to their staff), while trying to operate in a highly insecure environment with limited security resources of their own. Notwithstanding the above points, many NGOs had a close dialogue with DFID about their planning and sought DFID advice as they considered necessary. Following the conflict, DFID made clear its willingness, where appropriate, to meet increased security costs for NGOs it was funding in Iraq.

(Q2008) When exactly different parts of Iraq were declared safe by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD)?

UNSECOORD made a series of security assessments from late April to mid-July 2003. Around the 26 April it declared the Southern, British-controlled area of Iraq safe for UN personnel to operate in (under Phase IV UN security operating protocols). In early May, Baghdad was declared safe. Other areas of Iraq were declared safe between then and mid-July 2003.

(Q2017) UNSECOORD's assessment of the security situation in Iraq, broken down by geographical area; the FCO's assessment of the security situation by geographical area from the end of the major combat phase to now.

UNSECOORD's initial assessments are given in the previous answer. There has been no international UN presence in Iraq since the end of August, and UNSECOORD has not undertaken any field assessments of the security situation in Iraq since then.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office liases closely with the Ministry of Defence, the Cabinet Office's Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) and other agencies about the security situation in Iraq. The FCO does not conduct country-wide security assessments itself, although FCO security experts do keep the security of staff under constant review and have visited Iraq in the course of their duties. It is the responsibility of the FCO to ensure that UK Nationals are aware of the risks of travelling to countries with a volatile security situation. This is done through its travel advice.

(Q2027) Work that has been done drawing lessons from previous post-conflict work applicable to Iraq.

We have a comprehensive lessons learned process that investigates our performance in operations, including those where UK forces are committed to post-conflict operations. These lessons are available to those planning current and future operations. The Operational Policy and the Planning branches of the Permanent Joint Headquarters, for example, were able to produce a document of key post-conflict planning issues by drawing on their understanding of these reports and their own personal experiences in operations stretching back to stabilisation work in the Balkans. It should be remembered, however, that some aspects of Operation Telic new. The UK has not been an Occupying Power in another country for many years and in the meantime international law has changed dramatically.

(Q2037) Civilian and political advice channels to the military and how these have altered since the end of major combat operations.

During major combat operations the National Commander and the Air and Land component Commanders each had civilian Political Advisers (POLADS) on their staff. Ministry of Defence POLADS are generally civilian officials with significant policy and secretariat experience on Defence issues. A POLAD was also deployed to the Senior British Military Adviser (SBMA) embedded within US Centcom, first in Florida, then in Qatar when Centcom deployed forward for combat operations. The National Commander's senior Media Advisor was also a civilian and each headquarters included a Civil Secretary and other civilian staff who provided budgetary control and administrative support functions.

In the Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood, two branches consist mainly of civilians who provide advice to the Chief of Joint Operations. The J8 branch handles budgetary matters while the J9 branch deals with political, policy, media and legal issues arising from operations. J9 can draw on the expertise of branches throughout the MoD centre, in particular the Iraq Secretariat, which is headed by a civilian one star official. While most of PJHQ's legal advisers are military, the senior legal advisor is a civilian. In addition there were and continue to be officials from the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in Iraq who may be consulted, through POLADS, if the need arises.

Since the end of major combat operations the locations and remits for POLADS have slightly altered to reflect the requirements of reconstruction, though the basic structure of their deployment remains unchanged. For example, there is no longer a POLAD deployed with the Air Component. The Centcom SMBA continues to retain a POLAD, but both the SBMA and the POLAD are now based at the US HQ in Qatar rather than at Centcom itself.

(Q2038) Examples of documents given to incoming personnel to advise them of social laws and customs.

Personnel deploying to Iraq are given a five-day briefing by the Operational Training Advisory Group (OPTAG) which includes sessions on Iraqi society, culture and customs. Troops are not given specific documentation.

(Q2046-7) The total number of Arabic Speakers within the FCO and MoD; on how many of these have been deployed to Iraq; the number of trained MoD Arabic interpreters, and how many of these have been deployed to Iraq; the success of approaches made to Arabic speaking countries for Arabic linguists to assist UK forces

There are currently 80 staff within the FCO who have passed a qualification in Arabic at the Diplomatic Service Language Centre. The MoD (which employs some 90,000 people) does not centrally collate the number of people with Arabic language experience within its staff. This information could only be provided at inordinate cost.

The FCO currently has 13 Arabic speakers deployed in Iraq, and others preparing for deployment.

The MoD head office has one full-time and five contract Arabic interpreters. The Armed Forces have a total of 24 "interpreter" class personnel and 33 "advanced" class personnel. The former can read and write in near real time, the latter can hold conversations and translate on the street, for patrols, for example. Not all of these would have been deployable, owing to rank or existing role.

The MoD has deployed 34 personnel on interpreting duties to theatre.

The FCO approached a number of Gulf States to help provide Arab linguists to UK forces in Iraq in July 2003. None of the states approached was able to meet the requirement.

(Q2060) Steps taken to enable and help Iraqis provide information to the Coalition.

Encouragement is given to Iraqi citizens to talk to the Coalition in various ways, including by posters, handbills and radio broadcasts. These also often advise Iraqis how best to impart information. For example, in the Multinational Division (South-East) area of Iraq, those who have information are encouraged to seek face-to-face contact with Coalition forces. In Baghdad there is a "hotline" that may be called anonymously.

(Q2063) A note on the allowances available to British police officers volunteering for tours of duty in Iraq.

Allowances are the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. All UK police officers volunteering for duty in Iraq are entitled to a Difficult Postings Allowance paid directly to their UK bank account and a leave flight allowance. They are also entitled to a period of leave after six weeks service in Iraq.

(Q2064 and 2065) A note on the 600,000 items of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) have been destroyed in the UK Area of Operations, on how much unexploded ordnance (and of what type), remains to be destroyed, and on how priorities have been set for the destruction of UXO. A note also on how mine clearance operations are being funded, how much funding has been provided and who is receiving the funds.

During major combat operations, UK Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams were primarily concerned with clearing UXO that represented an immediate threat to our forces and to their accomplishing their mission. However, when resources allowed, they would also respond to incidents that represented an immediate threat to the Iraqi civilian population. Our forces now operate in a more permissive environment and we recognise our responsibilities as an Occupying Power to ensure the safety of the civilian population. As a result we now devote more resources to the wider issue of UXO. Incidents that require action by EOD teams are categorised according to two main criteria: firstly, according to the level of threat, both to civilians and to military personnel; and, secondly, according to the area in which the UXO is found, for example, the threat to habitation, infrastructure or cultivation. The assessment also takes into account the risk to EOD teams of carrying out the disposal task, the operating environment in the location, the type of UXO and the availability of appropriate assets to deal with the incident. The reduction of risk and the minimisation of loss of life and damage to property are the underlying principles of EOD philosophy. The safest course of action must be followed unless there are justifiable reasons for overriding this principle.

However, most humanitarian UXO clearance is best undertaken (and funded) through Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and commercial demining companies. Such organisations have years of experience of UXO clearance in a much wider range of situations than do UK forces. In working with local people, NGOs obtain a far better picture of the problems and clearance requirements than our forces could alone. We believe that the most effective approach to the issues of UXO clearance is the one we are currently taking in Iraq. The UK EOD team holds weekly meetings with UNICEF, UN Mine Action Service and commercial demining organisations. These provide a regular forum, established from the start of Operation Telic, for sharing information, co-ordinating clearance work, and handling various interrelated issues, such as the movement of explosives.

These meetings have been extremely well received by the relevant organisations. The UK government's funding of NGOs (some £15 million in 2003 including £5 million specifically for Iraq and set to rise in the coming months), provides a faster and more needs-driven UXO clearance Operation than could be performed by our forces alone. The bulk of this funding (approximately £4 million) was provided to UNMAS, who allocate the funds to various demining organisations and ensure that the work is carried out in a co-ordinated fashion. The remaining £1 million was allocated to a British demining organisation, Mines Advisory Group, for specific demining projects in Iraq.

Unexploded munitions are still being found on a daily basis, therefore it is not possible to estimate the amount of UXO left in Iraq. To date, UK Forces have disposed of around 680,000 individual items of unexploded ordnance, NGOs have disposed of 227,000 items and other multinational partners operating within the UK Area of Operations have disposed of a further 113,000 items. All known significant sites containing arms or munitions are marked and recorded and where possible guarded. These are then cleared once resources permit. To date, 62 Captured Enemy Ammunition (CEA) sites have been recorded within the UK area of Operations, of which around 13 have been cleared.

(Q2066) A note on retention of those recruited to the various Iraqi security forces.

Although the Iraqi Army recently experienced some desertions related to dissatisfaction with pay, the Coalition Provisional Authority has addressed this issue through the introduction of hazardous duty pay. Since then, retention has not been reported as a significant problem. For the Iraqi Police Service, the Coalition Provisional Authority cites a healthy recruiting programme with considerably more personnel applying than are required. The police service is seen as an attractive occupation and has remained so despite the deliberate targeting of Iraqi police officers. The number of recruited personnel for the Iraqi Police Service is over 90%. Other services are also enjoying healthy recruitment. Recruitment to the Iraqi Border Police stands at over 80% while 100% of the requirement for the Facilities Protection Service has been met, though many of those recruited have still to be trained.

(Q2069) The extent to which militias are operating within the UK Area of Operations, both with the consent of the Coalition and without.

Several organisations who may (or have elements who may) be termed `militia' currently exist within the Multinational Division (Southeast) area of responsibility. The Coalition's policy is to encourage individual members, from the Badr Corps in particular, to join the New Iraqi Army or another official organisation. The activities of militia, and their parent organisations, vary widely over time and by geographic area. Our analysis of their activities is classified.



© Parliamentary copyright 2004	Prepared 16 March 2004