Memorandum by NUMAST
INTRODUCTION
NUMAST is the trade union and professional organisation
representing more than 19,00 shipmasters, officers, cadets and
other marine industry staff working at sea and ashore.
NUMAST has, for many years, voiced considerable
concern over the strategic implications of the decline of the
UK-flagged merchant fleet and the reduction in the size of the
UK maritime skills base. The NUMAST report, Whither the fourth
arm?, published in June 2002, detailed these concerns and
presented proposals for addressing the points in a positive way.
We welcome this opportunity to contribute to
the inquiry into the "Lessons of Iraq" and in particular
the lessons for the future to be drawn from Operation Telic and
hope that the committee will consider our concerns with the utmost
seriousness.
THE TASK
FORCE
The Iraq war witnessed the assembly of Britain's
biggest maritime task force for more than 20 years. However it
was a task force that placed significant reliance upon foreign,
often flag of convenience, ships and foreign seafarers. NUMAST
learned that more than half of the 50-plus merchant vessels chartered
in support of the military deployment to Iraq were operating under
flags of convenience and only eight were under the red ensign.
NUMAST believes the MoD is ignoring strong strategic,
moral and political justifications to do much more to support
what has traditionally been known as the "fourth arm"
of Britain's defence and we believe it should be a matter of extreme
concern that the UK is dependent on such a high proportion of
foreign operated tonnage at times of national emergency. The Union
is concerned that this increasing reliance upon foreign owned,
foreign flagged and foreign crewed shipping by the MoD is a sign
of an absence of "joined-up thinking" at a time when
the Department for Transport is seeking to revitalise the British
merchant fleet and to rebuild the country's maritime skills base.
NUMAST is a party to the Shipping Task Force,
established by the Deputy Prime Minister to progress maritime
policy objectives. We have raised our concerns about aspects of
the MoD chartering policies on a number of occasions at STF meetings.
As a result, it had been agreed to invite a representative of
the MoD to discuss these issues with the STF, but it is unfortunate
that to date there has not been a positive response to this initiative.
It is also unfortunate that despite the expenditure
of considerable amounts of public money in the chartering of tonnage
in support of Operation Telic, the government has used the grounds
of commercial confidence to create obstacles to those seeking
details of the ownership, registration, manning and operation
of the vessels used by the MoD. However, it has been possible
to establish that these ships were under an assortment of flags
including Malta, St Vincent, Antigua, the Bahamas and Bermuda.
Similarly, crew nationalities included Russian,
Ukrainian, Filipino, Icelandic, Swedish and some British seafarers.
We believe such statistics confirm the Union's
concern that the decline of the UK fleet and the loss of British
seafarers have left alarming gaps in our maritime security resources.
NUMAST is concerned that successive governments
have ignored previous warnings about the serious strategic implications
arising from such a reliance on foreign merchant ships.
CHARTERING POLICIES
The reliance upon foreign-owned, flagged and
crewed tonnage for Operation Telic fits into an increasingly marked
pattern. Barely one-third of the 367 merchant ships chartered
by the MoD in the past five years have been British or Isle of
Man registered, according to figures revealed in a House of Commons
written answer earlier this year. Ships from more than 20 different
foreign flags have been used in that period, including tonnage
under the Cypriot, St Vincent, Maltese, Romanian and Liberian
registers.
We believe there needs to be considerable debate
on the reasons why foreign ships are being used in support of
operations and exercises in direct support of British military
forces and the circumstances in which the UK would consider the
requisition of UK-flagged tonnage.
NUMAST also believes there needs to be a clear
policy on the circumstances in which MoD-chartered ships would
be classed as "strategic"—and therefore re-flagged
to the red ensign and required to operate, as a minimum, with
a British master
Similarly, NUMAST is concerned about the inadequacy
of the existing criteria for determining whether a vessel is of
"strategic" importance. We consider the criteria to
be too narrow. It also fails to fully reflect the diverse strategic
needs and changing operational requirements and should, at a minimum,
take more account of the range of vessels that we used in the
Falklands conflict (such as product tankers, general cargoships,
offshore support vessels, ocean-going roros and stern trawlers.
We also believe the UK government should study
the results of a US report (see further details below) that identified
the security threat associated with the use of foreign shipping
for defence purposes. We believe that the UK should follow the
US example of reviewing the crew lists of chartered foreign ships
to check whether any seafarers represent a known security threat.
CHARTER COSTS
The costs of chartering foreign tonnage are
a serious issue, deserving considerably more scrutiny than they
have to date. In the last Gulf War only eight of the 143 ships
used by the MoD were British and a subsequent National Audit Office
report confirmed NUMAST's fears that the government had paid a
"premium" of between £30-38 million on dry cargo
vessel charter costs of £116 million as a result. In the
latest Iraq war, there have been market reports suggesting that
charter rates for the foreign ships used by the MoD were inflated
in the build-up to the Iraq war— by as much as 30% above
commercial rates.
NUMAST also believes there should be further
scrutiny of reports suggesting that problems with the availability
of merchant shipping may have delayed the military build-up.
In our correspondence with ministers on these
issues, NUMAST has received what we consider to be extremely complacent
responses to the problems identified by the Union and such bodies
as the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, the National
Audit Office, military experts, and by the US authorities. For
instance, we were incredulous to be told in one letter earlier
this year that the MoD considers there are sufficient militarily
useful vessels and seafarers for likely strategic needs. This
comes at a time when the UK merchant fleet and the number of British
seafarers are both considerably reduced from the time of the Falklands
conflict, after which concern was expressed by the Commons Defence
Committee on the numbers available.
Since the time of the Falklands, the number
of British seafarers serving in the UK Merchant Navy has declined
from more than 57,000 to well under 20,000 and on current trends
will almost halve over the next decade. The number of UK owned
and registered trading ships of 500gt and above has, over the
same period, fallen to one-third the level it was at the time
of Falklands.
NUMAST was also appalled to read a statement
in one response from the MoD that it believes there are no security
implications arising from the use of non-British registered shipping.
We were similarly extremely concerned at the statement that there
are no checks on foreign crews on ships taking part in MoD work.
When the MoD was questioned further on this issue, it appeared
that there was a lack of clarity over the procedures and policies
that were being followed in the case of the ships being used for
Operation Telic.
LESSONS FROM
THE US
The US General Accounting Office report on combating
terrorism, published in October 2002, identified the placing of
military equipment outside Department of Defense control as a
strategic weakness and warned that the use of foreign shipping
for transporting military cargoes increased the risk of equipment
being tampered with, seized or destroyed.
The 35-page report warns that chartering foreign
registered or foreign crewed merchant ships for military work
is a "significant weakness" in Department of Defense
policies.
According to the report, more than 95% of all
equipment and supplies needed for large-scale US military operations
goes by sea. However, some 43% of cargoes carried to overseas
operations for the DoD during 2001 went on non US ships, most
of which were foreign flagged and foreign crewed.
Although the Military Sealift Command reviews
the crew lists of chartered vessels to check whether any seafarers
represent known security threat, the GAO said it was concerned
that when control of DoD equipment was relinquished to third parties,
including foreign nationals, "there may be an increased risk
of the equipment being tampered with, seized, or destroyed by
individuals or groups whose interests run counter to the United
States".
There could also be a risk of the weapons or
equipment being used against military or civilian targets, the
report warned.
The inquiry team said officials from several
military commands had also expressed concerns about placing strategic
equipment onboard ships outside DoD control and warned of the
shortage of "appropriate" US-flagged tonnage for military
charters.
The report urges the DoD to review the security
of military cargoes transported on foreign ships and also calls
for improved coordination, risk management and comprehensive security
plans to tackle further "significant" shortcomings in
the protection of some 300 US seaports, 17 of which are designated
as "strategic" by the DoD.
It is important to note that another report,
published by the National Defense Transportation Military Sealift
Committee in February 2003, concluded that the US Maritime Support
Program, providing direct support to maintain a fleet of strategically-useful
commercial vessels, was the most economically practical solution
for safeguarding a reliable seaborne transport of equipment and
supplies. This report was subsequently followed by a decision
to extend and expand the MSP beyond 2005.
NUMAST believes the UK government should give
serious consideration to these reports, as their findings are
of direct relevance to the UK—particularly given the nature
of the strategic relationship between the two countries.
FLAGS OF
CONVENIENCE
NUMAST also believes the MoD needs to be more
sensitive to the evidence showing that flags of convenience have
markedly worse safety and social records than traditional registries
such as the UK, with disproportionate rates of ship losses, port
state control detentions, and infringements of conventions covering
seafarers" social conditions and welfare. There must surely
be serious strategic and security objections against dependence
on ships whose ownership, registration and crewing lies well outside
UK jurisdiction.
It should be remembered that Canadian military
forces had to take action to recover a flag of convenience ship
that was being used to transport military equipment and personnel
from the Balkans in summer 2000 after the crew refused to sail
the vessel to Canada in a protest over pay.
In this connection, NUMAST believes it is essential
that there is detailed scrutiny of reports that almost one-third
of 50 merchant ships chartered by the MoD to support the invasion
of Iraq have been detained after failing port state control inspections.
The investigation published by the Guardian newspaper showed that
the ships had been detained on 21 occasions—with defects
including lack of fire-fighting equipment, hull damage impairing
seaworthiness, inadequate life-saving appliances, and dangerously
faulty engines.
Given that one of the prime reasons for the
development of open registries has been their ability to offer
shipowners savings through reduced labour costs, NUMAST believes
it is essential that the UK is not perpetuating the abusive use
of seafarers from developing nations who are employed on unacceptably
poor social and labour conditions. In circumstances where public
money is being spent on chartered merchant shipping, there should
be agreed standards and conditions of employment for the crews
of such vessels. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency has developed
a "matrix" that the MoD will use to underpin such criteria,
but NUMAST is concerned that the process of producing this matrix
has not been fully inclusive and we need further details and dialogue
to be assured that it will set down acceptable standards.
MARKET PRESSURES
NUMAST is by no means alone in repeatedly warning
about the way in which strategic operations could be delayed as
a result of shortages of suitable tonnage: something that the
deputy commander of US forces in the last Gulf War acknowledged
to have been a problem in ensuring the combat-readiness of troops
at the time. We have yet to see a detailed response to reports
quoting an Army spokeswoman as saying the loading schedule for
the UK military had been pushed back because "ships weren't
in place in time'.
POSITIVE POINTS
NUMAST considers the Ministry of Defence review
of the UK's role in the Iraq war correctly identified the vital
role of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the new strategic sealift
ro-ros in transporting troops and equipment to the Gulf for the
war against Iraq.
The report states that significant logistics
demands had been successfully achieved, with a land force of the
same scale as that assembled for the 1991 Gulf war being deployed
in less than half the time.
Fourteen RFA ships were engaged in Operation
Telic and four new strategic ro-ros shipped some 11% of the total
equipment required. There are six ro-ros in the fleet of strategic
sealift vessels operated by the AWSR consortium. The last in the
series of six ships was delivered in April 2003 and Operation
Telic was the first time that these ships were deployed in direct
support of active military operations. Their success, and the
volume of material they shipped, shows the value of the policy
to provide and develop an assured source of UK-crewed strategic
sealift support.
Similarly, RFA ships have been correctly described
as "the life-blood of the maritime forces" involved
in Operation Telic, supplying equipment, stores, fuel and support
to UK and US ships, as well as delivering the first humanitarian
aid cargoes to Iraq. NUMAST believes the value of the RFA and
strategic sealift ships has been amply demonstrated in their contribution
to Operation Telic and deserving of recognition by way of clear
commitments to the future of both.
However, NUMAST also believes the report rightly
highlights the fact that the UK needs to charter "substantial"
additional shipping to ensure the rapid deployment of its forces
and correctly emphasises the need to review how the UK prepares
for such operations in complex geo-political situations. The report
stated: "It is important to develop a range of planning options
to cater for possible uncertainties" and NUMAST believes
the government's current policies and practices for the strategic
use of commercial shipping do not reflect these very real contingencies.
We urge the committee to note the report's comment that: "We
will need to keep under review our air and sea transport assets
and our ability to secure access to commercial transport in the
quantities and timeframes required to meet future expeditionary
requirements." We consider the government should take no
consolation from the fact that once again the UK has had to rely
heavily upon FoCs and foreign seafarers. There are many military
scenarios where such tactics cannot be used and we believe the
UK must look more closely at the US model of support to provide
a guaranteed pool of domestic shipping and seafarers to help meet
strategic demands in all circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Operation Telic has once again demonstrated
the important strategic role of merchant shipping. It has also
demonstrated the UK's increasing dependence on foreign-owned,
foreign-flagged and foreign-crewed vessels in such circumstances.
NUMAST believes this dependence is an issue of serious concern.
It is absolutely essential—particularly at a time of intense
global instability and insecurity—that ministers take us
seriously and respond to the worrying issues raised in our research.
NUMAST believes it is a matter of immense importance
that an island nation with a proud history of maritime expertise
has the ability to support its military operations with a domestic
fleet of high quality merchant ships, crewed by high quality British
seafarers.
REFERENCES
The Defence Requirement for Merchant Shipping
and Civil Aircraft—House of Commons Defence Committee Report
June 1988.
Ministry of Defence: Movements of Personnel,
Equipment and Stores to and from the Gulf—Committee of Public
Accounts Report, May 1994.
British Merchant Shipping: Supply and Demand
in an Emergency—Submission by the Chamber of Shipping to
House of Commons Defence Committee, November 1994.
British Shipping: Merchant Shipping and Defence—General
Council of British Shipping, September 1989.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve
Force Protection for DoD Deployments through Domestic Seaports—US
General Accounting Office October 2002.
US National Defense Transportation Association
Military Sealift Committee report on the Maritime Security Program—February
2003.
Letters from Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP to NUMAST—27
January 2003 and 5 March 2003.
House of Commons Written Answers—7 January 2003, 4 February
2003.
Independent—9 June1993.
TradeWinds Today—7 January 2003-11-28.
TradeWinds International—7 March 2003.
Reuters—18 December 2002, 4 February 2003.
Fairplay Daily News—8 January 2003.
Financial Times—5 February 2003-11-28.
Lloyd's List—25 July 2002.
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