Government response
1. We very much welcome the House of Commons Defence
Committee's report "Lessons of Iraq". It is right
and important that Parliamentarians with experience of Defence
carefully examine the performance of Britain's Armed Forces and
civilians during high-intensity warfare at large scale. It is
also proper for them to examine such areas as procurement, training
and logistics, where work carried out previous to the campaign
had a strong bearing on its successful outcome. We also value
the Committee's investigation into our performance during the
period subsequent to major combat operations.
2. The report covers a large range of areas and presents
131 conclusions and recommendations. These conclusions are generally
positive. Some of the issues covered are both detailed and technical.
But in assessing the Operation overall, we very much welcome the
Committee's conclusion that: "The men and women of the Armed
Forces deserve the highest praise for their conduct and performance
in Iraq. The commitment required of them not only during the combat
operations but also in the subsequent peacekeeping and peace support
roles is of a very high order."
3. This memorandum sets out below the Government's
response to each of the main points of Committee's report in the
order in which they were raised.
The men and women of the Armed Forces deserve
the highest praise for their conduct and performance in Iraq.
The commitment required of them not only during the combat operations
but also in the subsequent peacekeeping and peace support roles
is of a very high order. (Paragraph 1).
4. We agree with the Committee.
We extend our deepest sympathies to the families
of those who lost their lives. (Paragraph 1).
5. We thank the Committee for its sympathies, which
have been passed to the Service Casualty Organisations.
We welcome the openness of MOD and the Armed Forces
in publishing its 'lessons learned' reports on operations in Iraq
and we commend them for the efforts they made to do so promptly
after the major combat phase had concluded. (Paragraph 6).
6. We welcome the Committee's conclusion.
We regret that MOD has failed to provide us with
certain documents which we have requested and has demonstrated
on occasion less co-operation and openness than we have the right
to expect as a select Committee of the House of Commons. (Paragraph
21).
7. The Secretary of State has written to the Committee
on this issue. We believe that the information that we withheld
could not have been released without endangering current or future
operations; nor do we agree with the Committee's conclusion in
paragraph 21 that we could have released Commanding Officers'
confidential accounts of the operation without endangering the
candour of future accounts.
Special Forces
The 'increasing role' of Special Forces was demonstrated
in operations in Afghanistan, and has now been emphatically reinforced
by the crucial role which they played in Iraq. Their skills and
professionalism provide a unique capability to the total British
military effort. (Paragraph 23).
8. We agree that the Special Forces provide a unique
capability to the total British military effort. We continue to
invest in improving their capability through our Departmental
Planning processes.
Planning and Strategy
The Debate within the Pentagon
The British, who had had embedded staff officers
at Centcom from September 2001, were the first foreigners to be
brought into the American planning process and appear to have
been influential in the overall shape of the plan. In this the
British-American relationship also drew on more than 10 years
of close collaboration between the RAF and USAF in enforcing the
northern and southern no-fly zones over Iraq. We are not, however,
able to define the areas in which the British made specific contribution
to what was essentially an American campaign plan, other than
in the consideration of the northern option and in niche capabilities
such as special forces operations. (Paragraph 43).
9. The Department believes that the contribution
made by embedded UK officers was influential in the overall shape
of the plan. Bilateral engagement between Commander CENTCOM and
the UK Chief of Joint Operations provided the most effective and
immediate path of influence throughout the planning stages. Below
this, the UK had two principal liaison officers fully engaged
at the military-strategic and operational levels of command: CDS'
Liaison Officer in the Pentagon, and the Senior British Military
Adviser and his staff at CENTCOM. The final plan was therefore
the product of both US and UK thinking, discussion and ideas.
EFFECT OF OPERATION FRESCO
Although the Armed Forces commitment to Operation
FRESCO did not prevent them from putting together an effective
force package for the operation in Iraq, it did limit the total
numbers. It also adversely affected some elements of the force
(by for example requiring high readiness units to move at short
notice from fire- fighting to deploying to Iraq). In the longer
term it could have undermined the Armed Forces' ability to sustain
combat operations. (Paragraph 56).
10. At the time of planning Operation TELIC the main
effort for the Armed Forces was Operation FRESCO. However, the
firefighting cover provided by the UK Armed Forces did not affect
their ability to mount Operation TELIC. Obviously, if other commitments
had not existed, the range of potential force packages would have
been greater. That is always true. However, it does not follow
that a different force package would have been better.
11. The air and maritime packages were in line with
our Defence Planning Assumptions for an operation of this magnitude.
They also provided specialist capabilities which add particular
value to US forces, such as Air-to-Air Refuelling and Mine Counter
Measures. Choosing the land component was more complicated because
of the switch from planned operations in the North to South, which
required an additional brigade—16 Air Assault Brigade—to
strengthen our land assault capability. As a precaution we had
made this possible by releasing the brigade from Operation FRESCO
before Christmas.
Overall, the demands that Operation TELIC placed
on UK Armed Forces in the context of other operational requirements
were very close to the maximum that they could sustain. (Paragraph
57).
12. We accept that the requirement to support civilian
authorities in the context of the firefighter strikes at the same
time as the build up to hostilities in Iraq did place significant
demands on our Armed Forces. These were, however, within our capabilities.
When Operation FRESCO ended, further troops became available and
this pressure was relieved.
13. The recent Defence White Paper acknowledged the
additional demands placed on our Armed Forces by the range of
expanding tasks and the level and frequency of operational deployments.
Our planning assumptions have been revised accordingly and we
intend to ensure that the Armed Forces are appropriately balanced
for the challenges they are likely to face.
Planning Assumptions
We believe that MOD should consider whether for
major equipment and capabilities the planning assumptions process
is sufficiently flexible to match the very wide range of types
and scales of operations which our Armed Forces may be required
to undertake in the future. (Paragraph 59).
14. Planning assumptions are used to inform the development
of the future structure of the Armed Forces to enable them best
to meet the likely challenges of the future. In contrast to the
Cold War, today's planning assumptions require flexible Armed
Forces to meet a wide range of military tasks across different
regions and environments. They are the result of a lengthy process
of analysis of the future strategic environment that culminated
in the publication of the Defence White Paper. They are guidelines—we
may be able to do more from within the force structure, accepting
that this will stretch personnel and resources, or we may choose
to do less.
15. We need to strike the right balance between the
programmed procurement of equipment and the purchase of equipment
for specific operations as the result of an Urgent Operational
Requirement (UOR). We should have equipment that is appropriate
to the demands of the most likely and most frequent types of operation.
It would be very costly, however, to hold a stockpile of equipment
that is reserved solely for use on less frequent or likely operations.
The UOR process is there to meet any shortfall and we need to
ensure that it is responsive enough to meet the demands of operations
that we might conduct with longer warning times.
THE NORTHERN OPTION TO THE SOUTHERN OPTION
From the evidence we have seen it appears that
the late decision to move from the north to the south led to a
requirement for the UK to deploy a significantly larger force—at
least one brigade, something over 5,000 troops. This may well
have been a contributory factor in complicating the various logistical
problems that were later faced. (Paragraph 69).
16. The Committee correctly notes that following
the decision to switch from the North to the South we judged we
needed an additional brigade—16 Air Assault Brigade in this
case. It is also possible that we would have required an additional
brigade for the Northern Option, because of changes to the likely
disposition of US forces under that option.
17. The additional troops required for the Southern
Option did present a more challenging logistic supply task in
volume terms. But while the Southern option resulted in a longer
sea line of communication than the Northern option, both the land
and sea lines of communication were easier to manage. Additionally,
we were able to rationalise some elements of our structure by
sharing some US logistic support there. Overall the Ministry of
Defence is of the view that the challenges posed by mounting the
Southern operation at relatively short notice were met, and that
this was considerable achievement by our Armed Forces.
THE FORCE BALANCE
MOD needs to urgently re-examine the mechanisms,
including the use of reserves, by which units are brought to war
establishment with minimal disruption in all important preparatory
phases of the operations. (Paragraph 71).
18. The Army is already working through the "force
generation" issues highlighted by Operation TELIC and experience
on other recent operations. The outcome of this work will be the
Future Army Structure, which was noted in the Defence White Paper
(para 4.12). A formal announcement is expected later this year
but options include closer integration between the Reserves and
Regular forces and re-balancing manpower better to deliver the
deployable element of the Army.
Overall, however, the signs are that, above Brigade
level (i.e. at Division level), UK Armed Forces have become a
one operation force—one operation which must be followed
by a lengthy period of recovery before they can be in position
to mount another similar operation, even within a Coalition. (Paragraph
74).
19. In the context of other commitments including
Operation FRESCO, the demands of Operation TELIC were close to
the top end of the spectrum of what we might expect the Armed
Forces to be able to achieve. But this level of commitment reflects
current Defence Policy, which is based upon developments and evidence
since the SDR and its New Chapter, and the security challenges
we foresee in the future.
20. The Defence White Paper described how the MOD
plans to operate in the future strategic environment, countering
the threats of WMD proliferation and international terrorism and
addressing the challenges of weak and failing states. It is explicit
about the scale of forces we require for the types of expeditionary
operation that we should plan to undertake. It concluded that
we need flexible Armed Forces that are structured and equipped
for the most likely and most frequent types of operation at small
and medium scale, in other words up to brigade level for the land
component, while also meeting our Standing Tasks and Commitments.
21. Given time to prepare, the Armed Forces should
be able to undertake a single large-scale operation like Operation
TELIC (with a division-sized land component) while still maintaining
a commitment to a small-scale operation in addition to the Standing
Tasks and Commitments. To do more than this would require a significant
increase in the size of the Armed Forces. These planning assumptions
guide development of capability and are not intended to constrain
or precisely describe the actual pattern of operational commitments.
We may do less or may be able to do more. A period of recuperation
is required after any operation to ensure that personnel can be
rested and trained for other tasks, stockpiles can be replenished,
and equipment replaced.
We are pleased to learn that according to Lessons
for the Future, MOD intends to review the generation
of force elements at readiness and the implications for notice
to move times. But we feel that MOD should be more explicit in
articulating what scale of forces can be offered for expeditionary
operations of choice in the future, while ensuring adequate resources,
equipment and training time. (Paragraph 75).
22. Force Elements at Readiness (FE@R) are regularly
reviewed as part of the Short Term Plan process and in line with
changes to the policy framework described in Defence Strategic
Guidance. The FE@ R requirement is then published in the confidential
section of the Departmental Plan, which forms the baseline for
setting resource priorities. Defence Planning Assumptions are
currently being reviewed as part of the revised guidance that
will be published in 2005. This includes a more fundamental look
at readiness in order to align timelines more closely with resources.
Command and Control
The appointment of a deployed UK National Contingent
Commander worked effectively in Operation TELIC. (Paragraph 82).
23. We agree that the deployed UK national Contingent
Commander based in the NCC headquarters worked effectively during
Operation TELIC. We will keep under review what might be the best
arrangements for any given operation.
We expect MOD to revisit the question of the deployability
of PJHQ, raised in the SDR, in the light of recent operations,
and we look forward to their conclusions. (Paragraph 82).
24. Through the Joint Force Headquarters, PJHQ is
already deployable.
COMMAND RELATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS
We recommend that MOD considers whether the highest
levels of British command structures might be made more adaptable
so as to be able to operate more closely in parallel with their
American counterparts, when UK and US forces are operating together.
(Paragraph 84).
25. We do not agree. The Coalition command structures
were closely integrated.
THE MARITIME COMPONENT
The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) made a vital contribution
to the operation. MOD should ensure that the shortcomings which
were highlighted are addressed. (Paragraph 88).
26. The Royal Navy is looking at the issue of Maritime
Force Protection in the light of the lessons from Operation TELIC
and the terrorist threat. The RFA will be included within this
package. Measures range from individual body armour and night
vision equipment to the Block Phalanx weapon system. These measures
incur a cost and will be considered in relation to other priorities.
27. All RFA ships are currently fitted with close
range weapons for self-defence. These weapons are either 20mm
or 30mm cannon and 7.62 General Purpose Machine Guns. FORT VICTORIA
and FORT GEORGE are also fitted with a Phalanx Close In Weapon
System. All RFA crews are trained to operate and maintain the
weapons onboard. Additional defensive measures are being considered
to counter the asymmetric threat.
28. The replenishment capability of RFA ships varies
between the different classes and depends on their specific roles.
The larger FORT class ships are designed for full Task Force operations
and are capable of conducting simultaneous multi-ship replenishment
and flight deck operations. Others, such as the older LEAF class,
only have a single ship replenishment capability. MOD is currently
looking at the requirements for replacing the older RFA ships
and that work will include analysis of the replenishment capability
requirements for future ships.
TARGETING
There is clear evidence of UK influence on the
air targeting operations of the Coalition. Principally this influence
seems to have been applied to issues of perception, specifically
how attacking particular targets would be received by European
allies. The extent to which the UK persuaded the US out of attacking
certain targets on grounds of principle is less clear. We asked
MOD for specific examples of UK influence but they failed to provide
any, even on a classified basis. (Paragraph 98).
29. We note that the Committee recognises that the
UK had influence in the decision-making process for Coalition
targeting.
30. We are sorry the Committee has stated that we
failed to provide them with examples of UK influence. We provided
the Committee with classified material at the time of the request
that we feel adequately answered their query. The Committee did
not indicate at the time that they were dissatisfied.
We feel that the shortcomings in the practice
and training of close air support by the RAF and land forces which
have emerged in recent operations must be urgently addressed.
This will require a reassessment of the numbers of and equipment
for Forward Air Controllers, both on the ground and in the air,
the provision of adequate targeting pods for individual aircraft
and significantly greater exercising of these capabilities in
a joint environment. Such exercises are likely to have to take
place overseas since, as we understand it, no UK based facility
exists for such training. (Paragraph 104).
31. The interface between the air and land environments
is the subject of the Coningham/Keyes study. This is a joint initiative
between LAND and STRIKE Commands. Training for Forward Air Controllers
and Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP) is a specific study area
and emerging findings are looking to realign exercises between
the two commands in order to improve training opportunities. The
Army has also created additional TACPs in each Division and is
working to establish further teams in each manoeuvre Brigade.
A programme to provide tactical satellite communications for these
parties is scheduled to deliver by January 2005. The RAF acknowledge
the need for more targeting pods but this is subject to the priorities
placed on the Equipment Programme and has been judged unaffordable
at this time.
32. We are considering proposals for an enhanced
exercise programme.
Effective and timely arrangements for assessing
battle damage are crucial for continuously informing the campaign
plan and for establishing whether the aim of minimising damage
to civilians and civilian infrastructure has been achieved. We
look to MOD to exploit the latest technological advances to further
improve the speed and accuracy of battle damage assessment. (Paragraph
106).
33. We agree that timely Battle Damage Assessment
(BDA) is important. During Operation TELIC, however, the scale
of the air campaign meant there were insufficient resources available
to carry out the BDA task during major combat operations. Technical
and intelligence availability issues continue to limit our ability
to conduct BDA as effectively as we would wish; future developments
of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Intelligence, Surveillance,
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) platforms may alleviate
this.
Use of Reserves
Call-out and mobilisation
While we are pleased to learn that for Operations
TELIC 2 and 3, MOD has been able to give most reservists 21 days
notice to report, we are concerned that for TELIC 1 reservists
were given 14 days notice to report, and in some cases considerably
less. We expect MOD to ensure that the appropriate lessons are
learned to avoid the need for such short notice to report, and
to recognise the impact of this on reservists, their families
and their employers. (Paragraph 116).
34. Notice to report for compulsory call-out is set
by operational requirements. Ideally we would aim to give both
regular reservists and volunteer reservists 21 days notice to
report for service, but this cannot always be achieved. For TELIC
I, in order to ensure the reserves were ready in time, generally
we were only able to give 14 days notice to report. In some instances
notice to report was considerably shorter. For operational reasons
we were unable to avoid mobilising a number of key enablers soon
after the call-out order was made.
35. For TELIC II and III, in general we were able
to give reservists 21 days notice to report. Again, this could
not be guaranteed and a small number of reservists received a
shorter notice to report due mainly to late changes to operational
requirements.
36. As the Operation matures and planning can be
carried out further in advance, we hope to move to 30 days notice
to report for Op TELIC. In practice for TELIC IV we have generally
achieved over 28 days notice to report and we shall strive to
maintain this level of notice. However, it must be understood
that there will always be last minute changes of requirement and/or
operational circumstances which mean that we cannot guarantee
a set notice to report period for reservists.
We expect MOD and the reserve organisations to
take appropriate action to ensure that reservists are made fully
aware of their liability for call out. (Paragraph 117).
37. Every individual joining the Volunteer Reserve
is made aware of his or her call-out liability under the Reserve
Forces Act 1996. In addition, when joining the Regular Armed Forces,
individuals are informed that they may have a Regular Reserve
liability when they complete their term of regular service. They
are also reminded of this liability when they are discharged from
service and their Regular Reserve liability commences.
38. During the initial stages of the Op TELIC Lessons
Identified exercise, however, it became clear that many reservists
were unsure of the extent of their call-out liability and that
they were unprepared for mobilisation. As a direct result of this
finding all three Services have instigated 'Mobilisation Matters'
training packages which are being given to Volunteer Reservists
as part of their routine training.
We recommend that MOD consider what action can
be taken to ensure that the substantial proportion of regular
reservists who failed their medicals return to being 'fit for
role'. (Paragraph 119).
39. There are established procedures for monitoring
the fitness of Volunteer Reservists who fail mobilisation medicals.
For Regular Reservists, however, there are no procedures to monitor
medical fitness, nor is there any way of enforcing the maintenance
of medical fitness once an individual has left the Regular Forces.
As part of the Lessons Identified process, however, we are considering
the future role of the Regular Reserve. This will include considering
methods of monitoring and maintaining medical fitness and dental
health. At the time of writing it is too early to say what conclusions
may be reached.
Overall, it appears that the majority of reservists
mobilising through Chilwell considered that they had received
adequate training before being deployed. However, we are concerned
about the non-alignment of Territorial Army (TA) and Regular shooting
standards and expect MOD to address this issue as soon as possible.
(Paragraph 122).
40. The TA has a limited number of training days
per year compared to the training available to Regular soldiers.
It must, therefore, be recognised that we cannot expect the TA
to match Regular soldiers' training standards in all subjects
including Skill at Arms. Nevertheless, previous to Operation TELIC,
Skill at Arms was one of many areas where we delivered improvements
by introducing Phase One Training: the Common Military Syllabus
(Recruit) TA (on 1 April 2003). This programme not only reduces
the training gap with Regular soldiers across a range of skills
but also identifies that training which needs to be addressed
on mobilisation. Skill at Arms is one of the basic training requirements
for all soldiers and is under continuous development. Concurrent
activity across a number of work strands for the TA seeks to improve
both the annual Skill at Arms standard and attainment level required
for the TA's emerging roles.
41. In addition, once called-out, members of the
TA undergo a short period of pre-deployment training. The aim
of this training is to prepare reservists for the theatre to which
they will deploy and provide refresher training in key areas including
weapons handling. Once this training is complete, reservists are
deployed to theatre. On arrival, they then undergo further training
to ensure that they are fully prepared for the role they are to
perform.
FINANCE AND COMPENSATION ISSUES
We are concerned to learn that some TA reservists
experienced problems regarding their pay. We understand that for
future operations, where significant numbers of reservists are
deployed, PJHQ have agreed to the deployment of a Reserves Cell
whose role will include issues such as pay and allowances. We
expect MOD to ensure that this lesson is implemented in full.
(Paragraph 125).
42. We accept that there were a few problems with
pay delivery. Some reservists' pay statements did not get delivered
to units in the desert. This meant that they did not know that
they were being paid, or how much they were being paid. For the
small number that did experience pay delivery problems, we are
not aware of any delay in the payment of reservists' basic military
salary. However, there have been some late payments of allowances
for reservists during Operation TELIC, which are attributable
to delays in the administrative process for taking the reservist
on strength at the Theatre unit. In addition, there have also
been delays in handling claims for financial assistance. This
is due, in the main, to reservists failing to provide the evidence
necessary to process claims. Both of these issues were identified
during the Operation TELIC lessons identified process and action
is in hand to improve the administrative systems in use.
43. We fully accept the Committee's recommendation.
A dedicated Reserves Cell that can deal with reserve issues, including
pay, has been in theatre since TELIC. The need for such a cell
has been written into our future deployment plans.
It is clearly wrong that reservists who are compulsorily
mobilised for combat operations should lose out financially. We
note that to date only a small number of appeals have been made
by reservists dissatisfied with their individual financial arrangements.
We recommend that these be considered sympathetically and that
MOD monitor closely the numbers and outcomes of such appeals over
the coming months. (Paragraph 126).
44. The Committee appears to have misunderstood the
Financial Assistance process. Should a reservist be dissatisfied
with the amount of financial assistance awarded by MOD, they have
a right to appeal to an independent Reserve Forces Appeals
Tribunal. This is organised by the Employment Tribunal Service
who supply the members of the Appeals Tribunal. As the appeal
procedure is independent of MOD, we cannot influence the outcome
of appeals. However, we do make every effort to resolve cases
sympathetically before an appeal hearing is needed.
45. At the time of writing the total number of appeals
that had been submitted was 116 of which five were reservist financial
appeals. Two were resolved to the reservists' satisfaction before
the appeal date, leaving three which have gone to appeal. The
Tribunal found in favour of MOD in two cases. The final case is
still outstanding.
We expect MOD to ensure that the procedures for
reservists claiming financial assistance are streamlined and less
intrusive. (Paragraph 127).
46. We agree with the Committee's recommendation.
As already detailed in the recent Defence White Paper, work is
in hand to produce new regulations governing the award of both
Reservist Standard Award and Reservists Hardship Award. The new
regulations will take into account the lessons arising from the
mobilisation for Iraq. This work is being undertaken as a priority.
EMPLOYMENT ISSUES
We note that MOD has commissioned a study to measure
the degree of employer support for the mobilisation of the Reserve
and look forward to seeing the findings and the lessons that MOD
identify. But we consider that MOD needs to adopt a more proactive
approach to identifying cases where reservists have experienced
employment problems following a period of mobilisation. Reservists
need to be assured that they will not lose their jobs, as a result
of being mobilised, and that support will be available if they
encounter such problems. (Paragraph 129).
47. We agree that a proactive approach is the best
way of dealing with this problem. That is why, in cooperation
with the regional Reserve Forces and Cadets Associations, we have
introduced regional Employer Support Executives to liaise with
employers on a number of issues including employment problems
following mobilisation. We are also introducing Unit Employer
Support Officers to strengthen our capability in this area further.
48. We do not take the support of employers for granted
and have, for many years, run a campaign to win and maintain the
support of employers for the Reserve Forces. Support to British
Reserve Employers provides the main elements of this campaign.
Since the beginning of Op TELIC we have been writing to the employers
of those reservists who have been called out to thank them for
their support. Additionally, we have held a number of regional
receptions in order to thank employers personally.
49. With regard to employment protection, under the
Reserve Forces (Safeguard of Employment) Act 1985, employers are
required to take back into employment former employees who have
completed called-out service. The Act also deals with the terms
and conditions of reservists when reinstated to civilian employment.
If an employer fails to take a reservist back into employment
or infringes any of his or her rights under the 1985 Act, the
reservist may apply to a Reinstatement Committee which will decide
on the matter. The Committee has the power to require employment
to be made available to the reservist, or may order the employer
to pay compensation, or both. Our experience so far is that there
have been 17 cases that have been heard by Reinstatement Committees.
50. We are fully aware of the need to monitor reinstatement
difficulties, and we liaise closely with the employment Tribunal
Service to keep full track of all Reinstatement Committee hearings.
We are very concerned to learn that 11 members
of the TA in Germany (over a quarter of the TA in Germany deployed
to Operation TELIC), who form part of a key squadron (the Amphibious
Engineer Squadron), lost their jobs with civilian employers on
returning from deployment on Operation TELIC. We expect MOD and
the reserve organisations to raise these matters with the relevant
authorities within Germany and with the civilian employers of
the TA reservists in Germany. (Paragraph 131).
51. We were very concerned to learn that 11 members
of the TA in Germany lost their civilian jobs on returning from
deployment on Operation TELIC. These individuals were not protected
by the provisions of the Reserve Forces (Safeguard of Employment)
Act 1985, as they are British nationals who live overseas and
are not protected by UK law. We have, therefore, as a temporary
measure offered all those who were unable to regain their civilian
jobs Full-Time Reserve Service with the Army for 12 months or
until they are able to find alternative work. In addition, we
plan to raise the matter of reservists' employment protection
with the relevant authorities within Germany.
We are concerned that the requirement on reservists
to inform their employers of their reserve status seems to have
been announced ahead of the findings of MOD's own study on employer
support. There does not seem to have been prior consultation with
members of the Reserve. We recommend that MOD set out why it chose
to make this change at this time. (Paragraph 132).
52. This subject has been the topic of much debate
both within MOD and with reservists and employers. Surveys undertaken
by the Ministry of Defence have shown that a large majority of
reservists have already told their employers that they are members
of the Volunteer Reserve. In addition, when reservists are mobilised
their employers are automatically informed of their membership
of the reserve forces. Therefore, we do not expect routine employer
notification to have a significant impact on employer support.
53. The introduction of employer notification was
announced by Written Ministerial Statement on 3 February 2004
(Official Report, Column WS25). Currently members of the Volunteer
Reserve Forces (VRF) are required to declare their employment
status and to provide details of their employer(s) to MOD. They
are also encouraged to inform their employer(s) of their membership
of the VRF and of their liability for training and call out. A
majority are believed to have done so. They will now be required
to give their consent for MOD to do so automatically. This change
of policy is a reasonable requirement for the individual. It will
permit employers to plan for an employee's absence for full time
military service and thereby contribute directly to reducing mobilisation
risk by minimising the likelihood of employer applications for
exemption at time of call out.
54. Employer notification was implemented with effect
from 1 April 2004 for all new entrants to the VRF and for all
current members of the VRF as they re-engage unless granted an
exemption waiver. Employer notification will also apply with effect
from 1 April 2005 to those who do not routinely re-engage such
as commissioned officers.
IMPACT ON THE RESERVES
It is unreasonable that reserve personnel deployed
on Operation TELIC should have to do additional service, on top
of the six to nine months taken up by that tour, to qualify for
their annual bounty and we recommend that MOD waives this requirement.
(Paragraph 134).
55. We disagree. Reservists do not earn training
bounty when undertaking mobilised service. Although they are delivering
operational capability by carrying out their trade tasks in an
operational environment, they are not meeting the bounty requirements
for training. The reason for this rule is that it is a training
bounty, paid to those who undertake the required elements of peacetime
training to ensure they are fit for mobilisation. We recognise,
however, that mobilisation has made it difficult for some reservists
to meet their training bounty requirement. Authority has therefore
been granted for mobilised service to count in lieu of the continuous
training element conducted during annual camp. Nevertheless, reservists
must additionally complete their weekend training with their volunteer
reserve unit in order to qualify for bounty.
MOD has identified a number of lessons relating
to the Reserve from the experience of Operation TELIC. We look
to MOD to implement these lessons in full. We welcome the announcement
that, following Operation TELIC, MOD is adjusting the arrangements
for the higher management of the Reserve and that the Directorate
of Reserve Forces and Cadets will come under the direct command
of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, which reflects the importance
of this key part of our Armed Forces. (Paragraph 135).
56. We agree with the Committee that the reserves
form a key part of the Armed Forces. In order to reflect this
we have reviewed and amended our organisational structure to reflect
this. A new two star reserve post, Assistant Chief of Defence
Staff (Reserves and Cadets), has been established who reports
directly to Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.
57. With regard to the recommendations arising out
of the use of reserves during Operation TELIC, many of these have
already been implemented. Work continues to implement those that
remain. In addition, we will continue to modify and improve our
policies and practices on the use of Reserves in light of current
and future operations.
Throughout our inquiry we have come into contact
with a range of reservists who served on Operation TELIC. As with
the Regular service personnel, we have been impressed with their
dedication and the invaluable contribution they made. We concur
with MOD's conclusion that reservists 'showed the highest quality
and commitment… their value in all phases of an operation
has again been demonstrated.' (Paragraph 136).
58. We agree. We are grateful for the commitment
and professionalism with which reservists carry out their duties.
Defence Medical Services
Manning
We find it worrying that some five years after
the Strategic Defence Review the problems in the Defence Medical
Services (DMS), in particular the problem of under-manning, appear
to be as bad as they ever have been. We were alarmed to learn
that for the major specialities for war MOD had 'emptied the boxes'
for Operation TELIC. Further deployments in the near future are
only likely to exacerbate the problems. (Paragraph 143).
59. It is simply not true that "some five years
after the Strategic Defence the problems in the DMS" are
"as bad as they ever were". Compared with March 1999,
in January 2004 we had nearly 350 more fully trained medical personnel,
and over 500 more trainees in the pipeline.
60. We are making good progress in addressing shortages
in those areas where under-manning remains a problem, with an
emphasis on certain key clinical specialties: A&E, Anaesthetics,
General Medicine, General Surgery, Orthopaedics, Burns and Plastics
and Radiology.
61. The Medical Manning and Retention Review has
established a new pay structure to improve comparability with
the NHS, and the flexibility to respond to future NHS changes.
Pay for our Medical and Dental Officers improved by 10 per cent
last year. We have introduced a system of financial recruitment
initiatives (the "Golden Hellos" scheme) targeting certain
categories of consultants, General Medical Practitioners and certain
categories of nurses.
62. Other measures to address under-manning include
greater integration of the medical reserve and the use of civilian
medical personnel on enduring operations. One civilian consultant
anaesthetist has been working in Bosnia since December 03. We
also intend to send a civilian consultant team to Iraq.
63. Operation TELIC was a large-scale operation;
the most demanding one-off deployment for which we plan. Unsurprisingly,
the DMS, in common with other components of our Armed Forces,
was fully occupied supporting this commitment. But as with all
previous operations, we were fully able to meet the operational
requirement.
64. We continue to provide essential medical force
protection to the UK Armed Forces in Iraq. We remain confident
of our continuing ability to meet the MOD's planning assumptions,
and hence to support likely future deployments.
We acknowledge that the manning issue is not an
easy one to address quickly, but we look to MOD, the Department
of Health, the NHS and the medical profession to support the DMS
in its efforts to find new and innovative solutions. (Paragraph
144).
65. We are already working closely with the Department
of Health and the NHS. Under the terms of a Concordat signed with
the Department of Health in September 2002, we have established
a Partnership Board to address matters of mutual interest. The
Partnership Board also includes representatives from the NHS and
the devolved administrations in Scotland, Northern Ireland and
Wales.
66. A current initiative is to deploy NHS Integrated
Medical Teams to assist in the provision of medical support on
enduring operations. This will release regular and reserve medical
specialists for short notice operations, and alleviate deployment
fatigue. It will also provide career development and vocational
training for NHS staff in a challenging environment.
67. We have already received positive responses from
four NHS Trusts, and hope to deploy the first medical specialists
from a NHS acute trust in January 2005. We anticipate that, if
this deployment is successful, it will lead to further positive
responses from other NHS Trusts.
We recommend that MOD bring together the Department
of Health, the NHS and the medical profession with the DMS in
order urgently to identify solutions to the problem of increasing
specialism among surgeons in the NHS. (Paragraph 146).
68. We are already engaged with the Department of
Health, the NHS and the medical profession on these issues, and
we are making good progress.
69. We are confident that we will be able to make
the increasing trend towards specialisation among surgeons in
the NHS work for us, rather than against us.
70. Our surgeons must train to NHS standards and
expectations, and must, therefore, have a sub-speciality that
benefits their NHS Trust. Equally, our surgeons need to retain
competencies of a general nature for use on deployment. The two
requirements are not necessarily opposed, as most sub-specialities
will involve transferable skills.
71. We are working to ensure that, where necessary,
we can provide our surgeons with the additional training they
require to meet operational demands. For example, we have an arrangement
with South Africa whereby DMS surgeons receive specialist trauma
training there. This training is vital to the DMS as it enables
surgeons to train in the treatment of gunshot wounds.
We are most concerned to learn that 47 medical
reservists have resigned on returning from Operation TELIC, and
that MOD is aware of further resignations from Army medical reservists.
The number of resignations represents some six per cent of the
760 medical reservists deployed. We expect MOD to monitor this
issue closely, to identify the reasons behind the resignations,
and to take account of these in its recruitment and retention
efforts. (Paragraph 147).
72. Every year a small number of our medical reservists
leave for a variety of reasons, including an unwillingness to
participate in future operations following exposure to the realities
of a challenging deployment. This is to be expected, and we would
certainly not wish to retain reservists who have become either
unable or unwilling to meet their obligations.
73. So far, the numbers of medical reservists leaving,
for whatever reason, following Operation TELIC are not exceptional
by comparison with previous years.
74. If anything, the departure rate for medical reservists
compares favourably with the normal average annual turnover rate
for reservists as a whole. However, as with all retention issues
the MOD will keep this under constant review.
IMPACT ON THE NHS
This was the first operation where all the medical
personnel deployed came almost exclusively from the NHS and it
appears that the arrangements, such as the liaison between MOD,
the Department of Health, and NHS Trusts worked well. However,
thankfully, the number of casualties was low and the arrangements
for treating casualties in NHS hospitals were not fully tested.
(Paragraph 149).
75. We welcome the Select Committees' acknowledgement
of the success of our liaison with the Department of Health and
NHS Trusts.
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
We are pleased to learn that lessons about the
need to have more medical supplies on the shelves rather than
over-relying on UORs have been recognised. We expect MOD to identify
the appropriate balance between holding items and relying on UORs.
We also expect MOD to review any cases from Operation TELIC where
inadequate or insufficient equipment may have disadvantaged clinical
outcomes and, if any such cases are identified, to take appropriate
action to avoid such situations occurring in the future. (Paragraph
152).
76. We are working hard with the Medical Supplies
Agency and the Defence Logistics Organisation to establish and
maintain an appropriate balance between holding items and relying
on UORs.
77. We are not aware of any cases where inadequate
or insufficient equipment disadvantaged clinical outcomes. Allegations
to the contrary have not been substantiated.
Deployment
Sea Lift and Air Lift
We conclude that deploying such a large force
to the Gulf in the time available was a significant achievement.
(Paragraph 155).
78. We strongly agree that deploying such a large
force to the Gulf in the time available was a significant achievement
and a credit to our logistics organisation.
MOD should identify how the challenges of limited
landing slots for aircraft and small seaports could be addressed
in the future. (Paragraph 158).
79. We note the committee's recommendation, although
the committee has also recognised that we were successful in deploying
a large force to the Gulf in a short period of time. It will clearly
be important that the planning for any deployment takes account
of the physical constraints at the points of disembarkation.
We recognise the achievement of the DTMA in securing
the sea lift for Operation TELIC. We recommend that, drawing on
the experience from Operation TELIC, MOD should undertake a review
of ro-ro shipping to inform its future planning. (Paragraph 162).
80. We agree that the acquisition of sufficient sealift
was a major achievement and vindicated our procedures and practices.
The availability of RoRo shipping is reviewed by the Department
on a continuous basis, which will inform future planning.
The action taken by MOD ensured that the UK had
sufficient lift, but the outcome could well have been different.
For any future operations, MOD needs to avoid competing directly
with the US for outsize lift and co-ordinate its efforts to secure
such assets. (Paragraph 163).
81. Every effort is made as part of the planning
process to avoid competing with our allies for outsize lift.
Recent operations have highlighted the need for
sufficient sea and air lift. We look to MOD to ensure that those
assets that have performed their task well are available to our
Armed Forces in the future. We regret that the A400M programme,
which is intended to meet the UK's Future Transport Aircraft requirement,
has experienced delays to its planned in-service date. We expect
MOD to ensure that the current forecast in-service date is met
and that any capability gaps from delays already experienced are
filled. (Paragraph 167).
82. The Department is procuring 25 A400M not 180
aircraft (which is the total number of aircraft being purchased
through OCCAR) as mentioned in the report at paragraph 166. The
Out-of-Service Date for the Hercules C-130K fleet is linked to
the In-Service Date (ISD) of the A400M. We expect the current
A400M ISD to be met, but if for any reason this does not happen,
then Hercules and C-17 aircraft will fill any capability gaps.
URGENT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
We acknowledge that there were constraints on
when the UOR process could begin, but it is of real concern that
in some cases this resulted in Armed Forces personnel not having
access to the full complement of equipment, such as Minimi machine
guns and Underslung Grenade Launchers. (Paragraph 177).
83. The Department accepts that, on occasion, Urgent
Operational Requirements' (UOR) delivery timescales will be tight.
Any shortfalls that occurred did not in the event affect operational
capability. The decision as to whether our forces were ready for
combat operations, quite rightly, rested with the operational
commanders. They would not have allowed their troops to cross
the line without the necessary equipment for the task.
Much of the equipment procured as UORs made a
significant contribution to the success of the campaign and, in
most cases, industry supplied equipment at very short notice.
However UORs are not the solution in every case. MOD needs to
be better informed of which types of equipment and capabilities
can be delivered in UOR timescales—there were a number of
cases where equipment was not delivered by the time required or
where users did not have a full complement. We do not consider
that MOD planning properly recognised that the delivery date for
a piece of equipment and the date by which a capability is achieved
are not the same. If personnel are to be confident and fully efficient
with their equipment there must be adequate time for familiarisation,
training and integration. Furthermore, given the desire stated
in the recent White Paper to be able to intervene anywhere in
the world at short notice, we believe that the risks of relying
on UORs instead of holding adequate stocks, are not sufficiently
well analysed or understood in MOD's risk assessment processes.
(Paragraph 181).
84. The right balance needs to be struck between
having expensive stocks on the shelves and relying on procurement
during the readiness period. To keep large stock levels—so
that we could do another operation of this size at shorter notice—would
be very costly. We have to factor affordability into the equation,
and make judgements on the likelihood of action being required.
The Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) holds stocks in accordance
with agreed planning assumptions. These assumptions have recently
been looked at in detail and were reissued in revised form in
August 2003. We have started to identify the detailed actions
we need to take regarding stock levels.
85. The UOR process is used to fine-tune military
capability to ensure UK forces are as well equipped as possible
for the tasks they are asked to carry out. There will always be
capabilities we would like to have, but which we will not be able
to obtain in time for operations. But it must be borne in mind
that the capability we do have is highly potent, and with relatively
minor enhancement provides a strong basis on which to build successful
operations, such as those so recently carried out.
86. While the Department acknowledges that tight
delivery timescales can reduce the time available for training
prior to commencement of operations, many UORs were procured to
provide additional equipment of a type already held or to make
minor modifications to it. Such measures do not need much extra
training. Moreover, the help provided by the deployment of both
the Armoured Training Development Unit and Infantry Training Development
Unit into theatre was invaluable.
There are likely to be positive lessons from the
UOR process which have applicability to MOD's normal equipment
acquisition processes: for example, where UORs were used to accelerate
existing programmes. We expect MOD to identify and implement these
and reflect on the appropriateness of UOR procurement becoming
institutionalised. (Paragraph 183).
87. There is a clear process in the Department for
capturing Lessons Identified from Operations and exercises and
the same applies to the UOR process. In addition, the National
Audit Office (NAO) is in the middle of a study of the Department's
UOR process to see if it is the most effective/efficient way of
meeting urgent military needs. A report is expected during the
summer.
We expect MOD to evaluate fully the performance
of the equipment procured as UORs and the specific enhancements
they provided to the UK's military capabilities. This evaluation
must also take full account of the views of those members of the
Armed Forces who used the equipment in action. Disposing of useful
equipment cannot represent good value for money if it then has
to be reacquired in the future. (Paragraph 184).
88. The Department assesses whether we should retain
UORs in-service after an operation, and whether we can extend
the enhancements across equipment fleets. If an enhancement is
retained, our analysis will usually have shown that the benefit
it offers in improved performance outweighs the possible complications
in sustainability.
89. The UOR process allows us to respond to operations
in extreme environments (such as the desert) and to the specific
capabilities we anticipate opponents to have. We could not afford
to equip all our forces against every threat and climatic extreme:
a sensible balance has to be struck. At the conclusion of operations
we review whether we should resource the continuation of individual
UORs in-service from the Defence budget. We have been doing this
recently for Operation TELIC UORs as part of the planning round.
90. The Department acknowledges the Committee's point
that it can be wasteful to sell UORs and then buy them back. But
we must be realistic about resource constraints: we cannot always
afford to retain all the UOR equipment we want. In many cases
we may not keep equipment in-service if it has been used heavily,
or if technology is moving very fast. It may be better to buy
state-of-the-art equipment rather than keep kit in warehouses
for years.
The Start of Operations
From planning to operations—what was
found
The Committee congratulates the Royal Navy for
the success of the complex and demanding operation to clear mines
from the waterway to Umm Qasr and urges the MOD to review, as
a matter of urgency, the capability of the Royal Navy to undertake
mine clearance operations in shallow and very shallow waters,
given the likely need for increasing amphibious operations in
the littoral. (Paragraph 195).
91. In the light of our experiences during Operation
TELIC, we are incrementally improving our ability to conduct Mine
Counter-Measure (MCM) operations in shallow and very shallow water.
We have already established the Fleet Unmanned Underwater Vehicle
Unit (FUUVU) with an interim capability. It completed training
in January 2004 and has deployed operationally to Iraq in support
of the Iraq Survey Group.
92. Building on the work done by the FUUVU, we will
over the next five years, roll out a Mid-Term MCM Coherency package
that will introduce additional Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs)
into the Fleet, upgrade the command systems in the SANDOWN Minehunter
and provide an improved Network Enabled Capability that will enable
information to be shared electronically between ships and other
Fleet units. These enhancements will improve significantly our
current capability to undertake mine clearance in shallow and
very shallow water. In the longer term we are developing a Future
Mine-Countermeasures Capability that will:
- Further improve our ability
to conduct operations in very shallow water (2m - 10m),
- Facilitate the greater exploitation of Unmanned
Underwater Vehicles and remote MCM concepts, and
- Provide a more developed Network-Enabled Capability
to the MCM Commander and improved frontline support to MCM units.
THE APPROACH TO BASRA
The operation to take Basra was a significant
military achievement. One measure of its success—and in
the context of an effects-based operation an important one—was
that just one week later there were joint UK/Iraqi patrols. (Paragraph
202).
93. We agree that the operation to take Basra by
UK forces was a significant military achievement. Their subsequent
performance since that time, including both the mounting of joint
UK/Iraqi patrols and their extensive training, mentoring and monitoring
of the Iraqi security forces, has again demonstrated their professionalism
and versatility.
Major Defence Equipment
Overall Performance
We are pleased to learn that in most cases the
major defence equipments performed well in the difficult conditions
encountered in Iraq although, given the nature of the enemy, many
equipments were not tested to the full. (Paragraph 209).
94. The Department agrees that most of our defence
equipment performed well in the challenging environmental conditions
in Iraq. Although the Iraqis did not make the best use of their
capabilities, that is something for which Coalition forces can
take credit. The campaign plan was designed to overwhelm the regime,
present it with a multiplicity of problems and disrupt its command
and control capabilities. Clearly we were successful in this aim.
AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT
The availability of most defence equipment was
generally high during Operation TELIC. However, it is disappointing
that an impressive capability such as HMS Ocean is let down by
unreliable landing craft and 'that there are difficulties with
the acceptance of the new landing craft.' We expect MOD to remedy
this issue as soon as possible to ensure that the capabilities
of HMS Ocean are maximised. (Paragraph 213).
95. The full complement of four landing craft (MK
5A LCVP) embarked from HMS OCEAN during Operation TELIC. Although
problems were encountered with control of hydraulic and salt water
cooling systems, work is now in hand to rectify these faults.
The MK 5A LCVP Landing Craft is being replaced by the MK 5B craft.
Whilst there were delays in the early stages of the build programme
the total order of 16 craft was delivered and accepted into service
on schedule (March 04).
COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
It concerns us that for the next four to five
years we will continue to be dependent upon Skynet 4 which has
recognised limitations and which let us down on this occasion.
(Paragraph 215).
96. It is not the case that Skynet 4 services will
continue unchanged until replaced by a new Skynet 5 constellation
of satellites in four or five years' time. The Skynet 5 service
provider (Paradigm Communications Services) took ownership and
operational management of Skynet 4 space and ground assets in
mid 2003 and is already introducing improved services. By early
2005 we expect to have a full Skynet 5 service operating over
the existing Skynet 4 satellites and expect from around 2007 the
service provider to be introducing new satellites.
97. Both current and planned satellite communications
capability use military (Skynet) and commercial satellite communications
as they offer different benefits according to the circumstances.
The diversity that is offered by this approach has proved useful.
One of the Skynet satellites did experience a problem briefly
during the operation but the majority of communications traffic
was transferred to other available satellites.
Operation TELIC highlighted serious shortcomings
in the reliability, capacity and redundancy of the UK's communications
and information systems, which to a large extent are a consequence
of under-investment in the past. While we acknowledge that work
is in hand to address these shortcomings, we find it very worrying
that it will be some time before any real improvements will be
seen, particularly given the frequency with which UK Armed Forces
are now involved in operations, and the increased need to communicate
effectively not only within UK forces but also with our allies.
(Paragraph 218).
98. The communications links used during operations
in Iraq were carried over a diverse range of military and commercial
satellite bearer systems. Additional capacity was available had
it been needed. The total data bandwidth used during the operation
exceeded that deployed for any previous overseas operation.
99. Difficulties lay not so much with the systems
themselves but the gateways and interfaces between them. As explained
in Lessons for the Future, some of these could not always cope
with the volume of traffic. We are aware of the problems inherent
in operating a variety of different communications systems and
are developing the capability to manage our way round the inevitable
difficulties encountered.
100. As well as improvements to satellite communications
through the Skynet 5 programme, other communication infrastructure
improvements will begin to come on stream from 2004. The achievement
of In-Service Date (ISD) for the BOWMAN tactical radio system
(ahead of target) was announced in March 2004 and the CORMORANT
theatre system for connecting deployed headquarters is also due
to come into service later this year. Both these systems have
been developed for interoperability with the US and other allies
as a key consideration by, for example, incorporating NATO standards.
COMBAT IDENTIFICATION
We welcome the overall finding of the National
Audit Office that on Operation TELIC, the measures, procedures
and training relating to combat identification were largely effective.
We are disappointed that a copy of the review of combat identification
undertaken by the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, which was provided
to the National Audit Office, was not made available to the Defence
Committee during its inquiry. (Paragraph 222).
101. We note the Committee's comments.
We expect MOD to make available to Parliament
and the Committee the summaries of the conclusions of the reports
of the Boards of Inquiry into individual blue on blue incidents
as soon as possible and for the summaries to provide sufficient
information on the causes of the incidents and the lessons learned
in order to reassure the Armed Forces and ourselves that everything
practicable was done to minimise the possibility of such incidents.
(Paragraph 229).
102. We note the Committee's comments. We have indicated
to Parliament that summaries of the conclusions of the Board of
Inquiry reports will be made available to the Library of the House,
but only when all other related proceedings are entirely complete.
We expect MOD to implement the lessons from Operation
TELIC relating to combat identification. MOD should push forward
with the work with its allies to agree on a single system. The
latter is particularly important given that future UK military
action is most likely to be as part of a Coalition. We note MOD's
view that the opportunities for fratricide in an increasingly
complex battle space are likely to increase, but look to MOD to
identify the required action and make the necessary investment
to ensure that such incidents are reduced to a minimum. (Paragraph
233).
103. The Department remains committed to improving
combat effectiveness and minimising all casualties by improving
Combat Identification among other measures. This will also minimise
the risk of fratricide. Lessons identified from cases of fratricide
during operations in Iraq will inform all three elements of Combat
ID capability - situational awareness, target identification and
tactics, techniques and procedures. We continue to work with allies
on a range of Combat ID issues, including efforts to introduce
an interoperable target identification system for the ground environment.
UAVS
We are pleased to hear that, despite its chequered
past, Phoenix made a valuable contribution to the operation. We
support the robust approach being adopted in relation to the Watchkeeper
UAV programme, which aims to 'nail the…requirement and to
make sure that the companies deliver that which we have asked
for' although we continue to be concerned that the accelerated
in-service date for the programme may not be met. We will continue
to monitor the progress of this key programme. (Paragraph 236).
104. The Department notes the Committee's concerns
about the accelerated in-service date of WATCHKEEPER. Two proposals
for the demonstration and manufacture phase were received in March
2004 and are being assessed. The main investment decision is due
later in 2004 at which time a formal in-service date will be set.
We consider it well worthwhile that MOD is assessing
the usefulness of manportable UAVs for current operations in Iraq.
We expect MOD to reflect the results of this assessment when deciding
on the overall mix of UAVs for the future. (Paragraph 237).
105. Experience from the deployment of the Desert
Hawk man-portable UAVs in Iraq and from the work conducted under
the Joint UAV Experimental Programme (JUEP) will be taken into
account in informing decisions about meeting Intelligence, Surveillance,
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability requirements
in the future.
APACHE
We conclude that there are key lessons from the
United States' experience in Iraq which MOD needs to take into
account when developing its tactics, techniques and procedures
for its Apache helicopters. We expect MOD to take the required
action to ensure that UK Apache helicopters are as capable as
they can be, given the new sorts of environments and operations
they are likely to be operating in. (Paragraph 240).
106. The UK has developed close links with the US
in the development of the concepts for employing AH. The US lessons
from their experiences in Iraq validate much of what is already
laid down in the UK doctrine for Air Manoeuvre. The US did experience
problems during certain missions in Iraq and the lessons in terms
of mission planning, all-arms employment and threat assessment
have been incorporated.
107. In sum, the positive and negative aspects of
the Apache helicopter's experience on Operation TELIC have been
examined and the lessons learnt will be included in tactics, techniques
and procedures.
SEA KING
The Sea King helicopter made a significant contribution
to the operation and highlighted the benefit of acquiring equipment
that is sufficiently adaptable. However, we are concerned to learn
that, at times, the Sea King provided the only dedicated stand-off
sensor coverage for 3 Commando Brigade's operations on the Al
Faw peninsula. We expect MOD to ensure that the Astor programme
meets its in-service date to fill the current capability gap.
(Paragraph 241).
108. The ASTOR programme is on track to meet its
approved In-Service Date of autumn 2005, with Full Operating Capability
due to be achieved by 2008.
We expect MOD to ensure that the lessons identified
to minimise the Sea King's vulnerability are fully implemented.
(Paragraph 242).
109. All potential vulnerabilities of maritime helicopters
are naturally kept under constant review. The Royal Navy proactively
manages risk. With the exception of Sea King Mk4 (Commando) helicopters,
no maritime helicopters are currently fitted with either Defensive
Aids Suites (DAS), or armoured seating for the crew. The fitting
of DAS has been an aspiration for some time, and its potential
benefits have been highlighted again in Operation TELIC; but it
had not previously achieved a sufficiently high resourcing priority
within the Equipment Programme (EP). The priority list for the
fitting of DAS is assessed to be Lynx HMA Mk 3/8, followed by
Sea King Mk 7 ASAC and Merlin HM Mk 1. In EP 04, a funding measure
to equip a number of Lynx with DAS has been successful, and 12
sets will be funded. This should provide additional protection
to those Lynx when deployed on operational tasking from 2005.
Until upgrade programmes are approved for the remaining aircraft
types, protection will be achieved through operating procedures
and tactics designed to minimise risk.
THE DEFENCE WHITE PAPER
We have announced our intention to undertake an
inquiry into the Defence White Paper. We will also continue to
monitor the progress of the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES)
programme as part of our annual inquiry into defence procurement.
(Paragraph 246).
110. We welcome the Committee's inquiry into the
Defence White Paper. It is also appropriate to monitor the progress
of the FRES programme, which will be an important part of the
delivery of a medium weight land force.
Personal Equipment and Protection
We are pleased to note that, following its initial
rejection of the concerns about personal equipment and protection,
MOD now acknowledges that there was a problem which had a detrimental
impact on service personnel. Robust arrangements should now be
introduced to gauge the views of more junior ranks and specialists
whose widespread concerns do not seem to be properly understood,
reflected and acted upon by more senior commanders and officials
further up the chain. (Paragraph 249).
111. The Department has fully acknowledged that there
were shortages of certain items of personal equipment. However,
sufficient stocks of desert clothing, ECBA, NBC equipment etc.
were procured to meet the stated operational requirements. The
key difficulty was our inability to track assets once they were
delivered to theatre. Arrangements already exist to gauge junior
ranks' views on issues of concern to them via the chain of command.
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