Desert Boots and Clothing
The issue of the availability of desert clothing
and boots during Operation TELIC has been both a confusing and
worrying story. MOD should clarify its position on the circumstances
in which desert clothing and boots are to be used and ensure that
all service personnel understand the position. MOD clearly underestimated
the impact on morale of failing to provide service personnel with
the clothing and boots which they required and expected. We find
it unacceptable that some two weeks after the start of the combat
phase 60 per cent of the additional clothing requirement that
had been ordered was not available in theatre. We understand that
MOD has now increased its stockholding of desert and tropical
clothing and boots up to a total of 32,000 sets. We expect MOD
to keep the level of stockholding under review. (Paragraph 257)."
112. Sufficient stocks of desert clothing and desert
boots were ordered to meet the stated operational requirements.
However, the Department acknowledges that some personnel experienced
shortages. In light of operations in Iraq, the policy has been
reviewed and stockholdings have been increased to cater for 32,000
personnel.
113. The MOD is confident that arrangements for ensuring
personnel and units understand when Desert Clothing and Boots
are to be used are sufficiently robust.
ENHANCED BODY ARMOUR
Body armour is another example of where MOD's
in-theatre distribution and tracking led to shortages in critical
equipment. MOD should identify and implement solutions to address
these shortcomings and ensure that service personnel receive the
equipment they are entitled to. (Paragraph 262).
114. Measures have been introduced in the STP/EP
04 programme to provide incremental improvements to logistic tracking
and visibility. In the short term, efforts have focused upon enhancements
to the Consignment Visibility system and retention of the Total
Asset Visibility system procured as a UOR measure for Operation
TELIC. Funding has also been agreed for the equipment programme
to develop Management of the Joint Deployed Inventory (MJDI) and
a logistic element on the new joint operational computer system
(JC2SS). MJDI will provide the joint stores accounting and management
capability in a deployed Theatre.
115. The Department has been frank and open about
the difficulties encountered in tracking equipment in theatre.
Improvements to this capability are being actively pursued.
We will be interested to see the results of the
audit of previously issued body armour components and the action
that MOD plans to take in response to the findings. (Paragraph
264).
116. The results of the Enhanced Combat Body Armour
(ECBA) audit are detailed in the attached tables, which also include
issues data for Combat Body Armour (CBA) Covers (these do not
have the pockets for the ECBA plates). The audit has shown that
current stockholdings of ECBA components account for 66% of the
total number procured since 1992. The remainder (some 38,000 plates,
29,000 fillers and 79,000 `temperate/desert covers) have been
consumed over this period of as a result of wear and tear, and
operational loss. As can be seen from the data, ECBA is issued
as individual components and stocks are held throughout the supply
chain at central, single Service and in-theatre storage facilities.
117. When the audit was carried out there were sufficient
plates in stock to equip some 48,000 personnel (based on two plates
per set of ECBA). The overall number of ECBA/CBA component issues
since 1992 (691,458) is broadly consistent with the initial estimate
of 700,000 provided in February.
118. The figures for the number of issues include
items that have been returned to stock and re-issued, possibly
more than once, and therefore indicate the volume of activity
rather than the number of items issued on a permanent basis.
119. The data for the audit was collected from a
number of sources. Whilst we hold central records of the procurement,
issue and central stockholding of ECBA/CBA, information was also
collated from the Services, Northern Ireland and Op TELIC to develop
a more comprehensive picture of global holdings. Some of this
data will have been collected against differing baselines and
data on stockholdings can only therefore provide a snapshot in
time.
120. Taking into account the lessons learned from
operations in Iraq, we are currently in the process of developing
a policy for the future issue of ECBA, drawing on that which already
exists for other items of personal protection such as the GS helmet
and S10 respirator. The results of the ECBA audit will inform
this process in terms of the requirement for the initial procurement
of ECBA components to support it. Our aim is to have this policy
approved by the summer.
Before any firm decision on whether enhanced body
armour should become a personal issue item is made, the views
of service personnel, as well as the logistic implications of
a change in policy, must be considered. If the conclusion is that
enhanced body armour is not required for all operations, efforts
should nonetheless be made to ensure that where it is required
it is issued to personnel before their deployment.
121. The Department is currently reviewing its policy
on the issue of ECBA. All key stakeholders are being consulted
in the exercise. A decision should be made by the summer.
SA80 A2
The modifications to the SA80 have provided UK
service personnel with a more effective weapon system. MOD must
ensure that users of the weapon are kept fully aware of the cleaning
requirements for different environments and provide the necessary
cleaning material. Concerns about the weapon's safety catch must
be monitored and, where necessary, appropriate action taken. (Paragraph
267).
122. The Department notes the Committee's view of
the importance of ensuring that the SA80A2 maintenance regime
is promulgated. Reports from Operation TELIC are of almost universal
praise for the performance of the SA80A2. The promulgation of
the SA80 cleaning regime was reinforced in theatre by providing
an additional double aide memoire (cleaning procedure and safety
plunger maintenance). We have received no formal reports of stoppages
during the operation.
123. The problem with the safety catch/plunger is
infrequent, and is very quick to rectify. The problem does not
result in catastrophic failure and its onset is gradual.
124. Nevertheless, a new safety plunger has been
trialled in Iraq and has been approved following safety certification.
200,000 new safety catches have been ordered. Deliveries will
begin in June 2004 and will be completed in March 2005. The intention
is to fit the complete SA80A2 fleet with the new plunger.
AMMUNITION
Our examination suggests that there were problems
with the supply of ammunition when the fighting echelon began
operations. MOD accepts that in the very early stages there were
some problems and not all service personnel had the right amount.
We expect MOD to establish the scale of the problem, to investigate
any specific cases identified, in particular the tragic incident
involving the six Royal Military Policemen, and to implement the
necessary action to avoid any re-occurrence in the future. (Paragraph
270).
125. The Department notes the Committee's concerns
about the supply of ammunition at the start of operations. Over
23 million rounds of 5.56mm ball ammunition were delivered to
Operation TELIC. This was well in excess of the projected requirement
of all units deployed. Despite persistent rumours, no shortages
of 5.56mm ammunition were reported to HQ 1(UK) Armoured Div by
brigades either prior to or after crossing the Line of Departure.
While at times during the advance into Iraq the logistic supply
chain was stretched temporarily, the Department has been unable
to verify allegations that individual units were left with insufficient
ammunition.
126. It is not possible to determine whether some
of the rumours relate to troops in rear areas, who may not have
been allocated ammunition by their commanders. Notwithstanding
this, we have no record of commanders mentioning ammunition shortages
in their post-operation reports.
127. There has been speculation about the level of
ammunition available to the 6 Royal Military Policemen who died
in Al-Majar Al-Kabir on 24 June 2003. In order to establish the
facts surrounding this issue, a Board of Inquiry (BOI) convened
on 15 March 2004, which is examining the circumstances leading
up to the point at which the six soldiers moved into the police
station. The BOI will examine weapon and ammunition scalings,
and we are confident that this, together with the Service Police
investigation, will provide a much clearer understanding of events.
NIGHT VISION CAPABILITY
"We understand that MOD is currently reviewing
the scales of issue of night vision equipment. We consider that
the ability to operate confidently and effectively at night greatly
enhances force protection and capability. We look to MOD to examine
the case for providing night vision capability to all service
personnel who are required to operate at night. (Paragraph 272)."
128. The Department has a number of programmes that
are designed to improve our forces' night vision capability. The
Head Mounted Night Visions System programme provides individual
night vision equipment for infantry units as well as the RAF Regiment
and 3 Commando Brigade. The procurement of this system was accelerated
through UOR action and has proved to be particularly effective
on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Light Weight Thermal
Imaging programme provides a thermal imaging capability at platoon
level in infantry units as well as the RAF Regiment and 3 Commando
Brigade. We also plan to procure a Surveillance System and Range
Finder that will provide an integrated TI and laser range finder
which will equip fire controllers within the combat and combat
support arms of the Army as well as the RAF Regiment and 3 Commando
Brigade. These three programmes, in combination, will provide
a significant enhancement to the ability of our forces to operate
at night.
NBC EQUIPMENT
We find it alarming that MOD had to 'move Combopens
around in theatre' to fulfil the requirement. (Paragraph 274).
129. Redistribution of 'Combopens' around theatre
to ensure that the individuals requiring such personal protection
received it was a sensible response to the protection needs of
UK forces.
Given the potential threat posed by Iraqi armed
forces, sufficient chemical warfare detection and protection were
particularly important for this operation. However, there were
serious shortcomings in the supply and distribution system and
the required levels of detection and protection were not always
available to everyone. Indeed, while MOD ideally would have liked
each serviceman and woman to have had four suits available, only
one suit per person was available which MOD judged to be sufficient
for this operation. Furthermore it is essential that personnel
have confidence in the effectiveness of the equipment with which
they are provided. It was fortuitous that service personnel did
not suffer as a consequence, but had the Iraqis used chemical
weapons systematically, as employed in the Iran-Iraq war, the
operational consequences would have been severe. The lack of armoured
vehicle filters seems to us to be a matter of the utmost seriousness.
The lessons identified need to be implemented as a matter of urgency
to ensure that servicemen and women serving on operations have
complete and justified confidence that chemical warfare attacks
will be detected in time, that their individual protection equipment
will save their lives and that operational success will not be
imperilled. This is particularly important given that UK service
personnel are more likely to be operating in such environments
in the future. (Paragraph 281).
130. The NAO report on Operation TELIC states: "Although
overall protection against chemical agents was good there were
shortfalls". This is the position that the Department has
set out consistently since the operation began. There were sufficient
stocks on the shelf for all personnel who deployed into theatre,
including contractors and embedded journalists. Notwithstanding
this, owing to a mismatch between the sizes of the suits and individuals,
a small number of troops crossed the Line of Departure with only
one properly fitting suit. In particular there was a shortage
of large suits which primarily affected the Irish Guards. This
was caused by a combination of out-of-date sizing information
and a lack of historical data. We have developed procedures with
PJHQ to ensure units do not take in excess of their requirement
in the future, and are increasing the on-the-shelf size range.
131. Commanders assessed that the risk posed to the
Force by these shortages was low. The effect on morale was judged
to be more serious than the practical impact.
132. For NBC filter on armoured vehicles, as with
other threats, we had to judge the balance of risk between waiting
for all equipment to arrive and be available and delaying the
start of combat operations. Although a limited number of NBC vehicle
filters for some types of vehicle had arrived in 1 (UK) Division
before hostilities began, these had to compete with other priorities
such as in-theatre integration of forces and receiving and integrating
the final two armoured Battlegroups into the Division.
133. Not all armoured vehicles have NBC filters fitted.
For example older designs such as most of the FV430 series and
some of Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) variants do not.
Our principal fighting vehicles, such as Challenger 2, Warrior
and AS90 do. Sufficient NBC filters were dispatched to Iraq, most
in time for operations, but problems with asset tracking in theatre
meant that these were unable to be located until after hostilities
had ceased.
134. However, troops are trained to operate armoured
vehicles wearing their personal NBC equipment, irrespective of
whether the vehicle has collective NBC protection.
LOGISTICS AND ASSET TRACKING
Given how critical logistics are to operations,
we expect MOD to implement the lessons identified in its reports
on Operation TELIC, and also those lessons identified by the National
Audit Office. We intend to closely monitor the progress of MOD's
end-to-end review. (Paragraph 283).
135. There is a clear process for capturing Lessons
Identified from Operations and exercises led by the Defence Operational
Capability audit team. National Audit Office (NAO) and other reports
will also be collated to ensure a comprehensive compendium of
lessons' material for consideration in our forward plans. One
of the End-to-End Review's recommendations reinforced CDL's appointment
as end-to-end (E2E) Logistic Process Owner for the Department.
In addition, the Defence Logistics Board has been established.
The Board provides strategic direction to develop an operationally
effective E2E support chain that delivers operational and logistic
effect, aiming to give the end user full confidence. It provides
clear guidance on immediate priorities, and offers direction to
develop future logistic capabilities. The aim is to give primacy
to operational effectiveness at all times, without sacrificing
the overall need for efficiency.
We are in no doubt that one of the key lessons
to emerge from Operation TELIC concerns operational logistic support
and specifically, the requirement for a robust system to track
equipment and stocks both into and within theatrea requirement
which was identified in the 1991 Gulf War. The lack of such a
system on Operation TELIC resulted in numerous problems with the
in-theatre distribution of critical items such as ammunition,
body armour and NBC equipment. MOD has told us that having such
a system is top of its logistics priorities and we understand
that proposals will be submitted to Ministers in the spring. We
urge Ministers to provide the necessary funding. However, we find
it alarming that a full system is unlikely to be in place within
the next five years. (Paragraph 291).
136. Both the NAO report and the Department's own
reports on Operation TELIC recognise shortcomings in our ability
to track equipment in theatre, and the issue of tracking has been
examined. A package of improvements for logistics materiel management
has been identified which includes tracking. This package would
require funding and options will need to be considered as part
of the Department's planning round against other priorities. If
funded, the enhancements will provide a robust tracking capability.
Personnel Issues
Accommodation and Food
We are pleased to learn that the majority of Armed
Forces personnel in Iraq are now in satisfactory air-conditioned
accommodation. Such accommodation is vital in ensuring that Armed
Forces personnel can perform their roles effectively when they
are deployed to harsh environments. It should be a priority of
any operation that appropriate accommodation is made available
as quickly as possible. (Paragraph 296).
137. The importance of air conditioning in an exceptionally
hot climate is fully appreciated and led to the current level
of provisioning across Iraq. In general terms, whilst a comprehensive
air conditioned environment might seem desirable, provisioning
will always depend on the operational context and priorities.
It is also important not to undermine the acclimatisation process,
as our Service personnel must retain their ability to operate
in harsh environments. The key priority is to provide air conditioned
respites, which should be made available as early as possible
after the deployment of initial forces. Thereafter, other areas
for air conditioning (including some domestic accommodation, offices
and communal areas) will follow on in due course.
During our visit to Iraq we were impressed with
the quality of the food provided to our Armed Forces, particularly
given the difficult conditions, such as the very high temperatures,
in which catering personnel had to work. (Paragraph 299).
138. The production of high quality food is a team
effort involving not only the DLO and the World Wide Food contractor
'3663' but also the unit chefs who consistently produce a high
standard in the most difficult of conditions.
OPERATIONAL WELFARE PACKAGE AND FAMILIES
We regret the decision to withdraw the free postal
service in February 2004. (Paragraph 300).
139. The decision to withdraw the free postal packet
scheme became effective on 8 April 2004, but affects neither the
free delivery of aerogramme letters nor of electronic letters.
140. The free postal packet scheme allowed friends
and relatives of named Service personnel to send a packet[1]
weighing less than 2kg in weight to the Iraq theatre of operations
free of charge. A number of factors influenced the introduction
of the temporary scheme:
- During the First Gulf War the
British public demonstrated their support for Service personnel
by donating gifts of toiletries, books and small consumables.
The scale of the support overwhelmed both the British Forces Post
Office and the logistic supply chain. Many boxes were eventually
buried by the side of the road and a large number were diverted
to stations within the United Kingdom. It was identified that
the absence of a specific addressee was a contributory factor
in this.
- When the scheme was introduced on 17 April 2003
Service personnel, fighting in particularly austere conditions,
did not have access to the welfare facilities and consumables
that are now available and the desire of the British public to
demonstrate support for Service personnel in Iraq was at its highest[2].
141. Initially, the Royal Mail Group paid for the
cost of transport between the point of posting and delivery to
the British Forces Post Office. The subsidy ceased in July 2003.
Following careful consideration, including consultation with the
chain of command, the scheme was discontinued in April, coinciding
with the roulement of 20 Armd Bde and 1 Mech Bde.
142. The free postal packet service was a measure
unique to Iraq; no other overseas or UK based operation receives
a similar concession. Given that the provision of goods and services
in Iraq has reached the expected standard, and is similar to those
found on other operations, it would be wholly divisive to continue
to offer the service only to those in Iraq especially as the welfare
facilities available in theatre have been described as 'the envy
of US forces'. Those items that the scheme most commonly catered
for are now commonly available in theatre and the complete welfare
package includes:
- Free aerogramme letters and
e-letters ('blueys' and 'e-blueys').
- A free 20 minute phone call to anywhere in the
world once a week (this can be supplemented by the purchase of
additional phone cards).
- Free Internet access.
- Packets up to 2kg in weight may be sent at a
reduced cost equivalent to the UK Inland First Class Postage Rate[3].
- A generous allocation of TVs and radios to watch/listen
to multi-channel British Forces Broadcasting Services TV /radio
along with Videos, DVDs and computer games.
- Free books/newspapers and magazines.
- Free board games.
- Access to the Expeditionary Forces Institute
that will deliver a service across the British area of responsibility.
- Access to basic leisure facilities off duty (gymnasium/fitness
equipment, coffee bars and 'Wetherspoon' style pubs).
- Access to a Combined Services Entertainment show
once during a 6-month tour.
- A visit by a showbiz personality once during
a 6-month tour.
- Two weeks Rest and Recuperation during a 6-month
tour with an additional four weeks leave at the end of a six-month
tour.
- Extra allowances for deployment away from the
home base.
- Issue of additional travel warrants to spouses
to enable them to visit family members.
- Allocation of £1 per week for every person
deployed on operations to Units to enable welfare facilities (such
as Internet cafes) to be established for partners and families
to use at the home base.
143. All of this comes at a cost to the taxpayer
and schemes such as free postal packets must be seen in the context
of the complete package now available to Service personnel. When
the scheme finishes between £1.5m - £2m will have been
spent providing free postal packets. Should the scheme continue,
it would be invidious not to extend it to all operational personnel
(and the Iraq theatre of operations represents a third of those
currently deployed on operations). Under these circumstances we
could not guarantee postal delivery on RAF flights to the theatre
in question and would have to resort to civil charter with increased
costs. Dependant on the numbers involved in operations and the
availability of RAF transport this could cost between £3m
-£9m pa. In order to fund this, savings would have to be
made in other, more essential, elements of the Operational Welfare
Package, which would be highly undesirable.
The Operational Welfare Package (OWP) in place
for Operation TELIC worked well and was well received. However,
we are concerned that early entry forces saw little benefit from
the package. MOD acknowledges that this is an area where improvements
are needed. We expect MOD to implement such improvements as quickly
as possible. (Paragraph 302).
144. The second edition of the Operational Welfare
Support Policies' Compendium, dated 19 March 2004, includes a
requirement for an OWP for early entry forces and PJHQ will be
responsible for delivering this. Concurrently, PJHQ produced a
Concept of Operations brief for early entry welfare communications.
Moreover, a trial was conducted in Norway in March 2004 with the
supporting contractor and elements of 3 Cdo Bde provided with
a satellite phone linked laptop e-mail messaging service. Following
this trial, 40 ruggedised laptops have been acquired to meet the
requirement of one of the assigned Spearhead Battalion Groups.
Final validation work will be undertaken in late April/May 2004
by forces deployed in Afghanistan. Together with an operational
reserve of Iridium satellite phones a solution to the requirement
for both voice and basic e-mail welfare communications has now
been identified and, subject to validation activity, this combination
will be an invaluable welfare enhancement. Work on the provision
of the leisure/relaxation element of the OWP for early entry forces
is also in train.
We are pleased to learn that the needs of families
are being addressed and that there is now a families element to
the operational welfare package. (Paragraph 305).
145. The Operational Welfare Package is based on
a Review of Operational Welfare which reported in late 1999. The
subsequent publicly-funded policy was issued in the summer 2002
and most recently reviewed and updated in March 2004. The policy
is clear in its four key component requirements and deliverables
which are: Communications; Leisure/relaxation; Physiological and
Families. Of these, the communications package (20 mins telephone
call-time per week per person; Internet access, personal e-mail;
a postal service by letter, free aerogrammes (blueys) and e-blueys
(further enhanced in 2003 by the forces post card)) is designed
to link those deployed with home and is identified as key in maintaining
and improving the morale of our Service personnel and their operational
effectiveness. Further links with families are supported by:
- Concessionary postal rates;
- Concessionary travel for families;
- The operational welfare leaflet (to ensure Service
personnel and their families are fully briefed on the OWP and
allowances that they will be eligible for once deployed);
- The introduction in April 2003 of the Family
Package.
146. The Family Package assists Home Units in providing
welfare support to families of Service Personnel deployed on operations.
It is applicable to a Home/Parent Unit with at least five personnel
deployed on operations, exercises or deployments (for which the
OWP has been authorised) and consists of £1 per week for
each deployed Service person who is in receipt of OWP. The command
will judge the best use of the monies to support activities that
enhance communication or relieve hardship that have been generated
by the deployment. Expenditure must be within the spirit of this
enhancement and be consistent with current guidance on financial
propriety and regularity. Examples of acceptable expenditure are:
- Provision of communications
equipment (Internet facilities and telephone lines) for Help Information
Volunteer Exchanges (HIVE) and Community Centres.
- Meeting the cost of extended Community/Welfare
communications (Internet line usage to deployed operation area).
- Assistance towards the costs of producing and
posting welfare information (leaflets, flyers and updates).
- Extension of Help Information and Volunteer Exchange
(HIVE) opening hours.
- Occasional provision of transport for attendance
at briefings/meetings.
- Meeting costs of occasional children's activities
(e.g. provision of a crèche during family briefings/meetings).
- Provision of non-alcoholic refreshments at unit-organised
briefings/meetings related to the operation.
MOD is currently considering further ways of providing
improved information to families. Given how important this is
to families, MOD should implement the improvements identified
as quickly as possible. (Paragraph 306).
147. The MOD notes and supports the recommendation
and recognises the importance of communications between families,
those deployed on operations and the Services. The Operational
Welfare Package has gone a long way to address communications
and continues to improve its delivery. The provision of funds
via the OWP family package has enabled flyers, newsletters and
briefings (amongst other events) to be delivered at unit level.
Other non-operational welfare initiatives such as the continuing
development of Services' websites are actively being pursued and
put in place. Further, wider, work is also in hand on this issue.
The families of reservists have not, in the past,
received the same level of support as the families of regular
service personnel. We recommend that MOD takes action to address
this imbalance. This is particularly important given the increased
contribution which reservists are now making and are expected
to make to future operations. (Paragraph 309).
148. A Families Welfare Support Enhancement was introduced
on 1 April 2003. This amounts to £1/week/deployed reservist.
In the event of a service related death, payments equivalent to
attributable benefits will be payable to unmarried partners (where
there is a substantial relationship) of reserve personnel. Moreover,
the single Services have taken the following action:
- The RN are currently considering
the introduction of mobilised Welfare Officers to assist with
looking after the families of mobilised reservists.
- HQ LAND has instructed TA units that they may
mobilise a TA Unit Welfare Officer. Evidence shows that the Welfare
Officer is used to keep in touch with families, visit families
and assisting the PSAOs in dealing with any queries from families.
A course is run at Bristol University for the Welfare Officers.
- The RAF sends an Information pack to families
of reservists prior to their return. The RAFCom Internet website
provides a wide range of information for families. Nominated points
of contact (RAuxAF have stay behind cells who acted as poc for
families. Ex Reg Reserve have a nominated poc from affiliated
unit who will be in touch with families) have also been introduced.
Finally, regular briefings are given to families.
MOD needs to ensure that service personnel have
access to the required level of life and accident insurance while
on operations. (Paragraph 310).
149. After the events of 9/11 insurers reviewed their
exposure to risk in the light of global terrorism, WMD proliferation
and operational tempo. Accordingly, much of the limited capital
has migrated to civilian risks and Life Insurance capacity for
our Armed Forces reduced, since Service risks are deemed 'unquantifiable'.
150. Several major providers (e.g. the PAX (personal
accident) scheme with some 62,000 members) have introduced exclusions
for nuclear risks, biological and chemical weapons or 'dirty'
bombs; others have withdrawn schemes. These exclusions affect
death benefits under accident policies.
151. During Operation TELIC some Service personnelespecially
reservistsfaced exclusions for some of the specific war
risks they faced and some failed to secure appropriate cover before
deploying.
152. MOD provides a comprehensive compensation package
through the Armed Forces Pension Scheme (AFPS) and the War Pensions
Scheme. Even the refocused AFPS arrangementswhich will
not be widely applicable for many yearsmay not always match
desired levels of financial security, particularly for junior
people with large responsibilities.
153. People requiring enhanced benefit levels were
previously able to buy optional Life Insurance. Although Life
Insurance schemes are now available to Service personnel, comprehensive
cover is not universalparticularly for the large accumulated
numbers of Regulars and Reservists.
154. We recognise that gaps in commercial life insurance
cover are an important area where action is needed, but a decision
on whether a commitment to support a Group Life Insurance scheme
for our Armed Forces would be justified has yet to be taken. However,
options for an appropriate Departmental solution are currently
under consideration.
BEREAVEMENT
We conclude that, overall, MOD's casualty reporting
arrangements worked well during Operation TELIC. We emphasise
the critical importance of ensuring that next of kin are informed
of any casualty by the MOD and not the media. We welcome the improvements
in the revised arrangements introduced, which now better reflect
the needs of bereaved families. (Paragraph 316).
155. We welcome the comments of the HCDC and have
nothing to add.
We welcome the fact that widows' benefits have
been extended to unmarried partners of service personnel who die
in conflict, and that bereaved families can now remain in their
service accommodation until they are ready to leave. We look to
MOD to implement any further improvements which are identified
by the current tri-Service review of bereavement policy. (Paragraph
318).
156. The Department is conducting a 'Training-Needs-Analysis'
of the training given to Service personnel nominated to assist
bereaved families in the aftermath of a death in-Service. This
will assess current provision, identify areas that could be improved
upon and will enable us to promote 'best practice' across the
Department. Furthermore, a Guide for Bereaved families is about
to be published, which has been designed to assist widows and
bereaved families and explain the welfare provision available
from the Services. Drafts of this Guide were circulated to Service
Widows Associations for comment and this initiative has been welcomed.
TRAINING
The high number of operations which UK service
personnel have been involved in has had an adverse impact on their
training. We expect MOD to ensure that service personnel returning
from operations catch up with their training as soon as possible
and that promotion opportunities are not adversely affected because
of their operational deployment. But we recognise that, in the
short term, the most important point is for service personnel
to recuperate properly and that this includes the opportunity
to take the leave to which they are entitled. However, the Government
must recognise that the Armed Forces are simply not large enough
to sustain the pattern of operational deployment since the Strategic
Defence Review permanently without serious risk of damage to their
widely admired professional standards. (Paragraph 320).
157. Assumptions about the concurrency of operations
are based on historical analysis of the type, scale and endurance
of recent deployments, together with a judgement about how this
pattern might evolve in future. As a norm and without creating
overstretch we should be able to mount an enduring medium scale
peace support operation simultaneously with a small scale peace
support operation and a one-off small scale intervention operation.
158. We may choose to do more than this, accepting
that there will be an impact on training and individual or collective
'harmony' (single Service guidelines on the length and frequency
of operational deployments):
- We should be able to reconfigure
our forces rapidly to carry out the enduring medium and small
scale peace support operations simultaneously with a limited duration
medium scale intervention operation.
- Given time to prepare we should be able to reconfigure
to conduct a large-scale operation while still conducting a small
scale enduring operation and fulfilling standing commitments.
159. Operation TELIC preceded by Operation FRESCO
placed unusually high demands on our Armed Forces.
160. We recognise that the high level of personnel
committed to operations has made attendance on promotional courses
difficult, but there is the capacity to cope with the 'peaks and
troughs' of the educational demand of personnel deploying on,
or recuperating from operations, therefore not disadvantaging
officers and soldiers in terms of promotion opportunities.
161. The importance of individuals being able to
take the leave to which they are entitled to should not be underestimated.
This was problematic for Operation TELIC, as some units, especially
those who had been committed to Operation FRESCO, were unable
to take their Post Operational Tour Leave (POTL) and annual leave
Entitlement. We recognise that it is imperative for our troops
to recuperate and these situations have been closely monitored,
exploiting every opportunity for individuals to take their leave
entitlement.
POST OPERATION HEALTH
We are pleased to hear that MOD has commissioned
research into the physical and psychological health of personnel
who deployed and that the initial research is being followed up
in a major study to commence early this year. We look forward
to seeing the outcome of this work and expect MOD to take appropriate
action in response to its findings. (Paragraph 322).
162. The major study, based on an initial questionnaire
which is being sent out to about 19,000 personnel, is underway.
Results are expected by the end of 2004 and will be published
in the peer-reviewed scientific literature.
163. Further stages of the research will depend on
the results of the questionnaire, but might include clinical studies
and a comparison of the findings with the results of the Exposures
Study being undertaken by the Institute for Environment and Health.
This study aims to collect and examine data and records from Operation
TELIC, including operation logs, to identify possible exposures
that may have adverse health effects.
164. In order to ensure the independence of the research,
an oversight board, including scientists recommended by the Medical
Research Council and the Economic and Social Research Council
and representatives from the Royal British Legion, has been set
up. The Board overseas the research, and will also advise the
MOD on any future research it thinks necessary.
We are pleased to learn that the take up and use
of the new medical form appears to have been high and that, despite
the increased administrative burden, it has proved popular with
users. We note that MOD is reviewing the format in order to ensure
even greater utility for future operations. (Paragraph 323).
165. We are pleased that the introduction of the
new medical form has proved to be a success. Our review will make
the form even more user-friendly for future operations
We welcome the measures relating to post traumatic
stress disorder which MOD introduced for Operation TELIC. We look
to MOD to monitor this aspect closely and also other illnesses
experienced as a result of being deployed on Operation TELIC.
We are disappointed by the delays to the publication of MOD's
paper covering the health lessons from Operation GRANBY and the
experience of Operation TELIC. Given the level of interest in
these matters, we expect MOD to publish this paper as soon as
possible. (Paragraph 327).
166. We are confident that the measures we are now
putting in to place to create a managed health system, including
the creation of Departments of Community Mental Health and the
use of private providers for in-patient mental health care, will
enhance our ability to monitor post-traumatic stress disorder
and other illnesses experienced as a result of being deployed
on Operation TELIC.
167. The paper on the health lessons identified since
the 1991 Gulf Conflict was initially only intended to include
lessons from Operation GRANBY; however it was decided to delay
the publication of the paper so that it can take into account
the experience of Operation TELIC. The paper will be published
soon.
Costs and Recovery
Resource Accounting and Budgeting
Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) is a complex
financial process and MOD needs to ensure that its staff are appropriately
trained in its application. We remain concerned that the application
of RAB may, perhaps through a misinterpretation of its aim, have
led to stock holdings being reduced too far. We recommend that
MOD undertakes a review which assesses whether RAB is leading
to poor decision making, in particular in relation to stock level
holdings. (Paragraph 333).
168. The Department constantly reviews its stock
and Capital Spares holdings against assessments of future requirements
to minimise unnecessary overheads. These are business based judgements
and we do not believe that RAB has in itself had a significant
impact on decisions about levels of stock holding.
169. Deciding on appropriate levels of stock holdings
is a complex process which requires careful balancing of risks
and costs. In particular, ensuring value for money within a finite
resource budget requires us to balance the need to hold stocks
in store against the practicality of obtaining stocks from industry,
or elsewhere, within anticipated warning and preparation times.
The MOD carries out regular detailed Logistic Sustainability and
Deployability Audits to review, and where necessary update, its
stockpile requirements and holdings. For key consumable stocks
(such as Enhanced Combat Body Armour, clothing and operational
ration packs) the logistic sustainability requirements have been
updated, procurement authorised and the modest, non-cash holding
costs funded.
COST OF THE OPERATION
It will be some time before the costs of the operation
in 2003-04 are knownperhaps not until late summer 2004
when they are published in MOD's Annual Report and Accounts. MOD
acknowledges that it has taken longer than expected to assess
the costs of stock consumed and equipment lost or damaged during
the conflict phase. We expect MOD to ensure this work is advanced
as quickly as possible and for the outcome to be reported to Parliament
as soon as it is completed. (Paragraph 339).
170. Work on finalising the costs of Operation TELIC
in Financial Year 03/04 is being taken forward as quickly as possible
with data being audited by the National Audit Office as part of
their audit of the MOD's 2003/04 Accounts. Final figures will
be included in the Department's Annual Report and Accounts to
be published in September, in line with the accounts of other
Government Departments.
We expect MOD to recover costs owed to them by
other Coalition partners as soon as possible. (Paragraph 340).
171. Cost recovery arrangements are in place and
working successfully for current multi-national operations in
Iraq. Cost recovery for earlier phases of Operation TELIC is largely
complete. Fuel supplied by the UK to US forces, and vice versa,
is covered by a number of reciprocal Fuel Exchange Agreements
which provide access to each other's fuel stocks. The various
FEAs are periodically reconciled and, once all transactions have
been agreed, any outstanding balances are cleared by either repayment
in kind, or financial reimbursement.
FUNDING OF THE OPERATION
We expect MOD to replace the equipment, and the
stores and supplies, necessary to restore the operational capabilities
consumed or lost during Operation TELIC as soon as possible, to
ensure that Armed Forces personnel can undertake their roles effectively.
(Paragraph 344).
172. The Department has now entered a period of recuperation,
which is designed to restore required levels of operational capability
as soon as practicable. This process includes, as one element
of a number of strands of work, action to replace key equipment
that has been destroyed and to replenish ammunition and other
stores used during Operation TELIC. As the Department has indicated
to the Committee in oral evidence, not all of the individual equipments
lost during operations need to be replaced on a like for like
basis to meet our recuperation plans. Nor is it sensible for all
such replacement or stock replenishment to be taken forward at
a uniform rate; rather the pace of recuperation in individual
capability areas will reflect a range of factors including the
relative contribution to overall levels of operational readiness
and the speed with which new stock or equipment can be delivered.
1 In Royal Mail Group terminology a packet is 2kg or
less, a parcel weighs more than 2kg. Back
2
After the introduction of the free service, volumes of mail despatched
to theatre had to be limited to 20 tons per day, double the amount
usually handled. By October 2003, 3 tons of mail was being dispatched
to theatre of which 2 tons were packets; this figure remains constant. Back
3
A first class stamp will be required for cards; the cost will
rise according to weight to a maximum of 2kg for which £6.89
will be charged. This was previously notified as £7.23. Back
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