Transition and Reconstruction
Plans and Preparations
Being a junior partner in a Coalition constrained
the British Government in its ability to plan independently for
after the conflict. (Paragraph 355).
173. The UK worked closely with the US from Autumn
2002 to ensure that contingency planning included planning for
the post-conflict phase. Since we were working with the US, it
was important that UK and US planning was conducted jointly, as
far as possible, rather than for the US and UK to plan independently.
CONSTRAINTS
We believe that it was a misjudgement by the Government
to have decided that planning to meet the needs of the Iraqi people
following a conflict was particularly sensitive—more sensitive,
even, than the deploying of military forces. This misjudgement
unnecessarily constrained planning for the post-conflict phase.
(Paragraph 357).
174. The Prime Minister made clear in his statement
of 24 September 2002 the need for preparedness and prudent planning.
The details of such planning, including for the post-conflict
phase, were necessarily sensitive as some information about the
military plan could be extrapolated from details of the post-conflict
plan. Furthermore, as our witnesses have explained, we felt that
overt planning for the post-conflict would make it appear that
military action was inevitable (which it was not) and could seriously
prejudice ongoing attempts to reach a diplomatic solution. This
should not be taken to imply, however, that robust planning was
constrained. Rather that it was necessarily confined to a limited
number of people.
175. DFID also led on preparations for a range of
humanitarian contingencies, though fortunately no humanitarian
crisis transpired. No secret was made of this work and plans were
set out on a number of occasions, not least in the written statement
to Parliament by the Secretary of State for International Development
on 13 March 2003.
176. What was more sensitive were some of the details
of post-conflict planning with international organisations and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), many of whom DFID had funded
in order to be prepared for the possibility of conflict. Several
of these organisations were understandably reluctant to admit
openly that they were engaging in post-conflict planning and we
respected these concerns. This meant that some of the details
of their plans were not publicised, but this did not significantly
constrain our planning process. In the event, for both security
and political reasons, international organisations and NGOs were
not able to play as strong a post-conflict role in Iraq as we
had hoped. As the government has acknowledged, we also under-estimated
the degree of breakdown in law and order which followed the fall
of Saddam's regime.
It has also been suggested that DfID's role in
post-conflict planning was constrained by the attitude of the
then Secretary of State towards the prospect of military action.
Although our witness from DfID denied that this was the case,
we remain to be convinced. (Paragraph 358).
177. The government undertook considerable post-conflict
planning in the run-up to military action. DFID participated closely
in this cross-government process, including through its secondment
of advisers to the British military and the Office of Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance in Kuwait, and to the cross-departmental
Iraq Planning Unit based in the FCO.
The poor co-ordination of planning within the
US Administration meant that better co-ordinated British input
into the process had less impact than it should have had. (Paragraph
362).
178. Whilst the arrangements for co-ordination of
post conflict planning—which by its very nature is a complicated
and multi-faceted business involving an enormous range of issues
and requiring input from a large number of people with different
areas of expertise—within the much larger US system may
initially have been uncertain, we do not believe that this significantly
diminished the influence which our own thinking had on the overall
planning. Planning work done by the UK may have been one factor
which helped the US to reach a view on how to best to approach
the issues. When co-ordination mechanisms were agreed the UK was
able to make an important contribution to the Coalition plan.
The need to maintain a unified Iraq under central
control has been a constraint—usually a reasonable constraint—on
British freedom of action in the south-east of the country. (Paragraph
364).
179. UK leadership of Multinational Division South-East
and the CPA regional coordinating office in Basrah clearly has
to be within the context of policies made in Baghdad. However,
Multinational Divisions and CPA regional offices do have latitude
in the way that they implement those policies.
Perversely, the failure of the wider international
community to support the Coalition's military action did little
or nothing to constrain that action, but did make it more difficult
for the Coalition to restore law and order and to administer Iraq
once hostilities were over. (Paragraph 365).
180. We agree that the absence of some international
organisations usually active in post-conflict situations did have
some effect on immediate post-conflict efforts.
PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE
The Government was right to plan for a humanitarian
crisis. Such a situation might have arisen, and the Government
would have been rightly condemned if its preparations had been
inadequate. (Paragraph 369).
181. We agree.
For the Government to argue that it was unaware
of the extent of the repressive brutality of the Iraqi regime
strains credibility. It was widely known, not least because of
information published by the Government. (Paragraph 375).
182. The Government was not arguing that it was unaware
of the extent of the repressive brutality of the Iraqi regime
but rather that it was difficult to predict in detail what would
happen after the regime's removal. In particular the impact on
relatively low-level Iraqi administrative structures was greater
than we had expected.
INSECURITY AND DISORDER IN THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE
Much has been made of the many Iraqis who were
involved in looting and destruction in the immediate aftermath
of the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime. It should not be forgotten
that thousands more were locked up indoors fearing for their security
and for their lives. (Paragraph 379).
183. We agree. The establishment of basic law and
order was initially hindered both by the other demands on Coalition
manpower, including continuing combat operations, and by the unexpectedly
large-scale disintegration of local Iraqi authorities including
the police.
The scale and shape of the force provided were
best suited to achieving the Coalition's desired effects in the
combat phase, but not to carrying those effects through into the
post-conflict phase. We acknowledge, however, that the scale of
force which might have best achieved these effects was beyond
the Government's means. (Paragraph 387).
184. It is obviously true that there are limits to
the scale of force we could possibly have deployed. We have also
acknowledged that the extent to which Iraqi police and armed forces
effectively dissolved themselves was greater than we had expected.
A harsh critic might argue that Coalition planning
assumed that it would be possible to employ elements of the Iraqi
police, army and administration to maintain law and order, because
the alternatives were too difficult to contemplate. That assumption
was not only incorrect, but incautious. A realistic judgement,
based on good intelligence, should have warned of the risk of
serious disorder. (Paragraph 388).
185. The issue of maintaining law and order was recognised
and much work was undertaken on predicting the alternative outcomes
if disorder occurred. But it should be remembered that the Coalition's
intention had always been to enable a rapid transition to Iraqi
rule, and the assumption that some elements of Iraqi forces could
be quickly co-opted should be seen in this light.
It was indeed crucial to protect Iraq's oil infrastructure
from damage, as the main potential source of future Iraqi wealth.
But it was a mistake not to have identified and protected (and
to have been seen to be protecting) other key buildings and infrastructure
as a priority. (Paragraph 390).
186. It would have been literally impossible to have
protected every single building of the sort which attracted the
attention of looters, without much greater levels of manpower.
As we have noted, the virtual disappearance of the Iraqi police
and armed forces, combined with other demands on Coalition forces
while combat operations were continuing in some areas, contributed
to the difficulties the Coalition experienced initially in establishing
law and order. Protecting the oil and power system was a priority
for both environmental and economic reasons.
If 'a few more' troops were needed to protect
key sites, this should have been identified as a scenario at the
planning stage, and these troops should have been found and deployed
with this specific task in mind. (Paragraph 392).
187. As we note above, it would not have been possible
to protect all key sites and prioritisation was necessary. This
is not unusual and the solution was to sequence resources and
adopt local police to enhance security, engaging the Iraqis in
providing for their own security needs. As the Committee has identified,
there were joint Iraqi/Coalition patrols within the first week
of the campaign. The early difficulties reflected the initial
problems encountered in getting Iraqi police officers re-engaged
in the task of providing law and order.
The Government should have taken more care to
identify in advance sites in Iraq likely to contain records of
use to the Coalition, and should have ensured that forces were
provided to protect these sites from damage and looting. (Paragraph
397).
188. The issue of trying to obtain records of use
to the Coalition was recognised as important. However, Iraq was
a difficult intelligence target and detailed information about
the locations of such records was not available.
While Coalition forces successfully removed Saddam
Hussein's regime with remarkable speed, they were not able to
establish themselves on the ground with sufficient speed and precision
to avoid a damaging period of lawlessness during which much of
the potential goodwill of the Iraqi people was squandered. (Paragraph
398).
189. We agree that the early law and order problems
were damaging, although we believe that the position was stabilised
fairly quickly in most parts of the country.
None of these criticisms, however, should be seen
to detract from the thoroughly impressive way in which individual
members of Armed Forces personnel demonstrated their ability to
accomplish the transition between warfighting and peacekeeping
operations swiftly and effectively. (Paragraph 399).
190. We agree that the UK Armed Forces personnel
adapted quickly and effectively to peacekeeping operations at
the end of the end of major combat operations. Their performance
since that time has again demonstrated their professionalism and
versatility.
We commend the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) for the performance of its humanitarian role
in Iraq, before, during and after the combat phase of operations,
and we commend British forces for the way in which they cooperated
with the ICRC. (Paragraph 402).
191. We are grateful for the Committee's observations.
LESSONS FOR FUTURE CAMPAIGNS
We recommend that the Government should consider
closely, in the light of operations in Iraq, how the United Kingdom
provides peace support capabilities, and in particular how the
transition is managed between warfighting and peacekeeping. We
further recommend that the Government should consider whether
either a dedicated part of the Armed Forces, or even a separate
organisation altogether, could be specifically tasked with providing
these capabilities. (Paragraph 407).
192. The UK MOD generates peace support capability
as part of military capability. UK Forces are trained and equipped
to carry out peacekeeping, Peace Support Operations and warfighting
operations as an integral part of a campaign, and often have to
transition between these scenarios, as in Iraq. As the Chief of
the General Staff stated to the Committee, recent operational
experience has shown that a deployed force may be involved in
warfighting, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations simultaneously,
the so-called '3-block war'. The best way to prepare for the demands
of this type of operation is to train primarily for warfighting.
In modern operations there is no clear transition between warfighting
and peacekeeping and it would therefore incur unnecessary operational
risk to employ a dedicated part of the Armed Forces solely for
peace support operations.
193. Transition from conflict to post-conflict situations
is a wider issue for the Government, and national and international
objectives for such complex operations cannot be achieved solely
by military forces. Indeed, other Government Departments, multinational
organisations and the private sector are essential elements, particularly
for the process of rebuilding security, social and economic infrastructures.
Lessons identified from Operation TELIC, as from other recent
operations, have highlighted the need for a multi-agency approach.
194. There are many activities underway across Whitehall
to consider methods of better coordinating national efforts in
conflict scenarios, for both the conflict prevention stages (including
through the Conflict Prevention Pool), and for military-civilian
transitions and post conflict reconstruction. Meanwhile a cross-departmental
working group (FCO, MOD and DFID) has been set up to consider
ways in which to improve UK planning, co-ordination and management
of post conflict reconstruction activities.
We are concerned about the continuing requirement
on the ground for specialists from the military in areas which
would under other circumstances be provided by civilian organisations.
Many of these specialists will be reservists, and their prolonged
deployment may have adverse consequences for retention in specialisms
which are already suffering from undermanning. (Paragraph 411).
195. In the main, reservists have not been called-out
specifically to fill specialist civilian administration roles.
Only two reservists who volunteered to be mobilised have been
called-out specifically for their civilian skills. For the rest,
the fact that they possessed skills associated with their civilian
employment which could be utilised during the reconstruction of
Iraq was fortunate, but not planned. This is a prime example of
the benefits that reservists bring to the Armed Forces. With regard
to "prolonged deployments" in general reservists have
served no longer than six months in Iraq. A small number have
served longer, but this is because they volunteered to do so.
We do not believe that this will have an adverse effect on retention.
196. The work referred to in the response to recommendation
111 should reduce the need to use reservists for these purposes.
We are also conscious that post-conflict operations in Iraq are
unusual in that the UK is Occupying Power with the full range
of responsibilities which that involves.
We agree that the provision of language training
will need to be re-examined if the Armed Forces are to be more
involved in expeditionary operations in the future. In an effects-based
operation aiming to win over hearts and minds, an ability to communicate
with the local population is vital. (Paragraph 414).
197. We agree. Language training is currently being
reviewed through a series of processes which will produce an effective
and efficient way of achieving this objective.
Preparations should have been made in advance
of the military campaign to ensure that police advice on maintaining
law and order would be available as soon as possible after the
end of the combat phase. (Paragraph 416).
198. The Government accepts that we underestimated
the extent of civil disorder problems that we would face and the
dislocation of Iraqi civil administrative structures. However,
we quickly adapted to the situation, and deployed civilian police
advisers from the beginning of July. The security situation prevented
us from deploying a large civilian police force before then. We
have been undertaking substantial work to build Iraqi security
capability ever since. There are now almost 80,000 Iraqi police.
This is a very important step towards gradually giving responsibility
for security in Iraq to Iraqis as their capability increases.
While we support entirely the notion that Iraqis
should be encouraged to take responsibility for their own security,
we are concerned that local militias which have been allowed to
operate in the south-east of Iraq may represent vested interests.
There is a danger that these may seek to use their position to
pursue agendas which might not be to the advantage of the people
of Iraq more generally. (Paragraph 417).
199. We agree with the Committee that in the long-term,
allowing independent militias to operate unchecked in Iraq is
against Iraq's national interests. This principle is encapsulated
in the Transitional Administrative Law, which states: "Armed
forces and militias not under the command structure of the Iraqi
Transitional Government are prohibited, except as provided by
federal law."
200. In practical terms, we continue to work at integrating
personnel from existing militias into Iraq's emerging national
security structures, including the Iraq Civil Defence Force, and
the New Iraqi Army.
RECONSTRUCTION
The circumstances of the conflict in Iraq were
particular: operations without broad international consensus in
a country with a relatively advanced but extremely decrepit infrastructure.
While MOD is right to assess whether a national capability to
repair infrastructure is required, it would be wrong to assume
that a capability which might have been useful in Iraq will necessarily
be required in future operations. (Paragraph 422).
201. The MOD has contributed significantly toward
the programme of infrastructure repair in Iraq. Of course, no
two crises will be the same, and such events will often call for
different sets of technical skills and capabilities. Whilst reconstruction
efforts post conflict are not core military business, the flexibility
and resourcefulness of British servicemen and women resulted in
the adaptation of specialist military skills to ensure essential
work was completed in Iraq.
202. Despite the different types of operations undertaken
by UK forces, there are capabilities that have proven to be common
to many post-conflict scenarios. A cross-government and, where
possible, international approach to infrastructure requirements
is key to ensuring that such objectives are met. In this broader
context, a cross-departmental group is investigating ways of improving
HMG's planning, coordination and management of post conflict reconstruction
issues—this includes civilian (public and private sector)
deployments in order to provide capability and harness relevant
expertise.
Quick Impact Projects are, as one of our interlocutors
told us in Iraq, a 'band-aid' solution, which cannot hope to approach
the scale of the reconstruction effort required in Iraq. But they
have been a vital tool for showing that there are immediate benefits
from the presence of Coalition forces and the end of Saddam Hussein's
rule. We commend all those involved. (Paragraph 425).
203. We agree that the Quick Impact Projects have
been successful in making a visible difference in the post-conflict
period. The most important effect was on the local civilian population,
who benefited from investment of small sums in the areas of health,
education, law and order, essential public services (sanitation,
water, power) as well as some 'normality' of life (banks, transport).
204. By late November the British Army had planned
or carried out 634 projects worth £9.4m. The smallest project—repairing
an ambulance for a small community—cost £25. Around
40 projects have been worth £40,000 or more. The remainder
have been smaller sums.
205. This has shown that the UK Services are fully
committed to improving life at street level, as the larger reconstruction
projects were being planned. The gaining of trust has been enhanced
at relatively low cost, and the benefit has been to the UK military
as well as the local population.
Coalition efforts to clear unexploded ordnance
throughout Iraq will make the country a far safer place for the
people who live there. But the failure to provide sufficient forces
to guard and secure munitions sites in the weeks and months after
the conflict cost Iraqi civilian lives, and also provided potential
enemies of the Coalition with a ready stock of easily accessible
weaponry. (Paragraph 431).
206. The Divisional Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
teams worked tirelessly to clear unexploded ordnance in the MND(SE)
area of operations but the scale of the problem led to a contractor
being employed to deal with the clearance of the 67 captured Enemy
Ammunition (CEA) sites. Despite clearing between eight to 10 tonnes
of ammunition per day by April 2004, 24 sites still remained.
These sites were widely dispersed, generally poorly constructed
and in some cases contained up to 1000 tons of often-unstable
explosives, which had to be destroyed in situ. The requirement
to secure these sites once they had been identified was well understood
by commanders but with finite resources available, the guarding
of these static sites had to reflect overall priorities. Where
possible Iraqis were employed to release Coalition troops. It
is estimated that at least six more battlegroups would have been
required if MND(SE) were to physically guard every site, and this
is simply not a realistic proposition.
The Government should look again at whether the
relatively modest funds that it has dedicated to supporting the
clearance of unexploded ordnance in Iraq are adequate for the
task at hand. (Paragraph 432).
207. MOD committed a very large proportion of its
deployable EOD capability to theatre. At its peak, this consisted
of around 240 trained EOD personnel from all three Services and
a significant number of additional Royal Engineers and others
involved in securing and marking EOD sites. Together, they made
a vital contribution to addressing the problems of explosive remnants
of war (ERW) in Iraq; since the beginning of the conflict they
have cleared around a million items of ERW. However, experience
suggests that humanitarian ERW clearance is best funded through
NGOs and commercial demining companies. Such organisations have
years of experience of unexploded ordnance clearance in a wider
range of situations than do UK forces. They also often have better
contacts and, in working with local people, they obtain a far
better picture of the problems and clearance requirements than
our forces could alone. Funding for these bodies, which is administered
by the Department for International Development, provides a faster
and more needs-driven ERW clearance operation than could be performed
by our Armed Forces alone.
Mistakes were made in identifying potential local
leaders, and without better intelligence and a better understanding
of Iraqi society, such mistakes were probably inevitable. (Paragraph
437).
208. The repressive nature of the Iraqi state ensured
that there was no ready-made alternative leadership. The challenge
of identifying political leaders was compounded by the fact that
Iraq was a difficult intelligence target.
The Armed Forces have done their utmost to fulfil
their responsibilities to the Iraqi people as the occupying power,
and we applaud them. But they have been under-resourced for this
enormous task. It is unreasonable to expect the military to have
a fine-grained understanding of how an unfamiliar society operates;
but without this understanding, and without substantial civilian
support in the form of experts and interpreters to help them to
gain this understanding, mistakes were bound to be made which
would make it more difficult to construct the kind of Iraq that
the Coalition wants to see: stable, secure and prosperous; a threat
neither to its neighbours nor to the wider world. (Paragraph 441).
209. Fulfilling the UK's responsibilities as Occupying
Power is the responsibility of the Government as a whole and not
only the Armed Forces. Approximately 400 civilian employees have
been seconded to the Coalition Provisional Authority as the vehicle
for discharging these responsibilities and the Government has
committed £544 million to the reconstruction of Iraq. The
Armed Forces have played a substantial role in the administration
of Iraq, particularly in the provision of security. Whilst we
of course acknowledge that there is always room for improvement
in specific areas, we do not accept as a general proposition that
the Armed Forces have been under-resourced for the task.
210. As noted previously, there are many activities
underway across Whitehall to consider methods of better coordinating
national efforts in conflict scenarios, for both the conflict
prevention stages and for military-civilian transitions and post
conflict reconstruction.
Information Operations
UK Psychological Operations Capabilities
Our evidence suggests that if information operations
are to be successful, it is essential that they should start in
the period when diplomatic efforts are still being made, albeit
backed by the coercive threat of military force through overt
preparations. This would allow for the full potential of information
operations to be exerted in advance of the start of hostilities
and might even contribute to their avoidance. (Paragraph 455).
211. We agree that as a general principle Information
Operations should start as early as possible—with the aim
of helping avoid hostilities, or, at the very least, minimising
their intensity. This approach is firmly embedded in evolving
concepts for Effects-Based Operations, which aim to integrate
various effects in support of a strategic end-state. Each campaign
is, however, unique, and the role of Information Operations in
each will vary. Our pursuit of a diplomatic solution to the Iraq
crisis meant that military preparations needed to be carefully
measured. This was reflected in the themes and messages of the
overall Information Campaign which operated in support of that
approach.
EFFECTIVENESS
We believe that the British information operations
campaign did not begin early enough. We are concerned that the
lessons of the Kosovo campaign were not better learned in this
important area. It is disappointing that the Coalition is widely
perceived to have 'come second' in perception management. However,
we recognise that 'coming second' may be inevitable if a conflict
of choice is being pursued by liberal democracies with a free
media. We are, however, persuaded that information operations
are an activity which can be expected to become of increasing
importance in future operations. There were a number of successes
which provide evidence of the potential effectiveness of information
operations. We recommend that the Government should consider significantly
enhancing our capabilities in this area. (Paragraph 465).
212. We note the Committee's comments about timing.
Like other military preparations, information operations have
to be calibrated so as to support and not undermine diplomatic
efforts.
213. It is true that an Information Operations campaign
which transmits messages that are transparent, credible and true
may have difficulties against authoritarian regimes that entirely
control their media, and who are prepared to coerce, embroider
or lie. This proved, at times, to be the case during Operation
TELIC. Iraq's Information Campaign was, however, fatally exposed
when independent news organisations were able properly to compare
the regime's announcements with actual events. In this sense,
and beyond the very short-term, the Coalition's Information Campaign
prevailed.
214. More could, however, have been done to limit
the regime's Information Campaign abilities, and at an earlier
stage. We were, for example, at times unable to prevent, by technical
means, the channels the regime used to communicate with the Iraqi
population. Had we been able to, we would have denied Saddam publicity
in the crucial early stages, whilst retaining the relevant infrastructure
for the Coalition and Iraqis to use at a later date.
215. Information Operations are firmly established
in the UK's military inventory. As we move further towards Effects
Based Operations, we will continue to seek ways to further enhance
our capabilities.
Role of the Media
We believe that the importance of the media campaign
in the modern world remains under-appreciated by sections of the
Armed Forces. The early establishment of a robust media operations
capability in theatre must be a priority for any operation. Where
an operation is perceived to be a 'war of choice' the ability
to handle multiple media organisations in theatre with professionalism
and sophistication is essential. (Paragraph 477).
216. We are disappointed that the Committee formed
the view that the importance of the media campaign was under-appreciated
by sections of the Armed Forces. The importance of media operations
is regularly emphasised to military personnel, and has been fully
recognised in both this and previous operations. Indeed, during
this operation, unprecedented efforts were made in terms of the
numbers of media operations staff deployed and the numbers of
journalists embedded with the Armed Forces. The development of
a robust and high readiness early-entry media capability, as part
of the Defence Media Operations Centre continues apace. This work
started some time before Operation TELIC.
We strongly believe that the live broadcast of
the death of service personnel would be utterly unacceptable.
We recommend that MOD begin discussions as a matter of urgency
with media organisations to find a solution to this very real
possibility in a future conflict. (Paragraph 480).
217. Continuing dialogue with the broadcast organisations
has shown that this is just as much of a concern to them as it
is to the MOD. Green Book War Correspondent arrangements give
some measure of control. Some UK media organisations inserted
a 'delay loop' for all their live broadcasts to give them an opportunity
to stop broadcasting should such an incident occur. MOD will continue
to press its case at every opportunity.
Overall the embedding of journalists with combat
units worked well. The experience is likely to be seen as a precedent
for future operations. Problems arose, however, firstly with the
shortage, particularly early on, of properly trained and experienced
media officers in some units and secondly because of the inflexibility
of the deployment arrangements of the journalists. We recommend
that MOD take steps to avoid these problems arising in future
operations. (Paragraph 486).
218. The MOD shares the view that the embedding process
worked well, and recognises the practical training, movement and
logistic difficulties. A review of the Green Book is underway,
which will take into account the views and aspirations of the
media themselves, and media training will be much improved with
the advent of the Training Centre which will be part of the DMOC.
Whatever the intentions, it is clear that the
arrangements to provide a broader context for individual reports
from embedded journalists did not work in Operation TELIC. In
part this was a consequence of advances in technology and of the
growth in 24 hour news channels, both of which can be expected
to apply at least as forcibly in any future conflict. MOD needs
to consider how better to support the context setting of battlefield
information in the future. (Paragraph 495).
219. We agree. Correspondents embedded with front-line
units could not, and will rarely be able, to provide operational
and strategic level context. Reliance on the Qatar Coalition Headquarters
to provide this element proved overly optimistic and consideration
is being given to how this might work better in future conflicts.
We believe that the media also felt that they could have done
better in this regard.
MOD did not fully appreciate how the embedding
system, coupled with rolling 24 hour news programmes, would undermine
their ability to manage the information coming out of the combat
theatre. Nor were they successful in managing the expectations
of the different journalists in different centres such as the
Forward Transmission Unit and Qatar. We believe that failure to
support the media presence swiftly enough with enough adequately
trained and skilled media relations personnel was a serious shortcoming
and one that MOD should not allow to happen again. It is also
the case that this campaign went the Coalition's way most of the
time—in the circumstances of a more difficult military campaign
it is not clear how the Ministry of Defence would cope with the
pressures of unfavourable coverage from the front line. (Paragraph
499).
220. If by "managing the information coming
out of the combat theatre" the Committee means ensuring that
the information is accurate, complete and in context, then we
would agree that this will always be a challenge and could have
been improved. We also agree that the managing of journalists'
expectations, both in the Forward Transmission Unit and the Qatar
HQ, did not go as well as we would have wished. In terms of expectations,
it is fair to say that both the military and the press learned
much from the experience, but managing expectations will always
be a challenge in a multi-faceted, joint, Coalition, high intensity
combat situation.
Cause and Effect
We welcome the fact that on this occasion the
decision to commit forces followed resolutions of both Houses
of Parliament, and believe that it should be seen as an explicit
precedent for future combat operations. (Paragraph 504).
221. Constitutionally there is currently no requirement
for a Parliamentary resolution before the Government commits UK
Forces on an operation. We do not see the decision to seek such
a resolution in this instance as constituting a precedent for
the future.
The crafting of the targeting set to minimise
civilian casualties was not only a choice made by the Coalition
in order to achieve a particular effect, or deliver a particular
message; it was also a requirement of international law. (Paragraph
514).
222. We note the Committee's observation. Targeting
for Operation TELIC scrupulously conformed to international law.
The priority for military planning must be the
achievement of military objectives. We are concerned that too
great a focus on effects-based planning, and on the part military
action can play as one component in a spectrum of political and
diplomatic activity, may further complicate the tasks of military
planners and commanders who are already operating in an ever more
complex battle space and under more intense and intrusive scrutiny
than ever before. (Paragraph 517).
223. Military objectives and plans are defined in
the context of the UK's wider policy objectives and plans; they
cannot be a separate entity.
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