UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To
be published as HC 1031-iv
House of COMMONS
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE
TAKEN BEFORE
DEFENCE COMMITTEE
FUTURE
CAPABILITIES
Wednesday 17 November 2004
AIR
CHIEF MARSHAL SIR MALCOLM PLEDGER KCB OBE AFC,
MAJOR
GENERAL A J RAPER CBE and MAJOR GENERAL M D WOOD CBE
Evidence heard in Public Questions 385 - 500
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Oral Evidence
Taken before the Defence Committee
on Wednesday 17 November 2004
Members present
Mr Bruce George, in the Chair
Mr James Cran
Mr Mike Hancock
Mr Dai Havard
Richard Ottaway
Mr Frank Roy
Rachel Squire
________________
Witnesses:
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm
Pledger KCB OBE AFC, Chief of Defence Logistics, Major General A J Raper CBE, Defence Logistics Transformation
Programme Team Leader, and Major General
M D Wood CBE, Director General Logistics (Supply Chain) examined.
Q385 Chairman: Gentlemen, sorry we are a little late. Sir Malcolm, in December 2002 you gave
evidence to us for our inquiry, A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence
Review. You had been in post just a
couple of months. The MoD's Annual
Report and Accounts 2003-04 states that a new Chief of Defence Logistics will
be in post at the start of next year.
To what extent do you think that you have achieved the objectives that
you set yourself? I must warn you that
somebody else who talked about objectives and said he failed to reach six out
of the seven of them had a really difficult time giving such an honest
reply. I hope you have achieved all of your
objectives.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I think to begin to answer that, Chairman, we have got to look
back at the time of appointment and understand what the objectives were then
and understand how the process has moved on.
At that stage, of course, the main objective, as you reminded me, was to
achieve a strategic goal on the formation of the DLO. Since then, as I say, we have moved definitely into the arena of
trying to better align logistic endeavour with the new challenges that we have
in this uncertain world and, whilst delivering that strategic goal on
efficiency, managed the dependencies that we have within the strategic base
with industry. Those I would outline as
currently my three objectives. I would
say that already we have banked in programme terms the strategic goal by the
end of 2006. We still have to deliver
but in programme terms we have achieved that.
I think we have made significant progress in recognising the new
challenges that we face of expeditionary employment in these strategic
distances and we can explore some of the things we have done since we discussed
lessons from Operation Telic to show you how we have improved. Also, we have what I would call strategy now
to better engage with those industrial dependencies by which we fulfil our
remit: acquisition. On the one hand I
would say good progress and, on the other, I would have to say that of course
there is still a long way to go to resolve all of those issues.
Q386 Chairman: But two years is too short a time to have
somebody in post taking such a lot of very difficult decisions because of so
many problems to be resolved. Right,
you agree. Since you took up post two
years ago, what do you think the main difficulties have been because there are
always countervailing pressures to any reform and the reform agenda was
obviously a very long one?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Again, I think there are several facets to that, Chairman. The first is that change in any organisation
is usually impeded most by the behaviour of that organisation and it's, what I
would call, dependencies on traditional methods. Clearly I think much of that was overcome because of our
employment in such areas as Iraq and Afghanistan recently which proved
categorically to everybody involved that we needed to change the processes to
make this a successful supporting endeavour to those operational
challenges. On the one hand there will
always be behavioural issues but, on the other, I think most of those have now
been overcome because of the nature of our employment.
Q387 Chairman: You mean the - failure may be too strong a
word - problems that emerged from logistics in those very far distant shores
really compelled even those who wished to retain more traditional approaches
that change really had to come and it was self-evident that change had to be
made?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I think I would use a slightly different interpretation. The difficulties that we experienced of
those, I could not call them failures because ----
Q388 Chairman: I must look at the text. Did I say failure?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: We were successful in those operations. It did highlight areas where we can improve and, such was the
importance of those areas from a collective perspective, not just a logistic
one, we are now making significant progress across what we call the end-to-end
regime that is truly logistics.
Q389 Chairman: How long will it take before you or your
successor will be able to say "we have got things right now, all the necessary
changes have been made?" Is that ever
achievable in the Ministry of Defence?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I think that the nature of operations will mean that in some areas
we will have to manage difficulties for the foreseeable future. You cannot plan for everything and resource
everything but in terms of the processes that we are going to employ and the
efficient application of those processes, and the supporting means to deliver
them, I think for much of it, if I can use the supply chain as illustrative
here, we will have solutions in place within three years.
Chairman: The MoD said it could not go
to war before 2007/08 so we are in good shape then, Air Chief Marshal. No more provocative questions for a while. James Cran.
James can hardly speak, so if you cannot hear what he says please ask
him to shout.
Q390 Mr Cran: Can I apologise for my voice. Still on the End-to-End Logistics
Review. The MoD's Annual Report and
Accounts for 2003-04 said this: "in July 2003 a review of 'end-to-end Air and
Land logistic support reported on how logistic support to Air and Land forces,
including Naval Aviation and the Royal Marines, can be streamlined..." and so
on. That rather begs the question as to
why the maritime environment seems to have been excluded. I hope we do not need an Admiral here to
answer that. If that is correct, why is
it so?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Again, I think we have to look at the context in which we
conducted that study. Already what I
will call the surface ships and the submarine elements of the maritime logistic
community had gone through significant end-to-end rationalisation and change
which was continued with the formation of the DLO. For example, we, in the DLO, already own much of that end-to-end
right up to the jetty, indeed starting with the contractorisation of the
dockyards in 1987 and the then formation of the two agencies, the Naval Base
Support Agency and the Ship Support Agency, which in turn have been merged into
the WSA, and then was put into the DLO.
We already had what I will call the mechanisms of the organisation for
end-to-end management of maritime logistics and that was why we concentrated on
the other two areas which were substantially different on transfer into the
DLO. Certainly since then we have not
said that it is not included in the further Transformation Programme as we
apply all the lessons of that end-to-end study across the three environments,
not just the two. General Raper can
talk a little bit more about which elements of the maritime logistic endeavour
we are concentrating on currently. It
was deliberate, if you like, recognising where they already were, but they are
now incorporated in the full Transformation Programme.
Major General Raper: If I could just pick up on
your remarks. You mentioned that
clearly we have taken the aviation elements into forward with the Navy, so
everything in terms of their rotary platforms is considered as part of the
overall rotary Transformation Programme, no exemptions, same lessons being applied. Where we are now beginning to have a look is
in a number of areas having done warship support modernisation and we are now
looking at the submarine acquisition area in terms of the overall support as
well as acquisition of all the submarine platforms as more of an holistic
whole. Also, we are revisiting the ship
support arrangements, again having moved, and also the base porting and much of
that is as a result of the Future
Capabilities work. Now is the time
to look at that and look at that through the same eyes as we were looking at
everything else in the Transformation Programme.
Q391 Mr Cran: Just so that I get it clear in my mind, any
recommendations arising out of the End-to-End Review would apply to the
maritime environment too, would they?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Where appropriate, absolutely right.
Q392 Mr Cran: Just let us know what the words "where
appropriate" mean?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Clearly, some of the recommendations were specific to the
environment we are talking about. They
were also specific to the industry that supports that environment and,
therefore, not all of them were absolutely translatable into the maritime
environment. Where there are principles
here, for example in depth and forward, those kinds of concepts are being
applied equally in the maritime environment.
Mr Cran: I am grateful. That is all my voice will allow. Chairman, over to you.
Q393 Rachel Squire: In his statement to Parliament on 10
September 2003, the Minister said that a key change proposed by the End-to-End
Review was a "permanent, joint organisation...to establish and prioritise a joint
supply chain that will be driven by the needs of the joint commander of
operations". Can you say what progress
has been made in establishing such an organisation and developing a joint
supply chain?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Yes. The announcement was
entirely consistent, again, with what we are trying to do in
Transformation. It records what I would
call the different components of the supply chain. Again, when we last gave evidence here we showed that in essence
there were three elements to this.
There is what I would call the strategic base, the factory arrangements,
the acquisition means to support these endeavours, there is the forward
element, which is done in the operational theatre, and then there is the
so-called coupling bridge between the two.
The whole new concept is in order to create agility and flexibility and
improve our timelines and response rather than pushing, which we have done in
the past, from what I will call factory into foxhole, which in turn creates
huge stresses on component parts of those three elements, we are now trying to
create a demand system, a pull system, which serves the needs of those fighting
in theatre. Part and parcel of that is
because that demand has to be articulated by the Chief of Joint Operations in
whatever guise he is fighting in theatre, to construct the means of demand,
priorities and volumes before we start to push. It is in creating that focus and then managing it more
effectively in theatre that this relates to.
There are two elements of this.
We have already identified the solution to what I would call management
in theatre with one of the brigades we are going to use to do that, and we are
already setting up the core elements of that decision-making in theatre which
we can reinforce in future so that we can manage this rather than push it. The brigade is already identified,
nominated, it has undergone some of the training to make good some of the
deficiencies we saw in Telic and, as I say, the core element of what we call
the Joint Force Logistic Component Commander within the deployed headquarters
is now in place.
Major General Wood: We have done joint force
logistic components doctrinally for some time but the new development is a
permanent establishment of that. That
brigade headquarters will be in place and the newly appointed brigade commander
will be in place before the end of this year and he will be working in Northwood
in a permanent joint headquarters. That
is the organisational element, the creation of a permanent joint forces
logistic component which is readily deployable as opposed to double-hatting it
with an existing capability, which is how we created that doctrinal piece
before. In terms of the joint supply
process, that is not completely new, it is ongoing. What we are doing is improving it. If you take last week's operation, Op Phyllis, to the Ivory
Coast, that was the supply chain in operation.
You can see it in terms of a relative Land component, strategic airlift
being used and a ship being diverted to be available, but in order for that
deployment to take place stores were issued from the depots, medical
prophylactics were issued, munitions were issued, clothing was issued,
including body armour, rations were issued, fuel was issued. That was the joint supply working to get
that force available to move in the demanding time frames that were expected of
them and with the success that we saw.
That is the process day in and day out, it is happening every day to
support people in deployed operations elsewhere as well.
Q394 Rachel Squire: That is the really crucial thing. It is all very well to say that it has been
issued from various depots and so on and it is all very well to say it survives
somewhere on the Ivory Coast or, most importantly, in Iraq, but the crucial
thing, and I still hear it whether I am in this country or I am away elsewhere,
in Iraq or elsewhere, is once it arrives into the country does it actually get
to those literally in direct line? Even
yesterday I was hearing a bit of criticism, shall we say, that it is still not
happening as it should be. How can you ensure
that the arrival of materiel in the theatre of operations is in the right
order, in the right place at the right time and ensure that it is effectively
used 100 per cent?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Clearly that is crucial. I
am surprised you are still hearing that there is what I will call issues in
those areas. Again, I will ask General
Wood to describe what is going on in one of those theatres currently. We have now created the opportunity for the
demander to see where his piece of equipment or requirement is in that supply
chain, which in turn has created much more confidence in that user. We are delivering, for example, in Iraq
within 24 hours of arrival in theatre.
That is clear and apparent and visible to them. I say I am surprised because I have no
evidence whatsoever that in the sustainment phase of operations, because that
is where we are at the moment, we are not able to see, manage and satisfy the
demands of those people in the timescales that they have asked for them.
Major General Wood: On my specific reference to
Op Phyllis, there the challenge was to get it to the airhead because that was
where they were being deployed from. It
is a different challenge into Iraq in terms of sustainment of an established
operation there but, as CDL said, we have done a lot of work, and that is a
corporate "we", in conjunction with the permanent joint headquarters and the
people deployed in theatre. I do not
wish to command them, and nor would I wish to command them, but in conjunction
with the people in theatre we have made the in-theatre delivery in Telic, in
the Iraq theatre, a 24 hour operation and we have speeded up the delivery at
this end to seven days for UK and North West Europe. At both ends of this end-to-end process we have quite
considerably reduced the time that we were giving ourselves to get demand into
people's hands. It is those people,
those men and women, who are our most demanding customers. They are the people who we are doing this to
satisfy.
Q395 Rachel Squire: Can I just be clear that you are saying that
the logistic lessons identified from Operation Telic have really played a
crucial part in delivery to ensure that whether it is a private or a commander,
when they are in an operational theatre they get the equipment that they need
when they need it.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I think I am describing improvements to that end which currently
we are doing in theatre that we have mentioned, to their satisfaction against
their demand requirements. I state that
categorically. We have done that by
modification to some of the systems and by modification to some of the
processes. It has been enormously
helpful, as the General says, that I do not command those who do much of this
activity in theatre, but I do now own the process and, therefore, we have been
able to modify those processes that they use at their own behest to satisfy
their demand. That has been
enthusiastically received by all contributors and, as I say, the end user is
now able to see much of what he needs because of our modifications to the
current information systems. That is
not the end of the process. This is in
a sustainment regime where, I have to say, the predictability and the
management is easier than in the priming function of any large operation. We still have to develop the right
management information systems to make this work even more effectively. We are embarked upon those, there is a
series of them: management of materiel
in transit; management of the deployed infantry; and so on and so forth. Currently we have modified our existing
arrangements but we will take the next step to make this process even more
effective and efficient with those new information systems.
Rachel Squire: Thank you. When you move on from your current job maybe
we will have a chance to travel to parts of the world and check out that things
have been delivered that are needed.
Chairman: The problem is not just one
for the military, Sainsbury's have been having difficulties getting things on
to their shelves and their strategic environment is maybe less demanding but
much larger than that of the Ministry of Defence.
Q396 Richard Ottaway: Can I go into the tracking aspects in greater
depth. The review said that it was
"fragmented and poorly connected". What
investment have you put into it? Does
that investment include the maritime environment?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Perhaps I could just kick off and then ask the Director General of
the supply chain to take you through some other elements of this. You were saying "poorly connected", but one
of the major successes, of course, of Telic and the mounting of Telic was the
introduction of the TAV minus which did allow us to have constant and complete
visibility to what I would call the point of entry. That was done as an urgent operational requirement but has now
been formalised and is in active day-to-day use in order to overcome one of
those elements of this end-to-end arrangement to get the asset visibility as
well as the consignment visibility.
Q397 Chairman: We will be coming on to asset tracking in
more detail later on.
Major General Wood: You do not want me to answer
that now, Chairman?
Q398 Chairman: Just briefly.
Major General Wood: We do visit theatre, we get
a constant flow of information from theatre and, as CDL said, we are trying to
meet the priorities as set from theatre.
The comparison with supermarkets is interesting because where is the
checkout in the military supply chain?
What we have done is taken a family of projects and drawn them together
into a co-ordinated programme so there is consignment visibility, and you have
heard about the system called Vital, we are improving Vital, Vital Version 4 is
just being released, Version 5 is being prepared which will deal with the
acquittal. There is a demand tracking
system which we did pick up from the maritime environment because of my joint
responsibilities, which is applicable to the other environment, which allows
you to know where a demand is at any one particular time. That is in the field of the management of
materiel in transit. In terms of the
joint deployed inventory area, we have had a study going on inland with the
system that the Air environment currently uses which does appear to be
applicable and only yesterday signatures were put on a piece of paper declaring
Land's commitment to this particular functionality and, therefore, we will roll
that out to support all three surfaces, Land and Air first and then we will see
if we can make it fit into the maritime environment. Those are all steady progress steps but they add together to
improve our capability quite substantially.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: It comes back to this recognition that logistics is an end-to-end
function, not a series of separate endeavours.
As I say, my process ownership designation now allows us to range across
the whole of the execution chain and make sure that it is integrated and the
fragmentation that you describe to be a thing of the past.
Q399 Richard Ottaway: Is everything tracked?
Major General Wood: Everything always was
tracked at the point of issue. Every
single thing that leaves the depot in the UK is swiped and coded and
tracked. The challenge gets greater
further forward and it is that last mile which is the most demanding
piece. The network that we have of
automatic tracking capability has been further extended into Afghanistan,
further forward in Iraq, to give that automated reading capability because one
of the challenges with Vital, hence my specific reference to the need to
improve it, is that it was a relatively old-fashioned system and it was quite
time and labour intensive to complete the screens and very busy people dealing
with very large volumes were not always able to complete all the screens and
you lost that piece of the picture which was giving you your complete
end-to-end visibility trail.
Q400 Richard Ottaway: Are you using barcode technology?
Major General Wood: Everything that leaves the
depots in this country is barcoded and was barcoded during Telic. It is easier to do in that environment, it
is beyond that.
Q401 Rachel Squire: Just picking up the end-to-end process. Can I place the critical role of industry in
all of this. The End-to-End Review
certainly acknowledged that industry has a critical role to play in the delivery
of future logistic support. Can you say
what role you see industry playing in the delivery of future logistic
support? Is "just-in-time" still a
solution, given the experience on recent operations?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Again, if I could just explore the words there. You say "in future" industry has a role. Currently industry has a major role in the
means of providing logistic support to the Armed Forces. About two-thirds of my budget on a
day-to-day basis is already spent with industry. This is not an organisation that does all its own provisioning by
any stretch of the imagination. We have
to have a relationship and a means of managing the industry in a way that is
equally as agile to our needs as we require it from the Armed Forces. That is why I said in my opening comments
that the relationship with industry and the means of getting them to respond
was the third of my major objectives. I
would say in operational terms that their responsiveness to such examples as
UORs and contractors on deployed operations has been excellent. In one respect we already have a
relationship that is hugely responsive and effective, but I would then have to
move on and say I also have to make this system efficient and, therefore, I
have to create different ways of doing business in that acquisition space to
prove that we are getting good value for money as well as a responsive
provider. That is a core element of the
Transformation Programme that we are embarked upon and what I would call the
main part of what we are trying to develop in partnering support in the future
where those dependencies are clear. We
have to create something that is good value for money in the strategic base but
also is responsive in the way that we showed with Telic at the same time; we
must not break one for the other. I
come back to one of my objectives is that strategic goal of significant
efficiency, which is why we are trying to create that different
relationship. One real advantage from
that is we should use many of their management systems, not create our own,
which is why in future incrementally in IT, shall we say, we are not looking to
create something that we talked about in the past of DSMS - Defence Stores
Management System - we are looking to use their systems because their systems
have to be efficient to create shareholder value. We do not need to duplicate that. We need to draw on their materiel. Whether that means "just-in-time" is an issue for us to decide
upon as far as I am concerned. The real
question is, is "just-in-time" from industry an acceptable operational risk, is
"just-enough" an acceptable operational risk, or do we have to build in what I
would call margins in order to manage those operational risks? That is the very business of the CDL and the
Defence Logistics Organisation and the IPTs.
You have to make a judgment in those areas with each of these
arrangements that we have with industry and it will be different in different
circumstances.
Q402 Rachel Squire: Can I move on to the End-to-End Review which
recognises that improvements are needed in the approach to contracting. Can you say what improvements you are
introducing to your contracting arrangements and how will these compare with
best practice arrangements elsewhere?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Yet again, a component of the Transformation Programme, and if you
want a little more detail I can turn to General Raper, is in the first instance
we have looked at three components of our procurement arrangements. The first is that we are looking for a much
more market facing category management.
In the past, in essence each of the IPTs has been a law unto itself in
terms of empowerment, it has been able to produce the best value for money
acceptable operational risk solution for a particular endeavour. We have not been as successful as we might
be perhaps in looking across each of those contributors because they do not
stand alone in creating that end effect, therefore we have tried to combine a
whole series of these activities with industry so that we can get the market to
respond in the best possible way and we have had considerable success in doing
that in terms of supplier based optimisation, in terms of collapsing the huge
numbers of contracts we let in the past into a smaller number of larger
contracts which give you volume leverage.
We have moved that on from the information we have had from that
endeavour to trying to manage our suppliers much more holistically, and I do
not mean just the DLO, I mean the DPA and the DLO as the acquisition community,
so we are not sending different messages to those suppliers and getting
different outcomes. Also, we are
introducing common processes with our sister acquisition organisation, the DPA,
in order to make sure this works to best effect across that whole community. Indeed, we are rolling that out across Government
as best practice to other departments.
Q403 Rachel Squire: That leads on to ensuring that contracting
arrangements do ensure that risk is sensibly transferred and required
performance levels are delivered.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Again, I think we need to understand what we mean by "risk". The operational risk associated with this
relationship will always remain with the Armed Forces. What we are recognising is that industry and
other potential providers can contribute to a more effective arrangement that
mitigates that risk and we can transfer some of the financial risk with what we
have been doing in the past to get a more efficient solution from some of those
providers - know the marketplace; know what their strengths are - and then
deliberately using those areas that are better at managing the component parts
of this but with us continuing to integrate them in order to manage that
operational risk.
Major General Raper: Perhaps I could
differentiate between the two aspects.
One thing we are trying to look at with our major partners in industry
in relation to some of the major platforms is how might we contract for
availability in the future with the appropriate performance regime within
that. I would suggest that not only
gets at efficiency but crucially that gets at effectiveness, because if you
contract for availability for a partner then you are starting to put the onus
on to them to drive reliability and ease of maintainability because that is
where their future costs lie and that is what they would be clearly wishing to
take out, by comparison with a contracting regime whereby industry repairs when
something breaks down or provides you with spares. In other words, there is not the incentive to drive reliability
and, therefore, effectiveness in the way that we would wish. One aspect is the contracting for
availability with partners and the other aspect which the CDL was referring to
in terms of what we are doing with procurement reform is very much attacking
pure efficiency: how can we be a much,
much better buyer in the marketplace and use our economic power to much, much
better effect? I am sure you will be
familiar with the sorts of ratios that the commercial sector looks at when it is
actually looking at buying commodities and the sorts of prices that they are
taking out. In terms of procurement
reform, which has now been running for about eight months, we are looking at
that delivering in the first three or four years something in the order of £400
million of efficiency across and then from 2009 onwards about £410 million year
in year out. That has broken up our
spend into a set of categories and the first £2 billion of the £5.6 billion
that we spend has been analysed and out of that will come another £136
million. That is looking at things like
how we spend on travel money, how we spend on transport, how we do some of our
IS applications and so on and so forth.
One aspect of procurement reform is really trying to get to grips with
efficiency and us becoming a much, much better buyer in the marketplace and the
other is trying to get industry to deliver under an availability regime where
you do start to get the effectiveness that you want to see out of a number of
these major platforms.
Q404 Mr Roy: Could I turn to the Defence Aviation Repair
Agency and stick on the subject of efficiency and effectiveness. It is my understanding that during the past
year £18 million has been spent at St Athan building the new superstructure
which I understand is the size of six football pitches. That structure allows for 47 fast jets to be
repaired at any one time. With that in
mind and the money that has been spent, and also bearing in mind that at the
moment 1,450 civilians do the work that it previously took 4,500 RAF personnel
to do, what is the military case for the proposed re-nationalisation, because
that is what it is, of the modern up-to-date super facility at St Athan?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I cannot necessarily address the figures that you have used; I
would need to understand the origin. I
would simply say that the Red Dragon project that you describe was, of course,
a business case that delivered a particular outcome in a certain timescale and
that will be delivered. That business
case stands in its own right and will deliver the benefits associated with it
but, because of the End-to-End Review, what we are looking at here is a concept
that identifies our future needs in terms of forward and depth. This is not what I would call the original
arrangements, this is doing things differently in the future better to manage
the operational risks that we face and the dependencies that we face.
Q405 Mr Roy: Is that based on the business case or the
military case? Certainly I will expand
on the business case but I would like you to tell me about the military case of
moving and making all those people unemployed, building an £18 million
superstructure and then moving it somewhere that has not got the same track
record as where you have just left.
What is the military case, first of all?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I am not sure I understand your question because this is not just
a military case, it is a management decision on efficiency and on
effectiveness.
Q406 Mr Roy: Tell me, first of all, about the part that is
just a military case.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: The part that is a military case is better to be able to support
tomorrow's operations by doing things differently.
Q407 Mr Roy: You could not do that at St Athan based on
the £18 million you have just spent?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: No, I am not saying that at all.
I am simply saying that when we applied that principle of better support
and we looked at different ways of achieving it, the investment appraisal
showed us that one particular area rolled forward to a single centre of
excellence for depth was the right answer and in other areas rolled back into
industry or DARA was the right answer.
You cannot have one to stand without the other.
Q408 Mr Roy: A military case can still be made for keeping
the operations at St Athan.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I can make what I would call a compelling case to remain at St
Athan, but ----
Q409 Mr Roy: Do you have a military case?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I can make a more compelling case to roll forward elements of this
into other locations.
Q410 Mr Roy: Presumably that more compelling case will be
based on a military case and a business case?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: As we have said from the beginning, this is both effectiveness in
the new challenges we face which has determined we do things from depth and
forward, not the four lines that we had in the past, and applying that
principle leaves you one centre of excellence in the strategic base. That is what is being created at Marham, for
example.
Q411 Mr Roy: On that same theme, still sticking with the
business case, I hope you would agree that business has a social responsibility
as well. I presume that you do. You have agreed that you do. I live in an area that was devastated at one
point by the steel industry and the case was not made. We tried to make an economic case for the
work and a social case as well. I think
the business case should take care of the social aspects of any of its
plans. If that is the case, what
thought has been given to the devastating effect that job losses for 1,450
workers will have at St Athan, plus the businesses and families who depend on
servicing that sector? Presumably you
have thought about that.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Yes, we have. For example,
the trades unions have been involved throughout.
Q412 Mr Roy: And disagreed throughout.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I am not quite sure that they disagreed with the outcome. They have commented in the consultant period.
Q413 Mr Roy: Surely you are not going to tell me that you
perceive the trades unions to be in agreement with the closure of St
Athan. Let us get this very clear: are you telling me that the trades unions
have not disagreed with the proposed closure of St Athan?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I am saying they have had the opportunity and made their
observations on the business case which deals with the particular element of
DARA that lies at St Athan.
Q414 Mr Roy: But they have disagreed.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: They have made observations.
Q415 Mr Roy: They have disagreed. That is sitting on the fence. They have disagreed with the proposed
closure. Please do not pigeonhole
trades unions by saying that they have agreed to 1,450 redundancies.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I am not pigeonholing anyone.
I am saying that they have been consulted, they were involved
throughout, and they have made their observations on what we propose to do. We have taken due note of those and we are
actively trying to engage other potential employers to mitigate some of the
risks for that workforce.
Q416 Mr Roy: What is the opportunity cost to the MoD of
closing St Athan? How much will it
cost? How much will they need to
reinvest in that area because presumably as a good employer they are not just
going to turn their back on their former employees and walk away? There must be an opportunity cost; there
must be some money that will have to be spent in that area. How much will that be and does that come
into consideration?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Again, that is part of the investment appraisal. To answer that in any kind of detail, we
would have to make available that investment appraisal.
Q417 Mr Roy: Has the appraisal not been done yet?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Yes, it has been done.
Q418 Mr Roy: So how much is it? If you have done the appraisal, how much will it cost?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I can only offer to give you a particular number in answer to that
question. I do not know it immediately.
Q419 Mr Roy: You will be able to write to the Committee
with it?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Yes.
Q420 Mr Roy: I am very concerned that it used to take
three times more people to do the same work as those same men and women are now
doing. When did military personnel last
undertake the deep repair of aircraft and what experience do RAF personnel at
RAF Marham have in undertaking such work on Tornado GR4 aircraft?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Can I draw your attention to what happened at Cottismore on
Harrier where we have already introduced something we call a pulse line lean
system using RAF manpower, which has made huge efficiencies in that
process. Of course, we have learned
from that in the proposals for the business case for what we are going to do at
Marham.
Q421 Mr Roy: That does not answer my question. When did military personnel last undertake
the deep repair of aircraft and what experience do RAF personnel at RAF Marham,
not anywhere else, have in undertaking such work? You are moving jobs from one area to another and you will expect
other people to do it, but when you expect other people to do it I would like
to know what experience those people have got, not people at other RAF bases.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: You are suggesting that the people at Cottismore never moved from
Cottismore.
Q422 Mr Roy: No, I am not saying that.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I am saying that these military people who have been involved in
deep maintenance have the skill sets to complete that, they have just proven it
categorically in support to Harrier. We
have those skill sets.
Q423 Mr Roy: Let us talk about the people at RAF Marham,
not anybody else. Let us try and talk
about them. When did they last have
experience of working on these aircraft?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: As I say, I do not understand the question because the people at
RAF Marham today will not necessarily be the people at RAF Marham tomorrow in
order to fulfil the remit for deep maintenance of Tornado.
Q424 Mr Roy: I take it that those people at RAF Marham
today have no experience.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: No, I did not say that. We
have the skill sets across the Royal Air Force to do this, as we have just
proven with the Harrier line at Cottismore.
Q425 Mr Roy: That is okay, but if you are working in St
Athan and your job is going to another area, I would look towards those people
who are working on that particular base that that work is going to and I would
surmise that they would be expected to do the job that I am already doing, not
somebody else from RAF Leuchars or anywhere else in the country. You are saying that you are going to take
work from one area and put it in another RAF base and the people who are there
will be expected to do the work presumably.
I am trying to get the balance of the experience. Is it an old boys' network where you are
re-nationalising, you are moving the work out of South Wales and you are going
to put it into an RAF base somewhere else and expect the same level of
competence and experience that you have just given up?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: As I say, we have the skill sets to be able to do that without
significant technical risk.
Q426 Mr Roy: How reliant will RAF Marham be on private
sector assistance?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Significantly.
Q427 Mr Roy: Give me the percentage.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: As I said earlier on, we are already dependent in many areas on
commercial capability. I said we do
much of our work through acquisition, acquisition from both internal and
external providers. I am already
dependent for two-thirds of my activity on that.
Q428 Mr Roy: If problems are experienced at RAF Marham
with the deep repair of Tornado GR4 aircraft, where else could this work be
undertaken?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: For Tornado in particular?
Q429 Mr Roy: Yes.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Well, theoretically I suppose you could look back at the original
manufacturer as one option.
Q430 Mr Roy: More expensive?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: You asked me who could do it.
I am not saying that we have looked at the options and the costs, you
asked me who could do it. I go back to
the original ----
Q431 Mr Roy: Why have you not looked at the options and
costs?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: We did look at options and costs.
Q432 Mr Roy: Surely you have looked at every single
aspect. What happens if RAF Marham does
not work and something goes wrong, what is the option?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: As I say, we have looked at the options, we have judged the risk,
that is part of the business process and that is part of the investment
appraisal. The investment appraisal was
done in accordance with Treasury guidelines, it understands risks, it applies
factors for risks, those risks will be different whether it at St Athan, at
Marham or anywhere else. Those
judgments have been drawn in a number and then said the most cost-effective
solution to doing things differently in the future against a single depth
centre of excellence is at RAF Marham.
Q433 Mr Roy: And the social costs of the closure of the
other plant?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: You added those statements and I said I would tell you what the costs
in the investment appraisal were associated with that.
Chairman: Sir Malcolm, what is quite
irritating for me is that we did an inquiry into the new funding for DARA. It was very controversial and people came
and argued why there should be this rather radical change of reorganising DARA
and putting additional work into St Athan, a big argument about the role of the
MoD and the Development Agency, whether the site was adequate or not. Finally, after a great deal of complicated
decision-making, they decided they would put up this enormous hangar which
would accommodate the entire diminished Air Force and Army, I suspect, for £18
million. This looks to me like the
Grand Old Duke of York who marched everyone all the way over to St Athan and
now they are marching out again. It is
a bit like Lord Beeching. I recall in
South Wales whenever they repaired and painted the railway stations you knew
exactly what was going to happen next, they were going to close the line. This is a replication of that. I can understand Frank arguing the case for
dislocation of the workforce and possible redundancies, I share that view, but
my irritation is what kind of decision-making process is it that you have a
major decision in 2001, a major upheaval, a major reorganisation and then three
years later it is going marching off in the opposite direction? You have told us how you have improved
decision-making and asset tracking. You
should spend a bit more time on the asset tracking work being done because it
is going to a different part of the country.
I find the decision-making process to be totally bizarre, almost a
reversal of the decision, when so much effort was made to explain to us why the
St Athan decision, the DARA reorganisation, was essential. Now you are coming back,
and I must say others will follow behind you in defending this decision, but as
far as I am concerned, even though we have a very busy agenda, we did a very
quick inquiry into the move in 2001 and I see no reason why we should not do
the same for this proposed move. It is
the decision-making perspective that I find really difficult to
comprehend. I know the MoD is not
always keen to show us documentation but we would certainly like to see why
this study so quickly after the previous study came out with a totally
different solution. I am putting down a
marker that we will need a lot more information on this before we are going to
be convinced that a reversal of policy is necessary. We will go to my colleague who lives closer to St Athan than I
do. I have no fond memories of St
Athan, I let in 12 goals in 1961 so I would not do anything to save it, but
others have a very different and more passionate view than I do. Dai, from Merthyr.
Q434 Mr Havard: My colleagues have roamed across some of the
things that I was going to ask you. Let
us take the high level of the argument which the Chairman has just alluded
to. Clearly it is perceived by us as
being a reversal of policy to some degree because all the declarations,
politically, commercially and otherwise, about the establishment of DARA and
where it sat in relation to business, where it sat in relation to being a
competitive organisation as a trading fund to be able to give depth of support
for the MoD to have commercial opportunities, if you like, so you and the RAF,
the MoD, the Government is not hooked up to a monopoly situation from the
suppliers of the aircraft. All of those
big political questions seem to be being distorted by this particular action. The whole idea of this was that military
personnel would not be involved in this deep support of aircraft, it would be
done elsewhere, and in order to avoid the danger of being hooked up to
suppliers there would be an alternative in the market in the form of a Trading
Fund. This particular decision seems to
have hit at that general direction of policy.
There are other decisions that you have been making in the DLO that you
would argue are consistent with that political declaration but this one brings
that whole issue into question. Maybe
it is not a question you can answer but my colleague asked you about the
military rationale. My constituents
tell me that the real reason for the change is your crisis manning levels and
the way you approach them and what you perceive in the RAF to be your need for
certain personnel. A direct consequence
of that is you will now train these people as aeronautical engineers and keep
them employed. One way of doing that is
by organising the work for these GR4s in the way you propose. It has nothing to do with all these other
questions I raised about where DARA sits in the broader scheme of defence
industrial policy or even efficiency in spend, so that money is transferred to
the vote - in other words, employing military personnel rather than coming from
revenues which DARA might make as a commercial organisation.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I started by offering that this is transformation in order first
of all to create a more effective supply chain. I do not just mean distribution; I mean the whole of the supply
chain including repair, overhaul and initial acquisition. We are doing different things in order to
show (a) it is more effective but (b) I am afraid I then have to straddle the
operational space with the business space because of those dependencies. We are not simply doing what was there
before more efficiently. We are
challenging the very essence of why doing things in the way we used to is still
supporting the effective employment of our armed forces in a way that we can
show is value for money. You are right
in one essence: that this is a change of policy, but it is a change of policy
deliberately against those parameters.
We are not simply doing what we did before because it does not give us
the right answer to create an effective supply chain for the employment of
those armed forces in today's circumstances.
Q435 Mr Havard: From where I sit politically, what I see is
the RAF because of its particular perceived needs in this area and crisis
manning, in order to do that, it is not taking the advantage that is coming
through doing work more efficiently. It
is using its particular position as a sort of special pleading almost to retain
the work with military personnel rather than using the tools and processes that
are available to it for the establishment of DARA.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I am sorry but again I come back to the investment appraisal that
underpins these options. This is the
best value for money solution in this particular area.
Q436 Mr Havard: You have mentioned the investment
appraisal. You say that the investment
appraisal was done for this particular change.
What factors were taken into account in doing that and in deciding which
option showed the best value for money?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: You create the business case according to the parameters that
impact on it. In this case, it is how
best to do the activity that in the past was called fourth, third and second
line, using the best skill set, using modern, lean techniques that we have
proven in other military environments.
Then you cost that way of doing business, but you also ----
Q437 Mr Havard: Because the RAF has become smarter at doing
that with the Harriers, the circumstances have all changed and there has been a
policy revision. Is this to do with the
investment appraisal or with policy change?
Major General Raper: I wonder if I could outline
a couple of things that came out of the end to end review because that is the
piece of work which has covered the principles on which we are placing all of
that future support regime. That is
irrespective of location or organisation.
The end to end review came out with three key findings: we needed to
configure for the most likely - and I could give you some examples of what we
are doing there - and the second thing is that we should concentrate our
resources and material at logistic centres of gravity and therefore, in terms
of support for aircraft, that is in the form of having single depth support
locations. The third thing was having a
reliable supply chain which we have already spoken about. In terms of how we are taking transformation
forward, we have clearly taken those three into the transformation programme.
Q438 Mr Havard: This is all mixed in with this medium term
work strand discussion, is it?
Major General Raper: Those principles will also
play into the medium term work strand, yes.
Q439 Mr Havard: On this particular investment appraisal, is
it going to be published? Are we going
to see what the relative assessment was and why DARA did not come out top and
the RAF did?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: It has not been published.
In the consultation period parts of it have been made available to the
trade unions.
Q440 Mr Havard: Perhaps we can try to find out whether more
information could be given to us because in terms of transparency it would be
nice to see it. Who helped in doing the
appraisal? Did the National Audit
Office, for example, get involved? Who
did you use in order to help you do the process of deciding who was the best?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: It was done under the direction of the senior economic adviser in
the Ministry of Defence.
Q441 Mr Havard: The National Audit Office were not
involved? It was domestically done by
the MoD?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: That is absolutely standard practice in accordance with Treasury
guidelines for all business cases that we then consider.
Q442 Mr Havard: Can you say anything about what will now
happen to the money that has already been invested in the infrastructure in St
Athan?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: As far as we are concerned, the benefits that were apportioned to
that particular business case for Red Dragon will still be deliverable.
Q443 Mr Havard: We know from discussion elsewhere - maybe it
is not a question you can answer - but you will understand the reason why we
need to pursue it. We had a letter from
the Ministry of Defence yesterday which addressed some of the concerns that the
trade unions had raised about some of these things and really it comes to this
business about your capacity. Part of
the reason we asked the questions about military rationale is three years ago
there was a requirement for assured access to repair capabilities and a
capacity for surge workloads at a time of crisis. Is there still such a requirement?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: There is currently a review of the needs for that. Surge will obviously be a part of our
requirement in building up to some of the contingencies we prepare for.
Q444 Mr Havard: Where will that be met?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: We are going to have to create the means of doing that in that
organisation at Marham.
Q445 Mr Havard: St Athan will not be involved in doing
anything?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: If St Athan is the means of creating that surge and that is the
best way of doing it ----
Q446 Mr Havard: If this element of DARA effectively suffers
and goes out of business because it cannot track all the foreign, other
commercial and other military work which the work from the RAF is going to
provide a core for, you will have to go away and go presumably back to the
manufacturers.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I think you are slightly forgetting that that was an original
condition on the formation of DARA anyway.
They had to attract external work in order to make this organisation
----
Q447 Mr Havard: They were going to attract further work on
the basis of the core work which has now been taken away.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: That core work has been available for a certain length of time
already and will continue for another length of time in order to derive the
benefits associated with Red Dragon.
Q448 Mr Havard: This letter we had from the Ministry of
Defence said, "We accept that there are risks associated with any decision on
the options but that the effects on the workforce and hence the impact on costs
need to be carefully managed." It
addresses the question about the extent to which you might fall inadvertently
into a position where you are dependent upon suppliers of the equipment to do
things. It says this will not
happen. It says to me that the monopoly
situation in respect of both the decider and provider functions would be
avoided and the means of avoiding it is a very fancy - half of it, it seems to me,
has come out of the McKinsey book of boys' own management - management process,
which is described here, that is needed in order to establish clear
demarcations of responsibility to allow the MoD to manage effectively any
monopoly supply of risk. Why is this
construct having to be put in place when not too long ago we had a debate about
providing a trading fund and set up an organisation called DARA in order to do
all these things? What was there seems
to be having to be replaced by a new, fancy mechanism which frankly I have very
little confidence in, as it is described to me, in order to avoid the very
question that DARA was meant to help to address.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: If I may, you answer your own question because this is perceived
to be a better solution to the issues that you have just raised.
Q449 Mr Havard: Why is it better? How is it better?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Because the business case shows how we will do it, how we will
manage those risks. If the Minister
decides, which of course he has not yet done; he has simply indicated his
preferred option, we will manage those risks in the implementation plan.
Q450 Mr Havard: When is he going to make his decision?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: As you know, the consultation phase ended on 27 October and each
of the points made in that consultation period had been looked at very
carefully before then, offering the Minister advice against his preferred
decision. I expect that advice to be
available in the very, very near future.
Q451 Mr Havard: I am trying to struggle with the idea of
where this particular issue of these particular aircraft and the situation
between Marham and St Athan fits with the rest of the whole of DARA, where it
fits with the rest of the whole of the logistics, where it fits with the whole
thing about your transformation and how that all fits in with what is
mysteriously called a medium term work strand, which I am not clear about at
all; and how that all fits with whether or not there is a change of policy
going on here. If that change of policy
is being driven by the operators of the system, as it were, maybe the military,
DARA and the agencies, and not by the politicians, then I have a bit of a
problem.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: This is not a preconceived outcome and it is not a
re-rationalisation in the way that you describe because other aspects of this
review have resulted in a roll back. An
example of that is that the helicopter community will go back into Fleetlands
because that was seen as the most effective and efficient way of conforming
with depth and forward requirements in the future.
Mr Havard: You said earlier on this
could have been done and could be done at St Athan. You say for whatever reasons it is more efficient and effective,
by whatever criteria which I still do not understand. You decided it was more efficient and effective to do it the
other way. My colleague has a question
about how that decision is effectively the opposite to another decision.
Q452 Mr Roy: I still disagree with you on your
renationalisation where jobs in the private sector going into the public
sector. That is the same as what used
to be nationalisation the other way and I wish we had more of it. The Minister announced on 16 September that
concentrating support for rotary aircraft at DARA Fleetlands offers the
opportunity to exploit fully the economies of scale that may be achieved by
collocating these platforms at a single centre. That seems to be a contradiction to the approach taken with the
Tornado GR4 aircraft where support has been concentrated at the main operating
base that you have just been trying valiantly to defend. What are the economies of scale from
concentrating support at DARA Fleetlands?
I am not an expert at all on helicopters but I know you are. My understanding is that the rotary
helicopters have different engines, different structures, so where you have
aircraft with such differences in the engines, frames and systems, where can
you find the economies of scale?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: The reference, as I understand it, is about overheads being
apportioned across a larger number of aircraft at that location.
Q453 Mr Roy: Just overheads?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: That is that particular reference. What it does not say seemingly from your quote is that there is
also the significant opportunity, because of the nature of those platforms and
lean support mechanisms, to take advantage of collocating those platforms at
Fleetlands. There is more than one
potential benefit in what we are trying to do at DARA Fleetlands.
Q454 Mr Roy: You would accept that there is not an overall
economy of scale for repair or whatever?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: We are in danger of what I will call taking one comment out of
context and believing it is the only reason for a particular outcome. It is not.
Q455 Mr Roy: The Minister spoke about rotary and the
economies of scale and, not being an RAF person, they are all the same.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: They are not all RAF either.
For example, the Lynx will go.
The Lynx services the army and the navy. Helicopters are currently within the Joint Helicopter Command
which is in Land Command.
Q456 Mr Roy: What about the contradiction where you have
just been defending moving St Athan where there is a direct contradiction of
doing this at Fleetlands? Do you think
that is a contradiction?
Major General Raper: No, I do not. We need to come back to the principles I
sought to outline and those principles were about reducing the amount we bring
forward, creating a single depth, concentrating around a logistic centre of
gravity. From the military perspective,
those are things we need to look at.
There is then the investment appraisal and the business case which will
determine where the centre of gravity should be.
Q457 Mr Havard: In one case that depth support, albeit it in
one place, has to be done by military personnel and in other cases it does not.
Major General Raper: The number of military that
we need is that number which you need to sustain deployed operations and no
more. Therefore, that number of people
has to be employed.
Q458 Mr Havard: I am not wrong earlier on in talking about a
lot of this, as far as the RAF is concerned, is to do with your crisis manning levels
and where you keep these boys gainfully employed in the meantime.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: That is one of the elements because our whole purpose in peace is
to create readiness.
Q459 Mr Havard: There might be other ways you could do it without
disturbing St Athan.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: In the option which was St Athan, which was included in this, we
would still have had to employ the right number of military people in this
single depth hub.
Q460 Chairman: Those arguments
were not very strong in 2001. The
Ministry of Defence was saying DARA could do this job; they have the surge
capability; they are reliable. I would
like to know what has happened in the meantime.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Because we did not have the same principle that we have been
talking about applied. We had four
lines of maintenance which required larger numbers of people than we currently
expect to use in the two separations.
Q461 Chairman: You are losing
7,000 people from the air force. Have you
worked out how, with substantially reduced numbers, a number of these are going
to be engaged in the work that is currently being done outside the air
force? That is all worked out?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Many of the numbers, not only in the air force but in the army, as
we create a new army liability, come from the efficiencies associated with
logistics transformation.
Q462 Mr Roy: Will the investment appraisal and the
affordability analysis relating to this decision be published?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I do not know.
Q463 Mr Havard: I asked you whether the other one was going
to be published. The reason I asked you
that question is very simple. These two
are different. They almost seem
inimical to one another. What we need
to understand is what has gone into each of those appraisals and why it may be
different or the same and how they inter-relate. If we do not have that information, it is very difficult for you
to be able to convince me that individually they were correct to do and they
are complementary to one another as opposed to contradictory to one
another. That may be something you
cannot commit to do today but I think it is ridiculous for anyone's
understanding of what is going on here if we do not have that sort of
information to get that level of understanding.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I hear the question and I will write to you.
Q464 Rachel Squire: Future Capabilities sets out a number of
changes to army equipment including a reduction in Challenger 2 squadrons, AS90
batteries, Rapier anti-aircraft launchers and high velocity missile fire
units. What assessment has been made of
the impact of these equipment reductions on ABRO, specifically in terms of future workload?
Major General Raper: Some of that has been done
specifically in relation to the full structure changes which you have
mentioned. I would suggest that the
bigger change to ABRO comes from putting in place exactly the same principles
as we are doing on the air side and in particular putting in place lean
operations within ABRO, which is exactly the work that we are doing with the
chief executive at the moment. Indeed,
if we look at the work that we have done at Donnington to improve the processes
and the output at Donnington, that has released some 45 Warrior back to the
field army, simply by improving the processes between the in part and the out
part. The level of the workforce
clearly will be governed by the amount of work and how that work is done.
Q465 Rachel Squire: Can I ask you to say whether there is
sufficient funding to repair all the armoured vehicles such as Warrior which
have suffered damage in Iraq? You are
looking puzzled.
Major General Raper: I am just intrigued by the
question. The answer to that is yes,
for those that can clearly be repaired.
It depends entirely on the state of the vehicle.
Q466 Rachel Squire: That is a very vague and general statement.
Major General Raper: The specific is yes. The amount of work that is required if it
can be done is dictated by the state of the vehicle and in particular the state
of the armoured hull.
Q467 Rachel Squire: I remember myself and other Members of the
Committee visiting one of the ABRO sites and hearing about its operations and
the real effort and progress that had been made. A crucial role is repairing damaged equipment and getting it back
to the men and women on the ground as soon as possible.
Major General Raper: Irrespective of how that
damage has been caused and therefore, if you have had the privilege of seeing
the in part of some ABRO facilities, you will know the state of some of that
equipment that has been involved in traffic accidents, accidents on exercises,
and it does require a substantial amount of work. You do need some integrity of the armoured hull to be able to repair
everything else around it.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: There seems to be an implication here that the ground forces will
be short of these major equipments because of damage. We are using the whole fleet to support these endeavours and we
have to create an efficient repair and overhaul arrangement to deal with the
damage, but it is not the same vehicles that will replace the ones after their
repair until they have gone through that cycle. I do not think there is any danger that we will not have enough
Warrior in the operation because they come from the whole fleet.
Major General Wood: And an ongoing up-marketing
programme to improve their protection and survivability in theatre, issuing
more items to improve their protection for that particular vehicle.
Q468 Rachel Squire: It is the connection if you like because
apparently there are reductions planned in equipment. Will that still mean that you can get out to our armed forces the
equipment they need? There is also the
issue that ABRO has ten sites and there appears to be discussion about some of
those sites might be closed and some of the current manpower might be reduced
which immediately, given that we were just talking obviously about RAF St
Athan, the heart of it for many of us is ensuring that the equipment gets out
to our forces when they need it and in the best possible condition; but that
those who have undergone major changes and efforts on the ground, particularly
back in this country, are also recognised in terms of what they have delivered
and will continue to deliver to our armed forces. Yet there are all these constant reviews being done about how
further cuts can be made in equipment, sites and staff. I get totally flummoxed by how much we can
spend so much time and money at senior level employing endless consultants on
doing constant reviews to deliver value for money, where for me and many others
the real priority is what is happening on the ground at ABRO, RAF St Athan and
elsewhere.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: There is absolutely nothing but praise and recognition for what
these people have achieved. At the same
time, we must note, for example, that through process improvement we have put
another 45 Warriors back into the front line.
That has implications for the number of people that we need to employ
then to maintain them. That is a
reality and I am afraid it is my task to make this thing as efficient and
effective as it can be and manage the consequences that creates. You talk about reductions of equipment. Those reductions are a rebalancing as
well. In future army structures, we are
looking for a much more balanced force against what General Raper described are
the most likely. Those will be a
lighter, more balanced, more agile force into the future. This, I am afraid, is a different
requirement for tomorrow and maintaining the arrangements of yesterday cannot
be the right answer to creating an effective supply chain.
Q469 Rachel Squire: Can you say whether the recommendations of
the end to end review will affect ABRO in the long term?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I do not think it is in doubt at all. They must as we apply those principles.
Major General Raper: They will certainly impact
on ABRO as ABRO puts in place lean process.
That is exactly what has happened in looking at ABRO Donnington. The same will happen looking at ABRO at
Bovington. As those facilities become
leaner, if the amount of work that needs to go through there is also reducing
and they are doing it more efficiently, by definition the overall volume
reduces.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: In the same way as you were asking about how we become better
buyers of services in the future, we are becoming better buyers of the product
from ABRO as well as from commercial sources.
Q470 Chairman: I can see that
you think these guys on the Defence Committee are opposed to any radical
change. I am going about creating a
better system and they are being quite difficult. I hope you appreciate that, as I have been in my job longer than
you have, it gets frustrating when you find such radical changes three years
after the MoD come down and plead with us to accept why we have to go down the
direction or support the direction that they are supporting. Then the guy running it disappears. You come along with a new approach and yet we
can sit back and see it in the long term - i.e., over a three or four year
period. Frankly, it looks ridiculous. Maybe you are right now. I have sufficient confidence in you that you
are right but who thought about that plan three years ago that resulted in you,
because there was a war and lessons to be learned, very largely going in a
different direction. That is what
frustrates us. It is not that we are
opposed to change. We just like to see
change proceeded with in a more rational process than we are exposed to at the
present time. That is why we are a
little irritated as well as yourself.
In our Lessons of Iraq report,
we concluded, "We are in no doubt that one of the key lessons to emerge from
Operation Telic concerns operational, logistic support and specifically the
requirement for a robust system to track equipment and stocks both into and
within theatre, a requirement which was identified in the 1991 Gulf War. The lack of such a system on Operation Telic
resulted in numerous problems ..." etc.
We had Sir Kevin Tebbit talking to us on 15 September on logistics and
asset tracking. We said that one of the key lessons was the need for better
asset tracking. You have told us, "Yes,
we had a system but in the situation the military found itself it was not quite
up to it." The government told us, "A
package of improvements for logistics material management has been identified
which includes tracking. This package
would require funding and options will need to be considered as part of the
Department's planning round against other priorities. If funded, the enhancements will provide a robust tracking
capability." I know we have touched upon it and Mr Ottaway mentioned the
point. What is the outcome of this
consideration and has the required funding been made available? If so, how much?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Can I ask General Wood to deal with the outcome and the funding
arrangements? You also said to me at
that last meeting that you would not wish me, on my next appearance, to say
that we had not been able to improve that regime. I would claim categorically at the moment that already we have
improved that regime in what I called earlier the sustainment phase of that
particular operation. I gave you
examples of what we have been able to do.
I would like to reinforce that the answer to this question is not just
asset tracking. It is very definitely
about asset management because it is no good seeing what is happening out there
if you cannot intervene and make it right.
Just a plea from me: even if we have the best asset tracking regime in
the world, you may not still gain that confidence in the end user because you
cannot manage the information in the appropriate way. General Wood will describe the various components of what we are
doing in future, recognising that we are patching current systems that have
already given us visibility and greater confidence from the end user in the way
we have described.
Major General Wood: The lesson was
recognised. Funding was approved, not
huge sums of money because the CDL was saying we were building on the existing
capability to make it better. A total
of £20 million, just under, was approved for this family of projects. I am sure when General Jackson appeared
before this Committee he would have apologised for using what he described as
"alphabet soup" and I shall probably apply the same apology. This is a combination of the management of
material in transit, the management of the joint deployed inventory and
consignment visibility. Then you have
the base inventory systems. It is all
of that together in which we are trying to make improvements. All that family of projects have been drawn
together into a programme and they are going to an assessment phase now. We will go before the Approvals Board in the
autumn of next year to see those enhancements in a coordinated way delivered in
the following year; but, as the CDL said, we are making progress now to improve
capability building on what we already have, which is the reference I made
earlier in the area, for example, of consignment visibility to a further
version release of that system which is known as Vital. Another system release is planned in the new
year and a third one after that in order to improve the database on which it is
founded. I made reference to its user
unfriendliness in the past. The
management of material in transit is a bridging capability on top of that
existing consignment visibility capability, not to just wait for the September
2005 approval process but for this demand tracking system which was already
available being incorporated now. The
roll out for that is early next year.
Then, for the joint deployed inventory, MJDI, again it is part of that
submission for autumn next year but I made reference to the trial in the land
environment which has demonstrated that the existing capability will serve land
process requirements and therefore we will incorporate that. That is not the same as me saying that is
the solution; nor am I saying that is the solution for ever, but there is a
real capability there which we are taking, enhancing and using now. There is also the management of fleets and
whole fleet management. The CDL made
reference to the distinction between just tracking an item and the
configuration of an item. What is known
as JAMES, Joint Asset Management and Engineering Solution, the first stage of
that, will roll out next year which gives us fleet management capability. It is the sum of all those parts in this
programme that I would say is a demonstration of the improvements which are
being made now and into the near term.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: The visibility of all that is within the total programme overseen
by General Raper. The development of
this and the milestones and the deliverables are there for everybody to see in
the right timescales on the defence net.
This is not hidden. We are
showing exactly what we are doing, when the benefits will be delivered and
apportioned to which of the programmes.
I can guarantee you more transparency into the future as you see the
progress against each of these and I think there are other aspects of this in
process terms. For example, we are
introducing PEPs, Priming Equipment Packs, that again will enable this system
to work more efficiently and allow us to manage it.
Major General Raper: I could mention something
about PEPs which is directly related to this and one of the lessons from
Telic. If you recall, there were a
number of challenges at the beginning in getting units up to the right level
and making sure the equipment was at the right level. One of the things therefore we have already trialled with one of
the battalions and will look to trial at brigade level next year with a view to
operational deployment from 2006 onwards within the army is being done on a PEP
basis. A PEP is a Primary Equipment
Pack which means all of the scales, support and spares that that unit would
require would be delivered to it when it is warned for operations. That will ensure that that unit maximises
the time it has available in getting ready, not as it has done in the past in
terms of getting together all the equipment it needs because that will be
delivered to it. That should therefore
improve the availability of the equipment that it deploys with. It will also prevent quite a lot of the
demands that there have been on the supply chain in the early stages as people
try to make sure they have all the things that they require. That is one thing that we are putting in, in
direct response to those lessons which will also help with readiness.
Q471 Chairman: Will the
quartermasters be trained not to plunder like Gengis Khan's hordes because we
visited Umm Qasr and it appeared to be semi-anarchic. When the material was coming in, the quartermasters were grabbing
all they could. It was not signed
for. They were taking twice as much as
they required and it was rather embarrassing.
You think in a crisis like they went through, a new system if it was
properly operational would bring rationality in?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: We honestly believe it will create the confidence in those
quartermasters that changes their behaviour as a consequence.
Q472 Chairman: I hope that is
how they behave.
Major General Wood: Quartermasters are trained
at the Defence College of Logistics and there is a training piece to this in
terms of making people more familiar with the systems that I have just
described so that they are comfortable with their use.
Q473 Chairman: They are
professional scavengers but they do not have much concern for anybody
else. If much of this is going to be
computerised, will it be properly secure, because we do not want a potential
adversary making things more confusing than otherwise they would be? Within your £20 million upgrading, you can
give us some guarantee that it will be a secure system?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I am not sure I want to be constrained to that £20 million upgrade
because one of the keys to this is the bearer systems on which these will sit.
I think you are already aware of the MoD's
emphasis on DOAI signal infrastructure and the introduction of Bowman will also
help as a potential carrier. It is not
just the systems; it is the electric string between those systems that we need
to make sure is appropriate to the task of security.
Q474 Chairman: I hope we can be
reassured. When you spoke, you used the
word "patching" and this looks like a good old British compromise. We cannot
afford it; we do not have the money to have a proper system so the best way,
the way in which the British do best in a situation, is to get the best of what
we have to try to make it work. Try and
reassure us, if not now then in writing if you do not mind, that this patching
approach will deliver a proper system and that you have considered other
options, including getting the best available.
I presume this will not be the best available if you are merely
restructuring and improving upon what you have already. Perhaps you can drop us a note on that.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: We will do that.
Major General Wood: We are building on existing
capability. As we go through each stage
in the approval process, we ask very demanding questions about what alternative
capabilities were available and in existence within the defence community and
outside. That is part of the
examination process we would expect to go through.
Q475 Mr Havard: Obviously, the stuff gets in; then it is the
breakout and then the management of the assets and the recovery. None of these is an easy thing to do with
quantities and all the rest of it. You
talked about Vital. Echoing the
chairman's question, am I correct in understanding that you are not going to
try and invent a new computer system to deal with this? It is going to be consistent across
everything - otherwise, we will go to hell in a handcart. As I understand it, the existing systems in
the front end can be modified and made better but the back systems that each of
the services previously had which were not consistent, some sort of middle way
process is being applied to help to do that.
Is that correct?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: That is correct.
Q476 Mr Havard: We are not going to have another monster
computer debacle?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: No.
Major General Wood: The context is set within
the supply chain blueprint so there is a doctrinal context for this. It is not just a series of little
projects. There is a programme and it
is in the broader context of the end to end supply chain.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: We have had to do this at best pace as well. There has to be some manipulation of current
systems as the right way of doing that in the intervening period.
Q477 Mr Havard: The trials, you said, were on land. The problem comes to some degree at the
literal end so there is a particular set of issues there from Op Telic, is
there not, where the marines were giving the army boys petrol or diesel?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: There are different issues in the different environments but by
far the most complex issues to solve are in the land environment because of its
mobility and reasonable habit of moving the goalposts in terms of where it
needs delivery.
Q478 Chairman: The system will
be perfectly compatible with the Americans, French, Germans and any other
allies that come along with us?
Major General Wood: You will have been briefed
before about TAV Minus which we use. I
received some funding to retain that as a UOR.
We have extended the footprint for that and we have been involved in
some NATO trials using TAV Minus.
Q479 Chairman: You realise I
said that with very high irony?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: We have explained all this to the NATO Military Committee who were
very interested therefore in how they could engage with what we are embarked
upon in order to try to get that interoperability within those nations as well.
Chairman: I am sure there are many French companies masquerading as British
companies who will be more than capable of supplying any system you
require. They might even supply it to
their own armed forces, which I very much doubt.
Q480 Mr Havard: The NAO report which has come out recently
talked about the defence logistics transformation programme, the benefits from
that of some £2.1 billion over the years 2007-2008. Which major areas are these savings coming from? How are they going to be reinvested in the
DLO process, or are they going to be invested somewhere else?
Major General Raper: I was not clear which report
you were referring to.
Q481 Mr Havard: The National Audit Office report recently
said that the savings coming from the defence logistics transformation will be
£2.1 billion over a period. If you are
making those degrees of savings from your transformation process, how are you
going to use them? Which areas are they
coming from? Which areas are they going
to be reinvested back into or are they going to be stolen by somebody else?
Major General Raper: I would not dream of talking
about the stealing part. If we look at
2007/8, we have to remember that is the sum of a lot of work that started
several years ago. That also takes
account of everything we were doing with the DLO change programme. The DLO change programme, you will recall,
had a strategic goal which was the 1.262 billion, or the balance of it as 1.262
billion, by 31 March 2006. If you add
on the amount that has already been delivered against that, that takes you up
to about 1.8 billion. The end to end
review also identified further efficiencies on top of those that had been taken
inside the DLO change programme because the DLO change programme specifically
looked at things which the DLO budgetary area, rather than the end to end
programme which has clearly taken account of those aspects of logistics which
are within the front line commands and the services.
Q482 Mr Havard: I misled you and everybody else. It was the MoD efficiency review.
Major General Wood: I think it is the efficiency
review that you are referring to. The
issue as far as I am concerned becomes a reporting one because if all of the
work we have put into the programme delivers it will met the various targets
that have been set for us both internally and externally. The first of those was the strategic goal. The second are those efficiencies from the
end to end review which is a further 370 million of efficiency by 2008 and a
further 110 million of efficiency by 2011 on top of that. Those are the two numbers which go together
to give you your two billion. The
efficiency review merely takes account of all of that, which is what we have to
report to, back through the efficiency regime.
Q483 Mr Havard: Some of this spend is used to do some of the
things that we heard about earlier on?
Major General Wood: Some of that is reinvested
to improve process within the DLO. The
remainder is taken account of in terms of the Department allocating its
resources across the piece. Life in the
logistic area will not get easier.
Q484 Mr Hancock: Cheaper?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: More efficient.
Q485 Mr Havard: One of the things that immediately came out
of our Lessons of Iraq report was the
use of urgent operational requirements, particularly in the medical area but in
a number of areas. It was a case of
having to be done because it had to be done.
It raises this difficult question of whether or not we should have
stocks. You talk about business space
and how it relates to the battle space and whether you have the bridge because
you cannot go down to Tesco and buy one.
How much of these expected savings will be used to help you to have
sufficient stock in these critical areas so that we do not have to have this
URO requirement operating in the same way in any future situation?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: There are two questions there.
The UOR is the means of managing areas because deliberately we cannot
provide for every eventuality. The way
to do this is to do the scenarios, understand the costs in stock, equipment and
commodities of each of those scenarios and then create the core out of that for
the most likely. General Raper talked
earlier about one of the principles we are developing which is: be ready for
the most likely and adjust for the less likely. We will never be able to afford everything for every potential
contingent operation. I cannot promise
you a future without UORs but I think I can promise you a future where we
understand what risks we are going to have to manage in that warning period,
because we have identified the stocks we need -- you heard earlier about the
Primary Equipment Packs - so that these are available to the units at an
appropriate readiness. We have
identified what they are and will provide for them. Through this process, we are able to apply the resources we are
given to those areas that will define readiness and sustain that readiness in
these particular operations and manage the excursions from the most likely.
Major General Raper: The vast bulk of the
efficiencies that we will deliver through the programme in much the same way as
when the DLO was set up were to invest in other areas of defence, not
specifically within the DLO. We were
looking to make the logistic area not only more effective but significantly
more efficient.
Q486 Mr Havard: I have asked this question before and I am
becoming a bit of an anorak on this, but the resource account budgeting - it is
this question of the Treasury rules and the view, not just within the MoD and
other parts of the MoD, about if you keep stocks stocks are expensive. They are dead money on the shelf. The bean counters will tell you that is not
an efficient way to run a business. If
you are Tesco, it is much easier to deal with this issue because you are
shifting the beans off the shelf. You
have to have these bridges sat there for all time. The way in which assets are dealt with and the relative rules and
mechanisms and then people say, "You have saved a bit of money. Thank you very much" and we have the general
cock ups whereas you might think, "We have saved a bit of money over here. We can help ourselves with the penalty we are
experiencing on the accounting rules for having to keep these stocks." We are trying to get a bit behind the idea
of, if there is your organisation, quite clearly you are making inroads and you
are running it more efficiently in a number of ways. Why should you have the disbenefit of losing those efficiencies
and not have the benefit of being able to use them properly within our own
outfit to make it even better? I am not
necessarily your enemy in this regard.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Logistics are not products in their own right. We have to take a corporate view of the best
means of using the resources that the MoD has.
In some instances, that will result in reinvestment in logistics, but it
has to be a deliberate, corporate view as to where the resource is best used
having delivered the efficiency.
Q487 Mr Havard: You think all these mechanisms that apply and
all the rules and all the processes to decide these sorts of issues are not
constructed in a way that is hindering you.
That is a leading question but are the rules that the Treasury apply
misunderstanding the situation vis a vis the Ministry of Defence as opposed to
other organisations that have different requirements and do not have to keep
stocks in the same way?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I do not think that is right because if we understand our business
we should be applying the right resource totals in their various categories to
our need. If it is decided that, for
whatever reason, we will take the risk over here corporately, at least we will
know what that risk is in future and be able to manage it.
Q488 Mr Havard: Perhaps at some point you would give us a
better overview of the general thing about where the savings came from, how
they were deployed and investment policy, something that gives us some
confidence in the development of things in the way you describe them.
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: We can certainly do that.
Q489 Mr Hancock: You talked about the corporate approach and I
am interested in the MoD efficiency note which suggests you could make 2.1
billion saving. That is a pretty big
target to have to meet. How much of an
input did you have in setting that target?
You have been in the post two years.
How will we be able to judge whether or not you have achieved that? Is it not something that we talked about
earlier, a repercussion, and you have been set a very big target to have to
deliver overall from your operational part of that decision?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: There is nothing new in terms of estimate within that particular
number. These are all the products of
our incremental improvement to our processes identified either in the original
strategic goal and the means of delivering it, in the end to end study and in
future efficiency means. There is no
wedge, if you like, in these numbers.
Q490 Mr Hancock: When does the transformation programme end
and you then become another entity?
What is the process after the transformation? You save 2.1 billion during the transformation programme. What do we expect following on from that?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: The transformation is both about effectiveness and
efficiency.
Q491 Mr Hancock: Is that time limited?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: Once we have the product which is an effective supply chain, we
would then want to return to normal, efficiency programmes.
Q492 Mr Hancock: Is that something you will know when you have
found it? You will say, "This is now
the optimum supply chain; the transformation programme ceases now"?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: According to the capabilities paper, we are talking about 2008 as
our target.
Major General Raper: The efficiency targets all
come with dates. It is pounds and dates
and therefore we clearly have to report against those. We have a benefits tracking system where all
of those efficiencies are logged on by the delivery budget areas. That has been looked at by our own internal
audit people and the Treasury. That is
the mechanism that we use which is open in terms of tracking the delivery of
those efficiencies. In terms of the
delivery of the effectiveness and the supply chain, for example, we have done
work on the blueprint which will have the programme to deliver that effectiveness. Most of that we would expect to see in place
over the next three years. How long
will the transformation programme be in place?
I would like to think that in four or five years we will not be
referring to the transformation programme any more because it will deliver the
key elements of it and that will now become something akin to routine,
continuous improvement. In other
words, all the big things inside the
transformation programme.
Q493 Mr Hancock: With your experience of being in the post now
for two years, having this transformation programme in front of you, do you
foresee a merger between the DLO and the DPA, given that on your website you
acknowledge that the current system does not work very well and there are
problems and that collocation is going ultimately to lead surely to that?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: In terms of an organisational merger, no, I do not see that as a
necessity or even a valuable outcome.
Q494 Mr Hancock: Would it help?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: What helps enormously is this process designator, to understand
that this is an end to end activity that different organisations have to
contribute to. Even if we were to put
the DPA and the DLO together, you would still not have an end to end arrangement
because half of logistic activity currently goes on in the front line. It does not make any sense to me to look at
this organisationally. We have to
corral those organisations so that they are contributing to an integrated
outcome and their contributions are not fracturing that total arrangement.
Q495 Mr Hancock: If on your own website you admit that the
current set-up does prevent you achieving an effective, through life management
options, is there any serious consideration being given to the idea of the
merging of the two operations? Would that
not in the end allow you to achieve what you say yourself you cannot achieve at
the present time?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: No. What the website also
goes on to say is how we are improving and making the same processes across the
acquisition community, because that is where the value lies, not in putting two
organisations together when they are dealing in different parts of the through
life spectrum.
Q496 Mr Hancock: In the MoD's annual report for 2003/4 they
say that a new DLO structure is being introduced progressively from 2005. When do you expect that restructuring to be
completed? When do you believe the
overall effectiveness of that operation will start to be felt by the three
services?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: We have already started.
This will not be a big bang, one day the old DLO, the next day a new
DLO. We already have introduced what we
call the domain two starts which are now the single contact with our main front
line commands. I can speak for my
customers and say they much appreciate that and have seen the added value that
comes from it. That has broken one of
the barriers in the past which were based on historical arrangements. We are some way towards creating a new
series of enablers in common with that sister acquisition community called the
DPA. We are currently going through
consultation for that series of enablers with the trade unions, which will
reveal not only the new structure but also the post mapping for the people
within that structure. We are hoping to
roll that out by the end of this financial year.
Q497 Mr Hancock: The restructuring is expected to result in
some 3,000 job losses. I would be
interested to know how you are planning to manage that scale of job losses and
over what timescale do you envisage that will have to happen?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: We envisage up to 950 posts - I stress "posts"; not necessarily
people - this year and up to another 2,000 by 2008.
Q498 Mr Hancock: What sort of consultation are you having with
your current civilian workforce to ensure that that is handled?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: A huge effort. There are
advantages and disadvantages in this.
We have been determined from the time we started to consult with the workforce
directly as we develop ideas so that they can understand what it means for
them. We are not waiting until we have
discovered what the outcome is. That
has been going on for two years. We
have also been doing that systematically with the trade unions throughout that
period. I can report to you that the
trade unions have found that hugely helpful in understanding the outcome and
how therefore they can contribute to an efficient and effective supply chain.
Q499 Mr Hancock: You are knocking 3,000 posts out of the
system. Are you satisfied that the work
that has been done already on planning for that, the service you provide, is
not going to be diminished by that fairly heavily?
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Malcolm Pledger: I am absolutely confident and it comes back to: this is not doing
the same things with fewer people; it is understanding exactly what we are
responsible for and complementing it against those roles and
responsibilities.
Q500 Chairman: There are a
couple of questions we were going to ask but we will write to you. We were going to ask a question on the
clothing contract given by the MoD to a company called Cooneen Watts &
Stone. Now they have changed their name
to Kowloon Watts & Stone, I think.
Major General Wood: Your adviser had a note on
that yesterday.
Chairman: We have a letter from the Minister and we will study it and write
back to you with the last couple of questions.
Thank you very much. If this is
to be your last appearance before us, I will regret that. Thank you very much for the appearances you
have made. You were a little bit
irritated in some of the early stages but that is part of appearing before
us. If everybody smiles after a meeting
with us, we have not done our job properly.
All the very best in whatever you wish to do or you are asked to do and
thank you very much, gentlemen, for coming here this morning.