Supplementary memorandum submitted by
Professor John Coldron, Sheffield Hallam University (SA 19)
CONTENTS
1. Findings concerning the choice process—schools
and parents
1.1 Use of performance tables and likelihood
of opting away from local school.
1.2 Do parents demote their favourite school?
1.3 Likelihood of parents being offered
their favourite school.
1.4 On the characteristics of schools that
parents class as their favourite school.
1.5 Characteristics of parents who appeal.
2. LEA procedures for expressing a preference
2.1 How many LEAs use equal weighting of
parents' expressed preferences?
3. The management of preferences in wholly
selective areas
3.1 Selective areas.
3.2 Problems of admission management in
selective areas.
3.3 Ways in which selective LEAs try to
solve the problem.
3.4 Adjudicator rulings.
4. Management of the problem in areas that
are not wholly selective but have wholly selective schools within
their area
4.1 LEA practice.
5. Access to tests for places at a selective
school
5.1 Opting in or opting out?
5.2 Possible problems with non-universal
systems.
6. Evidence as to the educational benefits
of selection
6.1 Evidence from Schagen and Schagen and
PISA.
7. Proposals and recommendations
7.1 The need to accommodate different solutions.
7.2 Issues to be considered.
7.3 Proposals and recommendations.
1. FINDINGS CONCERNING
THE CHOICE
PROCESS—SCHOOLS
AND PARENTS
1.1 Use of performance tables and likelihood
of opting away from local school: There are a number of relevant
findings in the nationally representative survey conducted by
the Office for national Statistics for our joint DfES study (Flatley
and Williams 2001) into the experience of parents. The figures
are for 1999-2000.
The findings provided further evidence that
parents consider a whole range of criteria of choice and that
the academic performance of the school is only one. For example
a minority of parents (39%) used performance tables to find out
about schools. However parents among whom the mother had a degree
or above were nearly twice as likely to consult them as those
among whom the mother had no educational qualifications.
We also found that parents in London, those
with higher educational qualifications and those in occupational
classes I and II were more likely to opt away from their nearest
school (see Table 1). This shows that parents who live in London
were six times more likely to apply for a place outside their
own LEA area than parents who live in a Shire authority and that
parents where the mother had never had paid employment were three
times less likely than those in Social Class I or II to have applied
outside their own LEA; and where the parent had no educational
qualifications they were half as likely (two times less likely)
to have applied outside their own LEA (see Table 1).
Table 1
LIKELIHOOD OF PARENTS APPLYING FOR A PLACE
IN A SCHOOL OUTSIDE THEIR OWN LEA AREA (BASED ON ODDS RATIOS FROM
LOGISTIC REGRESSION)
|
| Characteristic | Odds ratios
| 95% confidence intervals
|
| | Lower
| Upper |
|
Highest educational qualification
Degree or equivalent or higher
| 1.0 | —
| — |
| Other qualifications | 0.5
| 0.4 | 0.9
|
| No qualifications | 0.4
| 0.2 | 0.7
|
Social class of mother
I & II
| 1.0 | —
| — |
| III non-manual | 1.0
| 0.7 | 1.5
|
| III, IV & V manual | 0.9
| 0.6 | 1.4
|
| Never worked | 0.3
| 0.2 | 0.6
|
Parental LEA type
London borough
| 6.3 | 4.2
| 9.4 |
| Metropolitan authority | 1.3
| 0.8 | 2.0
|
| Unitary authority | 2.6
| 1.8 | 3.8
|
| Shire authority | 1.0
| — | —
|
| Nagelerke R2 | 0.1
| | |
|
1.2 Do parents demote their favourite school? Members
were interested in whether there was a difference between the
school that parents stated on the application form as their first
preference and the school they would "really" have preferred.
The ONS analysis covered this aspect of parental choice to some
extent. Parents were asked if there were any state schools they
had not applied to but would have preferred their child to attend.
Eight per cent of parents reported that there were. In addition
the survey collected the names of all schools to which parents
applied for a place. Parents were asked which of these schools
they most wanted their child to attend. For the purposes of analysis
this school was referred to in the report as the parent's favourite
school. It is therefore possible to infer what proportion
of parents demoted their favourite school to a lower preference
in the ranking of their application form. The survey found that
while 92% gained entry to the school they had put as their first
preference 85% reported that they had gained their favourite
school. This indicates that about 7% had not put their favourite
school as their first preference. The results are presented in
Table 2.
Table 2
OUTCOME MEASURES BY COHORT
|
| % offered a place in
| Entry cohort of selected child
|
| Sept 1999
%
| Sept 2000
% |
Total
% |
|
In a preferred school
Favourite school
| 89 | 81
| 85 |
| First preference school | 93
| 91 | 92
|
| Any school for which preference expressed |
97 | 95
| 96 |
| In a school for which no preference stated |
3 | 5
| 4 |
| Weighted base | 1,192
| 977 | 2,170
|
|
1.3 Likelihood of parents being offered their favourite
school: It was found that there was not a strong relationship
between the background characteristics of parents and the likelihood
of being offered a place in their favourite school. However
parents in London were an exception and were the least likely
to be offered a place in their favourite school (an odds ratio
of 0.3:1.0 compared with the reference category of Shire authorities).
While nationally 85% of parents were offered a place in their
favourite school in London only 68% receive such an offer. Nationally,
4% of parents were offered a place in a school for which no preference
had been stated. Nevertheless, among these parents around half
reported they were satisfied with the school they had been offered.
1.4 On the characteristics of schools that parents class
as their favourite school. Six in ten of the favourite schools
(as defined earlier) had higher than average GCSE performance
scores than their LEA average. When compared to national figures
for the proportions of pupils eligible for free school meals,
46% of favourite schools fell within the two lowest national
quintile groups (ie in the 40% of schools with the lowest proportions
of students receiving free meals). Fifteen per cent of the favourite
schools were in the 20% of schools with the highest proportions
of students receiving free school meals.
When the odds of all the different factors in combination
are examined, parents who had no previous experience of choosing
a secondary school, were owner occupiers, lived in London boroughs,
had a degree level qualification or above and were in Social Class
I and II had the highest odds of choosing a favourite school
with a high GCSE performance score. They were three times more
likely to do so than those parents in the reference category (who
differed from them in having previous experience of choosing a
secondary school and in living in a Shire authority). Parents
who had the lowest odds of choosing a secondary school with a
high GCSE performance score had previous experience of choosing
a secondary school, lived in social sector rented accommodation,
lived in a Shire authority, had no qualifications and were parents
among whom the parent had never worked. This group of parents
were about eight times less likely than the reference group of
parents to choose a favourite school with a GCSE performance
score above the LEA average.
1.5 Characteristics of parents who appeal: Five
percent of parents in the nationally representative survey reported
that they had appealed (n=129). In general, these parents
did not vary by background characteristics. In other words there
was no greater likelihood of a middle class parent appealing than
a working class parent. In our work for the DfES project on Appeals
panels (Coldron et al 2002) panel members reported their impression
that there were now greater numbers of working class appellants.
We also found that there was no greater likelihood of a middle
class parent winning an appeal ie the Social Class of an appellant
bore no significant relation to whether the appeal was successful
or not (n=317).
2. LEA PROCEDURES FOR
EXPRESSING A
PREFERENCE
2.1 How many LEAs use equal weighting of parents' expressed
preferences? The question was raised as to how many LEAs used
an equal weighting procedure. The nationally representative survey
(Flatley and Williams 2001) found that 66% of parents were asked
by their LEA to list their preference for school, on their application
form, in rank order.
In Stage One of the same project (Williams et al 2001) we
analysed all eligible LEAs in England (n=141) and categorised
their procedures for allowing parents to express a preference.
This data relates to the procedure for September 2000 entry. Finding
a means of categorising LEA modes of practice which captures the
complexity that exists, whilst ensuring that a useful and usable
typology was developed presented several challenges. In some areas
LEA admission procedures applied to such a small proportion of
schools that describing the LEA mode of practice did not provide
a meaningful description of the procedures that many parents experienced
there. The procedures found in the composite prospectuses were
categorised into four types.
Type 1: Multiple preferences—Rank order
The parent is invited to name a number of schools as preferences
in rank order and the LEA admission authority attempts to allocate
them a place at their first choice school. Though the first choice
takes precedence in the majority of cases it is not guaranteed
that a parent's first choice will take precedence over someone
else's second choice. There are circumstances where a second choice
takes precedence, particularly if this means a pupil would be
spared a long or difficult journey to an alternative school. Sometimes
a multi-stage process is involved where parents may be asked to
enter the next stage of the admission procedure and identify further
preferences if they have been unsuccessful with their initial
preferences.
Type 2: Invitation to accept a designated school or choose
another
Parents are notified of a place allocated at a school chosen
by the LEA on the basis of the general admission arrangements
of the authority and invited to confirm that particular school
as their expressed preference or to name one or more alternative
preferred schools. The parent must confirm in writing that the
allocated school is acceptable otherwise it is treated as a non-preference
and no place is reserved. This procedure is most commonly used
in those areas where a catchment or priority area system is in
place. How the consequences of this are handled by LEAs varies
considerably. Some LEAs state explicitly that not putting the
designated school down as first preference may mean that a place
is not available at this "local" school should they
be unsuccessful in gaining a place at a different first preference
school. Other LEAs state explicitly that parents who put their
"catchment" school down as a second preference who do
not get their first preference will not be treated any less favourably
than a parent who chose the catchment school as their first preference.
Type 3: Multiple preference equal weighting
Parents are asked to express multiple preferences and each
preference is given equal weighting. LEAs then allocate to one
of those preferred schools on the basis of their general admission
arrangements. This is often in context where the admission system
is complex involving a number of admission authorities. In such
circumstances the procedures can seem to be complex unless there
is a common admission timetable and a common application form
as is now required by the new Code (DfES 2003).
Type 4: Single preference system
Parents are invited to express a single preference and if
this proves unsuccessful they may apply to alternative school(s)
in a second stage of dealing with preferences.
Table 3
FREQUENCY OF PROCEDURES FOR EXPRESSING A PREFERENCE (SEPT
2000 ENTRY)
|
| Type of system | No. of LEAs
| % of LEAs |
|
| Multiple preference rank order | 105
| 74 |
Invitation to accept designated school or express a
preference for other school(s)
| 18 | 13
|
| Multiple preference equal weighting | 7
| 5 |
| Single preference | 11
| 8 |
| Total | 141
| 100.0 |
|
3. The management of preferences in wholly selective areas
3.1 Selective areas: Although only a minority,
selective admissions present very different issues of management
for both school admission officers and parents. The official definition
of a selective LEA is one where over 25% of the pupils attend
selective grammar schools. There are other areas such as Chelmsford
and Colchester in Essex, or Ripon and Skipton in North Yorkshire
where all of the schools reasonably available to parents are organised
as either selective grammars or secondary moderns. But because
these are sub-areas within larger LEA districts the LEAs are not
classified as wholly selective. All wholly selective areas use
some version of a standardised test of general ability administered
at 11-plus. In practice this was either one produced by an independent
research organisation such as the NFER or one developed within
the LEA itself. We deal in turn with two aspects of admissions
in these areas—the first being the allowance of two first
choices and the second being access by pupils to selective tests.
3.2 Problems of admission management in selective
areas: The advent of open enrolment highlighted a tension
between the new inclusive principle that gave parents the theoretical
right of attendance at any school of their choice and the older
exclusive principle of selection. This, and the requirement to
take account of parents' expressed preference creates a difficult
issue for parents who wish to apply for a selective place if,
at the time of stating their preference, they do not know if their
child is eligible for a selective school place. If they express
a first preference for a place at a selective school and their
child does not reach the required standard (or too many do) it
is possible that they would not get their preferred non-selective
school because that school may already have reached its admission
limit through the allocation of first preferences.
3.3 Ways in which selective LEAs try to solve the
problem: In the event of a child not gaining admission to
a first choice selective school some wholly selective areas manage
this difficulty for parents by allowing the next non-selective
school preference to be deemed a first choice equal with those
other parents who had expressed this as their actual first choice.
Thus, parents who apply to selective schools are advantaged over
other parents who for whatever reason do not apply. We found two
variations of this default process. One is to maintain separate
selective and non-selective school preference lists deciding which
to use when the child's 11-plus result is known. The second way
is to require parents to express preferences for selective and
non-selective schools on a common form. If it turns out that the
child is deemed ineligible for a place at a selective secondary
school the highest preference non-selective school becomes, by
default, the first preference. These systems have either been
accepted by parents and schools, or at least have operated without
any effective objection, over a number of years.
3.4 Adjudicator rulings: While the 1998 Education
Act reaffirmed both open enrolment and then existing systems of
selection the legislation also created the Office of the Schools
Adjudicator thereby creating a process for challenging the admissions
practices of schools as admission authorities and of LEAs. The
Schools Adjudicator has ruled against the default procedures described
above in two important determinations one concerning Wirral and
the other Torbay. In Wirral the adjudicator decided that tests
for selecting to secondary schools should, under the Authority's
admission arrangements, take place after rather than before all
parents had expressed a preference for the school they wanted
their child to attend. The implications of the Torbay Determination
are that tests for selection to secondary schools should follow
and not precede the invitation to all parents to express a preference.
4. Management of the problem in areas that are not wholly
selective but have wholly selective schools within their area
4.1 LEA practice: A system adopted by a number
of areas which are not wholly selective but have one or two selective
schools in their area is to ask parents to express preferences
for both selective and non-selective schools on a common form
without first knowing if their child is eligible (ie has reached
a high enough score in the test) for a place at a selective school.
The tension mentioned above between the inclusive and exclusive
principles is addressed directly by some LEAs. For example one
LEA states clearly in its composite prospectus:
"If you enter your child for the 11-plus you should bear
in mind that a place at your local comprehensive school or community
college cannot be reserved in the event that he or she does not
gain a grammar school place."
In this case advice was then given about the previous year's
entry (what marks children had and what marks those who were given
a place had). This would have had the effect of reassuring those
parents whose children's measured attainment to date was well
above average but would put pressure on those considered borderline.
It represented a risk for these parents but it allowed most parents
to make a reasonably informed choice. Of course the "pass"
mark may change each year as the number of students achieving
those marks increases or decreases. The local authority acknowledged
the fact that,
". . . A place is not guaranteed for a candidate who
qualifies for a place under the 11-plus selection arrangements
. . . The guarantee of a grammar school place was necessary in
the past when the only alternative was a secondary modern school,
which did not cater for pupils of grammar school ability. Nowadays
suitable alternatives are available at comprehensive schools and
community colleges that cater for the whole academic ability range."
This robust position is replicated in a number of other areas
and would tend to facilitate comprehensive (all-ability) intakes
at the non-selective schools in the area.
5. Access to tests for places at a selective school
5.1 Opting in or opting out? A significant aspect
of the admission process to selective schools is how children
are entered for the test. We found that there were different ways
in which this happened. In some areas all children in the last
year of primary school were entered for the test (with parents
able to withdraw them by request). This method of entry was common
for wholly selective areas. It provides universal access and raises
no obvious equity issues beyond those generally associated with
selective systems. In other areas children were entered on the
primary school's recommendation (with parents able to include
them by request). This involves, as a formal part of the process,
a discussion with primary school staff about the child's secondary
education and raises questions about the status of primary schools'
judgements and recommendations. Because there is an element of
judgement at this early stage in the child's school career it
is possible that some primary schools may inappropriately close
off an opportunity for some children.
5.2 Possible problems with non-universal systems:
There is also the possibility that parents will differ in
how they act on the primary school's recommendation. In addition
we know from the extensive work on how parents choose a school
that there are significant differences in the way that parents
from different social groups respond to information and to the
task of choosing. In other LEAs, and for all wholly selective
Voluntary Aided and Foundation schools, parents must request that
their child take the test as part of the application to the school.
Skilled and semi-skilled choosers, who tend to be from more advantaged
families, will do this more readily than those who are less engaged
with the process of choice.
6. Evidence as to the educational benefits of selection
6.1 Evidence from Schagen and Schagen and PISA: Members
asked about the evidence as to the educational benefits of selection.
I explained that as I read the evidence the differences between
the two systems in terms of exam performance was very small. I
quoted two pieces of recent evidence and present them here with
more precision than was possible in the hearing. Ian and Sandie
Schagen of the NFER have produced authoritative work (Schagen
and Schagen 2002) concerning the effects of selection in 149 LEAs
in England. They considered the effects at the level of the school
(ie for the pupils attending grammar or comprehensive schools)
and at the LEA level (the effects for the whole cohort of children
in the LEA). At the level of the school there were significant
differences but at the level of the LEA there was no significant
difference between selective and non-selective. Specifically they
concluded that at the level of the school "there is a
large `grammar school effect' which shows that borderline pupils—those
who narrowly obtain a grammar school place—obtain much better
GCSE results five years later than pupils of equal prior attainment
in comprehensive schools" and on the other hand that
"pupils of higher prior attainment (key stage 2 average
level greater than 5)" fared better in comprehensive
schools. They hypothesise that these two gains at school level
balance out so that there is no difference between the systems
in the performance of children at GCSE at the LEA level.
The PISA study looked at the different performance of national
systems (OECD/UNESCO-UIS (2003). We should be very cautious about
cross national comparisons but the findings are of interest. This
study was concerned to investigate any relationship between school
and student characteristics and student performance. They found
that "the impact [on educational performance] of
school's socio-economic background is much stronger than the effect
of any other variable (including school climate, homework, reading
engagement etc . . . ) Ch. 7 p219. They also investigated
the factors that were associated with social selection and found
that academic selection is correlated with socio-economic segregation,
"Among the ten countries with the most pronounced socio-economic
segregation observed in PISA, all carry out selection procedures
that channel students into different streams of secondary education
before or at the age of assessment." Ch 7 p220.
7. Proposals and recommendations
7.1 The need to accommodate different solutions: Any
set of recommendations needs to be sensitive to the fact that
different areas experience different levels of problems. Policies
designed to solve chronic problems in London should not make things
worse in Cumbria.
7.2 Issues to be considered: We know that the
majority of parents want their children to go to good local schools,
defined not just in terms of exam performance but also in terms
of moral and physical security. They also want predictability
and speediness in the admission procedures. The evidence suggests
that balanced intakes will reduce the problems of polarisation
and are either educationally neutral or beneficial. Further, local
contexts must be taken into account. It will therefore take a
combination of measures to affect these connected issues. Some
proposals are given below.
7.3 Proposals and recommendations
Proposal One: The aim of amendments to admissions policies
should be to:
— encourage balanced school intakes;
— maximise parental satisfaction with the process,
but more importantly, the outcome;
— increase social justice and maximise overall choice
(ie not give choice to some by taking it away from others);
— facilitate cooperation between schools;
— maximise efficiency and cost-effectiveness as
far as possible consistent with other principles; and
— have concern for wider environmental implications
such as traffic congestion.
Proposal Two: Responsibilities for admissions to schools
should rest with one admission authority for a given area (ie
VA and Foundation schools should no longer act as the admission
authority for their school). One of the things that increases
segregation of intakes and increases the difficulty of managing
the process of admissions for both parents and admission authorities
is the existence of a number (sometimes a majority) of autonomous
admission authorities in an area. The new Code (DfES 2003) has
made significant moves to increase collaboration and cooperation
but it stops short of taking away the ability of schools to act
as their own admission authority. There should be consideration
of combining the admission responsibilities into one authority
for a relevant area. This seems particularly important in London.
Clearly there would need to be extensive discussion with interested
parties but the relevant area for London would most effectively
be drawn to include the whole area where presently there is a
great deal of cross border admission. Unifying admission authorities
would greatly improve the appeals procedures of Voluntary Aided
and Foundation schools which are at the moment poor (Coldron et
al 2002).
Proposal Three: Admission criteria should be common within
the area covered by an admission authority. A single authority
for an area implies that admission criteria should also be common
for community, Foundation, Academies and CTCs. For religious schools
there would need to be an additional criterion as to religious
commitment common to all religious schools in the admission authority
but in combination with ability banding to prevent covert selection.
Proposal Four: Admission authorities should seek to maximise
parental preference overall rather than giving absolute priority
to the first in a ranked list of schools. This is already
a recommended model in the new Code of Practice. It allows admission
authorities to balance other criteria such as proximity with parental
preference to gain optimal satisfaction.Proposal Five: Schools
should be encouraged to join into collaborative federations and
there should be active exploration of the possibility of making
federations the unit for admission rather than the individual
school. This could contribute significantly to reducing polarisation
of perception especially if Proposal Eight underpins it and banding
by attainment is used to balance intake.
Proposal Five: Schools should be encouraged to join into
collaborative federations and there should be active exploration
of the possibility of making federations the unit for admission
rather than the individual school. This could contribute significantly
to reducing polarisation of perception especially if Proposal
Eight underpins it and banding by attainment is used to balance
intake.
Proposal Six: The major oversubscription criterion for
community and Foundation schools should be proximity (or catchment
areas based on proximity) and, for Voluntary Aided schools, catchment
areas. This is the least worst option and would have the undesirable
effect of reinforcing selection by mortgage. Therefore this Proposal
needs to work in conjunction with Proposal Eight on resourcing
harder to educate children and, in urban areas, the use of banding
(perhaps within groups of schools) to mitigate segregation of
intake. Admission authorities need to ensure that all schools
are able to accept casual admissions of harder to educate children.
Proposal Seven: Selection by general ability should be
phased out. This includes partially and wholly selective systems.
They are not radically more or less effective educationally but
they create greater segregation, generate a lot of appeals and
are incompatible with parental preference systems.
Proposal Eight: Resources to schools should follow the
child and be based on a calculation of risk factors indicating
how easy or hard each child is to educate. A school with a greater
proportion of harder to educate children will receive proportionately
more resources than a school with fewer children who are harder
to educate. We know certain characteristics of children (such
as the socio-economic status of their family, their prior attainment,
their mobility between schools, and their first language) are
highly correlated with their educational attainment at 16. Some
are easier to educate than others. We also know that some schools
attempt to select the easier to educate and to exclude the harder.
The extra resources would encourage schools to better balance
their intakes and this would in turn reduce one of the pressures
toward segregation and polarisation of perception. It may also
have other advantages; for example it would go some way to complement
the advantages already experienced by pupils in schools with high
socio-economic status intake; it encourages an inclusive rather
than an exclusive response from schools; it acknowledges the additional
difficulties that schools as institutions have when they have
educationally disadvantaged intakes; it would help to reduce some
of the competition between schools and therefore provide a sound
foundation for the operation of the Admission Forums or the unitary
admission authorities and the development of Federations of schools;
it addresses one of the main problems of English education which
is the low achievement of the middle and lower attainers; it would
improve the morale and the retention of teachers in the schools
most in need of stability.
Proposal Nine: Greater travel subsidies should only be
considered as one among a number of ingredients. Greater real
choice may have a role in reducing segregation of intakes in some
areas but should not be considered as either adequate in itself
or as problem free e.g. an increase in the school run traffic
would be an undesirable result. It should be considered as an
option in specific contexts.
REFERENCES
Coldron, J, Stephenson, K, Williams, J, Shipton, L, Demack,
S (2002) Admission Appeal Panels: Research Study into the Operation
of Appeal Panels, Use of the Code of Practice and Training for
Panel Members School of Education, Sheffield Hallam University
for the DfES, Research report RR344.
DfES (2003) School Admissions Code of Practice London:
Department for Education and Employment.
Flatley, J, Williams J, Coldron J, Connolly H, Higgins V,
Logie A, Smith N, Stephenson K (2001). "Parents' Experience
of the Process of Choosing a Secondary School." Office
for National Statistics and Sheffield Hallam University. DfES
Research Report RR278.
OECD/UNESCO-UIS (2003) Literacy Skills for the World of
tomorrow—Further results from PISA 2000 OECD.
Schagen, I and Schagen S (2002) Using national value-added
datasets to explore the effects of school diversity presented
at BERA, Exeter, 12 September 2002
Williams, J, Coldron J, Stephenson K, Logie A, Smith N (2001).
"An analysis of policies and practices of LEA admission authorities
in England." in Parent's Experience of the Process of
Choosing a Secondary School, edited by J Williams and J Flatley:
Department for Education and Skills.
Professor John Coldron
Sheffield Hallam University
16 September 2003
| 
