Conclusions and recommendations
from the Committee's Third Report of Session 2003-04, Pre-Budget
Report: Aviation Follow-up
(paragraph references are to the text of the Third
Report)
1. It is extraordinary that, after such an extensive
period of consultation on aviation policy, the DfT was unable
to publish the documents supporting the White Paper until nearly
two months later. This raises questions about the extent to which
such analyses were fully available during the autumn at the time
when the key decisions contained in the White Paper were being
made. (Paragraph 6)
2. Despite protestations to the contrary, it is abundantly
clear that the aviation White Paper adopts a "predict and
provide" approach. The DfT has forecast future demand and
then provided the framework to meet practically all of it. It
is actively promoting growth on the scale envisaged, and indeed
the urgency with which it is requiring airport operators to implement
expansion plans bears this out. (Paragraph 12)
3. We do not know to what extent future growth in
air travel will be fuelled by existing passengers travelling more
frequently rather than by the 50% of the population who do not
currently fly at all. The DfT has failed to carry out any detailed
studies to explore the social and behavioural impacts of the proposed
growth in aviation, and the manner in which these impacts may
vary for different rates of growth. It must do so as soon as possible
and publish the results. (Paragraph 16)
4. The DfT must publish a formal statement of what
it understands by sustainable consumption in the context of air
travel. As part of this statement, it should explain how the projected
growth from 180 mppa to 476 mppa by 2030 can be reconciled with
the commitment made by the UK Government in Johannesburg to encourage
more sustainable approaches to consumption; and it should also
set out what policies it is pursuing to discourage unnecessary
air travel. (Paragraph 18)
5. The Integrated Policy Appraisal which supports
the White Paper offers a particularly weak assessment of climate
change impacts. The entries are not only very slim compared to
other parts of the IPA, but they entirely fail to reflect the
scale of aviation emissions by 2030 in relation to UK domestic
emissions or to give any hint of the difficulties which will face
the UK in meeting its carbon reduction targets. (Paragraph 21)
6. We agree with the Chief Scientist that climate
change is a profoundly serious threat to mankind. The Government
has in principle accepted our recommendation that specific consideration
must be given in policy appraisals to the impact on carbon targets.
It must ensure that this priority is in future fully reflected
in appraisals conducted by all departments. (Paragraph 24)
7. We welcome the fact that the Government will consider
including the possibility of catastrophic or sudden climate changes
in its estimate of the price of carbon—notwithstanding our
conviction that the value of our climate is literally priceless.
(Paragraph 26)
8. The DfT has implicitly admitted that it failed
to include the environmental costs of aviation emissions in its
appraisals and has sought to rectify this omission in the supporting
document Aviation and Global Warming. (Paragraph 27)
9. As far as we can identify, the DfT has nowhere
calculated a figure for the net consumer and producer surplus
arising from the overall increase in aviation forecast in the
White Paper from 180 mppa to 476 mppa. In other words, we have
no net benefit figure with which to compare our figure of minus
£42 billion NPV for the increase in environmental costs.
In this sense, the DfT has failed to evaluate the impact of new
terminals, runway extensions, and operational improvements aimed
at maximising the use of existing runways. (Paragraph 28)
10. The quality of the economic appraisal of options
carried out by the DfT is poor and the supporting analysis contained
in Aviation and Global Warming is opaque and unhelpful. The DfT
should address this by publishing a new and fully documented appraisal
which takes account of the overall forecast increase in air traffic.
(Paragraph 28 )
11. On the key issue of the impact of aviation on
global warming, the White Paper contains no specific proposals
apart from the commitment to work towards the inclusion of aviation
in the second phase of the European Emissions Trading System from
2008. We are disappointed at the failure of the Government to
show leadership in this area. (Paragraph 30)
12. It is regrettable that the Government did not
take the initiative in promoting an interim emissions charge in
view of the difficulties and timescales involved in developing
an ETS to cover aviation. We believe that such an approach could
offer the scope for flexible adoption by like-minded member states
and could therefore be a more practical option than emissions
trading which requires an all or nothing approach. (Paragraph
33)
13. We are astonished at the lack of essential research
to underpin the incorporation of aviation in the EU Emissions
Trading System (ETS). In view of the timescales involved in developing
and ratifying EU directives, we suspect it may soon be too late
to achieve the Government's professed intention of incorporating
aviation in the second phase of the EU ETS from 2008. The DfT
must set out, in response to this report, what needs to be done
and by when to achieve this goal. (Paragraph 36)
14. It is unclear if any consensus exists among EU
member states on incorporating aviation within the EU Emissions
Trading System; and whether the political will exists to resolve
the complex and contentious issues which need to be addressed
for this to be achieved. It is not even clear to what extent,
and at what level, any of these issues are even being discussed.
(Paragraph 38)
15. In commenting on the recent ICAO meeting, the
DfT official referred to the UK as 'ploughing a pretty lonely
furrow' in its advocacy of emissions trading, and—given
the opposition of some important players—we conclude that
the likelihood of any significant progress being made is remote.
(Paragraph 39)
16. We welcome the fact that the DfT has accepted
our figures for the relative impact of aviation emissions compared
to UK domestic emissions. We trust that the Treasury will do so
too, and will in future provide figures on a consistent basis
which take account of the radiative forcing effect. (Paragraph
43)
17. It is inconceivable that any emissions trading
system could generate sufficient credits to allow aviation to
expand as forecast, while at the same time delivering carbon reductions
of the order needed. The price of carbon could, in such circumstances,
go through the roof—provided there was sufficient political
will to maintain targets and enforce penalties. (Paragraph 45)
18. If aviation emissions increase on the scale predicted
by the DfT, the UK's 60% carbon emission reduction target which
the Government set last year will become meaningless and unachievable.
The most we could hope to attain would be about 35%. The DfT admitted
that the target would need to be looked at should international
emissions be allocated to national inventories—and this
can only mean with a view to watering it down. (Paragraph 50)
19. The Government should recognise the difficulties
it faces in meeting its long-term carbon targets. If it did so,
it would be forced to take more action now and develop an adequate
policy response. It should not continue to hope that the solution
lies in technological advances as the weight of evidence suggests
that the scope for these is limited. (Paragraph 51)
