Conclusions and recommendations
Part 1: Evaluating the 1999 Strategy
The Strategy
1. Sustainable
Development is an inherently ambiguous and complex concept. The
Government's refusal to accept the Brundtland definition of sustainable
development in the International Development Act conflicts with
the apparent acknowledgement of that definition within the 1999
Sustainable Development Strategy. It suggests that the Government
places insufficient weight on the environmental dimension of sustainable
development and inclines more towards an economic interpretation.
In developing a new Strategy and Framework, the Government should
clarify its definition of the term. (Paragraph 18)
2. While we entirely
support any policy initiatives which aim to move us in the direction
of more sustainable lifestyles, the language of sustainable development
will become debased if the Government continues to use it indiscriminately
in formulations such as 'sustainable transport', 'sustainable
communities', and 'sustainable growth'. The widespread use of
this term also reinforces the perception that the Government places
more emphasis on narrower UK socio-economic aims than on long-term
international environmental concerns. (Paragraph 21)
3. The current Strategy
characterises sustainable development as meeting all four main
aims at the same time. It ignores the fact that many policies,
such as the expansion of housing and aviation, will inevitably
involve trade-offs between different aims. One of the key roles
of a future strategy should be to identify the 'crunch' issues
where such trade-offs exist and to evaluate in depth the basis
on which policy decisions are to be made. (Paragraph 24)
4. Indicators for
economic wellbeing or life satisfaction should complement rather
than replace the standard measure of GDP. But to recast the economic
objective simply in terms of well-being would cloud the distinction
between objectives and militate against the fundamental point
of the strategy which is to provide a framework in which economic,
social and environmental impacts can be evaluated against each
other. (Paragraph 28)
5. There is insufficient
emphasis in the principles underpinning the Strategy on international
and inter-generational equity. More generally, it is unclear
to us how the principles are to be taken into account in the policy
making process, or even whether they are mutually consistent with
each other and with the four objectives. (Paragraph 30)
6. The concept of
environmental limits is fundamental to sustainable development.
While such limits cannot, as yet, be firmly established in many
areas of human activity, it is nonetheless certain that they exist.
The new Framework and Strategy should place greater emphasis
on the concept of environmental limits, and the Government should
devote more effort to developing this concept—in conjunction
with the precautionary principle—as a tool for policy making.
(Paragraph 34)
The Strategy as a driver
7. The
crucial importance of the 1999 Strategy was that it was intended
to provide an alternative and all-embracing policy framework to
set against the traditional dominant orthodoxy of economic growth.
Yet, five years later, in a competitive world and a competitive
economy, traditional socio-economic concerns still largely dominate
policy making. To this extent the Strategy has failed, though
its very existence may have had positive impacts—both internationally
and within the UK —which are more difficult to quantify.
(Paragraph 40)
8. The Sustainable
Development Strategy has not driven environmental progress in
the way originally envisaged and it contains few links to the
important series of topic based strategies. Much of the progress
which has been made can be ascribed to the latter, and as such
it has been driven by particular and specific environmental concerns.
(Paragraph 44)
9. It is difficult
to see how a new UK Strategy could function more dynamically even
if it were to include a number of specific priority areas for
action. If the point of including such areas is to drive progress,
there would inevitably be considerable overlap and potential confusion
where dynamic topic-based strategies exist, as in the case of
energy. If, however, the point of including them is to provide
accountability through a strategic overview of progress, we would
question why such an overview could not be extended to other areas
as well—in particular, biodiversity loss and education for
sustainable development. (Paragraph 47)
10. The proliferation
of sustainable development strategies, plans and frameworks at
all levels of Government is a major problem that needs to be addressed.
It contributes to the impression that such documents are an impotent
irrelevance, particularly where they are secondary to 'mainstream'
economic strategies. Inconsistencies and inadequate linkages between
different levels of strategies can also reduce the scope for effective
action, particularly at a local level. (Paragraph 51)
11. The impact of
the Strategy on departmental strategies, Public Service Agreements
and associated targets has been limited. A few departments have
published their own separate sustainable development strategies,
but such strategies have tended to be one-off exercises which
do little to mainstream sustainable development within the priorities
of the department. The paucity of environmental targets within
departmental PSAs also demonstrates the low priority accorded
to the sustainable development agenda. (Paragraph 56)
12. It is surprising
that DEFRA did not commission an independent consultancy review
of the impacts of the Strategy on departments nor even require
departments to conduct their own formal assessments of those impacts.
(Paragraph 62)
INDICATORS
13. The
introduction of the full suite of 140 indicators in 1999 represented
a major advance. These indicators reflect the interests of Government
as a whole, and allow it to focus on the broad range of issues
with which it is concerned. However, in terms of progress in
mainstreaming environmental objectives, it is difficult to assess
the impact of the 1999 Strategy on the basis of these indicators
because insufficient time has passed to identify firm trends and
because changes in the indicators may not relate simply and directly
to the effectiveness of policy instruments. (Paragraph 66)
14. It seems to us
unsatisfactory that differences in data collection in some cases
limit the geographical coverage of the headline indicators; and
we hope that, in the context of a new Strategy, agreement can
be reached on a common core of indicators against which progress
can be reported for the whole of the UK. (Paragraph 67)
15. Anyone taking
the Government's own assessments of progress against the headline
indicators at their face value could be forgiven for thinking
that —with a tweak here or there—we would be well
on the way to achieving sustainability. This is far from the
case and the current set of indicators fails to provide a clear
assessment of the level of sustainability of the UK. (Paragraph
69)
16. It is imperative
that a new UK strategy should include one or more aggregate measures
of sustainability, and it seems to us unsatisfactory that the
UK indicator set should be less complete in this respect than
that which the Welsh Assembly Government is developing. While
we appreciate that some of these indicators may be of limited
use as an analytical tool, they are hugely important as a means
of communicating to the public the immense challenges we face
in trying to move towards more sustainable lifestyles. (Paragraph
73)
17. The Government
should either fulfil the commitment it made in the 1999 Strategy
to include a headline indicator to measure life satisfaction,
or else explain why it no longer considers such an indicator important.
(Paragraph 74)
CONSUMPTION AND AWARENESS
18. It
remains disappointing that progress on the resource productivity
agenda has proved so slow since 1999, and that relatively few
outcomes have resulted from the considerable effort expended in
this area. In particular, there are still no strategic targets
for improving resource productivity. A future strategy should
include such targets. (Paragraph 76)
19. Sustainable consumption
and production is an essential component of a Sustainable Development
strategy, and it therefore represents a significant failure on
the part of Government that it has delayed so long before taking
any action here. While we welcome the setting up of the Round
Table on Sustainable Consumption, we regret that the Government
has completely delegated responsibility in this way and that little
progress is likely to be made on it before the finalisation of
the new Framework and Strategy. (Paragraph 77)
20. We were also intrigued
by the possibility of using consumerism itself to promote sustainability—making
sustainability, as it were, a consumer product. In this
sense, sustainable consumption may not mean consuming less, but
consumer 'greener'. (Paragraph 78)
21. While the consultation
on the Strategy acknowledged that awareness is an issue and proposed
a more extensive publicity campaign, it still does not seem to
us that the Government has grasped the full extent of the challenge.
It is essential for the Government to invest far more campaigns
to increase public awareness which focus on specific priority
issues, in line with the recommendations we made in this area
last year. (Paragraph 80)
22. We do accept,
however, that there are limits to what can be achieved by individual
choice. It is therefore important that the Government should also
ensure that environmental values are reflected in the economic
structure of the economy in such a way that they drive behaviour.
(Paragraph 81)
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES
23. A
new strategy can only be more effective if the structure of institutions
and the processes they employ takes full account of it. Structural
and procedural aspects such as policy appraisal mechanisms, departmental
objectives, monitoring and reporting, and the role of Cabinet
Committees are therefore crucially important if the Strategy is
to be implemented effectively. The Government did not include
these issues in its consultation, but it will need to take full
account of them in developing its new approach. (Paragraph 82)
24. It is becoming
increasingly clear that the break-up of the DETR has had a negative
impact as evidenced, for example, by the failure to incorporate
a deeper understanding of sustainable development within the Aviation
White Paper and ODPM's 'sustainable communities' initiative; and
by the limited scope of the latest Sustainable Development in
Government Report where reporting on policy and awareness issues
has been abandoned. (Paragraph 85)
25. Whilst we appreciate
that there can be no definitively correct organisation of departmental
responsibilities, it does seem to us that departmental structures
can play an important part in reflecting Government priorities.
If sustainable development is indeed an over-riding priority
for the Government, there may well be merit in drawing together
responsibilities for energy policy, transport and climate change
in the way in which the PIU envisaged; and rationalising the plethora
of related bodies involved in this area. (Paragraph 87)
26. The Government
has failed to implement its commitment to consider including sustainable
development within the remit and statutory duties of all departments
and public bodies. This has had particularly damaging consequences
in both procurement and the implementation of energy policy, where
the incorporation of such a duty within the Office of Government
Commerce and Ofgem would have facilitated more progress. In this
context, we regret the fact that the Government recently opposed
amending the Energy Bill so as to give Ofgem a primary duty to
promote sustainable development. As it is, we are disappointed
with how little has been achieved in these areas since 1998.
(Paragraph 93)
27. Departments can
play a key role in turning the Sustainable Development Strategy
from an illusion into reality through the way in which they evaluate
new policies. The Government should take account of our previous
recommendations in this area and ensure that appraisal processes
take sufficient account of environmental priorities. In this
respect, Regulatory Impact Assessments may not be adequate, and
the Government should therefore:
- rigorously implement the requirement that departments
should maintain a central record of the results of screening new
policies, and conduct integrated policy appraisals and separate
environmental appraisals where justified;
- require all appraisals to incorporate specific
consideration of key environmental objectives, such as the need
to reduce biodiversity loss and to achieve the 60% carbon reduction
target;
- ensure that appraisals are conducted sufficiently
early to inform choices between different policy options, rather
than as a means of justifying the chosen option; and
- ensure that appraisals incorporate an in-depth
discussion of any conflicts between economic, social and environmental
objectives, and of the basis on which policy decisions are to
be made. (Paragraph 99)
28. While
ENV no doubt plays a primary role in implementing major environmental
initiatives, we suspect it is failing to play any decisive role
in influencing wider policies across government in order to ensure
that they are based on a more fundamental understanding of the
concepts of sustainable development. Similarly, it is unclear
whether ENV(G) now has any role in greening policy, and on what
basis it can assess departmental performance in this respect.
Since these two Committees ought to be playing a key role in
implementing the Strategy, it would be helpful if the Government
could provide more information about their activities. (Paragraph
101)
29. Within the international
community, the UK has taken a lead in certain respects notably
by setting the 60% carbon reduction target for 2050. In practice,
however, the huge cuts in carbon emissions which developed nations
will need to make in order to address global warming can only
be envisaged in the context of an international framework which
has legal force and can be rigorously implemented. (Paragraph
103)
Part 2: Taking it forward—recommendations
for a new Strategy
30. The
Government deserves much credit for the introduction of the 1999
Strategy and the comprehensive set of national indicators. However,
it is clear in retrospect that the Strategy has not had the impact
expected, and that the concept of sustainable development has
not displaced the priority accorded to economic growth. This
is because of the inherent ambiguities implicit in the notion
of sustainable development, and because environmental limits are
not as yet sufficiently defined in all areas to provide a rigid
framework for policy making (Paragraph 106)
THE NEW STRATEGY
31. The
new Strategy should encompass the Brundtland definition of sustainable
development and emphasise the concept of environmental limits
underpinning that definition. It should focus more explicitly
on placing the environment at the heart of government. In particular,
it should identify where environmental objectives conflict with
economic and social objectives, and set out the basis on which
Government policy is to be developed in those areas. (Paragraph
108)
32. The headline indicators
should be revised so as to show clearly and objectively how environmentally
sustainable the UK is, and so as to enable progress on mainstreaming
environmental objectives to be assessed. They should therefore
include aggregate measures such as ecological footprinting or
'years to sustainability', together with other measures of economic
well-being, resource productivity, and the global impact of UK
consumption. (Paragraph 109)
33. The new strategy
should set out all key environmental targets, both domestic and
international, in order to provide an adequate basis for accountability.
It should also provide the mechanism by which further policy
related targets are set. In this respect it should fulfil previous
EAC calls for a structured approach to the setting and monitoring
of targets in a policy context, mirroring the development of a
similar approach for greening departmental operations. (Paragraph
110)
34. The new strategy
must clarify the relationship between the strategy itself and
the existing series of topic-specific strategies. In doing
so, the Government should review the effectiveness of the latter
and update them accordingly. In particular, while the Statement
of Intent on Environmental Taxation published in 1997 is an admirable
statement of principle, the Government urgently needs to develop
a comprehensive strategy to implement it in place of its current
ad hoc approach. (Paragraph 111)
IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY
35. Departmental
responsibilities should be reorganised in order to reflect priorities
identified in the new strategy and the need to achieve overriding
environmental objectives. In particular, given the necessity
of making huge cuts in emissions in order to combat global warming,
responsibilities for energy policy, transport and the environment
(including climate change) should be brought together in a single
department. (Paragraph 112)
36. Where key environmental
objectives remain split across several departments, the Government
must be much more "joined-up" in order to deliver key
environmental objectives. It must ensure that new initiatives
such as the ODPM's 'Sustainable Communities' initiative and the
huge expansion in residential building proposed for the South-East
are built on a fundamental understanding of sustainable development
rather then merely paying lip-service to it as they do now. Moreover,
the Government should ensure that key objectives of the Strategy
are implemented throughout the wider Health and Education estates.
(Paragraph 113)
37. The Sustainable
Development Unit, currently located in DEFRA, should play a far
more cross-departmental and central role in ensuring that the
objectives of the new Strategy are incorporated in the development
of new policy initiatives across Government. In doing so, it
could explore where there are significant conflicts between environmental
and other objectives. It could also identify where the aims and
targets of departments, agencies and regulatory bodies are insufficiently
aligned with key environmental objectives. In these respects,
it should function like the Strategy Unit. (Paragraph 114)
38. Policy appraisal
procedures must be revised so as to require specific consideration
of impacts on key environmental objectives such as the need to
reduce biodiversity loss and to achieve the 2050 carbon reduction
target. Moreover, the Government should fulfil its commitment
to review the remits of all departments and public sector bodies
with a view to incorporating the promotion of sustainable development
as a primary objective. It must also make available adequate
staff resources within departments to developing the sustainable
development agenda. (Paragraph 115)
MONITORING AND AUDIT
39. The
Government should continue to publish an annual monitoring report.
This must include a critical and objective analysis of progress
against all the indicators and targets set out in the Strategy.
The report should also include environmental appraisals of relevant
policy instruments (including projected impacts), with full details
of the methodology used. (Paragraph 116)
40. The annual monitoring
report should highlight where significant conflicts between environmental
and other objectives exist, set out on what basis policy is being
developed in these areas, and highlight any changes to priorities
or targets which might be required. In this respect it should
constitute a rather more pro-active strategic document than the
current monitoring report, and function more like the Government's
Pre-Budget Report. (Paragraph 117)
41. To the extent
that the new Strategy constitutes a more structured basis for
setting policy targets, it will also provide a more secure basis
for both the Environmental Audit Committee and the Sustainable
Development Committee to audit progress. In this context, the
NAO is already assisting us with our annual analysis of the Greening
Government initiative, and it is currently auditing on our behalf
the implementation of WSSD commitments by departments. The EAC
will wish to build on this developing relationship in order to
verify and analyse performance on a comprehensive and regular
basis. We recognise that there are resource implications associated
with this task which we will need to take account of. (Paragraph
118)
42. The extent to
which politicians can pursue more radical policies to achieve
environmental objectives is inevitably limited in a democracy
by the extent of public support. As the fuel duty protests of
2000 demonstrated, no government can pursue an unpopular policy
against outright public opposition. However, public values will
inevitably have to change in response, for example, to large increases
in the price of oil, or to the increasingly serious impacts of
climate change. (Paragraph 119)
43. Political leadership
can play an essential role here in anticipating and promoting
such shifts in public values. The Government needs to capitalise
on the fact that the public does share a commitment to environmental
objectives and, where the right frameworks and opportunities are
provided, can indeed adjust their behaviour accordingly. We are
faced with a small window of opportunity to promote such behavioural
change largely on a voluntary basis without incurring too great
a cost. If we do not grasp this and action is delayed, it is
likely that more radical measures will become necessary in view
of the scale of impacts human civilisation is now having on the
natural world. (Paragraph 120)
44. We therefore need
a different order of commitment from political leaders to sustainable
development, and we have often emphasised in the past the importance
of political leadership in this respect. If the Prime Minister
wishes to place the environment at the heart of government and
does indeed believe that climate change is the most serious threat
facing mankind, we would expect to see him play a far larger role
in promoting and implementing the new Sustainable Development
Strategy than he has done to date. He could display greater
commitment, for example, by:
- giving more priority to environmental and sustainable
development issues in his speeches;
- enhancing the role of the SDU and re-locating
it within either the Cabinet Office or his own office;
- requiring environmental issues to be fully addressed
in all relevant policy initiatives; and
- ensuring that the Cabinet Committees ENV and
ENV(G) do indeed function dynamically, driving forward the new
Strategy and appraising the impact of all policies—not just
those which are overtly environmental. (Paragraph 121)
45. The
new Strategy should be accompanied by far more focused and well-resourced
campaigns to increase public awareness in specific areas and promote
education for sustainable development. In particular, the overriding
threat to mankind posed by global warming should be reflected
in the extent of such campaigns—for example, through the
use of sustained and high profile advertising and promotion to
improve energy efficiency. The Government should also initiate
comprehensive training programmes to ensure that the UK has sufficient
skills in the new technologies required to facilitate their development
and implementation. (Paragraph 122)
46. We
realise that these are difficult issues for politicians across
the world because it is always easier to trade-off short term
economic and social gains against long-term environmental goals.
It is therefore essential to build a consensus across political
parties on the priority and approach required to address environmental
issues, while at the same time promoting a far greater and more
profound understanding among the public of the global consequences
of our current lifestyles. (Paragraph 123)
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