Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 200-212)

DR JAMES JONES, MR RICHARD LOLE AND MR STEVE ELLWOOD

11 FEBRUARY 2004

  Q200 Chairman: But what does your intuition as a man of long experience in this field tell you?

  Mr Ellwood: What it tells me is that we might be arguing about the extent of this but over a period there is no doubt in my mind that farmers will increasingly see Single Farm Payments as something that they have and there are certain costs and obligations that they will need to comply with to fulfil that cross-compliance. And then they will have the job of producing food or other goods for the market-place and over the period that will happen to a greater or lesser extent. What happens in terms of the market-place depends on a whole myriad of signals. To name but two: exchange rates in the UK have a big influence on farmers' incomes because they are primarily producers of commodities; and there is also the general issue of market price. Whilst I can see in the short term that many farmers would use their support payments to cross-subsidise loss-making farming enterprises, over a period that will change and so this will have implications not just for UK farmers but also for UK processors and others who are using food as part of the food chain.

  Q201 Paddy Tipping: The decision on decoupling was taken in the middle of last year. How do you rate the consultation process that has gone on since then? You have mentioned Alan Buckwell but does there seem to have been a lot of work going on to try and bring forward a model that will work?

  Dr Jones: I think Defra have done a good job in getting their stakeholders together and consulting with us and there have been many, many meetings going on now over almost a two-year period. I think what has been lacking in that process is enough hard information to go by. Particularly when we are looking at the effects of these various models for the delivery of the Single Farm Payment system, I think we needed more detailed information than we even have now, and what information has been provided has been slow in coming.

  Q202 Paddy Tipping: Conceptually we were entering a negotiation and one really ought to have had before last summer a set of options, a set of illustrations of what might happen. As I understand it, it was only fairly recently that we have had some of those illustrations.

  Dr Jones: I agree with that entirely. I think the amount of money that we have put behind research to try and anticipate what the effects might be of decoupling in particular is very small in comparison to the overall research budget and we were still, even once the "cat was let out of the bag" in July 2002, sponsoring research into things that would be fundamentally impacted by decoupling but not looking at the decoupling itself. I think that is a very good point.

  Q203 Paddy Tipping: Are we going to get the new way of payments in place by 2005? Can anything go wrong?

  Dr Jones: I am sorry, I did not quite catch that?

  Q204 Paddy Tipping: Are we going to get the new system in place for 2005? Is it achievable?

  Dr Jones: I think it has to be. We do not have a choice about that. Well, we do have a choice about that and the UK had that choice and it has made its decision that we will have a new system in place for 2005.

  Q205 Chairman: Given that this process represents a transfer from Pillar One to Pillar Two, do you think we have enough information in the geographic sense in the United Kingdom of winners and losers and of the regional impact and of the flows of money around agriculture?

  Dr Jones: I suppose that is another issue. We have got the issue of the redistribution of the Single Farm Payment which is within Pillar One, if you like. We also then have this movement of money from Pillar One to Pillar Two. I think that is more adequately researched than purely the decoupling effect and then also the effects of delivering the Single Farm Payment in different ways.

  Q206 Alan Simpson: Chairman, what I just wanted to ask about was this issue about trade in entitlements. Some of the figures were quite hard going but you certainly livened things up at the mention of "naked acres" and "virtually naked" and "scantily clad". I am sure you will defend yourselves against the charge of "sexing up" the documentation but can you try and tell us what are the differences between naked, virtually naked and scantily clad?

  Dr Jones: Certainly. I think the reason why we have all been a bit fixated by naked acres is that unless you have an area of land—and the subsidies are based on an area and you need eligible acres in order to exercise the subsidy under the historic allocation—that effectively does not have subsidy or possibly has a very low entitlement per hectare, sufficiently low that you might just choose not to exercise it, then you have not got a basis for trade because the subsidy can only be bought by somebody who is not already using his land to reference the Single Farm Payment against. It could end up being a bit like a game of musical chairs in the sense that one person buys a Single Farm Payment from somebody who is already using a certain area of land. That then becomes naked as a result of having moved the subsidy so other subsidy can move in from somewhere else, and that makes that area naked, and so on. If you are relying purely on this wonderful great game of musical chairs, which might take place at Michaelmas when tenants move off farms and so forth, then you will not really have a big enough basis for a market or it will be a very strange sort of market because it will be very incestuous because you are all trading amongst yourselves. What you therefore want to anticipate is how many people might be in a position to buy because they have land that has not already got subsidy referenced against it and, secondly, would they want to by it, ie, would they feel it was worthwhile? Are they interested in buying subsidy to reference against it? We have identified in the RICS paper nearly one million acres in England that might be naked acres. An estimate that was used by Alan Buckwell in his paper also came to a similar sort of figure by a rather different route. Nevertheless, it appears that there is quite a lot of land under the historic system that would be not clothed in subsidy, if I can put if that way, and as a result there is a basis of trade with those people who own that or have control over those million acres. Would those people be interested in buying it? Personally I think that is a matter of price and whether it is worthwhile. It is a business decision. Basically if you have got land that is capable of being used with reference to the subsidy and the subsidy look likes quite a good deal, if, let us say, it is worth twice the annual level of payment, well, that is a very good rate of return really. It would be hard to find investments that could offer you much more, so you would. If it was five times, well, that is not quite so good, it is a 20% return and it is a declining level of income. It then simply becomes an investment decision and some farmers will be attracted by that; some will not.

  Q207 Alan Simpson: Have you been working on a reference value of what you think a per acre or per hectare entitlement would be?

  Dr Jones: One of the other issues is that there are some subsidies, particularly once they become available, the dairy subsidies, once the reform process is complete, that will be very high value per hectare and high value per hectare subsidies are going to be worth more than low value per hectare subsidies. So there will be subsidies that come from the hills that will be very diluted and very low value per hectare. There will not only be a low income potential from these subsidies but the capital value as a multiplier of that income will be even less because people will need a very large area in order to get the same amount of money. I am not ducking the question. I put an example in my paper which was based on an arable farm where the subsidy levels are much easier to reference against, and using a discounted cashflow of the income stream and building in some assumptions about the way in which that income would reduce over time, we thought that it might be in the order of three times the current level of payment or five times the discounted level of payment in rough terms. It is also affected by scheme rules and we did not know the scheme rules then and we do not know the scheme rules now but there are such things, for example, as siphons. This occurs with the beef and sheep quotas at the moment. A proportion of the subsidy each time it is traded gets taken and put into the national reserve and can be used for worthy cases. If that sort of process goes on, obviously it undermines the value of the subsidy.

  Q208 Chairman: Can I jump in here and ask a question? Does the concept of decoupling work better with a tradable element in it?

  Dr Jones: The decoupling is taking place anyway so regardless of whether it is tradable or not I suppose we are looking at a separate entity here. We are looking at delivery of subsidy in return for cross-compliance and as a compensation for subsidies received in the past that are no longer available.

  Q209 Chairman: What I was driving at, just to help you, was if we have got assets which are moving around agriculture, under the historic arrangement where trading is possible, then assets can move to different land for different purposes and people can make commercial decisions and financial decisions. With regional averaging it is locked in place and you cannot trade it, there is no point in doing it, so in terms of the economic outcome for agriculture as a whole does trading represent a better buy than a position with no trading of entitlement?

  Dr Jones: I think that is quite a difficult question to answer because one comes back to the fact that it is not coupled any more.

  Q210 Chairman: But it does have an impact on what farmers do because you talked about naked acres, and those are acres currently without any cash. People are going to make a financial decision, as our bankers reflected in their paper, to acquire the right to monies and they are doing it for a purpose because they want to do something different with the land.

  Mr Ellwood: Taking that question in absolute isolation, it strikes me that if we had an historic system that enabled trading of payments then the element of the payment that related to subsidies for incomes foregone, if you use that argument, the original owner of that entitlement would sell that and he would take a simple decision to sell that and cash in his chips at the beginning rather than taking an annual payment. Anybody else buying it subsequently is going to be influenced by two things, one of which is the simple rate of return, does he feel that he is going to get a good rate of return, and the cost or benefit (but more likely cost) of cross-compliance that then comes with and having to fit with that. Frankly, it has got very little to do with food production at that point. Looking at that point in isolation.

  Q211 Alan Simpson: Chairman, I can see how if you are a banker or a land valuer that there are attractions to a market in the trade in entitlements without land but, as Mr Ellwood said, this does not have much to do with food production any more. I was just wondering, if you were looking at this from the perspective of the taxpayer, would you see any value at all in there being such a market? Why do we just not have a system that says use it or lose it? Why create a trade in entitlements without land?

  Mr Lole: If this is intended to be a transition to a market value, what this provides the opportunity for is for businesses to have the option on how they restructure and how they use that value from past expectation.

  Q212 Mr Lazarowicz: How do the banks envisage that a market in entitlements would operate, the mechanics of it, how do we envisage it functioning?

  Mr Lole: If we assume for a moment that we are looking at the historic basis, which is the one which allows a market function, we have plenty of precedent of other quotas being traded and the industry is well supplied with brokers to be able to make that trade.

  Mr Ellwood: I have no view on that. I think that as far as I am concerned at the moment it is just a hypothetical possibility and it has, as I have said, little bearing on the production value. The maths of this become relatively straightforward as an investment if we get to that point at some future date.

  Mr Lole: To briefly come back if I may, the question was what do bankers think of it What will make that market a more attractive market to lend to is if this becomes a separate asset, then it would give bankers comfort to be able to secure a charge against that asset and to become an interested party at the time of transfer of that asset. In other words, that charge would be registered with the administrative body and the lender with a charge on that asset would have to consent to sale.

  Dr Jones: Because the payment is decoupled, in theory at least, it should not really make any difference to production decisions because what a farmer does with his land is conditioned by other things. The fact that at the moment he is conditioned in what he can do by receipt of the subsidy payment because it comes with a whole lot of conditions means that in a sense there is a new world out there which means that production will follow the market rather than follow the subsidy. Another difference needs to be brought out which is the balance of power between landlord and tenant. I am reluctant to walk into that because you know from the evidence that you have received already that the views are polarised and I think there is a lot of discomfort in the industry about it. There is little doubt that despite the fact that the receipt of payment is quite firmly in the hands of the occupier, and therefore the tenant under any of these systems, because that is a requirement of the CAP reform, in practice a system in which a tenant can sell the entitlement gives him a lot of power whereas a system that has no market for the entitlement, which is the regional averaging system, does not give him that opportunity, and that is a crucial difference. That is really why I think the views that you have had from various organisations have been quite so polarised on the subject.

  Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you very much for the perspectives that you have been able to bring on to what is as we have gone into it an incredibly complicated subject. There may be one or two other points we would like through our Clerks to take up with you for further education on this subject. May I thank all three of you, as I did at the beginning, for the papers you have put in and for your very helpful answers this afternoon.





 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2004
Prepared 6 May 2004