Examination of Witnesses (Questions 241-259)
23 MARCH 2004
BEVERLEY HUGHES,
MR BRODIE
CLARK, MR
CHRIS POND
AND MR
RICHARD KITCHEN
Q241 Chairman: Ministers, you are most
welcome. It is a bit like News at Ten—we have had the natural
break after part one with Lord Whitty and we now have before us,
from the Home Office, Beverley Hughes, Minister of State, and
Mr Brodie Clark, Senior Director, Operations and Projects, Immigration
and Nationality Directorate; and Chris Pond, the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary at the Department for Work and Pensions, and Mr
Richard Kitchen, who has a much shorter title, the Chief Investigation
Officer of DWP. You are all very welcome to this second session
this morning, dealing with the subject of the follow-up of our
report on Operation Gangmaster. Can I start, Mr Pond, with
you because in operational terms, if I have understood the government's
response to our report correctly, your Department takes the lead
on Operation Gangmaster. Could I ask you, first of all,
when the tragic news of Morecambe Bay unfolded what was your first
ministerial act?
Mr Pond: My first reaction, if
you like, was the same reaction as all of us, which was of shock.
My first ministerial act was, of course, to talk to ministerial
colleagues to talk with both the Members of Parliament for Morecambe
and for Ellesmere Port to have a meeting with them within a matter
of days of that tragedy happening, and to discuss with officials,
including those in the Health and Safety Executive, what further
action was necessary immediately to respond to that tragedy.
Q242 Chairman: When you said you talked
to your ministerial colleagues, did you do that on the telephone
or did you summon a meeting when it became evident that there
were aspects potentially of gangmaster operation involved in the
tragedy of Morecambe Bay? How did it actually work out? Which
ministers did you speak to?
Mr Pond: I think initially it
was by phone, Chairman. I spoke also to Lord Whitty, on that occasion,
over the phone, and also to Alun Michael face to face because,
of course, he has responsibilities in relation to the gangmaster
licensing bill. Subsequently, of course, we have had meetings
with the Minister of State, with me here, and with Lord Whitty
to discuss the response to this Committee and, inevitably, all
of our discussions are overshadowed by that tragedy in February.
Q243 Chairman: For the record, when did
the first roundtable ministerial meeting take place to discuss
Morecambe Bay and the implications for Operation Gangmaster
and, if you like, your response to our report? When did those
things occur?
Mr Pond: The first meeting between
myself, my honourable friend the Minister of State and Lord Whitty
was on 18 March, when we were discussing our response to this
Committee and, of course, also the gangmasters licensing bill.
Prior to that, I have had bilateral meetings with Alun Michael,
and discussions over the phone with Lord Whitty immediately following
that incident.
Q244 Chairman: Did you think it was quick
enough to wait nearly a month and a half to have a ministerial
discussion about following up what had occurred?
Mr Pond: I do not think it would
have been quick enough if it was directly in response to that
tragedy. As you will be aware, Chairman, the response of my Department,
as of other departments, to that tragedy was immediate. We offered
assistance, particularly to the police, immediately; in fact in
the early hours of the morning following one of my officials was
discussing with the police and the other agencies engaged in considering
what had happened, what should be done and the investigations.
We were working immediately on that. The meeting on 18 March was
to discuss our coordinated response, as I think you would expect,
to the Committee's further enquiries; but, inevitably, part of
those discussions was related to what had happened in the tragedy
in Morecambe Bay.
Q245 Chairman: Let us go back to when
the government published its reply to the Committee's report,
a reply that was published on 10 December. We indicated that there
was a need for improvement to be made as far as the government's
response and Operation Gangmaster was concerned. When did
you first gather as a group of ministers to consider the Committee's
report? Was that also on 18 March, or did you have a meeting before
then?
Mr Pond: No, we had a much earlier
meeting.
Q246 Chairman: When was that?
Mr Pond: That was to consider
the Committee's response, and that was on 11 November, I am advised.
That was with Lord Whitty from Defra and my right honourable friend
the Minister of State.
Q247 Chairman: 11 November?
Mr Pond: Yes, 11 November.
Q248 Chairman: That was the first time
you met to discuss the Committee's report?
Mr Pond: That was the first time
we met face to face. We had had previous telephone conversations.
I had a conversation particularly with Lord Whitty in advance
of that because, in terms of the recommendations that were raised,
there were some important recommendations and we wanted to respond
appropriately to those. Some of them required organisational change
within the departments, and it was important we gave that proper
consideration. We had a process of discussions leading up to that
meeting on 11 November.
Q249 Chairman: It took you effectively
from 18 September, when it was published, to 11 November to get
round the table to officially respond to it. How did you set about
between you evaluating the work of Operation Gangmaster
in light of the Committee's findings?
Mr Pond: Can I explain that
Operation Gangmaster, which is of course the enforcement element
of the overall activities, is a responsibility of my own Department,
the DWP. Following the report in September I was appointed as
the minister responsible for overseeing and coordinating the work
of Operation Gangmaster. One of your recommendations was—
Q250 Chairman: Can I stop you at that
point because I want to be clear, and I am sure the rest of the
Committee wants to be clear. When you say you are the minister
responsible for Operation Gangmaster, Lord Whitty in evidence
earlier pointed out that he is the minister responsible for policy
as far gangmasters are concerned. How do the two of you get on
together in terms of working your way forward?
Mr Pond: We get on very well,
I have to say.
Q251 Chairman: I am sure you are good
chums.
Mr Pond: We have known each other
for a very long time, Chairman! I should explain that the distinction
we have got here is between the operation of the enforcement role—which
is the coordination Operation Gangmaster does bringing
together the different agencies through the regional forums—to
look at what can be done, in a strategic way, to make sure we
get the enforcement and the operational activity right. The policy
responsibility lies with Defra and with Lord Whitty, as he has
told you; and he also has responsibility, for instance, on Jim
Sheridan's gangmaster licensing bill.
Q252 Chairman: We will come on that in
due course.
Mr Pond: Those two fit together
very effectively. The original recommendation in your report was
that the minister should be directly accountable. I am now that
minister. You also felt in your report that it should be Defra
that should have that ministerial accountability. It was decided
that because it was actually my department that was mainly concerned
with the operational activities, and given that it was my department
who had been coordinating Operation Gangmaster, it was
more sensible that that was where the ministerial accountability
should sit. That also sits, I think, quite comfortably with the
policy issues being dealt with in Defra. The main groups with
which we are concerned, and with which the Committee is concerned,
are of course those working in agriculture, horticulture and food
processing and, the industry which has risen to the top of the
agenda, the fisheries industry, particularly shellfish. In those
circumstances, it is sensible for Defra to be responsible on the
policy end of dealing with gangmasters. In terms of operational
activities it is my department that holds that responsibility.
Q253 Chairman: Is it not better to have
one minister in charge of the whole thing, to give that degree
of coordination and imperative which, certainly up until the publication
of our report in September last, seemed to be lacking?
Mr Pond: I think one of the difficulties
with that suggestion, Chairman, it does appear attractive initially,
is that Defra itself (as you will be aware) has enforcement roles
in relation to agricultural wages; it has no other machinery that
deals with the enforcement end of things. My own department has
been coordinating Operation Gangmaster as you know for
some years. It has already an operational machinery—one
of the lead members of that operational machinery is sitting to
my left here—and we are in a much better position to make
sure that, in effective terms, we can improve the enforcement
and the coordination across departments. At the end of the day,
it is not tidiness I think we should be concerned about, it is
effectiveness. We believe it is more effective if DWP coordinates
the enforcement activity—but I stress "coordinates".
Q254 Chairman: You have evaluated
Operation Gangmaster—what did you find?
Mr Pond: We are undertaking an
evaluation, as you know, at the moment.
Q255 Chairman: When did this evaluation
begin? When did you start work on it?
Mr Pond: The formal evaluation
began in October last year.
Q256 Chairman: Here we are, six months
on, and you still have not finished it. Why has it taken so long?
You have been involved in this, Minister, for some considerable
time. This is not a new kid on the block?
Mr Pond: No.
Q257 Chairman: Why has it taken so long
to evaluate it, particularly in the light of our forensic report
which illustrated many of the failings of what was Operation
Gangmaster up until September?
Mr Pond: Indeed, we responded
to that.
Q258 Chairman: The question is: why has
it taken you so long?
Mr Pond: If I could answer the
two parts of your question, Chairman. We responded to your report.
Your report made a number of important recommendations. I think
it is fair to say most of those recommendations we have pursued,
including the appointment of a minister with direct accountability.
That had to be our first priority. You will understand that the
circumstances that occurred with the Morecambe Bay disaster have
meant that the focus also has to be very much in that direction.
Q259 Chairman: With respect, our report
was produced in September last year. The investigation which we
carried out began before that and most departments witness what
select committees are doing—I would have thought that the
perceptive department would have started this process quite some
time ago. Are you saying that the work in finishing off this analysis
has not been done? Lord Whitty said that some kind of interim
report had now been produced and, quite magically, by the end
of the month in one week's time the final report is going to be
available. Is that correct?
Mr Pond: It is not magic, Chairman,
I asked for that report to be available at the end of this month.
It will be presented to me at the next Fraud steering group, which
will be on 5 April.
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