Memorandum submitted by Tate & Lyle
European Cane Sugars (TLECS) UK Operation (O73)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TLECS support regime arrangements which provide
a stable and orderly market and which take into account the interests
of its traditional preferential developing country suppliers and
the least developed country suppliers (LDCs).
Tate and Lyle's refinery, at Silvertown in East
London, is the largest in the world, it represents 2/3 of EU port
refining capacity and imports and refines from developing African
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the LDCs, 1.13 million
tonnes of sugar per year. The raw sugar supply restrictions arising
from the current regime require the refinery to operate at only
85% capacity.
The T&L operation could compete effectively
in a deregulated market. However the EU Commission has ruled out
deregulation as a viable option for the future of the EU sugar
arrangements. It is thought that the majority of EU Member States
share this view.
Under either a regime with supply managed by
quota, or one with supply managed by price, it is essential that
the arrangements provide:
An adequate and secure supply of
raw sugar.
Institutional margin arrangements
which permit cane to compete equitably with beet.
In order to ensure that the UK refining is not
threatened during any regime arrangements, prior to any deregulated
regime in the future, then it is essential for all reform options
be tested against the two principles above.
The eventual regime will be structured around
beet and, at this stage, T&L cannot be prescriptive about
the precise arrangements necessary to safeguard cane refining
on an equitable basis with beet.
The role of the UK Government in ensuring an
equitable balance between beet and cane will be a key one.
1. TATE &
LYLE PLC
A short note outlining the Group is attached
at Appendix I.
2. CANE PRODUCTION
INTERNATIONALLY
2.1 It is Tate & Lyle's view that cane
production, including cane refining, will continue to increase
internationally. For example, as far as cane refining is concerned,
the Redpath refinery in Canada has increased throughput from 350,000
tonnes to 650,000 tonnes in the last 10 years. In the last six
years the United Sugar Company, in Saudi Arabia, has increased
from 500,000 tonnes to 930,000 tonnes with ongoing plans to increase
throughput to over one million tonnes, whilst the Al Khaleej refinery
in Dubai has increased production from 700,000 tonnes to 800,000
tonnes in the last three years. New refineries are now in production
in Brazil, Algeria, Sudan, Nigeria and Indonesia, and others are
planned in Egypt, Syria and elsewhere. There is no shortage of
raw sugar internationally for these refineries.
3. TLECS: UK OPERATION
3.1 As a result of UK entry to the EU, and
the consequent reduction in raw sugar supplies available to the
UK refineries, TLECS has been forced to close five of its six
refineries. The one remaining refinery is at Silvertown in the
East of London. It is the world's largest refinery with a capacity
of 1.3 million tonnes. The refinery is located in the borough
of Newham, which is one of the three most deprived boroughs in
the UK.
3.2 The refinery operates at only 85% (1.13
million tonnes) of capacity because of the restricted raw supplies
available under the EU sugar regime. The refinery is situated
directly on the River Thames and has its own private jetties for
importing and exporting. Raw sugar is imported from African, Caribbean
and Pacific (ACP), Developing and Least Developed Countries which
are signatory to the Sugar Protocol of the Cotonou Agreement,
and from the world's Least Developed Countries (LDCs) under the
EU's "Everything But Arms" (EBA) initiative.
3.3 The range of countries from which these
supplies are drawn is given in Appendix 2. TLECS therefore provides
the principal bridge into the EU to enable these suppliers to
reach the EU market.
3.4 The refinery operates 24 hours per day,
364 days per year. Approx 70% of the output is bulk sugar, either
crystal or liquid. The balance, 30%, is speciality sugars eg Lyle's
Golden Syrup. It is the largest private sector employer in Newham
with 650 direct employees and 300 on-site contractors. Only 14
persons are on process and utilities per shift. Over 300,000 are
directly employed in the cane supplying industries with a great
additional number in indirect employment.
3.5 In the last 10 years, the UK refinery
objective has been "To safely, sustainably and efficiently
meet customer needs at lowest cost". In relation to lowest
cost, it has been the aim to lower costs to the point where the
business could compete in the EU and internationally in a liberalised
market. This has been achieved. Further cost efficiencies are
sought. These efforts could be negated, and the business threatened,
if the EU regime does not yield:
An adequate and secure supply of
raw sugar.
A refining margin which enables sugar
refined from cane to be marketed in equitable competition with
sugar produced from EU beet.
4. SUPPLIERS
OF RAW
SUGAR
4.1 The suppliers to TLECS receive a price
for their sugar in line with the EU price due to the terms of
the preferential import arrangements applicable. Any reduction
in the EU price would reduce the earnings TLECS suppliers realise
from access to the EU market.
4.2 As these suppliers will doubtless testify
themselves, their sugar industries play a highly significant role
in either their national economies or local/regional economies.
Sugar provides important rural employment, both direct and indirect,
and the mills provide professional opportunities for a range of
skills. Unlike many other industries in the developing world,
sugar provides a high level of net foreign exchange earnings as
opposed to gross foreign exchange. In some countries the sugar
industries provide the education and health facilities for families
linked to the sugar industry.
4.3 The energy for the mills is provided
by bagasse, the cane fibre by-product of the milling process.
In almost all cases only a small quantity of energy need be purchased
in order to start the mills at the beginning of crop. Increasingly,
bagasse is being used in co-generation plants to provide electricity
for the national grids.
4.4 The ACP suppliers are fighting to retain
the value of the existing arrangement. The LDC's were given quota
free and duty free access to the EU market with full effect from
2009. This was a unilateral trade concession granted by the EU.
The LDC suppliers' Governments and industries have responded by
asking the EU to delay full implementation of the access until
2019. In the meantime they have asked that their exports to the
EU should be controlled by quota rising from 578,860 tonnes in
2005 to 1,622,941 tonnes in 2016. They view this as the way in
which value can be gained from EU access. Otherwise a market managed
by price reduction would render the EU's access gesture an empty
one.
5. REFINING IN
THE EU
5.1 The UK Refinery represents about 2/3
of EU refining capacity and the EU refining activity itself represents
about 13% of EU consumption. There are two small refiners in each
of France and Portugal and another very small one in Finland.
TLECS owns the refinery in Lisbon, Portugal. Only the UK and Portuguese
refineries are owned by companies with no beet interests in the
existing EU.
6. THE INTERNATIONAL
SUGAR MARKET
IN PERSPECTIVE
6.1 World consumption and production is
approx 140 million tonnes and the market is growing by about 2%
per annum. However only about 35 million tonnes is traded freely
internationally. Most countries have a sugar regime of some sort.
6.2 The world market is dominated by Brazilian
exports; there has been a ten-fold increase in these exports over
the last 10 years. They currently account for about 13 million
tonnes of the market of 35 million tonnes. Further expansion of
sugar production is planned. Brazil has been able to expand production
because of repeated massive devaluations, a genuinely efficient
industry and the "support" provided by the Government
inspired ethanol programme. The average cost of production is
around 4-6 cents per lb; in contrast the ACP average cost of production
is probably in the region of 16 cents per lb.
6.3 After Brazil and India, the EU is the
world's largest sugar producer. Its exports are static to declining
as they have to comply with the EU's Uruguay Round export reduction
commitments.
6.4 After Brazil and the EU, the two largest
exporters to the world market are Australia and Thailand. The
EU is the world's second largest importer; Brazil, Australia and
Thailand do not import sugar.
6.5 A straight comparison of world and EU
prices is an unsound one. Most sugar is consumed in the countries
in which it is produced. The world price bears no semblance whatsoever
to average costs of production, whether beet or cane. If some
comparison of sugar prices must be attempted, there is a measure
of international support for this being done on the basis of purchasing
power ie the wage which has to be earned or hours worked to purchase
a unit of sugar. The EU intervention price of approx 26 cents
per lb would show EU sugar to be remarkably cheap.
7. EU OPTIONS
FOR REFORM
7.1 The initial four options considered
were:
Supply Management by Quota.
Supply Management by Price.
7.2 The EU Commission considered that deregulation
was unrealistic. It felt that supply management by quota was also
unrealistic given the EU's offer of duty free and quota free access
to the LDCs and the Balkans. This latter offer has resulted in
some fraudulent imports into the EU. This arrangement is currently
suspended in the case of Serbia and the region continues to be
the focus of OLAF scrutiny (EU's fraud investigation unit).
7.3 Also status quo was considered unrealistic
because of the advent of uncontrolled imports and the implementation
of changes arising from the outcome of any successful conclusion
to the Doha Development Round negotiations.
7.4 The Commission has not specifically
promoted management by price in its latest consultation document
as its chosen option. Nevertheless there is a feeling among all
those discussing the document that this is the preferred route,
albeit after a transition period where quotas would be retained.
8. EFFECT OF
MANAGEMENT BY
PRICE ON
ACP, LDC AND T&L
8.1 The EU Commission's current estimate
of a supply equilibrium price to bring supply from domestic beet
sugar and isoglucose (nutritive sweetener from EU wheat) production
and imports, into balance with demand is below the costs of production
of most of T&L's current suppliers. Some suppliers already
have cost problems at the current level of the EU price. Only
a very few ACP and LDC suppliers would have costs at around the
EU's idea of an equilibrium price. Many developing countries would
find the EU market uneconomic.
8.2 There are claims that if the EU were
to reduce its production and exports the world price would rise.
Thus, it is said, countries which no longer found the EU an economic
market, could sell on the world market. T&L, among others,
believe that it is wrong to assume the world price would rise.
Any world market share given up by the EU would quickly be taken
up by the large volume, low cost world producersproducers
with costs below the ACP and LDC.
8.3 For Tate & Lyle, already operating
at only 85% of capacity, and given its high percentage of fixed
costs, the result would be a further damaging loss of raw supply
at a time when there is no shortage of raw sugar on the world
market. T&L has no choice but to argue against the Commission's
current thinking on supply management by price and which does
not contain a proposal for a quota on raw sugar supply entitlement
for the EU refining sector.
9. COMPARATIVE
BEET PROCESSING
AND CANE
REFINING MARGINS
9.1 When the UK joined the EU, most UK negotiating
currency was concentrated on securing the Sugar Protocol of the
Lome convention and, thus, a level of continued access to the
UK for traditional Commonwealth sugar and a raw sugar supply,
albeit seriously diminished, for the UK refining sector. The EU
sugar regime was established in 1968. It was naturally beet driven.
No real efforts were made to integrate cane refining into that
regime; rather it was bolted on to the side of the beet regime.
9.2 It was acknowledged at accession by
the authorities that there was a problem in the EU regime and
price structure which disadvantaged the cane refiner. Over the
years a number of ad hoc measures taken by the UK and/or
EU, combined with some currency factors which marked the problem,
enabled T&L to remain in business. In 1986, under UK Government
pressure, the EU overtly accepted the problem and chose, as its
way of resolving it, a system of margin aid payments to the refiners
based on refined output.
9.3 At the 2001 regime review there was
a thorough re-examination of the margin aid system, including
the scrutiny of the outcome of a report by independent consultants.
It was decided to retain the system. With the regime itself, this
margin aid will come to an end in 2006. T&L has no choice
but to seek the extension of this arrangement, or an alternative
system having equivalent effect. Only in this way, could the current
competitive disadvantage, under which cane operates in relation
to beet, at least be maintained, not increased further. The current
level of margin aid is
29.2 per tonne. This aid in no way whatsoever reflects
any cost inefficiency in refining.
10. UNDERLYING
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
BEET AND
CANE MARGINS
10.1 Beet is a through processbeets
in, white sugar out. In cane, on the other hand, cane is produced
and crushed in the country of origin to produce raw sugar crystals.
These are not designed for direct consumption; they are shipped
in bulk and refined in the UK. Therefore, beet processing requires
a greater capital employed per tonne of output than refining.
However, the size of the existing gap between the beet processing
margin and the cane refining margin puts sugar produced from beet
at a competitive advantage, in the market, to sugar refined from
cane. The current institutional beet margin is 2.3 times the cane
margin.
10.2 In the UK market place this has the
effect of enabling almost all quota beet to be marketed within
the UK and Continental Europe. To the extent which T&L cannot
compete, as a result of the margin disadvantage, such sugar must
be exported to the world market with restitution.
11. TATE &
LYLE AND
DEREGULATION
11.1 After having consistently addressed
its critical survival issues T&L studies indicate that, under
liberalisation, T&L refining:
Would be competitive with white sugar
imports.
Would be competitive with what would
be left of the EU beet sector.
Would have an adequate and secure
supply of raw material from the world market.
Further, T&L has the benefit of long experience
of, and the skills in, international sugar trading. It has one
of the world's largest sugar trading operations.
12. IMPORTANCE
OF ROLE
OF UK GOVERNMENT
There are only four Member States with port
cane refineries. Of these, the UK represents 2/3 of the existing
capacity utilisation. The UK Government has traditionally sought
to maintain a balance between beet and cane and T&L values
this greatly. There is no reason to suspect that, on this occasion,
UK Government policy will waver from this. However delivering
a balance from the forthcoming EU negotiations will be a much
greater challenge than in the past when regime changes and the
stakes have been smaller.
12.1 At the moment the UK is the leading
Member State out of the four Member States with refining interests
which, themselves, are in a minority in the EU of 15. On 1 May
they will be only four Member States out of 25. T&L, as always,
will do everything it can to support British Government efforts.
However, at the end of the day, T&L has no direct place at
the negotiating table.
5 April 2004
APPENDIX 1
TATE & LYLE
PLC
Tate & Lyle is a world leader in carbohydrate
ingredients. It has 50 plants in 24 countries. These concentrate
on wheat and sugar processing. Its EU wheat processing operations
use 2-3% of the EU's wheat production.
The European Cane Sugar Business comprises of:
Tate & Lyle Sugars (UK Sugar
Refining).
Tate & Lyle International (Global
Sugar Trading).
Alcantara (Portuguese Sugar Refining).
United Molasses (Global Molasses
Trading).
United Storage (Global Liquid Storage).
Tate & Lyle does not own sugar producing
interests in its supplying countries or ships for the transport
of sugar from these countries to the EU.
APPENDIX 2
SUPPLYING NATIONS
TO THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belize
Brazil
Burkina Faso
Congo PR
Cote d'Ivoire
Cuba
Fiji
Guyana
Guadeloupe
India
Jamaica
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mauritius
Mozambique
Nepal
Reunion
St Kitts
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Trinidad
Zambia
Zimbabwe
5 April 2004
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