22 European Security Strategy
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| European Security Strategy: "A Secure Europe in a Better World".
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| Legal base | — |
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 27 November 2003
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| Previous Committee Report | None
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| To be discussed in Council | 8 December 2003 GAERC
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
22.1 The EU's Secretary-General/High Representative, Javier Solana,
presented this latest draft of the European Security Strategy
to Foreign Ministers at the 17 November General Affairs and External
Relations Council. The first draft was presented on 21 June 2003
at the Thessaloniki European Council, where it was discussed by
Member States, and subsequently with representatives from think-tanks,
other States and international organisations. It has been revised
in the light of these discussions.
The revised Strategy paper
22.2 The paper recognises that large-scale aggression against
any Member State is now improbable. Instead, the EU faces new
threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.
This revised draft identifies the five key threats to the EU[57]
as:
- terrorism;
- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD);
- regional conflicts;
- State failure; and
- organised crime.
TERRORISM
22.3 Terrorism is a strategic threat which puts lives
at risk, imposes large costs and seeks to undermine the openness
and tolerance of European societies. Some terrorist movements
are well-resourced and connected by electronic networks. Logistical
bases for Al Qaeda cells have been found in the UK, Italy, Germany,
Spain and Belgium. The recent wave of terrorism is linked to
violent religious fundamentalism, which arises out of complex
causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural,
social and political crises, and the alienation of young people
living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also part of
society in the EU.
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)
22.4 This is potentially the greatest threat to
the EU's security. The international treaty regimes and export
control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery
systems. The paper contends that we are now entering a new and
dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race,
especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences
may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming years;
attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious
possibility. The spread of missile technology adds a further
element of instability and could put the EU at increasing risk.
The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups
acquire weapons of mass destruction. In this event a small group
would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible
only for States and armies.
REGIONAL CONFLICTS
22.5 Problems such as those in Kashmir and the Korean
Peninsula have a direct and indirect impact on European interests,
as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East.
Violent or frozen conflicts threaten regional stability. Conflict
can lead to extremism, terrorism and State failure as well as
providing opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity
can fuel the demand for WMD. Sometimes, the most practical way
to tackle the often elusive new threats will be to deal with the
older problems of regional conflict.
STATE FAILURE
22.6 States which fail, due to bad governance and
civil conflict, can be associated with obvious threats such as
organised crime or terrorism. Somalia, Liberia, and Afghanistan
under the Taliban are the best known recent examples.
ORGANISED CRIME
22.7 The EU is a prime target for organised crime.
This internal threat to its security has an important external
dimension in the form of cross-border trafficking in drugs, women,
illegal migrants and weapons. It can have links with terrorism.
Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing
States. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of State
structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from
trade in gemstones, timber and small arms fuel conflict in other
parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule
of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime
can come to dominate the state. 90% of the heroin in Europe comes
from poppies grown in Afghanistan, where the drugs trade pays
for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan
criminal networks which are also responsible for some 200,000
of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade worldwide. A new
dimension to organised crime, which will merit further attention,
is the growth in maritime piracy.
22.8 The paper concludes that, taking these different
elements together — terrorism committed to maximum violence,
the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime,
the weakening of the State system and the privatisation of force
— the EU could be confronted with a very radical threat
indeed.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
22.9 The paper says that the EU should set three
strategic objectives for tackling these key threats, and describes
them as follows:
1. Addressing the key threats
22.10 Steps taken have included adoption of a European
Arrest Warrant and measures against terrorist financing. Policies
against proliferation have been pursued over many years. Further
action foreseen includes strengthening the International Atomic
and Energy Agency, tightening of export controls and dealing with
illegal shipments and illicit procurement. The EU is committed
to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes,
as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification
provisions.
22.11 The EU and individual Member States have intervened
to deal with regional conflicts and put failed States back on
their feet. In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be
as much a concern as those that are near at hand. The EU's traditional
concept of self-defence was based on the threat of invasion.
The first line of defence against the new threats will often be
abroad. It should be ready to act before a crisis occurs —
conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.
Left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous.
22.12 In contrast to the massive visible threat in
the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military and each
requires to be countered by a mixture of instruments. In failed
States, for instance, military instruments may be needed to restore
order, with civilian crisis management helping to restore civil
government. The EU is particularly well equipped to respond to
multi-faceted situations.
2. Building security in our neighbourhood
22.13 Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict,
weak States where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies
or exploding population growth on its borders, all pose problems
for Europe. The integration of acceding States increases the
EU's security but also brings it closer to troubled areas. The
EU's task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to its
east and on the borders of the Mediterranean with which it can
enjoy close and cooperative relations. Resolution of the Arab/Israeli
conflict is a strategic priority of the EU. Without this, there
will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle
East. The EU should now take a stronger and more active interest
in the problems of the southern Caucasus.
3. An international order based on effective
multilateralism
22.14 In a world of global threats, global markets
and global media, the security and prosperity of the EU increasingly
depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of
a stronger international society, well-functioning international
institutions and a rule-based international order should be the
EU's objective. It is committed to upholding and developing international
law. It wants international organisations, regimes and treaties
to be effective in confronting threats to international peace
and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules
are broken. One of the core elements of the international system
is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in the EU's
bilateral interest but it strengthens the international community
as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship.
The United States has played a critical role in European integration
and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of
the Cold War has left the US in a dominant position as a military
"actor". However, no single country is able to tackle
today's complex problems on its own.
22.15 Trade and development policies can be powerful
tools for promoting reform. The EU has an interest in developing
the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new institutions
such as the International Criminal Court.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE
22.16 The paper says:
"The EU has made progress towards a coherent
foreign policy and effective crisis management. We have instruments
in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated
in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution
that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent
and more capable. And we need to work with others."
22.17 The paper says that the EU needs to be:
"More active in pursuing our strategic
objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments
for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal,
including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade
and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter
the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture
that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.
"As a Union of 25 members, spending more
than €160 billion on defence, we should be able to sustain
several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value
by developing operations involving both military and civilian
capabilities.
"We need to be able to act before countries
around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected,
and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement
can avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union
which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will
be one which carries greater political weight."
22.18 A more capable EU is "within our
grasp", but it will take time to realise its full potential.
More resources for defence are needed to transform the military
forces to address the new threats. The paper says that in almost
every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed
by civilian chaos. The EU needs greater capacity to bring all
necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post-crisis
situations. There could be added value in developing operations
which involve both military and civilian capabilities. Ways to
improve the EU's military and civilian capabilities are set out,
including the pooling and sharing of assets. The EU-NATO permanent
arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, provide the framework
for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in
crisis management. A stronger diplomatic capability is also
needed.
22.19 The paper says the challenge now is to bring
together the different instruments created under the Common Foreign
and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy
to form a more coherent whole and to bring these together
with the European assistance programmes, the military and civilian
capabilities of Member States and other instruments, such as the
European Development Fund. "Security is the first condition
for development". "Diplomatic efforts, development,
trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda.
In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command. ...
Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but
also embracing the external activities of the individual Member
States."
22.20 According to the paper, there are few, if any,
problems the EU can deal with on its own; it needs to work
with partners; the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable,
and acting together, the EU and the US can be a formidable force
for good in the world. The aim, it says, should be that of an
effective and balanced partnership with the US. The EU should
continue to work for closer relations with Russia.
CONCLUSION
22.21 The paper concludes that "This is a world
of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union
has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing
with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An
active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global
scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral
system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world."
The Government's view
22.22 The Minister for Europe (Mr Denis MacShane)
notes changes from the earlier text, in particular the more explicit
reference to the EU-NATO strategic relationship and to key allies
other than the US, such as Russia. What was referred to in the
earlier draft as "pre-emptive engagement" is now described
as "preventive engagement", but the Minister says that
the concept of early and robust engagement has not changed. He
notes that this revised Strategy is:
"still strongly in line with UK views on
the need to take early and tough action against international
terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and other key security threats
and also places a welcome emphasis on the importance of the EU's
relationship with the US, with NATO and other strategic partners.
The Strategy remains focussed, short and accessible with a strong
message on the need for the EU to have a more coherent, pro-active
and capable policy response in tackling the global security threats,
drawing together all of the existing policy tools at the EU's
disposal".
22.23 The Minister comments:
"The development of the Security Strategy
is an important step forward in fulfilling the Government's aim
of a more pro-active and capable Common Foreign and Security Policy.
The Government expects the Security Strategy to provide the basis
for a more coherent policy approach on the EU's external actions.
We hope that the EU will be able to develop more robust positions
to tackle global security threats such as terrorism and WMD.
"The EU's plan is to finalise the Security
Strategy, have it endorsed at the next European Council, ... and
begin work on implementing it. We want to see practical implementation
of the Strategy and ensure it is fully disseminated throughout
the working groups who develop our external policy in the first
instance. The Irish Presidency has indicated that it too will
emphasise practical implementation and that it will seek to avoid
further, lengthy paper exercises. This is welcome".
Conclusion
22.24 The Strategy is expected to be adopted
through a Council Decision at the 8 December General Affairs and
External Relations Council and endorsed at the 12-13 December
European Council.
22.25 The Minister does not give any indication
of the likelihood of any of the language in the text being unpalatable
to other Member States. Since it has been worked on over the
last six months, we take it that no radical amendments are likely
to be pressed for at this stage. The proof will be in the practical
implementation of the many earnest intentions in it. It will
be interesting to see how the Irish Presidency, and other neutral
Member States, will deal with the fact that the paper stresses
the need for the EU to deploy the full spectrum of instruments
at its disposal including, at times, early and robust engagement
of a military nature to restore order before humanitarian tasks
can be undertaken. So far, the Irish have shown a political will
only to contribute to EU civilian crisis management operations.
22.26 We now clear the document.
57 The paper refers to "Europe" throughout. Back
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