29 Voting arrangements for measures against
dumped and subsidised imports
| (25181)
16078/03
COM(03) 799
| Amended draft Council Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community and Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community
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| Legal base | Article 133 EC; QMV
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| Document originated: | 15 December 2003
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| Deposited in Parliament: | 19 December 2003
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| Department | Trade and Industry
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 20 January 2004
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| Previous Committee Report | None, but see footnote 63
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| To be discussed in Council | Before 1 May 2004
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| Committee's assessment | Legally and politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
29.1 Two Regulations — No. 384/96[61]
and No. 2026/97[62] —
enable the Council to take measures against dumped or subsidised
imports from third countries. In particular, the Regulations
stipulate that such a decision should be taken on the basis of
a simple majority on a proposal submitted by the Commission following
consultation with an Advisory Committee comprising representatives
of the Member States.
29.2 In a recent anti-dumping case, a proposal failed
to secure approval after seven Member States had voted in favour,
with the other eight votes being split between those opposed to
the measure and those abstaining (the latter thus in effect being
treated as a vote against the proposal). To prevent a recurrence
of this, the Commission proposed in June 2003[63]
that the procedure laid down in the two Regulations in question
should be amended. In future, it would consult Member States
in the Advisory Committee on a draft of the measure proposed,
and, if no objection is raised then, the measure would be adopted.
If an objection is raised, the draft would be forwarded to the
Council, and would be deemed to be adopted unless the Council
decides otherwise by a simple majority. In other words, whilst
the onus is currently on the Commission to obtain majority approval
for a proposal, it would in future be on a majority of the Council
to block it.
29.3 In our Report of 17 September 2003, we noted
that the Government had said that the UK was generally in favour
of more liberal trade, and tended to oppose proposals for anti-dumping
measures; there would therefore be no reason to support a proposal
which would effectively make it easier for the Commission to secure
support for such measures in future. Also, we were told that
legal experts in the Department of Trade and Industry were not
convinced by the Commission's argument, or that the only way to
effect the change in the value of abstentions was by moving from
an essentially Council-based procedure to a Commission-based one.
As a consequence, the UK would want to explore this point in
much more detail with the Commission and other Member States.
29.4 Whilst indicating that we understood these concerns,
we asked the Government to indicate whether these arose principally
because of the policy view taken by the UK in this particular
area, or because of the legal precedent which would be set for
other areas. We also asked it to clarify whether the UK might
be willing to see some change in the value of abstentions, if
this could be achieved by a means which did not involve moving
to a Commission-based procedure.
29.5 These points were addressed in a letter of 7
November 2003 from the Minister of State for Trade, Investment
and Foreign Affairs at the Department of Trade and Industry (Mr
Mike O'Brien), and in paragraphs 14.5-14.8 of our Report of 19
November. In particular, we noted that, on the question of the
UK's attitude to changes in the value of abstentions so long as
the Council retained the decision-making role, the UK recognised
that their current treatment, under which they effectively count
as negative votes against a proposal, was anomalous, and conflicted
with the meaning of "abstention", which equates to not
taking a position or declining to vote. However, the Government
did not believe that the solution was simply to reverse the value
of an abstention, its preference being to leave the decision-making
process as it is, but to provide that abstentions should be treated
as neutral, with proposals being adopted (or not) on a simple
majority of the votes cast. The UK had therefore proposed an
amendment to that effect, but the Commission was understood to
regard it as contrary to the Treaty.
The current proposal
29.6 In this proposal, the Commission has adopted
a different approach, under which the decision to impose measures
would be taken by the Council, but would be adopted unless a simple
majority of votes was cast against. This would thus avoid earlier
concerns over ceding competence to the Commission, but it would
mean that abstentions would in future count as a vote in favour
of any Commission proposal. At the same time, the new document
would make a number of other changes to the substance of the proposal
in such areas as price undertakings, absorption and circumvention.
The Government's view
29.7 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 20 January
2004, the Minister says that, although retention of decision-making
by the Council partially addresses the UK's concerns, the proposal
would still reverse the present way in which abstentions are treated.
However, he says that, although the approach advocated by the
UK (of allowing abstentions to be discounted) attracted some support
among other Member States, doubts were cast over whether this
would be compatible with Article 205 of the Treaty, which allows
for this only where unanimity applies. He also points out that
a majority of Member States are prepared to back the modified
proposal, and that there is therefore no mileage in the UK continuing
to resist the proposal, or to pursue alternatives. Nevertheless,
in an attempt to ensure that this proposal is ring-fenced, and
does not set an unintended precedent for other areas of Community
policy, the UK will argue for the inclusion of a recital in the
text of the Regulation, expressly stating that the arrangements
in this proposal are limited to the Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy
Regulations, and do not serve as a precedent for other Community
policies. He says that the Commission has indicated that it will
accept this condition, and that the UK may seek a joint Council
and Commission Declaration to the same effect.
29.8 The Minister also says that the UK can welcome
the other changes proposed, and that, whilst the new proposal
is not ideal, it is one which the UK could support.
Conclusion
29.9 We note the way in which it is now proposed
to deal with this issue, and the steps which the Government has
taken to ensure that the intention to treat an abstention in effect
as a vote in favour of a proposal, rather than as one against,
is limited to anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures. We also
note that, unlike the original proposal, any regulations adopted
on this basis would be made by the Council, and not the Commission.
29.10 Whilst we recognise that the wording in
Article 205 is intended to deal with the question of abstentions
within the context of a decision to be taken by unanimity, it
does not seem to us that it necessarily precludes their being
treated as neutral where a vote is by qualified majority. However,
having drawn these points to the attention of the House, we are
now content to clear the document.
61 OJ No. L 56, 6.3.96, p.1. Back
62
OJ No. L 288, 21.10.97, p.1. Back
63
(24702) 11035/03; see HC 63-xxxii (2002-03), para 7 (17 September
2003) and HC 63-xxxviii (2002-03), para 14 (19 November 2003). Back
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