Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)
19 NOVEMBER 2003
MR MICHEL
SERVOZ AND
MR PETER
HANDLEY
Q20 Angus Robertson: Moving on to
issues relating to accession, when you gave evidence to the Committee
previously the Committee discussed the increase in staffing which
would be required by European Union institutions following accession.
You identified the particular problem posed by translation. Will
there be adequate provision for the necessary translation by May
2004?
Mr Servoz: Yes, we are working
on that. We are discussing with Parliament and with the Council
the size of the human resources increase that we have requested.
We hope that this request will be granted. This would allow us
to have the full linguistic capacity on 1 May 2004, which means
catching up with the 19 or 20 languages that we will have to deal
with on 1 May.
Q21 Angus Robertson: That is a very
positive response. May I ask you a wider question about accession?
There is a lot of focus on the 10 accession states, but there
is a wider European dimension to things. I recently returned from
the three Caucasus republics, where there is very significant
disappointment across the political spectrum, amongst all the
political parties, that those three republics have not been included
in the near-neighbourhood policy of the European Union. Bearing
in mind the difficulties in transition to democracy there, does
the Commission not believe that there is a positive role that
the EU can play in the future in helping those countries which
are our near neighbours?
Mr Servoz: The Wider Europe Initiative
is an initiative which concerns all our neighbours, but not necessarily
the countries which are just beyond the accession countries. It
is a policy which is wider and which should also concern the Caucasus
countries. This policy, as you know, is one of the President's
most important projects. His idea is that eventually we should
move forward to a Single Market with all these countries. He even
says that we should go forward to seeing a system which would
contain everything but the institutions. That is clearly an ultimate
objective, but this is just to indicate the direction in which
the Commission would like to move forward.
Q22 Mr David: Could I also ask you
about the enlargement process because, as you have identified,
it is one of the main priorities for next year? The other day
this Committee received a communication from the Commission which
was an analysis of the preparedness of the accession countries.
I think that it is true to say that it provided quite surprising
reading. Frankly, the amount of work that still remains to be
done by most of the accession countries is quite alarming. I am
also aware that the Commission has responded by saying that you
will take action to ensure that things improve quickly and dramatically.
Could you give us an indication of what exactly the Commission
is planning to do and what is the timescale for this?
Mr Handley: The Commission produced
on 5 November its comprehensive monitoring report on the 10 Member
States joining the Union next May. On the whole, the report was
positive because it said that all 10 candidate countries have
made substantial progress in applying the 29 chapters of the acquis.
In every candidate country there is a problem area. That is without
exception. By and large, however, the problems are containable.
The conclusion drawn by Commissioner Verheugen, who is responsible
for enlargement, is that these problems can be addressed and all
of the new Member Stages should be in a position to apply the
acquis correctly from 1 May next year. That is just to
put the inevitable areas of concern into some kind of overall
perspective. The Commission is confident that things will all
work correctly in an enlarged EU from next year. Have I answered
your question?
Q23 Mr David: No. You began to answer
it. As you said, there are areas in each Member State where there
need to be improvements. What do you intend to do to ensure that
there are improvements and what is the timescale for that?
Mr Handley: We have been monitoring
the progress of the candidate countries consistently ever since
the negotiations were completed. We are providing substantial
amounts of technical assistance to them all, through the PHARE,
SAPARD and ISPA programmes. We are working with them to develop
their administrative capacity to be responsible for spending Community
programmes, like on agricultural and structural funds, from the
time that they become Members of the Union. There is also the
possibility that the Union can apply safeguard measures for up
to three years, if there are problems of disturbance to the Single
Market in the first period after these countries join the Community.
So we will be continuing to monitor developments very closely
and we do have some sanctions available, if needed.
Q24 Mr David: Could I press you on
that? You mention sanctions. What sanctions?
Mr Handley: Safeguards, commercial
measures. They may not be allowed to access the rest of the Union
market if, for example, they are not up to scratch with certain
standards or controls.
Q25 Mr David: Could I pursue that
a little more? This is a huge area of critical importance to the
future of the European Union. You mentioned a little while back
that you were confident that every one of the accession states
should be able to comply with the acquis communautaire.
What happens if they do not? The logic of that, therefore, is
putting in question whether or not they actually will be able
to join next year, is it not?
Mr Handley: No, it is really a
question of saying that, after next May, they are in the same
position as any existing EU Member State, which is that they are
expected to comply with Community legislation and they will be
dealt with through procedures that are in place if they do not
apply Community law correctly. It applies equally to the UK, or
to Germany, or to France, as it would in future to Poland or the
other new Member States.
Q26 Mr Marshall: Effectively, it
is those countries which fail to comply with the Stability Pact,
is it?
Mr Servoz: I think that it is
a slightly different issue. You are talking about infringement
procedures for not respecting, for example, veterinary standards
or things like that.
Q27 Mr Cash: It is very interesting
territory. What you are really describing in relation to the acquis
communautaire is that everyone is expected to comply with
it all, but at the same time you have a process of what is called
flexibility, variable geometry, or enhanced co-operation. So that
everyone is expected to comply, but some can comply with it more
than others. There is a fundamental inconsistency there. There
is the accession of 10 new states. Do you not agree that, because
of the fundamental diversity and the nature of the countries concerned,
in their relationship to the Union as it now, the effect of variable
geometry, of this pick-and-choose operation—whether it is
with regard to defence, to monetary union, which of course it
already is, to justice, home affairs, immigration—the list
is endless—this will, instead of stabilising, create tension,
increase costs and a hard-core Europe? A Europe largely dominated,
as we saw in Le Monde on 13 November this week, by a comprehensive
political alliance between France and Germany, of which Germany
will most likely be the leading partner, and that therefore the
Union will be under very severe pressure of unsustainable tension
within a relatively short time?
Mr Servoz: We think that what
we should avoid is indeed a hard-core Europe and a soft-core Europe.
The concept of variable geometry is precisely what the Commission
has tried to avoid. I do not think that we should move into a
situation where there are first-class Member States and second-class
Member States. If you look at the past and the situation of Greece,
Portugal and Spain when they joined the EU, you could have made
the same remarks about variable geometry. There has been a very
thorough investigation of the situation of the 10 new Member States:
very thorough because it is clear that Member States and also
people in the Commission and Parliament had doubts about whether
these countries were going to be able to deliver. I think that
the judgment has been made, after this thorough investigation,
that, yes, they will be ready on 1 May 2004 but we will need to
be very careful in monitoring. We have reinforced our equipment
to deal with infringement procedures, and there will be safeguard
measures. I think that all the monitoring equipment is therefore
in place. We know that it will not be easy, because these countries
have transposed the acquis communautaire, but then you
have to implement the acquis communautaire on a day-to-day
basis. We know that most of them are already doing it, but we
know that there are difficult areas—for example, JAI. The
veterinary area is another difficult area. However, this will
be monitored very carefully. Let us at least give the 10 new Member
States the credit that the European Union has already been through
this kind of process with countries like Greece, and it worked
well.
Q28 Mr Cash: Is it a cardinal principle
of the Commission and the institutions generally to apply the
process of variable geometry? As you said in a paper a few years
ago with regard to monetary union, that was the best form of flexibility
yet devised, because it was both irrevocable and it anchored monetary
union in the engine of the system. In other words, are you 100%
in favour, as a Commission, of variable geometry?
Mr Servoz: Regarding the acquis
communautaire that the 10 new Member States have acquired
to become a Member on 1 May 2004, there is no variable geometry.
Mr Marshall: Can we move on from stability
within the European Union itself to stability with our near neighbours?
Q29 Mr Connarty: Still on the question
of stability, I welcome the fact that we have talked about a wider
Europe. There is one omission, however. I see nothing specific
about the EU and the Middle East peace process. I do think that
the EU has been a very important contributor to trying to bring
some stability and economic infrastructure to the Palestinian
people, for example. I do not know if that is left out because
you feel that it is already covered. Turning to our other close
neighbours in the wider Europe, Russia and Ukraine, you mention
specifically the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements with
Russia and an action plan against organised crime. I have to say
that when I was in Colombia a few years ago, talking to the anti-narcotics
police there, they singled out Ukraine specifically as one of
the major routes into Europe for cocaine from Colombia. I do see
that as being a major danger. I do not think that, in the time
I have been in some of the new accession states, I have felt confident
that they had the capacity to cope with organised drug-trafficking
through their borders and through their states. There have been
some achievements in the area, but what further improvements are
the Commission intending should be targeted, to increase the capacity
to deal with organised crime in Russia and Ukraine?
Mr Handley: In the Work Programme
for 2004 you will not see any new legislative proposals coming
forward, but that does not mean that the Commission will not be
doing anything. It is essentially a question of implementing.
You have referred to the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements
with these countries. Indeed, what we would like to do next year
is to reinforce practical co-operation on the justice and home
affairs side, deal with the drugs issue, crime, and illegal financial
transactions which help contribute to the funding of terrorism.
There is therefore already a sufficient consciousness that there
is a problem that needs to be addressed. We have recently reinforced
the framework for co-operation with these countries, particularly
with Russia through the declaration in St Petersburg, and there
is a serious body of work that will be going on next year, precisely
on the matters that you raise.
Q30 Mr Connarty: Would you comment
on the Middle East?
Mr Handley: The Middle East is
certainly central to our stability priority. It is not so far
away from the European Union, after all. However, we are not intending
to bring forward any solo European proposals in the context of
our Work Programme next year. The Commission is working within
the quartet with the other partners to try to take forward the
peace process, and is also talking to the other partners in the
region, as well as to the United States. At this stage, however,
for the European Union the "road map" is on the table
and needs to be given a chance to work.
Q31 Mr Marshall: Mr Connarty has
indicated the porosity of some of our borders. Is there any intention
to introduce an agency to manage control of external borders?
Mr Handley: The Commission has
very recently adopted a proposal for an agency to deal with co-operation
at the European Union's external borders. When I say "external
borders", I am referring to the borders of the enlarged European
Union. This is basically driven by a need for greater solidarity
between the Member States. For example, it would not be fair for
a country joining the EU for the first time next year which finds
itself at the eastern borders of the Union to have to deal, without
any assistance, with all the influx of problems that might come
through its borders. This agency is not an operational agency,
in the sense that it is not a body of European border guards.
It is designed to provide a co-operation and co-ordination mechanism
to help national Member State border authorities deal with the
problems, to exchange experience, and also to provide training
and technical assistance. The proposal is now with the Council,
so we hope to see some progress already this year because the
Italian presidency has indicated that it would very much like
to get a political agreement on the setting up of this agency
before the end of this year.
Q32 Mr Marshall: I notice that you
have said quite specifically that this organisation was advisory
and also had training capabilities, which implies that the control
will remain in national hands. Does it still remain, however,
a Commission objective to have a European border guard? A European-wide
one, which would be controlled by the Union rather than by the
individual Member States?
Mr Handley: In previous communications
the Commission has suggested that the long-term goal should be
to have a really well-integrated border management system for
the European Union. At various European Councils there has been
growing support for this kind of idea but I think that, at this
stage of the process, the consensus around the Council table is
that this is the maximum needed.
Q33 Mr Cash: I would like to press
you on this question about the agency. When you are dealing with
borders, it would be nice to think that everything would be sweet
and easy, but actually you can have border incidents. If you have
border incidents, it is incredibly important to know what the
legal authority is of those who seek to enforce the law in relation
to those incidents. Could you explain a little more just exactly
what these specific tasks would be? It seems to me that you are
getting into very dangerous territory here.
Mr Handley: When you talk about
"border incidents", you are talking of—
Q34 Mr Cash: Somebody might have
to shoot somebody. Is the agency going to be entitled to do that?
Mr Handley: No, the agency is
not an operational agency. It is not itself providing border guards.
It is providing a better co-ordination, so that the Lithuanian
guards and the Polish guards are all working from the same common
manual of external border practice.
Q35 Mr Cash: Where is the authority
for this action, assuming that there is a case—which I can
envisage—where somebody will be shot? It could be to do
with smuggling or something, and there will be a return of fire.
Under what legal authority will the person who has pulled the
trigger know that he is justified in having done so? Where does
he get the authority from?
Mr Handley: National law.
Mr Cash: But if the agency has been given
additional legal powers to override the national laws—
Mr Marshall: I thought, Mr Cash, that
we had cleared that point up in the answer that Mr Handley gave
to me.
Mr Cash: Not to my satisfaction.
Mr Marshall: He made the point that the
responsibility for the practical day-to-day matters would be the
responsibility of national governments and they would provide
national border guards. If the kind of incident occurs that you
have just postulated, then if it happened in Britain it would
be under British law; if it happened in Lithuania, it would be
under Lithuanian law.
Q36 Angus Robertson: Can I ask how
the budget for security support should be defined? Should it specify
that support should be provided only for crisis management operations
of the nature of Petersberg tasks, or should it allow for operations
which are of a more military nature?
Mr Servoz: It is only for the
Petersberg tasks.
Q37 Angus Robertson: Does the Commission
take the view that there should be distinct budget lines for development
assistance and for security support, so that funding is not diverted
away from the poorest countries?
Mr Servoz: Yes, absolutely. In
fact, in the context of the new Financial Perspectives the Commission
intends to put forward some simplification proposals on the instruments
which are used for development assistance and for security. The
Commission intends to propose only two financial instruments:
one for development and the other for security.
Q38 Mr Marshall: Could I follow that
up? As you well know, Mr Servoz, the Petersberg tasks cover a
whole gamut of objectives, from very soft to very hard security
issues. Where would you say that some are of a more military nature
than others? Where would you draw the line? Where would the Commission
draw the line?
Mr Servoz: I agree with you that
the line is difficult to draw. I think that the Commission has
indicated its wish to focus on research which could have a military
impact. That is the main area of focus, which I think is indicated
as a priority for next year. Dual research, research with a military
impact, is the main focus of the Commission for next year. However,
I agree with you that sometimes the line is difficult to draw.
Q39 Mr Marshall: So the answer is
that we do not know? At the present time we do not know?
Mr Servoz: I would rather say
that it is a matter to be decided on a case-by-case basis, because
I cannot give you a very precise definition.
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