Select Committee on European Scrutiny Thirteenth Report


2 Compensation for fluctuations in the export earnings of ACP countries

(25393)

6370/04

COM(04) 68

Draft Council Decision on the position to be adopted by the Community within the ACP-EC Council of Ministers regarding the revision of the terms and conditions of financing for short-term fluctuations in export earnings (Annex II of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou)

Legal baseArticle 310, in conjunction with the second sub-para of Article 300(2) EC; unanimity
Document originated12 February 2004
Deposited in Parliament25 February 2004
DepartmentInternational Development
Basis of considerationEM of 4 March 2004
Previous Committee ReportNone
To be discussed in CouncilNo date yet set
Committee's assessmentPolitically important
Committee's decisionNot cleared; information on progress requested

The Commission document

2.1 The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, known as the Cotonou Agreement, provides for a system of financial support (FLEX) to mitigate the negative effects on the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries which are party to that Agreement of short-term fluctuations in export earnings. Article 68.2 of the Agreement says that the purpose of this support is "to safeguard macroeconomic and sectoral reforms and policies that are at risk as a result of a drop in revenue and remedy the adverse effects of instability of export earnings". The support is financed from the B-allocation of the financial envelope for support to long-term development, which covers unforeseen needs.[1]

2.2 The current criteria used to determine eligibility for support under FLEX are set out in Article 9 of Annex II of the Agreement. During the first three years of this new system (2000-2002) relatively few countries qualified. The Agreement provides for these provisions to be reviewed and the Commission now proposes that two revisions should be made to the eligibility criteria. The Agreement allows amendment of Annex II on the basis of a recommendation from the ACP-EC Development Finance Cooperation Committee.

2.3 The Commission provides a summary which shows how many ACP countries applied for support in the three years 2000, 2001 and 2002 and met the two criteria used to determine eligibility:

  • 51 countries (68% of ACP countries) requested support under the FLEX mechanism;
  • 29 countries fulfilled criterion one, a 10% loss of export earnings, or 2% in the case of least-developed countries; and
  • Six countries fulfilled both criteria one and two. Criterion two is a 10% worsening in the programmed public deficit.

Total support received under FLEX during the period was €35.65 million.

2.4 The Commission argues that the main principle of the instrument is to provide support for losses in Government revenues resulting from a fall in export earnings and that this should not be changed. However, to improve the functioning of FLEX, and to ensure that it responds better to its objectives, the eligibility criteria should be simplified.

2.5 Two modifications are proposed:

  • under criterion one, the extension to landlocked and island ACP states of the more favourable provision, currently available only to least developed countries, of having suffered a 2% (rather than 10%) loss of export earnings; and
  • elimination of the 10% hurdle in the second criterion for eligibility: a worsening of 10% in the programmed public deficit.

The Government's view

2.6 The Secretary of State for International Development (Mr Hilary Benn) comments that compensatory financing facilities, such as FLEX, have the potential to play a positive developmental role, provided lessons learnt from the past, including those relating to previous schemes such as STABEX, a predecessor of FLEX, are applied. The Commission is anxious to make FLEX work better and the changes proposed will almost certainly increase the flow of funds through the mechanism.

2.7 The Minister notes that there are considerable financial implications, which he sets out below. However, he says, there is no guarantee that this, by which presumably he means the proposal, will increase the effectiveness of the mechanism from a development perspective. To achieve this result measures are required to ensure that FLEX supports and is consistent with broader EU development policy, with an emphasis on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks.

2.8 The Commission's current proposal is short on detail on the potential financial implications. The Minister says that there must be a focused debate on the role of compensatory financing mechanisms in development processes before such a significant decision as the one proposed here is made. The Commission should also explore making FLEX complementary to other instruments operated by, for example, the International Monetary Fund.

2.9 On the financial implications of the proposal, the Minister comments as follows:

"There are no direct financial implications for the UK, as overall funding for the EDF[2] is fixed. Any increase in cost resulting from a change to the criteria will have to be [met] from the existing fund. However, there are opportunity costs in terms of other external activities remaining unfund[ed].

"The Commission has not officially calculated any financial implications for the cost of the mechanism. However, based on initial contacts with the Commission, we understand that:

  • 29 of the 51 applicants in 2000-2002 would have met the proposed revised eligibility criteria;
  • This would have resulted in an increase in cost of at least €205 million (£137million); and
  • Approximately €400 million (£268 million) would be required over a four-year period if the changes are adopted.

"Similarly, the proposal provides no estimates from the Commission regarding any potential increase in the number of applications resulting from the proposed revised eligibility criteria.

"We will be encouraging the Commission to undertake a more detailed analysis of potential financial implications."

2.10 The Minister says that the Government will seek additional relevant information in order to have a constructive dialogue with the Commission and other Member States on the proposal in the Working Group discussions.

2.11 The exact timetable for the proposal to come before the Council is not yet clear.

Conclusion

2.12 The Commission gives no clue in the document to its reason for selecting landlocked and island ACP states as potential further beneficiaries of a modification to the first criterion for eligibility to support from FLEX.

2.13 We support the Government in pressing the Commission to provide estimates of the cost of the proposal. We also agree that this opportunity should be taken to ensure that the FLEX financing facilities are consistent with broader EU development policy.

2.14 We ask the Minister to provide us with an update in due course on the negotiations in the Working Group on this proposal. Meanwhile we do not clear the document.


1   Article 3.2(b) of Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement. Back

2   The European Development Fund, from which support for the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement is drawn. Back


 
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