9 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
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| Draft Council Joint Action on the implementation of measures of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and in support of activities under the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund
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| Legal base | Article 14 EU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 27 April 2004
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| Previous Committee Report | None
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| To be discussed in Council | 17 May 2004
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
9.1 The EU Strategy on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(the EU WMD Strategy) follows on from the Thessaloniki European
Council declaration on WMD proliferation, and was endorsed by
the Council on 12 December 2003. The Action Plan of the Strategy
envisaged "enhancing political, financial and technical support
to verification regimes". An important component in this
task is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and particularly
the IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan, which is funded through voluntary
contributions to its Nuclear Security Fund.
The proposed joint action
9.2 The proposed Joint Action would commit the EU to funding certain
projects under the IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan. The Joint Action
identifies three projects for funding:
- Project 1 aims to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear
and other radioactive materials in selected countries. It will
result in the upgrading of physical protection of selected facilities
and priority locations; the provision of expert assistance to
improve national regulatory infrastructure for physical protection;
and the provision of staff training in selected countries.
- Project 2 aims to strengthen the security of radioactive materials
in non-nuclear applications in selected countries. It will result
in the provision of expert assistance to improve national regulatory
infrastructure for the safety and security of radioactive materials;
the protection, dismantlement or disposal of up to 30 vulnerable
sources; and the provision of staff training in selected countries.
- Project 3 aims to strengthen the capabilities of selected
countries to detect and respond to illicit trafficking. It will
result in enhanced collection and evaluation of information on
illicit nuclear trafficking; the provision of expert assistance
on the establishment of national frameworks to combat illicit
trafficking; the upgrading of monitoring equipment at selected
border crossings; and the provision of training for law enforcement
staff.
9.3 The Joint Action envisages that priorities will be identified
following evaluation missions by the IAEA. These to be performed
within a period of three months of the signature of the funding
agreement between the IAEA and the Commission. The evaluation
missions will focus on non-EU states in South-Eastern Europe and
projects will then be carried out in parallel during the 12 subsequent
months.
The Government's view
9.4 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 27 April 2004, the Minister
for Europe (Mr Denis MacShane) explains that the Government strongly
supports the WMD Strategy and its associated Action Plan, which
it regards as "a step change in the EU's efforts to tackle
this threat", and has been working to ensure its effective
implementation. It has also strongly supported the IAEA's Nuclear
Security Plan, including donating £950,000 to the Nuclear
Security Fund. An EU contribution to the IAEA's work in this
area is seen as a further strengthening of its part in the EU's
Action Plan.
Conclusion
9.5 As the European Security Strategy, "A Secure Europe
In A Better World", of 12 December 2003 noted, "Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest threat
to our security … The most frightening scenario is one in
which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In
this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a
scale previously possible only for States and armies." Integrating
WMD concerns into the EU's relations with third countries is therefore
plainly sensible. So, too, is the proposed partnership with the
International Atomic Energy Agency, especially in projects that
will strengthen the physical protection and security of nuclear
and other radioactive materials, in both nuclear and non-nuclear
applications, in the selected countries, and those countries'
capabilities to detect and respond to illicit trafficking.
9.6 We clear the document.
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