17 EU Common Strategy on Russia
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| Council Report on the implementation of the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia
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| Legal base | — |
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 21 June 2004 and EM of 12 July 2004
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| Previous Committee Report | None
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| Discussed in Council | 17-18 June 2004 European Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared, but further information requested
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Background
17.1 The 1998 Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a number of new instruments
relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The use of
the Common Strategy instrument is intended to set out the objectives,
means and duration of the EU's external policies towards geographic
or thematic areas. The European Council subsequently agreed that
work should start on Common Strategies on Russia, Ukraine, the
Western Balkans and the Mediterranean. The Common Strategy on
Russia was launched in June 1999, with a four-year duration.[40]
17.2 When adopting the Common Strategy, the European
Council decided that a report should be submitted on its implementation
at least once a year. The last report was presented to the Thessaloniki
European Council in June 2003, and the Council agreed to extend
the Common Strategy for one year. The present draft report covers
the Italian and Irish Presidencies.
The Common Strategy
17.3 Under the Common Strategy the EU seeks to assist
the development of a stable, open, pluralistic democracy in Russia,
governed by the rule of law, and underpinning a prosperous market
economy. The Union also seeks to strengthen stability in Europe
by promoting global security through increasing co-operation with
Russia. The core of the relationship remains the Partnership
and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), with its aim of promoting the
integration of Russia into a wider area of co-operation with Europe.
There are four principal objectives:
- consolidation of democracy,
the rule of law and public institutions in Russia, paying particular
attention to areas such as relations between central, regional
and local government, Russias efforts to meet its human rights
commitments, and promoting media freedom and equal opportunities;
- integration of Russia into a common European
economic and social space through support for the establishment
of an operational market economy, particularly assistance for
the restructuring of enterprises, reform of public finance, banking
and corporate governance, and policies to attract domestic and
foreign investment, with a view to laying the foundations for
a future EU-Russia free trade zone;
- co-operation to strengthen stability and security
in Europe, by endeavouring to develop a permanent political dialogue
and work towards joint foreign policy initiatives; and
- finding common responses to common challenges
in the fields of energy policy, nuclear safety, the environment,
organised crime, drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings.
Recent developments
17.4 The May 2003 EU-Russia St Petersburg Summit
decided that the development of EU-Russian relations should focus
on four "Common Spaces" — a common economic space;
a common space of freedom, security and justice; a space of cooperation
in the field of external security; and a space of research and
education. The June Thessaloniki European Council accordingly
agreed to extend the Common Strategy for one year, to enable work
to be done on the new proposal. The November 2003 Rome EU-Russia
Summit formally adopted the concept of the Common European Economic
Space (CEES); issued a Joint Declaration committing both sides
to reinforce cooperation on political and security matters, including
in the area of crisis management; underlined the interest of both
sides in intensifying co-operation in justice and home affairs;
and welcomed the signature of the agreement between the Russian
Federation and Europol.
17.5 The Irish Presidency continued the work begun
during the Italian Presidency, with a comprehensive assessment
of the EU's relations with Russia. This assessment, agreed by
the Council in February 2004, set the groundwork for the future
development of EU-Russia relations. The draft report notes that
the Council agreed that "a genuine strategic partnership,
founded on shared values as well as common interests, necessitated
a mature and frank dialogue, which would work to resolve differences
and build up common understanding, including on such issues as
human rights, the rule of law, media freedom and the situation
in Chechnya".[41]
The Irish Presidency has sought to develop closer relations with
Russia on this basis, with progress dependent on balance and reciprocity.
The political dialogue on regional and global issues of concern
has continued, with informal meetings on human rights as well
regular discussions on the EU's and Russia's "common neighbourhood",
including the so-called "frozen conflicts".[42]
17.6 The February Council decided that internal work
on all four Common Spaces should be taken forward with a view
to reaching agreement on the main lines by the May 2004 Moscow
Summit. However, progress was delayed, pending the outcome of
contacts with Russia on extension of the PCA to include the Acceding
States, which were not concluded until the first meeting of the
Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) on 27 April.[43]
17.7 Following the agreement to attend the PCA, the
EU forwarded to Russia its proposal for the main lines of a Joint
EU-Russia Action Plan on the Common Spaces on 29 April. The Russian
response is still awaited.
"The EU side continues to urge Russia to begin
substantive discussions on the content of the Common Spaces, with
a view to preparing concrete proposals in good time for the next
Summit. Equally, it continues to insist that the PPC and existing
PCA structures should be fully utilised in developing the Common
Spaces. Further development of Neighbourhood Programmes is important
for regional and cross-border cooperation. The various instruments
that are or will be available in the future, including the new
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), could significantly contribute
to the EU-Russia cooperation within the four Common Spaces."[44]
17.8 At the May 2004 Moscow Summit, it was announced
that negotiations with the EU on Russia's accession to the WTO
— one of the goals of the Common Strategy — had been
successfully concluded.
17.9 According to the draft report,
"Environmental issues remain a priority for
the EU. While Russia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is
still awaited, President Putin's commitment to speed up the process
of Kyoto ratification is to be welcomed and built on. The EU
side also stressed the need for strong cooperation on environmental
issues, including in the Baltic Sea region, and proposed to work
jointly with Russia to promote the socio-economic development
of Kaliningrad. The EU side also noted Russian acceptance of
the need for early signature and ratification of the border agreements
with Estonia and Latvia. Since the Summit, the Irish Presidency
has been in contact with President Putin to ensure proper follow-up."[45]
17.10 The draft report says that, in the light of
the dialogue with Russia about vision, "the Commission in
April 2004 presented draft negotiating directives for an agreement
on visa facilitation, which is currently under consideration in
the Council".[46]
17.11 The draft report concludes:
"In the light of developments over the last
year, particularly the internal assessment of EU-Russia relations,
it is not considered necessary to renew the extension [of the
Common Strategy]. The four Common Spaces, agreed with Russia
in St Petersburg in May 2003, provide an extensive basis for development
of the EU's relations with this very important neighbour and strategic
partner. The immediate priority is to develop these spaces, within
the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with
Russia."[47]
The Government's view
17.12 The Minister for Europe (Mr Denis MacShane)
notes in his Explanatory Memorandum of 12 July that
"the Common Strategy document was long and diffuse,
and did not clearly signal what the EU's specific priorities in
its relations with Russia were. Furthermore, the Common Strategy
never enjoyed any buy-in from Russia."
He adds that
"developments elsewhere in the EU-Russia relationship
underlined the fact that the Common Strategy had outlived its
usefulness. The four Common Spaces initiative, agreed with Russia
at the EU-Russia summit in St Petersburg in May 2003, provide
an extensive basis for development of the EU's relations with
this very important neighbour and strategic partner. The Four
Common Spaces provide, for the first time, the opportunity for
the EU and Russia together to agree priorities for the relationship.
Work is now going ahead on developing the substance of the spaces,
within the framework of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
with Russia … In the light of these developments EU member
states, including the UK, considered it unnecessary to renew the
extension of the EU's Common Strategy on Russia when it expired
at the end of June this year."
He concludes that
"The Government does not regard the current
EU Common Strategy on Russia as having played a wholly effective
role as a guide to EU policy towards Russia, and believes that
other developments in EU-Russia relations have more potential
to drive the EU-Russia relationship forward."
and that
"The Government therefore welcomes the Council
report, which allows the Common Strategy on Russia to lapse."
Conclusion
17.13 The EUs strategy towards Russia clearly
remains a matter of great political importance. Continued co-operation
in encouraging democratic and economic reform, in promoting regional
security, and in matters of common concern, such as nuclear safety
and international crime, remain as critical as it was when the
Common Strategy was launched. The hope, clearly, is that the "Common
Spaces" approach will be more effective than its predecessor.
But that will happen only if, henceforth, there is — to
use the Minister's words — more "buy-in" from
Russia. On the face of it, there is much similarity between the
four original objectives and the four Common Spaces. But the Common
Spaces are very broadly drawn at this stage. It is important
that the Council does not back away from the dialogue envisaged
in February on issues such as Chechnya and media freedom (see
para 17.5 above) in order to achieve progress.
17.14 In the meantime, we should be grateful if
the Minister would provide us with more information on the main
lines of the Joint EU-Russia Action Plan on the Common Spaces,
forwarded to Russia on 29 April.
17.15 When the previous Committee first considered
the Common Strategy,[48]
it noted that, in accordance with Article 23(2) EU, the Council
acts by qualified majority when adopting joint actions, common
positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common
strategy, unless one of its members objects for important and
stated reasons of national policy (in which case the matter may
be referred to the European Council), and that, given the broad
scope and general language of the Common Strategy, it appeared
to offer considerable opportunity for the adoption of further
measures. In responding to our request to the then Minister for
Europe (Ms Joyce Quin) to provide us with her view on the extent
and significance of the further action the Council might adopt
by qualified majority on the basis of this Common Strategy, with
reference in particular to the circumstances in which the United
Kingdom might insist on the European Council acting by unanimity,
she replied in her letter of May 1999 that she did "not see
a large amount of business under the Common Strategy actually
being contested and put to a vote", taking the view that
"Any Presidency which tries to push through policy proposals
which are opposed by a significant number of member states would
put at risk the political cohesion and credibility behind the
Common Strategy". We should be grateful if her successor
would let us know if, in practice, his predecessor's judgement
has proved to be well-founded.
40 20084 - ; see HC 34 xix (1998-99), para 13 (12 May
1999). Back
41
Draft report, Para 4. Back
42
The so-called "frozen conflicts" of Abkhazia, South
Ossetia and Ajaria, dissident republics within Georgia, all of
which are opposed to the Georgian State and look to Russia for
support. Back
43
A Ministerial-level troika body (past, present and future EU Presidency
and Russian counterpart) which can meet as often as it likes. Back
44
Draft report, para 7. Back
45
Draft report, para 8. Back
46
Draft report, para 9. Back
47
Draft report, para 10. Back
48
20084 - ; see HC 34 xix (1998-99), para 13 (12 May 1999). Back
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