7 Safety of nuclear installations
| (25951)
12386/04
COM(04) 526
| Part I: Amended Draft Council Directive (Euratom) laying down basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installations
|
| Legal base | Articles 31, 32 and 187 Euratom; consultation; QMV
|
| Document originated | 8 September 2004
|
| Deposited in Parliament | 21 September 2004
|
| Department | Trade and Industry
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 12 October 2004
|
| Previous Committee Report | None, but see footnote 12
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| To be discussed in Council | See para 7.9 below
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| Committee's assessment | Legally and politically important
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| Committee's decision | Not cleared; further information awaited
|
Background
7.1 In January 2003, the Commission produced two legislative
proposals on nuclear safety, one concerned with the management
of radioactive waste,[11]
and the other with the safety of nuclear installations.[12]
The latter proposal, which would apply to all civil nuclear installations,
is based on the Nuclear Safety Convention of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and addresses three aspects of nuclear
safety —
the setting of minimum standards, independent verification of
the actions of Member States in this area, and the continuing
need for radiological protection after the active life of a nuclear
installation. In particular, it would require Member States:
- to establish an independent
nuclear authority to supervise and regulate safety in nuclear
installations;
- to take the measures necessary to establish and
maintain effective arrangements against potential radiological
hazards and nuclear accidents, and to ensure the long-term management
of all materials, including radioactive waste and spent nuclear
fuel, produced in the course of decommissioning;
- to ensure that due priority is given to nuclear
safety in such installations;
- to require those responsible for such installations
to operate them in accordance with common safety standards;
- to ensure that nuclear safety experts are available,
and that the necessary inspections are carried out by the relevant
authority;
- to see that adequate financial resources are
available to ensure the safety of nuclear installations, and in
particular to cover decommissioning costs, based on contributions
from those responsible during their operation; and
- to establish procedures to deal with operating
incidents and accidents, and (where significant) for these to
be notified to the responsible authority, together with any corrective
measures taken.
7.2 It also proposed that these measures could be
revised by the Group of Experts established by Article 31 of the
Euratom Treaty, and should be backed up by a verification system
operated by the Commission. The latter would be able to call upon
nominated national experts, and would send its report to the Member
State concerned (which would then have three months to indicate
how it intends to remedy any shortcoming). At the same time, Member
States themselves would have to submit an annual report to the
Commission on the measures taken to implement the Directive.
7.3 In our Report of 10 July 2003, we noted that
the Government had a number of concerns about the proposal, relating
to the Commission's competence; to the proposed legal
base; to the need to clarify the way in which certain of the
obligations imposed by the proposal would apply in the
UK; and to subsidiarity, where doubts arose as to whether
the proposal would add any value to the existing nuclear regime,
which involves national regulation within the framework of the
IAEA. The Government also doubted whether there was any benefit
in taking further legislative action, but said that the possibility
of a non-binding instrument had found favour with a number of
Member States, including the UK.
7.4 The arguments for and against such an approach
were subsequently touched upon in a letter of 30 October 2003
from the then Minister of State for Energy, e-Commerce and Postal
Services at the Department of Trade and Industry (Mr Stephen Timms)
to the Chairman of the House of Lords Committee; in the oral evidence
which we ourselves took from the Minister on 2 December 2003;
and in our Report of 17 December 2003.[13]
More recently, our Report of 16 June 2004 noted that the then
Irish Presidency had invited COREPER[14]
to give a political steer on whether the Council should continue
to develop a legally binding instrument, during which it became
clear that there was neither a qualified majority in favour of
a Directive, nor a consensus in favour of proceeding with a non-legally
binding instrument. We were also told that the Conclusions being
drawn up for the Council were likely to reaffirm the importance
it attached to nuclear safety, but to restrict, for the time being,
the Commission's ability to come back with further legislative
proposals in this area. The Government suggested this would mean
that further action in terms of scrutiny clearance was no longer
necessary, and that the prospect of a re-emergence of the Commission's
proposal for legislation was very remote, certainly in the short
to medium term. We for our part accepted that no further action
was needed at that stage, but added that, in view of the potential
implications of the proposal, we felt it would be right for us
to continue to hold it under scrutiny, unless and until it was
formally withdrawn by the Commission.
The current proposal
7.5 In this document, the Commission says that it
has amended its original proposal to take into account the views
expressed by the European Parliament and the discussions within
the Council. It has confirmed its initial intention of seeking
a legally binding instrument, but has suggested a number of detailed
changes. In particular:
- the national reports provided
by Member States on their implementation of the Directive would
have to be submitted on a three-yearly basis rather than annually,
in line with the programme of national reporting under the Convention
on Nuclear Safety;
- a Committee of Regulatory Authorities, drawn
from representatives of the Member States, would be established
to assess these reports, and would have the power to give an opinion
and possibly make recommendations to the Member States concerned;
- in the event of a nuclear emergency, there would
be a new requirement on Member States to provide information (and,
where appropriate, the opportunity for consultation) on safety-related
issues to their own public and to the authorities of neighbouring
Member States, in the vicinity of nuclear installations likely
to be affected;
- there is no longer any suggestion that the Article
31 Group of Experts would be asked to establish a corpus of operational
standards; and
- the proposal no longer includes a specific provision
on decommissioning funds, and the requirement for operators to
establish a separate decommissioning fund has been dropped, Member
States being required instead to ensure that sufficient funds
are available to support the safety of a nuclear installation
throughout its life, including decommissioning.
The Government's view
7.6 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 12 October 2004,
the Minister for Energy and e-commerce at the Department of Trade
and Industry (Mr Mike O'Brien) says that the new proposal has
"completely ignored" the Council's conclusions on 28
June 2004 that the development of a Community dimension in this
field should be a product of consultation and take account of
developments in the international arena over the next 2-3
years. He also says that, whilst overall national responsibility
for nuclear safety is now explicitly recognised in the proposal,
some of its provisions are ambiguous and still appear to give
the Commission fairly wide scope to interfere with national regulatory
decisions, whilst others, such as an obligation on Member States
to consult their public and the authorities in neighbouring countries,
cover areas where existing arrangements are well established and
where a regulatory requirement of this kind is thus inappropriate.
7.7 The Minister expresses two further concerns.
The first is that the requirement on Member States to ensure that
adequate financial resources are made available from regulatory
bodies and operators to support the safety of nuclear installations
throughout their life appears to be inconsistent with the establishment
in the UK of the Nuclear Development Agency, which is to be responsible
for clean-up and decommissioning of public nuclear liabilities,
but which is not a regulatory body within the meaning of the proposal.
The second is that, whilst the proposal now includes a provision
making it clear that the safety measures taken at a nuclear installation
are to be decided solely by the regulatory body and licence holder,
and that reports submitted by Member States will in future be
reviewed rather than verified, the proposal still gives the Commission
considerable scope for involvement in national regulatory decisions
on nuclear safety.
7.8 More generally, the Minister says that the Government
continues to have serious doubts that the proposal will add any
value to the existing nuclear safety regime, over and above that
already existing under the framework of the IAEA. He is also concerned
that, since the Commission lacks the technical expertise in this
field, it would have to rely on experts from the Member States,
who would thus have to be taken away from their current duties
for significant lengths of time, thereby reducing their effectiveness
and undermining work in progress within the IAEA to raise nuclear
safety standards world-wide.
7.9 Finally, the Minister says that it is already
clear that a significant number of Member States remain opposed
to Community legislation in this field, and he thinks it is very
likely the Dutch Presidency, which has indicated little enthusiasm
for this dossier, will conclude that there is no real option other
than to pursue it on the basis of the Council Conclusions adopted
in June.
Conclusion
7.10 We note that, although this latest proposal
contains a number of changes intended to emphasize the nuclear
safety role of national authorities, it nevertheless still includes
provisions which would give the Commission undue scope to interfere
with decisions taken by Member States, and which, in the Government's
view, would continue to duplicate unnecessarily work being undertaken
within the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Consequently, although the Minister has said that the current
Presidency is unlikely to wish to pursue the proposal, we think
it prudent at this stage simply to report this latest development
to the House, and —
as with the proposal put forward in January 2003 —
to hold it under scrutiny, whilst awaiting further information.
11 (24704) 8990/03; see HC 63-xxix (2002-03), para
4 (10 July 2003) and HC 42-xxii (2003-04), para 6 (9 June 2004). Back
12
(24507) 8990/03; see HC 63-xxix (2002-03), para 8 (10 July 2003),
HC 42-iii (2003-04), para 3 (17 December 2003) and HC 42-xxiii
(2003-04), para 4 (16 June 2004). Back
13
In that Report ((24507) 8990/03; HC 42-iii (2003-04), para 3 (17
December 2003) and HC 42-xxiii (2003-04), para 4 (16 June 2004)),
we also noted that the Council Legal Services had confirmed the
Commission's competence to legislate in this area, and had in
the process addressed the outstanding questions on the legal base. Back
14
The Committee of Permanent Representatives. Back
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