9 THE TRANSNISTRIAN REGION OF MOLDOVA
(25888)
11858/04
—
| Restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of Moldova
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration |
Minister's letter of 28 October 2004 |
| Previous Committee Report |
HC 42-xxxiii (2003-04), para 12 (20 October 2004)
|
| To be discussed in Council
| Already agreed |
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Cleared (decision reported 20 October 2004)
|
Background
9.1 Against a background of EU concern about the threats to security
and stability in Eastern Europe posed by the activities of the
illegal separatist regime in the Transnistrian region of Moldova,
the Minister for Europe (Mr Denis MacShane) first alerted us in
November 2002 to likely Council action on possible restrictive
measures (such as a visa ban or asset freeze on the Transnistrian
leadership and measures aimed at stemming the region's steel exports),
noting that, once agreement had been reached, they "may be
implemented very quickly [without there being] enough time to
clear formal scrutiny". The Minister wrote again on 14 February
2003, saying that only slow progress had been made but that the
Chair in Office of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) was keen to have a ban on members of the leadership
travelling to the EU agreed at the 24-25 February General Affairs
and External Relations Council (GAERC); he hoped that we would
understand that he intended to support the adoption of the proposal
at the Council. Having received that only on 26 February 2003,
we queried the late submission and purpose of the proposal, and
kept the matter under scrutiny. In response to the Minister's
subsequent letter of 3 March 2003 we concluded:
"This proposal was first mooted in November last year.
The Minister, rightly, warned us that it might be put at short
notice to the Council. Whatever case there was for urgency hardly
carries the same weight when, some three months later, it has
still not been put to the Council but we are told that the Minister
intends to agree to it before it has even been seen by the Committee.
We consider that there are times, such as this, when the Government
should be prepared to defend the principle of scrutiny before
adoption more vigorously in the face of pressure."[16]
In February 2004 we cleared without a substantive Report the continuation
of the restrictive measures for a further 12 months.
Changes to the Common Position
9.2 It was recently proposed that ten individuals be added to
the list of those to whom the travel ban applied, they having
"participated in the implementation of repressive measures
against Latin script schools in Transnistria". This change
was to be effective from 1 September to coincide with the beginning
of the school year. None of the previous history or context was
referred to in an Explanatory Memorandum (EM) submitted on 31
August by the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Mr Bill Rammell, standing in for the Minister for Europe).
Since, by then, it had emerged that the amendment to the Common
Position had already been adopted by written procedure on 26
August (i.e. five days before the EM) and under pressure from
another Member State, it was suggested that the Minister should
write to us to explain his position.
9.3 The Minister for Europe's letter of 11 October
explained the context much more fully than in the EM. But it
did not reach us until two hours before our meeting on 20 October.
It also referred to a letter of 26 August from Mr Rammell related
to his EM, which did not reach us until 18 October. It also contained
no suggestion that it was in response to our concern expressed
nearly two months earlier about both the content of the EM and
the decision to override scrutiny, but instead suggested that
the initiative in writing to us was his. We continued to have
no difficulty with the amendment to the Common Position, and cleared
the document. But we remained unclear that the Common Position
needed to have been agreed just before a meeting of this Committee,
and did not feel that the Minister had responded appropriately
to the questions raised about the process. In our view, while
it may have been desirable for the imposition of the new measures
to coincide with the start of the school term, it was by no means
essential in order to send the desired political message. Instead,
it seemed to us to have been precisely the situation we had in
mind when we told the Minister on 19 March 2003 that "We
consider that there are times, such as this, when the Government
should be prepared to defend the principle of scrutiny before
adoption more vigorously in the face of pressure". We accordingly
asked the Minister to write to us about the handling of this document
and about why the Government agreed that the scrutiny reserve
resolution should be overridden. He has now done so.
The Minister's letter
9.4 In his letter of 28 October, with respect to
the initial concerns expressed to the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, the Minister says:
"I understand that in discussions between
your Clerks and the Foreign Office at the beginning of September,
it was suggested that I write again to your Committee setting
out in more detail why the deadline had been so important. I was
not aware that we had been asked to respond to specific concerns
that the Committee had about the process itself. I apologise if
this was the case and hope that this letter will answer your questions."
9.5 As to the reasons necessitating the imposition
of the travel ban from 1 September 2004, thereby overriding scrutiny,
he says:
"Although the implementation of the travel
ban was above all a political signal, we shared the view of our
EU partners that timing was crucial. During the visit of the EU
Council Secretariat mission to Moldova on 9-11 August, it was
made clear to all parties that the EU did not wish to see a further
escalation of the situation (this included the possibility that
the Moldovan side would renounce the 1992 cease-fire agreement
and formally withdraw from the settlement negotiations). We shared
the analysis that this was a very real risk. The mission requested
that all parties should ensure the fastest possible return, no
later than 1 September, to the status quo ante and urged the Transnistrians
to re-open the schools immediately. The mission was instructed,
on the basis of EU agreement at the Political and Security Council
(PSC) meeting of 5 August, to inform the Transnistrian leadership
that, unless the crisis was resolved by the start of the school
year, the EU would look to impose further sanctions against the
leadership. Had the EU then failed to act, it would not only have
had consequences for the EU's credibility, it would also have
significantly reduced the political impact of any ban imposed
at a later date. This was the reason I agreed to the amendments
to the Common Position before your Committee was able to next
meet after recess.
"We then supported the decision at the PSC
on 20 August that implementation of the travel ban should be brought
forward from the original 1 September deadline, as it was clear
that the Transnistrian authorities were not going to make any
concessions before this date. Moreover, at the same time the Transnistrians
were proceeding with a number of provocative actions including
barring OSCE officials from Transnistria and deploying Transnistrian
militia at the railway station in Bender."
9.6 On the question of withstanding pressure from
other Member States, he says:
"It is unfortunate that we had to override
the scrutiny reserve in this case. However, I am always mindful
of the requirement where possible, as set out in the Government
White Paper of 1998, to afford the European Scrutiny Committee
the opportunity to scrutinise European Documentation before it
is agreed within Council. During the last Parliamentary recess
we were able to successfully delay the agreement of several documents,
which were heading for the 11 October GAERC. These were:
- Council Decision concerning
the conclusion of the Status of Mission Agreement between the
EU and Georgia for the EU Rule of Law Mission, EUJUST THEMIS;
- Council Decision concerning the conclusion of
the Agreement between the EU and Romania on security procedures
for the exchange of classified information;
- Proposal for a Council Decision on the signature,
provisional application and conclusion of an additional protocol
to the Association Agreement between the EU and Chile to take
account of the accession of the new Member States;
- Proposal for a Council Decision on the signature
and provisional application of a Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean
Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States,
of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other
part, to take account of the accession of the new Member States;
- Proposal for a Council and Commission decision
on the conclusion of an additional protocol to the Europe Agreement
establishing an association between the EU and Romania to take
account of the accession of the new Member States; and
- Proposal for a Council and Commission decision
on the conclusion of an additional protocol to the Europe Agreement
establishing an association between the EU and Bulgaria, to take
account of the accession of the new Member States.
"Each document was judged on its urgency
and we lobbied the Presidency and Council Secretariat informing
them of our parliamentary scrutiny requirement. We are keen to
promote the use of our scrutiny reserve within Council in order
for your Committee to have the opportunity to scrutinise European
documentation. However, CFSP remains fast moving compared to work
in other pillars and for that reason there will always be occasions
where the Government needs to take part in EU decisions before
scrutiny is completed."
9.7 Finally, with regard to the errant letters, he
says:
"I understand your concerns about not receiving
a letter soon after your clerks had suggested this to our officials
in early September. A letter should have been sent to you on 15
September setting out in more detail the reasons for overriding
scrutiny. However, due to an internal office error the prepared
letter was not issued. When your Clerks told us on 11 October
that they had not received a response we acted to correct the
error and immediately reissued the letter on 12 October. I can
confirm that separate reissued letters were sent to both yourself
and Lord Grenfell.[17]
I understand the letter addressed to you did not arrive in your
office when, on Wednesday 20 October, your Clerks informed the
Foreign Office that you had still not received my letter. A further
copy was sent."
Conclusion
9.8 We are grateful to the Minister for his fuller
explanation of the circumstances and are now able to accept that,
on this occasion, his decision not to hold up agreement on the
Common Position was reasonable.
9.9 We are also happy to acknowledge this reaffirmation
of his commitment to the scrutiny process, as evidenced by both
the content and the nature of his letter, for which we are also
grateful.
16 (24271) -; see HC 63-xiv (2002-03), para 15 (5 March
2003). Back
17
Chairman of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European
Union. Back
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