Examination of Witness (Questions 200-219)
17 JULY 2003
MR ANDREW
GILLIGAN
Q200 Ms Stuart: So I understand it.
Mr Gilligan: Without the opportunity
to compare it with our transcript, I am afraid I simply cannot
answer that question.
Q201 Chairman: Was that transcript
obtained from the BBC?
Mr Gilligan: My statement that
the weapons did have the range to reach Cyprus was an allegation
that had been made before. It was simply an extrapolation from
the range of the CBW missile which is within range of Cyprus.
Q202 Chairman: Are you asking the
Committee to say that your statement that it was already known
only refers to missiles reaching Cyprus and not to the 45 minutes?
Mr Gilligan: Yes. The 45 minutes
was a new point and it was treated as new by all the press.
Q203 Chairman: Did you say so at
the time?
Mr Gilligan: As I say, without
access to the transcript, I simply cannot remember. You would
need to provide me with access to the transcripts. It is really
a little difficult for me to start talking about things which
I said many months ago and which I was not expecting to be asked
about.
Q204 Sir John Stanley: Mr Gilligan,
as you know, the Director of the CIA, Mr Tenet, gave private evidence
yesterday in front of the Senate Intelligence Committee. At the
same time he issued a public statement and this was all in r
elation to how the 16 words about uranium from
Africa had got into the President of the United States' State
of the Union address. If I could just quote you a final paragraph
of his statement, because it bears on what is the central issue
in the evidence that you have been giving to this Committee, Mr
Tenet said as follows: "Portions of the State of the Union
speech draft came to the CIA for comment shortly before the speech
was given. Various parts were shared with cognisant elements of
the Agency for review. Although the documents related to the alleged
Niger/Iraq uranium deal had not yet been determined to be forgeries,
officials who were reviewing the draft remarks on uranium raised
several concerns about the fragmentary nature of the intelligence
with National Security Council colleagues. Some of the language
was changed. From what we know now Agency officials in the end
concurred that the text in the speech was factually correct, ie,
that the British Government report said that Iraq sought uranium
from Africa. This should not have been the test for clearing a
presidential address. This did not rise to the level of certainty
as should be required for presidential speeches and the CIA should
have ensured that it was removed." As The Independent
today says in relation to Mr Tenet's statement, "In his statement
Mr Tenet accepted that he bore overall responsibility for approving
the speech but said there was pressure to make the claim".
In your earlier evidence to us you again gave the impression that
there was a degree of pressure. I am not referring specifically
to Mr Campbell here, but there was a general undercurrent of pressure
to try to make the September dossier, as you alleged, more newsworthy
than might otherwise have been the case. What I would like to
ask you is, did you find evidence of that pressure being applied
in the conversations with just the source for your 45-minute allegation
you made in relation to Mr Campbell or did you find that generally
among the four sources to which you referred when you came before
the Committee last?
Mr Gilligan: The four sources
I mentioned were people within the intelligence community, as
the evidence I gave makes clear. They were people within the intelligence
community who had expressed disquiet to me about the Government's
handling of intelligence on Iraq. Their disquiet included the
fact that the intelligence was being over-interpreted, to put
it mildly, in support of the proposition that Iraq was a serious
and grave threat. Remember one of them was concerned about the
link between al-Qaeda and Iraq which he said was unproven. Another
was concerned about the September dossier. Another was concerned
about the February dossier. The evidence that George Tenet has
given that the CIA warned the British Government against including
the uranium from Africa claim in its dossier before the dossier
was actually published I think supports one of my sources' claims
that the uranium from Africa claim was regarded as questionable.
It is an important piece of further evidence which supports some
of the claims made by my source.
Q205 Sir John Stanley: So in answer
to my question, and it is for you to put it in your own words,
you are saying to us that the suggestion of pressure was one that
came to you from all of your four sources or not?
Mr Gilligan: How I would characterise
it is how I characterised it to the Committee originally. The
sources were concerned about the use that was being made by the
Government of intelligence material on Iraq in a number of ways.
I cannot really go very much further than that.
Q206 Sir John Stanley: Can you tell
the Committee what was the form in which the pressure was applied?
Mr Gilligan: I have not mentioned
pressure. As I say, my sources were concerned about the use that
was being made of intelligence material on Iraq. The source who
showed me the al-Qaeda document, for instance, was concerned that
a rather firmer link than was justified by the evidence was being
made between Iraq and al-Qaeda. He believed that there was no
clear evidence of links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. He was sceptical
about the claim made to that effect, made by the Prime Minister
on 29 January in the Commons and by his spokesman on the same
morning in the official briefing, and he showed me the document
which I referred to in my earlier session, which seemed to—
Q207 Sir John Stanley: This is the
top secret document?
Mr Gilligan: That is right, which
seemed to cast doubt on those claims being made by the Prime Minister
and his spokesman.
Q208 Sir John Stanley: Without using
the word "pressure" again, can you in your own words
attribute some sort of causation to the fact that a greater degree
of certainty was being attributed to intelligence than was justified
on the basis of the intelligence source? I think that is what
you are saying to us. To what do you attribute that?
Mr Gilligan: The sources were
concerned that the intelligence was being over-interpreted to
support the case that Iraq was perhaps a greater threat than it
actually was. As I said, the person who expected me to put out
on al-Qaeda, for instance, did not say Alastair Campbell made
Tony Blair say this. He did not say that. He did not mention names.
He did not say that pressure had been applied. He just said that
it had happened and one must assume that that was happening at
the behest of the Government, but that is an assumption that is
not—
Mr Olner: Rather a large leap.
Q209 Sir John Stanley: Sorry; can
the witness just conclude his answer to my question?
Mr Gilligan: That is my answer.
Q210 Sir John Stanley: Could you
just repeat that before Mr Olner's interjection?
Mr Gilligan: My sources were concerned
that intelligence about Iraq was being over-interpreted by the
Government, by the Prime Minister, specifically in the case of
al-Qaeda, to a conclusion that it did not warrant, so that was
the allegation in respect of al-Qaeda.
Q211 Sir John Stanley: Did anybody
in the Government, apart from your source about 45 minutes, make
any suggestion at any point that what you have described as over-interpretation
was coming at the behest of Number 10, as I say, apart from what
you originally said to us was your source for the 45-minute claim?
Mr Gilligan: The over-interpretation
was being done by Number 10.
Q212 Sir John Stanley: Was being
done by Number 10?
Mr Gilligan: Yes. The clear import
of what my source for the al-Qaeda claim said, for instance, was,
"Here is the intelligence. I am showing you the intelligence.
This is what it says. Compare this with what the Prime Minister
said in the Commons on 29 January. Compare this with what his
spokesman said at the lobby on the same morning. They do not match
up. Over-interpretation is under way."
Q213 Sir John Stanley: You referred
to, I think, three particular instances. You have covered the
45-minute claim. As far as the dodgy dossier, the February one,
is concerned, are you alleging any over-interpretation of that?
Mr Gilligan: The dodgy dossier,
as has been described to you in evidence, came about again as
the result of the Government's desire to make a pressing case
for Iraq's being a serious and current threat, or an immediate
threat, as one minister described it.
Q214 Sir John Stanley: Could you
just clarify which minister you believe used the word "immediate"
because that has been denied strongly by the Foreign Secretary?
Mr Gilligan: It was Geoff Hoon
in a speech in Kuwait towards the end of February. He said, "The
issue of Iraq is an immediate issue for our security", or
something like that, and in an interview with the Today
programme the same morning he used a similar formulation.
Q215 Chairman: "Immediate"
linked with "threat"?
Mr Gilligan: I can get you the
exact quote if you need it
Q216 Sir John Stanley: I would be
grateful for the exact quote.
Mr Gilligan: The implication was
that it was an immediate threat. The word "immediate"
was used in that context.
Q217 Chairman: There is a difference,
with respect, between using the word "immediate" and
saying there is an immediate threat.
Mr Gilligan: "The issue of
Iraq is an immediate one for our security". That is roughly
what I remember Mr Hoon saying and that strikes me as implying
an immediate threat, but I would have to look at the exact quote
before I said—
Q218 Sir John Stanley: Could we have
the two quotes, both in Kuwait and on the Today programme?
Mr Gilligan: Sure.
Q219 Sir John Stanley: Perhaps you
would just continue what you were saying in answer to my question
about you alleging that there was over-interpretation of the February
dossier.
Mr Gilligan: The February dossier,
as I said, was intended to further the case that Iraq was a threat.
The extent of my conversation, as I mentioned in my previous evidence,
was that the intelligence services were extremely unhappy and
expressed disquiet that this dodgy dossier had not been cleared
with the JIC in its final form.
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