Examination of Witness (Questions 220-239)
17 JULY 2003
MR ANDREW
GILLIGAN
Q220 Sir John Stanley: I do not understand
the point you are making, Mr Gilligan, in relation to the February
dossier because from the best of my recollection the February
dossier does not deal with the issue of threat. It deals with
the structure of the Iraq security services, so I do not understand
the answer you have given in relation to the February dossier
being valuable as a means of over-interpreting intelligence for
the purposes of exaggerating the immediacy of the threat.
Mr Gilligan: I think it was intended
to further the case that United Nations weapons inspections alone
were insufficient to contain the threat posed by Iraq because
of Iraq's infrastructure of concealment, deception, intimidation.
It therefore went to the case that Iraq's threat was sufficiently
grave not to be contained by such measures. As I say, my contact
with one of my four sources on that subject was simply for this
person to say that they were unhappy that the fact that this document,
presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister as largely the work
of the intelligence services, had not in fact been approved by
the JIC.
Q221 Chairman: One question arises
from Sir John's question. You are an experienced, intelligence
reporter on defence matters. That is correct?
Mr Gilligan: Yes, yes, I have
been doing it for eight years.
Q222 Chairman: You read the document
produced on September 24. You came to the clear conclusion, as
reported in the transcript which has been read to us by Ms Stuart,
that there was nothing dramatic in it.
Mr Gilligan: As I say, what I
said, and I really have not seen the transcript of what I said,
but what I recall saying was that there was very little that was
dramatic or new in it but that there were some spicy elements
which were clearly intended to make dramatic tabloid headlines
the next day, which they duly did. I have absolutely no problem
with that statement. I stand by that statement.
Q223 Chairman: I am going to ask
Ms Stuart to refresh my memory.
Mr Gilligan: The headlines the
next day in papers across the political spectrum—The
Times headline was, "Iraq `One Year Away from Nuclear
Bomb'".
Chairman: I was not asking that. I just
want to have the conclusion of you as an experienced defence reporter
to the document that you read on September 24. What was the quote?
Ms Stuart: The whole sentence says, "There
are, as I say, a couple of sexy lines designed to make headlines
for the tabloids, like the fact that he can deploy within 45 minutes
if the weapons were ready and he could reach the British base
in Cyprus", then James Naughtie says, "How?", and
the response is, "Both of which we actually knew".
Q224 Chairman: "Both of which
we actually knew". How do you reconcile your conclusion then
on September 24 with what you are now telling the Committee, that
the intelligence was over-interpreted to strengthen the immediacy
of the threat?
Mr Gilligan: The implication of
the statement that chemical and biological weapons could be ready
for use within 45 minutes was that there was an immediate threat.
It is difficult to understand how that could be interpreted in
any other way. That was a new line in the dossier, whatever I
may or may not have said on the day, and with 20 minutes of however
long it was to examine it after it came out.
Q225 Chairman: "Both of which
we actually knew".
Mr Gilligan: Whatever or not I
may have said on the day, I am pretty sure I was actually referring
to the fact that they could reach Cyprus with the same missiles.
The 45 minutes was a new point. It was taken as such by the press,
as was the allegation that Saddam had sought significant quantities
of uranium from Africa. The 45 minutes was taken as an indication
that Iraq was an imminent threat and the uranium from Africa allegation
was taken, at least by the newspapers, as an indication that Saddam
was not far off a nuclear weapon provided he could obtain some
material, which was indeed the statement made in the dossier.
Q226 Chairman: We hear you. I was
asking you specifically on your conclusion as an experienced defence
reporter and your immediate response?
Mr Gilligan: Yes, my conclusion
as an experienced defence reporter immersed in this field for
many years, was, as I say, apart from those two "sexy"
lines there was very little that was new in it. This was clearly
not the conclusion that many others, less experienced, less immersed
in the area drew. Many other individuals have testified that that
dossier was a decisive factor in shaping their perceptions of
the threat from Iraq.
Q227 Mr Chidgey: Mr Gilligan, as
I am sure you will know we took evidence on Tuesday from Dr David
Kelly. I do not know whether you have had an opportunity to follow
that session or have since seen a transcript of the evidence?
Mr Gilligan: Yes, I watched it
on TV.
Q228 Mr Chidgey: That is good. Thank
you. I wonder if you can help me clear up something in the way
that Dr Kelly responded to some questions from me. You are, of
course, aware that he has spoken to other BBC journalists, in
particular Sue Watts, I think.
Mr Gilligan: Sorry?
Q229 Mr Chidgey: You are aware that
he spoke to . . .
Mr Gilligan: I am not aware of
anything about Dr Kelly's dealings with other journalists, how
could I be?
Q230 Mr Chidgey: Have you had an
opportunity to talk to Sue Watts about any note she may have made
about them?
Mr Gilligan: No, I have never
met or spoken to Susan Watts.
Andrew Mackinlay: It is a big organisation.
Q231 Mr Chidgey: I am sure it is.
Are you able to help? No one is trying to probe into your sources
in that regard, Mr Gilligan, I am merely trying to get some accuracy.
Mr Gilligan: Heaven forbid!
Q232 Mr Chidgey: You will know from
watching the evidence session that Dr Kelly was having conversations
or meetings and I was trying to find out whether or not the information
I read out to him was something that he was believed to have said
in your organisation to reputable journalists. He ducked and dived
about whether he met with Sue or Susan, but he did later on in
response to Gisela Stuart say he had a telephone conversation
with her on four of five occasions. What I would really like to
find out is whether from your discussions, your own knowledge
of the information in the transcripts that have been kept in the
BBC, whether or not the questions I asked him were, in fact, a
fair record of what he said?
Mr Gilligan: In relation to Susan
Watts I simply cannot help. You would have to ask her that I am
afraid.
Q233 Mr Chidgey: That is obvious,
but time is short.
Mr Gilligan: I have never met
or spoken to Susan Watts, genuinely. It is a big organisation.
Q234 Mr Chidgey: There was no information
passed to you from her office?
Mr Gilligan: No, not at all.
Q235 Chairman: Have you ever handled
a transcript or an alleged transcript?
Mr Gilligan: How do you mean?
Q236 Chairman: Have you ever seen
a transcript of an alleged conversation between Susan Watts and
Dr Kelly?
Mr Gilligan: I have seen Susan
Watts' original report on Newsnight in which she quoted
a "source involved with the process of pulling the dossier
together". I have transcribed that but I have not been given
access to Susan Watts' notes or anything.
Q237 Mr Chidgey: Does the transcript
you watched from Newsnight more or less match up with the
information I read out to Dr Kelly?
Mr Gilligan: Yes, it pretty much
does. That was described by her as a senior figure intimately
involved drawing up the dossier.
Q238 Mr Chidgey: Were you surprised
by him saying that he did not recognise that?
Mr Gilligan: I cannot answer questions
about Dr Kelly's relationship with Susan Watts because I have
never spoken to either of them about it.
Q239 Mr Chidgey: Okay. Can I ask
a couple of quick questions, can you tell us how long you have
known Dr Kelly for?
Mr Gilligan: I am pretty sure
some considerable time, I cannot remember the exact day we first
met I am afraid.
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