Correspondence between the Committee and
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Letter from the Chairman to Rt Hon Jack
Straw, Secretary of State, FCO, dated 15 July 2003
I would be grateful to receive answers to the
following questions.
1. In your public oral evidence of 23 June
you said that you would get to the Committee "as quickly
as possible" the answer to the question "When did the
CIA report to the British intelligence community the result of
the former US ambassador's visit to Niger?" Why was this
answer not provided to the Committee before it published its report
rather than appearing in your letter of 11 July?
2. Following your oral statement in the
House today, you undertook to place a copy of your answer to Andrew
Mackinlay in the Library. Would you also include that answer in
your reply to this letter?
3. Please will you provide the Committee
with a copy of the "detailed account of Ambassador Wilson's
report" that you have now seen.
4. What were the terms in which the CIA
expressed its reservations to the British Government about the
uranium from Africa element of the September 2002 dossier, and
on what date or dates were those reservations expressed?
5. Why did neither you nor your officials
disclose to the Committee, in either your written or oral evidence,
before the Committee published its recent report that the CIA
had expressed reservations to the British Government on the uranium
from Africa element in the September dossier—particularly
when you were specifically asked by a member of the Committee
in your public evidence on 27 June why the British Government
did "at least not put some degree of health warning"
over the uranium from Africa statements in the September 2002
dossier?
6. On receipt of the CIA's reservations,
which you say in your letter were "unsupported by explanations",
about the uranium from Africa element in the September 2002 dossier,
did any British official ask for an explanation of the CIA's reservations?
If not, why not? If so, what was the CIA's response?
7. On what date was the CIA first informed
of the contents of the September 2002 dossier, which draft or
drafts were shown to the CIA, and were the CIA shown the contents
of the draft dossier in its entirety?
8. What reservations and comments did the
CIA express about any other elements in the September 2002 dossier
in addition to its reservations about uranium from Africa?
9. At the end of your letter you refer to
"The recent discovery of technical documentation and centrifuge
parts—necessary for the enrichment of uranium—buried
at the home of an Iraqi nuclear scientist in Baghdad." Is
it correct, as has been reported in the Independent of
15 July, that these centrifuge parts were buried some 12 years
ago? If so, why was this not disclosed in your letter to the Committee?
Donald Anderson
Chairman
Letter from the Chairman to Rt Hon Jack
Straw, Secretary of State, FCO, dated 15 July 2003
As you know, the Committee heard oral evidence
today from Dr David Kelly of the Ministry of Defence.
The Committee deliberated after hearing Dr Kelly's
evidence, and asked me to write to you, expressing their view
that it seems most unlikely that Dr Kelly was Andrew Gilligan's
prime source for his allegations about the September dossier on
Iraq. Colleagues have also asked me to pass on their view that
Dr Kelly has been poorly treated by the Government since he wrote
to his line manager, admitting that he had met Gilligan.
I am copying this letter to Geoff Hoon and to
Bruce George.
Donald Anderson
Chairman
Letter from Matthew Hamlyn, Parliamentary
Relations and Devolution Department, FCO, dated 28 July 2003
Thank you for your letter of 15 July. There
follow the answers to your questions.
Matthew Hamlyn
Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Department
FAC QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
ON 15 JULY
1. In your public oral evidence of June 27
you said that you would get to the Committee "as quickly
as possible" the answer to the question "When did the
CIA report to the British intelligence community the result of
the former US ambassador's visit to Niger?" Why was this
answer not provided to the Committee before it published its report
rather than appearing in your letter of 11 July?
We answered the question as soon as we had ensured
the accuracy of the information in our reply. The FCO Memorandum
submitted to the Committee and included in its report (Evidence
page 74) stated that our information on Iraqi attempts to procure
uranium post-dated the visit of a former US diplomat to Niger
(reported in the media). However, the Foreign Secretary's letter
of 11 July made clear that the first UK officials knew of Ambassador
Wilson's visit was when it appeared in the press. (It should also
be borne in mind that between 27 June and 11 July the Foreign
Secretary was abroad in Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq for four days
(30 June-3 July) with an intensive programme. On this trip he
contracted a severe bout of food poisoning and was unable to resume
work full time until 9 July by which time he had a large backlog.)
2. Following your oral statement in the House
today, you undertook to place a copy of your answer to Andrew
Mackinlay in the Library. Would you also include that answer in
your reply to this letter?
The information is as follows:
"We first had indications that the IABA
had suspicions about the authenticity of some of the documents
in late February but no confirmation of that until the IAEA gave
its report to the Security Council on 7 March. Ministers were
then informed."
3. Please will you provide the Committee
with a copy of the "detailed account of Ambassador Wilson's
report" that you have now seen.
This is an intelligence document. It is summarised
in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 11 July.
4. What were the terms in which the CIA expressed
its reservations to the British Government about the uranium from
Africa element of the September 2002 dossier, and on what date
or dates were those reservations expressed?
Just before the dossier was finalised, the CIA
offered a comment noting that they did not regard the reference
to the supply of uranium from Africa as credible. But the CIA
provided no explanation for their concerns. UK officials were
confident that the dossier's statement was based on reliable intelligence.
A judgement was therefore made by the JIC Chairman to retain the
reference.
5. Why did neither you nor your officials
disclose to the Committee, in either your written or oral evidence,
before the Committee published its recent report that the CIA
had expressed reservations to the British Government on the uranium
from Africa element in the September dossier-particularly when
you were specifically asked by a member of the Committee in your
public evidence on 27 June why the British Government did "at
least not put some degree of health warning" over the uranium
from Africa statements in the September 2002 dossier?
British officials saw no need to put a health
warning on the claim, because they were confident in the intelligence
underlying it. The reference in the dossier was based on intelligence
from more than one source. We had not shared this intelligence
with the CIA, nor were we in a position to do so, for reasons
explained during the private evidence session.
6. On receipt of the CIA's reservations,
which you say in your letter were "unsupported by explanations",
about the uranium from Africa element in the September 2002 dossier,
did any British official ask for an explanation of the CIA's reservations?
If not, why not? If so, what was the CIA's response?
UK intelligence officials have regular exchanges
with their counterparts in the CIA. We note that the October 2002
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessment, parts of which
were published on 18 July 2003, supports our view that Iraq had
sought to acquire yellowcake from Africa. The relevant part of
the NIE reads:
"A foreign government service reported that
as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of `pure
uranium' (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001 Niger
and Iraq reportedly were still working out arrangements for this
deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. We do not
know the status of the arrangement."
7. On what date was the CIA first informed
of the contents of the September 2002 dossier, which draft or
drafts were shown to the CIA, and were the CIA shown the contents
of the draft dossier in its entirety?
The CIA were consulted throughout the drafting
process and were passed a draft of the WMD section on 11 September.
8. What reservations and comments did the
CIA express about any other elements in the September 2002 dossier
in addition to its reservations about uranium from Africa?
The CIA made a number of comments. The JIC chairman
incorporated or rejected them as he judged fit.
9. At the end of your letter you refer to
"The recent discovery of technical documentation and centrifuge
parts—necessary for the enrichment of uranium—buried
at the home of an Iraqi nuclear scientist in Baghdad." Is
it correct, as has been reported in the Independent of 15 July,
that these centrifuge parts were buried some 12 years ago? If
so, why was this not disclosed in your letter to the Committee?
It is well known that the documents and components
hidden by the Iraqi nuclear scientist, Ubaidi, had been hidden
for 12 years. The Foreign Secretary referred to this in his statement
in the House on 15 July. The key point is not when the documents
and components were hidden, but when they were discovered—ie
in June 2003, over 12 years after they should have been surrendered
to UN inspectors. As reported by CNN, Ubaidi has said that he
was ordered to hide these things "so as to be able to rebuild
the bomb programme at some time in the future". The discovery
was significant both in terms of Iraq retaining components for
a nuclear programme, and as an example of successful concealment
from UN inspectors.
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