The way forward?
92. At present, it is difficult to see how South
Africa's handling of Zimbabwe will develop in the future. On the
one hand, the majority of our evidence suggests that if any outside
force has influence on the thinking and actions of Robert Mugabe's
Government, it is South Africa. It has been argued that, were
it willing, South Africa could use a number of levers on President
Mugabe's regime, not least through its supply of the vast majority
of Zimbabwe's power:
They do not even have to turn off the lights, just
remind them that all their electricity comes from South Africa
by turning them off for an hour in the evening from time to time.
There are a 1,001 ways: they could tighten the border, they could
put patrols on the border to pick up Zimbabweans coming across.
There are 1,001 ways in which neighbouring countries, where one
is very big and powerful, can send messages very simply.[120]
93. On the other hand, many South Africans we spoke
to argued that the United Kingdom, and the West generally, was
over-estimating the influence they had over Zimbabwe; if they
spoke out too strongly, they would simply be ignored. They also
felt that there was a lack of understanding for their situation
as a neighbour. Their position has been summed up by one commentator
thus:
A tightening economic squeeze, which only South Africa
had the capacity to impose, would have hastened the political
and economic implosion of Zimbabwe, might have rebounded on Pretoria
to disastrous effect via a mass influx of refugees, disrupted
trade links and caused generalised chaos on the borders.[121]
Also, given what we have already said about the constraints
on South Africa's freedom of action owing to its history and political
outlook, such radical options as turning off the lights would
appear to be ruled out in practice.
94. As to how the United Kingdom should act on this
very difficult issue, our witnesses were generally clear:
one of the mistakes we could make would be believing
that British pressure on South Africa to put pressure on Zimbabwe
would be a positive thing ... South African quiet diplomacy should
be more balanced, much clearer condemnation of human rights abuses
in Zimbabwe for example. But South Africa being seen to act in
response to a United Kingdom demand for it to do so is likely
to be extremely counter-productive. ... Every time the megaphones
come out in the UK, it tends to have an unfortunate result, whatever
the intention.[122]
We also received this impression during our visit
to South Africa from those to whom we spoke.
95. In his oral evidence to us, Mr Mullin made clear
the United Kingdom's doubts about South Africa's policy of 'quiet
diplomacy:
I cannot, at the moment, point to any seriously positive
outcome and previous predictions that there would be a positive
outcome have not so far born fruit, but I do not necessarily put
that down to any lack of effort on President Mbeki's part but
to a particular stubbornness on the part of Mr Mugabe[123]
He stated explicitly, though, that he did not believe
that South Africa was neglecting its responsibility toward Zimbabwe:
if anybody has influence over Mr Mugabe then President
Mbeki would be the one, but Mr Mugabe is a very stubborn man and
he has brought his country to the edge of ruin. There is cause
to doubt whether he would listen to anyone: his former comrades
in South Africa, let alone advice that comes freely from Western
Europe or America or somewhere else. ...
It is certainly not our position ... that the South
Africans are doing nothing to help in Zimbabwe; they are.[124]
96. We conclude that:
a) South Africa and the United Kingdom unquestionably
share the same objective for Zimbabwe—the return to a fully-functioning
and economically vibrant democracy that respects the human rights
of its citizens;
b) South Africa is acting in the manner it
sincerely believes to be the most effective and the most likely
to bring about the desired goal identified above;
c) the situation of the Zimbabwean people
will continue to deteriorate unless effective pressure is brought
to bear on the Government of Robert Mugabe to change its disastrous
and self-seeking policies, and South Africa is the best placed
external force to stimulate that change; and
d) South Africa, and the region more generally,
will continue to suffer from Zimbabwe's plight until such a change
takes place, not least by deterring much-needed foreign direct
investment.
97. We recommend that the British Government:
a) continue to maintain the strongest possible
pressure on the Zimbabwean Government to respect the human rights
of its citizens and to call free and fair elections, especially
through multilateral means;
b) recognise the importance of South Africa
in achieving a long-term solution to the severe crisis affecting
Zimbabwe;
c) seek the closest possible co-operation
with South Africa on achieving the mutually desired outcome of
a peaceful and democratic Zimbabwe; and
d) seek to promote a greater understanding
of its genuine concerns about Zimbabwe in South Africa, and elsewhere
on the continent, and the facts about the land reform issue.
88 
