Written evidence submitted by Professor
James Barber, Centre of International Studies, Cambridge
THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
In this paper I tempt to give a broad overview
of South Africa's (SA) external relations over the past decade—its
international activities and roles, its position in international
organisations and its relations in Africa—and the settings
in which it has operated.
It is unusual for a society to experience fundamental
domestic change. It is equally unusual to face a major change
in its international setting. Yet SA during the past decade has
experienced both. The new government, most of whose members initially
had little or no administrative experience, has struggled to develop
a society undergoing a political revolution at home while establishing
itself in a disordered international setting. However, two provisos
may be added. First, revolutions are usually not fixed points
in time, but rather (as in SA) are processes stretching over time.
Second, although there has been great change in SA, it has been
uneven and much remains from the past. While there has been profound
political upheaval; internal social and economic relations have
altered more slowly and superficially.
Measured in terms of resources SA is a small/medium
state. Yet it has gained greater international attention than
states with greater resources. As a result it has—in a phrase
which Nelson Mandela would savour from his early boxing days—been
able `to punch above its weight' in global affairs. There are
a number of reasons for this, including the momentum of the past.
THE MOMENTUM
OF THE
PAST: COLD
WAR AND
NEW WORLD
ORDER
In the decades following WWII South Africa's
racial policies became a matter of international concern. As the
struggle against apartheid developed into a "great moral
cause", SA became a pariah state; sanctions were imposed
on it, and the anti apartheid campaign absorbed into the fabric
of international organisations. At the same time a low intensity
war developed between the white government and the liberation
movements (African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress).
Several neighbouring black states, by supporting the liberation
movements, brought down Pretoria's wrath on themselves, in the
form of e a cross border "destabilisation" policy.
Harold Macmillan had made clear in his "Wind
of Change" speech (1960) that he—and by implication
other Western leaders—were concerned not only about racial
issues, but whether post colonial Africa would turn to East or
West in the Cold War context. However, the West's response to
the situation was characterised by vacillation and ambivalence.
In Britain's case successive governments sought the middle ground
in a situation were the contending parties saw no room for compromise.
The liberation movements accused Britain of putting its material
interest before its moral concerns by failing to give them support
and refusing to impose further sanctions against SA.
For its part the apartheid government saw itself
as the target of a Moscow inspired "total onslaught",
and accused the West, not only of failing to give support, but
kowtowing to the Afro-Asian states by imposing sanctions. Pretoria
dismissed the British as "wish wash liberals" at best,
and communist fellow travellers at worst.
In contrast with the West the Soviet bloc gained
prestige in black Africa by supporting the armed liberation movements—including
the ANC's armed wing (Umkhonto we Sizwe). This military support—together
with its alliance with the Communist Party (SACP)—drew the
ANC towards the Soviet bloc and its socialist ideas; while rejecting
Western capitalism.
A New World Order and the SA "Miracle"
The demise of the Soviet bloc was greeted with
joy the in the West, but consternation in the ANC. Internationally
the tension of Cold War gave way to the short lived hopes of a
New World Order. President George Bush (Snr) spoke of a world
free from threats, of states living in harmony under the rule
of law; and Francis Fukuyama trumpeted the triumph of the West
by declaring "the end of history". At the UN Butros-
Butros Ghali published his "Agenda for Peace". The hope
was that persistent international problems—whether in the
Middle East, Northern Ireland, the Balkans, or Southern Africa—could
be resolved peacefully. In the event only in SA were such hopes
realised, where a UN negotiated settlement was achieved in 1989,
followed by the SA "miracle".
It started in February 1990 when President F.W.
de Klerk seized the initiative—confident that with the collapse
of the Soviet Union the ANC had been seriously weakened and the
threat of the total onslaught had disappeared. He lifted the ban
on political parties and released Nelson Mandela. Four years of
negotiation followed—with the National Party (NP) Government
and the ANC as the major players—before a new SA was born.
The international community strongly supported the negotiating
process and to an extent saw itself as midwife of the new democratic
state. Furthermore, the hope was that the successful outcome of
negotiations in SA, and the earlier Namibia settlement would act
as models for others to follow.
Therefore, although the end of apartheid and
the emergence of a new democratic polity had been achieved by
South Africans themselves through negotiation, the international
community was involved and the momentum of the past ensured its
continuing interest in the future.
The New South Africa: Self Identity and the Burden
of Expectation
For all his charm and bonhomie Mandela proved
to be a formidable negotiator, and although the outcome of the
negotiations had elements of compromise it largely favoured the
ANC. The agreement was for the introduction of a five year interim
constitution, with a Government of National Unity (GNU) at the
helm. At the same time principles—strongly influenced by
Western liberal values—were laid down for a permanent constitution.
At the 1994 election the ANC gained more than
60% of the national vote, followed by the NP with 20% and the
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 10%: with seats in the National Assembly
distributed in direct proportion to the national votes cast. Like
all major parties the ANC is a broad church. Under its banner
at election time it forms the main element of a tripartite alliance
with the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South
African Trade Unions. When the GNU was formed, it consisted of
the ANC, which was the dominant element (with Mandela as President
and Mbeki as a Deputy President): together with the NP (led by
de Klerk as Second Deputy President) and the IFP led by Chief
Buthelezi who became a cabinet minister. After two years the NP
followed a disgruntled de Klerk out the GNU.
World leaders hurried to SA to bathe in its
reflected glory, to identify with Mandela; and to encourage it
to accept continental leadership. In the West SA was hailed as
Africa's best hope of securing peace and prosperity in that troubled,
poverty plagued continent. A burden of expectation descended on
the new government's shoulders, which was enhanced by Mandela's
personal prestige—by assuming that he could achieve ends
that eluded others.
The new government identified itself with "the
South" and more especially Africa; (whereas the white regime
had presented itself as an outpost of European/ Western civilization
in an alien continent). However, it could not ignore the changes
in the international setting. If it wanted help and support, or
to increase its trade and economic development, it had to turn
to the West. This was reflected in the overseas trips of Mandela
and Mbeki. Both have made many visits to the West, where they
have paid court to business and financial institutions, sometimes
at the expense of anti apartheid groups. Only once did Mandela
visit Moscow and that no more than a Swan song, at the end of
his Presidency. Furthermore, when the ANC agreed principles for
the conduct of foreign policy, they were peppered with the ethical
values of the West: respect for human rights, commitment to peace;
promotion of democracy; support for international organisations;
and "universality" (prepared to work with all)—with
"human rights" as the corner stone. The new government
soon discovered that such values were open to challenge and differences
of interpretation—as, for instance, in its failed attempt
to apply "universality" in the "Two Chinas Policy"
(PRC and Taiwan). Soon SA was accused by radical critics that
while it claimed a 3rd World identity it had succumbed to Western
ideas and values. Pretoria denied this, and pointed to its continuing
good relations with states which the West branded as "rogues".
One of the clearest cases of the new government's
dilemma came from the first Commonwealth conference that Mandela
attended—in New Zealand in 1996. At the time there was concern
at breaches of human rights by a military regime in Nigeria led
by General Sani Abacha. The breaches included the detention of
Chief Abiola, who had won the last election, but was now a political
prisoner. A further case concerned the treatment of the Ogoni
people, from whose land in the Niger delta, large quantities of
oil had been extracted. While the government and Shell had profited
from the oil, the Ogoni, led by Ken Sarow-Wiwa, claimed that they
had gained nothing and instead had their territory ruined. The
regime responded by arresting Sarow Wiwa and a number of his follower.
Thy were brought before a military court, accused of conspiring
to plot a coup, and of rioting leading to the death of a chief,
and were sentenced to death. With increasing international concern
about Nigria the SA government became actively involved—in
line with its stated principles. In its attempts to mediate it
employed quiet diplomacy—with visits by Mbeki and Archbishop
Tutu among others.
When, on his is arrival in New Zealand Mandela
was questioned about Nigeria, and the fate of the Ogoni prisoners
in particular, he was sanguine, believing diplomacy would be effective.
He was wrong. While the conference was still in session news was
received that Saro Wiwa and his colleagues had been executed.
Mandela was furious and humiliated. He accused the Nigerian regime
of "judicial murder". He called for the severance of
diplomatic ties, Nigeria's expulsion from the Commonwealth, he
urged the UK and USA to impose an oil embargo; and he recalled
the SA High Commissioner. On his return home he called a special
meeting of the Southern African Development Community (comprising
SA and all its neighbours) to decide on further action. In the
event Mandela's proposals led nowhere. He ran into a wall of silence
and indifference. The Western states continued to buy oil, and
the rest of Africa refused to act.
The other African states saw Nigeria, not as
human rights offender but as a major continental power that had
loyally supported the liberation struggles against colonialism.
The Liberian Government thought it was "was very shocking"
for Mandela to allow SA "to be used in the division and undermining
of African solidarity". The Nigerians themselves described
Mandela's attitude as "horrific" and they too called
for African solidarity. A Nigerian minister described Mandela
as the black leader of a white state—implying that white
officials and Western ideas were too influential.
Even at home Mandela found little or no support.
The cry for African unity was echoed from the Department of Foreign
Affairs to the ANC (which also remembered Nigeria's contribution
to its election campaign—rumoured to be US$10m). In parliament
Mbeki spoke of the dangers of acting alone and of over estimating
SA's strength. SA, he said, was not involved in exploiting Nigerian
oil or acting as her bankers, whereas those that were and had
real power (ie Western states) instead of directly challenging
Nigeria had used and humiliated Mandela. They had left him out
to dry.
Mbeki had succeeded in regaining ground by steering
the government away from an attack on a fellow African state to
criticism of the West. The case had underlined the problems of
SA acting as a custodian of the continent's morals. It was a lesson
that became imprinted in the government's memory.
One of the West's hopes was that SA would take
the lead in continental peace making and peace keeping. Yet, while
Pretoria was ready to play an active international role, it resented
being branded as the West's poodle. Thus Mandela was not prepared
to cut links with old allies and more recently Mbeki has refused
to make public attacks on Mugabe. The government saw the Western
pleas to act as Africa's peacekeeper as an attempt to shuffle
off their own responsibility. In any case, although SA's armed
forces were better trained, experienced, and disciplined than
elsewhere in Africa, they had been trained and were experience
in fighting, not to keep the peace. With British help, the old
rivals—the forces of the liberation movements and those
of the white government—have undertaken the difficult tasks
of merging together and being trained in new roles. Yet, even
when the government has been prepared to involve itself in peace
making it has discovered that its efforts are not always welcomed
and produce mixed reactions (eg in the vast Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC), and the tiny Lesotho).
The Economy
The economy inherited by the new government
was "mixed" in a double sense—with segments of
the 1st and 3rd worlds; and with private and state controlled
sectors. (Under the apartheid government the state sector had
been used to counter sanctions and to protect white workers).
In the new debate all are agreed of the desirability of both growth
and redistribution of wealth and income. In broad terms, those
who emphasise growth favour a strong private sector, whereas those
whose priority is redistribution support greater state control.
This continues to be a divisive issue within the ANC. The new
government's first effort produced the Reconstruction and Development
Programme (RDP). This went through several drafts, starting like
a socialist blueprint but finishing with its emphasis on a mixed
economy. Within a couple of years the RDP was pushed aside as
the government—with increasing emphasis on growth and the
private sector—introduced the Growth, Employment and Redistribution
Programme (GEAR).
Naturally SA has tried to use economic circumstances
to its advantage. It identifies itself with the Third World, and
has served as chair in the Non Aligned Movement (which has reinvented
itself since the end of the Cold War as the voice of the Third
World). However, not everybody has been prepared to accept SA's
own self evaluation. This was discovered when it applied for Lome
terms of trade with the EU—its major trading partner. The
EU view is that SA was too developed and advanced to qualify for
Lome. Prolonged, tough negotiations followed, which resulted in
a bilateral Trade Development and Cooperative Agreement (TDCA).
This fell short of SA's early hopes, but was claimed to offer
benefits to both sides. During Clinton's presidency, SA has also
established a mutually beneficial relationship with the USA, through
the establishment of a Binationall Commission and the African
Growth and Opportunity Programme.
On other occasions Pretoria has been prepared
to play its 1st World card. For example, in seeking direct foreign
investment it has stressed the strength and high standards of
the business community, the excellent communications, financial
and transport services, the government's financial sobriety, and
in opening up the economy.
There have been economic progress—initially
there was a peace dividend, the lifting of sanctions and external
development aid. Since then further advances can be attributed
to sound government financial policy, plus its preparedness to
open up parts the economy. This has led to the extension of trade,
the growth of tourism and some investment by foreign companies.
A recent report (Africa Investor October 2003) underlined the
positive aspects of the economy—claiming that as a financial
centre Johannesburg is nw to Africa what New York is to the Americas,
and by pointing to industrial successes, including the motor industry.
However, progress has been slower than the government had hoped
or assumed. Direct investment has been disappointing, and unemployment
remains a major problem. A number of explanations can be found
for the disappointments. They include:
local crime which continues to flourish deterring
tourist and external investors, as well as undermining existing
economic activity (eg with the murder of white farmers damaging
the agricultural industry); b) the adverse impact of HIV/aids;
which is ravishing the society and economy; and c) the fag ends
of apartheid with its inbred prejudices and its complex layers
of inefficient bureaucracy.
Added to these internal issues are regional
problems, over which SA has little control but are of major consequence
for her. Most of the neighbouring states are poor—some among
the poorest in the world; others are unstable (eg Zimbabwe); and
some have been torn apart by civil wars (eg Angola). As well as
the general recognition that SA cannot flourish in a sea of poverty,
its relative wealth acts as a honey pot for immigrants (legal
and illegal) from neighbouring states, exacerbating the problems
of unemployment and crime. Nobody knows the true number of illegal
immigrants but estimates range from 2 to 8 million (the official
SA population is c 40 million).
The International Bridge Builder and "Go
Between"
Alec Erwin, the Minister of Trade and Industry,
at a meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), claimed that
"South Africa is a bridge between and developed and the developing
worlds". He was a recognising that SA's mixed economy and
society create an opportunity to play a linking/facilitating role
between the First and Third worlds. However, to play such a role
requires not only willingness on SA's part, but the acceptance
and trust of others who are involved. The frequency with which
SA has been invited to play this role is a sign of the trust it
has gained in international organisations. For example Erwin was
elected as president of the WTO, SA was invited to take the chair
of NAM; and it was in the same spirit that SA has been invited
to the World Economic Forum at Davos; and when, as chairman, Mbeki
broke previous NAM practice by inviting the developed states to
send observers to the meeting in Durban.
It is not only in an economic/development setting
that SA has sought act as a "go between". It has also
been active at international gatherings concerned with nuclear
developments and the campaign to ban land mines, and it has helped
to initiate the formation of a new grouping of states around the
Pacific rim. Further and more controversially it has sought to
act as a bridge between Western values and ideas and those of
Africa and more generally the 3rd World. Inevitably there has
been controversy about SA's stand on some issues, and its interpretation
and application of principles. Nor have all SA's efforts achieved
their desired outcome, as witnessed by the recent WTO failure
to reach agreement at Cancun. However, a further example of trust,
this time at a personal level, is the success of Mandela and Professor
Jakes Gerwel (Director General of Mandela's Office)" in persuading
Colonel Gadaffi of Libya to seek a settlement with the US and
UK governments of the long standing Lockerbie air tragedy.
South Africa in Africa
Relations with the rest of Africa have been
the most intense and challenging of all the new SA's external
relations. The ANC came to power emphasising its commitment to
the continent. It spoke of its "great pride in being African",
and recognised the particular debt it owed to its neighbours who
had contributed to and had suffered in the liberation struggle.
In the years that have followed the government has reiterated
again and again its African identity, its debt to the continent,
and eagerness to play a full part in its development. In its attempt
to reassure fellow Africans it has underlined that it has no intention
of using its resources and strength to impose a new hegemony.
Its aim is simply to co-operate with others on equal terms as
sovereign states. Pretoria also realises that SA's self interest
and future are tied to the continent—that it cannot achieve
either security or prosperity if it is surrounded by poor, unstable
and violent neighbours. As Alfred Nzo, then Foreign Minister told
a meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
in 1995: "We cannot be an island of prosperity surrounded
by a sea of poverty".
Yet, while there is no reason to doubt Pretoria's
commitment to the continent, there are problem of realising its
ends. To start with SA is simply not just another African state.
It is so much more advanced and developed than the rest of the
continent that it cannot avoid playing aleading role. The question
is not whether it will be a prominent actor but how and in what
may. In the Southern African region it is a giant.
When Pretoria works in harmony with another
state, all is well—as in the case of the massive Highlands
Water Project in Lesotho, and more widely in the relationship
with Mozambique (doubtless aided by Mandela's marriage to Graca
Machel). In Mozambique's case both sides have recognised the advantage
of co-operation, with results such as the development of the Maputo
corridor. Yet in other places matters have not gone smoothly.
SA's strength has produced jealousy and suspicion. Seen from SA
the expansion of trade and investment has been beneficial to the
whole continent. That view is not always shared by others. Some
complain that SA gains most of the advantage (with a large balance
of trade surplus), that its major companies have forced local
companies out of business and that the control of business still
lies in white hands.
Nor have the complaints been confined to economic
affairs. Some of the strongest criticism has come from Zimbabwe,
which, much to Mugabe's chagrin, was ousted by the new SA as leader
at the Southern Africa's major organisation—the Southern
African Development Community (SADC). Following Mandela's election
as SADC chairman there was a clash over control of a security
body chaired by Mugabe. Mugabe claimed that it could act independently,
whereas Mandela claimed it was subordinate to SADC. More generally
Jonathan Moyo—now a Minister in Zimbabwe—criticised
South Africans for their arrogance and their assumption that they
could speak for all Africa. SA has also encountered obstacles
in its peace making efforts, as in the DRC, where Laurent Kabila
snubbed it, and in Lesotho—where in 1998, despite an appeal
for help from the Lesotho Prime Minister. As in the case of the
Commonwealth and Nigeria (see above) SA was accused of bullying
a small neighbour, of absorbing too many Western ideas of whites
in the society.
Among SA's leaders Mbeki has been especially
prominent in committing himself to the continent—as witnessed
by his famous "I am an African" speech in welcoming
the new constitution, his advocacy of an African renaissance,
the leading part he played in negotiating NEPAD, and his support
the new African Unity. Yet even Mbeki cannot brush aside difficulties
and disappointments. In Africa it appears that a step forward
in one area is countered by a reverse elsewhere. Thus while the
recent elections in Kenya went reasonably well, that is countered
by the chaos that reigns in Zimbabwe. Hopes of the end of fighting
in Angola are matched by a continuing conflict in the DRC. Yet
for all the problems Mbeki retains his faith, and that faith helps
to shape some of his controversial views. Thus in relation to
HIV/Aids he resents what he sees as Western attempts to attribute
the disease largely to the continent and to see Africans as primitive
people, who are unable to control their sexual behaviour. For
Mbeki, the wretched living conditions in which many Africans are
forced to live is a major factor explaining the dreadful death
toll.
Further controversy surrounds Mbeki's reaction
to developments in Zimbabwe. Mbeki has followed the path of quite
diplomacy. He has resisted pressure both domestic and internationally
to pursue a much tougher line. Why? First, he realises that Mugabe
has a strong following among Africans (including SA)—from
his role in overthrowing the white Rhodesian regime; and from
his seizures of white farms to restore the land to, what many
Africans regard as its rightful owners. Second, and arising from
the first, is his concern that a tougher line against Mugabe would
create political rifts at home (including the ANC). Finally, with
the Nigerian case in mind (see attachment) he wants to avoid condemnation
by other African states as acting as the West's poodle. He was
not prepared to break what Maxi van Aardt has called the "unwritten
law" by which "African states do not turn on each other
in international fora, but close ranks when attacks are made against
one of them".
SUMMARY
SA's international relations over the past ten
years can be summarised as follows:
— It has gained greater international
attention than its resources appear to warrant.
(a)
the past concern re apartheid;
(b)
its position in Africa;
(c)
the peaceful, negotiated settlement; and
(d)
the personality of Mandela.
— The new SA identifies itself with
the Third World, and and seeks to act as a bridge between 1st
and 3rd Worlds. Its mixed economy is the foundation for the latter
claim.
— On coming to power the ANC agreed
a set of "idealistic" foreign policy, principles but
in office discovered that they were often difficult to implement.
— Somewhat reluctantly it recognises
the current strength of the West, has accepted many of its values
(perhaps unconsciously—absorbing the dominant values of
the time) and in trade and economic activities West is major partner.
However, is eager to avoid being branded as West's agent in Africa.
— Supports a variety of international
organisations, and is widely respected in them. While an active
UN member it favours reform of the Security Council, with SA gaining
permanent membership.
— A strong commitment to Africa, based
on a combination of sentiment and hard headed interest—recognising
support in the liberation struggle, and for the future, recognising
the SA cannot flourish surrounded by poverty and instability.
— In an age of globalisation and powerful
regional blocs, it seeks co-operation with other African states
(eg NEPAD) and is eager to extend economic links, but has mat
a mixed response.
— Is ready to play a part in peacemaking
and peacekeeping but not to over extend itself, or isolate itself
(as in Nigeria case), or let the powerful Western states off the
hook.
Professor James Barber
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