Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
9 DECEMBER 2003
PROFESSOR JAMES
BARBER AND
PROFESSOR DAVID
SIMON
Q1 Chairman: Gentlemen, may I welcome
the two of you to our Committee. Professor James Barber, Emeritus
Professor of Durham University currently advising the University
of Cambridge's Centre of International Studies, who worked in
the field of South African studies for very many years, and published
extensively; and Professor David Simon of Royal Holloway, University
of London, specialising in Southern African regional issues, again
published extensively on foreign policy and development. We welcome
you to what is the first of the sessions of the Committee in respect
of South Africa. As a Committee we decided in the middle of July
to undertake an inquiry into South Africa and to inquire into
the role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in relation to
South Africa in the light of the strong historic connections which
link the United Kingdom to South Africa. We have three planned
sessions. The first is today; the second is due to take place
on 3 February with another panel of experts, and then, finally,
on 9 March with a Foreign Office minister before, as usual, we
produce our report. Gentlemen, I had the privilege personally
of being almost ten years ago at the remarkable election in South
Africa: I was supervising the international observers in Port
Elizabeth and there was a great euphoria. Prior to that there
had been dire predictions about South Africa going the way of
Algeria with the infrastructure collapsing, with the minority
fleeing the country—happily for many reasons, not least
the wonderful example of the first President, Nelson Mandela,
things have been very different and if we want a text, I was struck
with what Matthew Parris said recently in an article in The
Times on 25 October which was called: "A pessimist recants:
the new South Africa is working".[1]The
quote is: "Fitfully but unmistakably the new South Africa
is working. The country today is richer, happier, more powerful,
fairer and more secure than it was a decade ago, and the direction
is still up . . . Tremendous problems remain: HIV/AIDS, unemployment,
the unrealistic aspirations of the poor. Party allegiances clustered
around racial and tribal groupings continue to stunt real democracy.
Can these things be solved?" Are you gentlemen optimists
or pessimists?
Professor Barber: I think what
has been said by Matthew Paris is very fair. It is a much more
attractive place to visit and much fairer but, of course, it has
enormous social problems as all societies have, particularly in
South Africa with HIV/AIDS as you mentioned, and crime and unemployment,
but overall, if you have to take a broad balance of one side or
another, yes, it is a much better place now. I, too, was at the
1994 election and it was a marvellous up-lifting experience. Since
then, of course, things have not been perhaps as uplifting but
overall I think that is a fair judgment of Matthew Parris.
Professor Simon: I would concur
with that and particularly, if you take as the baseline the period
of intense violence and intimidation that led up to that election,
the transformation which followed is truly remarkable. I guess
the longer-term answer depends in a sense on whom within what
position in South African society you speak to. There are many
who would argue that the change has been quite remarkable; that
the achievements are legion. If you talk to many of the historically
disempowered or unempowered, particularly in rural areas or urban
townships, you get a different picture, and I have heard it said
quite recently that, "Very little has changed, our lives
are much as they were before". Personally I find that hard
to believe—precisely because of the substantial change to
the political economic climate, the overall situation, the repeal
in many profound ways of the legal apparatus that apartheid initially
underpinned. Even though the legislation has been gone now in
some cases for sixteen or so years, it is a question of structural
change as much as superficial change whereby hangs the conundrum
between the appearances of goodwill and progress and peace to
all men and women, and the ability to address the fundamental,
deep-rooted and historical legacies of inequality and deprivation.
Q2 Chairman: But the legacy of the Group
Areas Act is still there?
Professor Simon: Yes. It is much
more difficult to recast concrete, bricks, mortar and steel and
glass than it is to amend legislation, and that, I think, is a
very good illustration of how change can only come about in different
ways, at different speeds and in different contexts. People can
move and the extent to which there has been residential integration
reflects in the first instance the working of the private property
market because that is the principal means by which people can
escape from their previous group area since the legislation was
repealed. But only a small proportion of people have the wherewithal
to do that and therefore are people who do not remain trapped
either in high density townships or shanties or squatter areas
or some other form of social housing. Even the million or so RDP[2]houses
which were built in the first six years of the post-apartheid
period, one of the few RDP targets achieved, people speak disparagingly
about because they are smaller than their predecessors, the so-called
matchbox houses of the apartheid era, many of them built in a
way that has given way to a rise in structural faults and so on.
So it does depend whom you spoke to in what context, but there
are many targets which are being achieved now and take longer
to gestate.
Q3 Chairman: Finally from me, Professor
Barber, which areas, if any, disappoint you? I have heard a number
of concerns about the exodus of skilled personnel from South Africa
which has an adverse effect on public services, education and
health. Where do you think the major failings are?
Professor Barber: There has been
but this is a mixed picture because South Africa gains from some
countries of the region. The brain drain is not all one-way. For
example, it has gained from Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has a fine educational
structure and regional movements out of Zimbabwe have been helpful
to South Africa in some ways, but I remember the health services
in this country were starting to recruit largish numbers of nurses
and doctors and therefore in that sense we gained at South Africa's
expense—and not just us but Australia and New Zealand as
well. A fair number of doctors moved there. So there has been
movement but it is a mixed picture. It is an area I have read
about rather than researched myself, but I do believe there is
a mixed picture. South Africa has gained some of the brain drain
from the region as well as losing some to more advanced countries.
Q4 Chairman: So it has been disadvantageous
to Zimbabwe?
Professor Barber: That is right.
Q5 Mr Illsley: Could I introduce a few
questions on South Africa's role within the region? Already South
Africa has been described to the Committee by a number of sources
as the principal economic and military power in sub-Saharan Africa.
I think the World Service talked about it being the dominant military
and economic power in southern Africa. Professor Barber referred
to South Africa, "punching above its weight". To what
extent would you agree that South Africa is the dominant economic
and military power within the region, and would you add any caveats
to that?
Professor Barber: No, I am sure
it is. In almost every respect South Africa is more advanced and
larger than its neighbours, but the South Africans are conscious
that they cannot prosper fully as an island in a sea of desperation,
and they are surrounded by difficulties. Angola, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe are all in difficult circumstances
at the moment, and this has a drag effect. There may be a brain
drain, as I have mentioned, but overall the picture is not a good
one in the region. This has an adverse impact on South Africa
which is the giant, and there is this burden of expectation. We
all somehow think that South Africa can solve the regional problems
and I do not think it can by itself: it needs help internationally,
and so, returning to your question, it seems to me there is too
much a burden of expectation on South Africa in the region.
Q6 Chairman: Do you agree?
Professor Simon: At one level
yes, at another no, and again I think it reflects the duality
because we cannot talk about the rest of the Southern Africa or
sub-Saharan Africa in such singular terms. Last year I found myself
in the space of about six weeks in South Africa, Ghana and Uganda
on separate business, and the contrasts in terms of what people
were thinking and talking about and particularly their view, for
example, of the NePAD[3]
programme as a whole and South Africa's role within it, illustrate
the tensions and these conundrums very well. Even within South
Africa, which is one of the leaders of the programme, there are
many people who are extremely sceptical and, indeed, critical
of Mbeki's personal role and the Government's position overall.
Why? Largely, not entirely, because of the tension—and this
is the big caveat that I would add to what James just said—and
there is a direct sense within black South Africa, to the extent
one can generalise, of a trade-off between the use of resources
and energy to redress the historical inequalities and the poverty
within South Africa and the use of the skills and the resources
of the investment to address similar disparities internationally
within southern and sub-Saharan Africa. In Ghana and in Uganda
for slightly different reasons, but broadly because they are what
you might call second-string economies and powers within sub-Saharan
Africa, the perception was very critical because they feel they
are likely to get very little out of the NePAD deal, and they
point to the big four or five, if you like, who are the main drivers
behind NePAD as the ones who will gain mainly from the investment
and the new opportunities from abroad.
Q7 Mr Illsley: Just taking that a little
bit further, the "burden of expectation", and looking
at South Africa's peace-making and peace-keeping role, since 1994
South Africa has attempted to broker peace in a number of African
conflict areas. In which of these areas do you think it has seen
greatest and least success, and for what reasons?
Professor Barber: I think the
overall picture has not been particularly bright. It has improved
slightly in the DRC.[4]
It was at first virtually rejected in the DRC but I think it has
got some peace-keepers there now. Angola is quieter. Mozambique
is the one big success story in relation to South Africa and there
it has been a combination of what has happened in Mozambique itself.
South Africa has been able to offer Mozambique substantial help.
The Maputo corridor and the help it gave when there were floods
in Mozambique was very useful so there it has had direct help,
but also the combination of political change in Mozambique which
has gone along similar lines at the same time as South Africa's.
Also the personal connection between Nelson Mandela and Joachim
Chissano I am sure has helped.
Q8 Mr Illsley: Given that the South African
government has shown an increased willingness to involve itself
in regional peace-keeping duties beyond the DRC, and bearing in
mind the memorandum which you probably have not seen which we
received from the BBC World Service that pointed out problems
within the South African Defence Force of a lack of equipment
and so on and so forth, does South Africa have the necessary capabilities
to be putting itself forward for these roles? Coming back to your
burden of expectation, are we expecting too much of South Africa
in accepting these roles and, if that is the case, what further
help should we and the rest of the western nations be giving to
South Africa in that peace-keeping monitoring way?
Professor Barber: Some of the
situations like the DRC rely on everybody's ability to handle
them frankly. The early dilemma after 1994 for the South African
armed forces was bringing together very disparate elements and
merging them into one national force—a very difficult job.
I think it has gone reasonably well towards the end but with many
earlier difficulties because you had to merge the liberation forces
together with the old South African forces and the Bantustan forces,
which had to be formed into one coherent force. It was a remarkable
achievement to do it at all but there were lots of difficulties
in doing so, of course, and while that was taking place South
Africa was reluctant to involve itself in peace-keeping operations.
I think that phase is largely over, and they are more prepared
to involve themselves in peace-keeping, but to equip yourself
in peace-keeping is different from other situations for the armed
forces. There has been a big debate about the arms purchase. You
need to know what you are going to use them for before you buy
your arms, and the arms purchase was mainly on the primary role
of defence of the borders. Whether that is good for peace-keeping
or not is an open debate, so there has been uncertainty both about
the peace-keeping role and about the arms purchase.
Professor Simon: The period immediately
after 1994 was characterised by a deliberate rundown of South
Africa's military capacity in every sense: the scrapping of conscription,
which had been in many senses the backbone during the apartheid
period; the planned obsolescence of some of the materiel; and
the reduction in the standing army notwithstanding the reintegration
issue, with assistance from BMATT[5]as
had been the case in Zimbabwe and Namibia before, got to a point
where it was realised that some re-equipment was required and
also retraining, hence the controversial arms deal. But I would
like to add at this point a fundamental dilemma for South Africa
and, indeed, other countries in Africa in respect of South African
peace-keeping or any other military form of intervention, and
that is simply this: until the early 90s, the experience of the
rest of Africa in terms of South Africa's military was as a destructive,
destabilising force, invading and occupying part of Angola and
so on, sabotaging as part of that whole period of conflict, and
that is still very firmly embedded in the minds of many people
in South Africa and beyond. So the thought of seeing South African
soldiers in uniform and bearing arms as part of some other presence
is still a difficult one. That is waning with time and, as James
alluded, the role in DRC has been quite instrumental. The other
success I would point to, that he did not mention, is Nelson Mandela's
role in brokering agreement, however fragile it remains, in Burundi,
which received much less attention than the DRC, Zimbabwe and
Angola.
Q9 Mr Illsley: Turning to brief questions
on the Southern Africa Development Community which it joined in
1994, what useful role does the SADC plays in facilitating economic
and political development within southern Africa?
Professor Simon: It played a far
more useful and active role until the conflict in the DRC broke
out and Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola became directly involved.
They are three of the SADC members and their involvement was,
in effect, unilateral without going through the appropriate SADC
channels, which exist for multilateral agreement before such involvement
commences, and that effectively emasculated the organisation for
several years—in fact, it damned nearly brought it to its
knees. Another element of the dilemma is that there are at least
three regional institutions with increasingly overlapping membership
and in the post-Cold War period also increasingly similar aims
and objectives. SADC is arguably the foremost; then there is COMESA,
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African which stretches
all the way up to Djibouti and Eritrea, and the oldest of them
all, the Southern African Customs Union dating from the period
of the union of South Africa in 1909-10, which now links up South
Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia and is the only
real customs union to date of the three, although the others have
now common markets and free trade areas on their agendas. But
progress has been slow. The free trade area within SADC is being
implemented very gradually. It is supposed to have an eight-year
implementation period, but that has been delayed, and the individual
countries are struggling with the old dilemma of, "Do we
lower and remove the barriers to trade amongst the membership
for the common good relative to what we as country X, Y or Z might
gain or lose individually?", and especially for the smaller,
weaker countries that is a very real dilemma.
Q10 Mr Illsley: Regarding what you said
about the countries which paralysed SADC for several years because
of their inability to continue, what then is the significance
of the recently signed Mutual Defence Pact by SADC members?
Professor Simon: Potentially it
is part of the resumption of progress. There used to be something
called the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security which was
a semi-detached institution headed by Robert Mugabe, and a few
years ago was part of the restructuring after South Africa joined
SADC that was given a different status and brought in, and this
Mutual Defence Pact is part of the political programme of SADC
and this reconfigured organ.
The Committee suspended from 3.33 pm to
3.43 pm for a division in the House of Commons.
Q11 Sir John Stanley: As you know, the
remit of this Committee is to scrutinise the foreign policy of
the British government, and I would like to ask you both what
you consider to be the top priorities for the British Foreign
Office in relation to South Africa.
Professor Barber: Let me try.
One of them will be to help in the quest for trade. You will never
get an absolutely level field, so far as I can see, but to help
get it as level as possible. It is one of the things that Alec
Erwin[6]mentioned
when he was over here recently—they want fairer trade situations
particularly in parts of the agricultural structure. They have
an agreement, of course, with the European Union on a free trade
arrangements, but the implementation of that is important. It
is not just having an agreement but it is how it is implemented,
and I think it is in British interests to help South Africa as
much as possible in that. So that is certainly one area. In another
area, if SADC is going to be effective, HIV/AIDS should be one
of the areas which it addresses because you cannot contain this
to one country, it spreads over the whole region, and if we can
give them any assistance and help in that we ought to do so.
Professor Simon: I would draw
attention to several things. The first and perhaps most problematic
is the ambiguous, ambivalent relationship between South Africa
and the United Kingdom which in a sense we saw coming to a head
again at the weekend at CHOGM[7]over,
in this particular instance, Zimbabwe, but that is one—albeit
very important—illustration of the difficulty and the way
in which particular problems can cloud otherwise very productive
and broadly co-operative relations that have existed since the
transition in South Africa. In that sense the difficulty is that
South Africa finds itself, as we were saying earlier, in a leadership
role on the one hand and also in the role of a recipient of aid
and transitional assistance in various guises of the sort that
we have alluded to. In that particular context, things like the
Chevening studentship awards are profoundly important, and the
role of the British Council, which comes under the Foreign Office.
Here I would like to enter some concerns regarding the current
view of those activities. One hears that the Chevening studentships
might be reduced in number, that the higher educational links
might be discontinued and a variety of those other mechanisms
which are both of direct benefit to Britain but also crucially
important to that longer term support, not least in the context
of expanding the skillbase, compensating for the loss of people
through HIV/AIDS and so on. But the bigger issue of trying to
find accommodation with a country like South Africa over joint
foreign policy and World Trade Organisation-related issues is
very complex. The difficulty is how to find a strategy that works,
and here I could draw attention to the contrast between the policy
of at least one former minister of state for African affairs and
the South African government. One tried very upfront, full-on
tackling of the issue; the South Africans, as they still do, prefer
quiet African unity, supposedly behind-the-scenes role, and yet
when you talk to officials on both sides it is clear that they
feel equally frustrated at the lack of progress. So this is a
real dilemma and it is not easy to say, "That was right,
this was wrong", but it is a critical issue which is now
likely to complicate the relationship between South Africa and
the United Kingdom, particularly after CHOGM at the weekend.
Professor Barber: I would like
to add international crime. South Africa, after 1994, became a
centre for international crime including the drugs trade. We have
given some help, I know, but that is another area in which we
could help.
Sir John Stanley: Following on from what
you have both said, can you tell us whether there are any particular
policies that the British Government is currently following that
you would like to see altered, or any policies not being followed
now that you would like to see being adopted?
Q12 Mr Maples: In relation to South Africa!
Professor Barber: I think we could
do probably more in training people, for police and, as David
mentioned, universities. I know our universities, dare I mention
it, here at the moment are controversial and under-funded maybe
but compared with South Africa we are very well off and it is
the staff and post-graduates that would be useful for us to help.
I will try to think of others as we go along.
Professor Simon: The one I would
urge most strongly is that beknighted term, "joined-up thinking"
and, crucially, joined-up action to follow the joined-up thinking,
particularly in the interface between the FCO and DfID, the Home
Office or the Department of Trade and Industry in respect of negotiations
at the World Trade Organisation, the problems encountered at Cancun,
and the way in which South Africa is again emerging as a significant
player. But there was evidence that Britain did not dissent from
the overall EU position which has caused some consternation among
people in South Africa and others in that group of players.
Q13 Sir John Stanley: You are referring
to the tariff issue, are you?
Professor Simon: In particular
yes, but the wider agenda as well. Secondly, in respect of FCO
and Home Office co-operation, or collaboration, in terms of policy
towards asylum seekers and migrants from South Africa. South Africa
was recently added to the so-called "White List" of
countries from which asylum seekers will normally be presumed
to have no bona fide case and are therefore subject to
the new accelerated process that has been introduced. I have personally
been involved over the last year in a number of asylum claims
and appeals as a provider of expert evidence, and it is very clear
from that work that there is a large category of people, not necessarily
for party political reasons but nevertheless through well-founded
individual fears of persecution in terms of the scope of the UN
declarations on refugees and associated legislation, who should
not automatically be assumed to have no bona fide case
and should be seen and heard on their merits.
Q14 Chairman: Professor Barber, have
you had any further thoughts?
Professor Barber: No, I do not
think so. The last time I wrote about this I said it was `a comfortable
relationship'.
Q15 Mr Hamilton: I wanted to move on
to the subject of Zimbabwe, South Africa's neighbour and the problems
in that benighted country. As you may know, this Committee has
had an on-going interest in Zimbabwe; we have published three
reports to date, the latest was in May, and we devoted a section
of our report to Zimbabwe in its region.[8]
May I just quote a small paragraph from that report? We said that,
"if Zimbabwe's neighbours were fully to assume their responsibilities—for
example, by imposing targeted non-trade sanctions similar to those
already imposed by the EU, by some Commonwealth countries and
by the United States—Mugabe's regime would be further isolated,
his opponents would be encouraged and his days would be numbered".[9]The
Government fully agreed with us, by the way, in its response to
our Report. However, some people who have submitted evidence to
this inquiry have said that one of the reasons that South Africa
is doing very little about Robert Mugabe is that there is this
belief that the West has double standards; there is anger that
the West appears to be so active on the issue of Zimbabwe yet
apparently ignores the adverse impact of globalisation on countries
like South Africa. Firstly, why do you think that President Mbeki
has been so reluctant to criticise the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe,
given the damage he is doing to that country and to the whole
region, and to what extent is South African policy on Zimbabwe
a reflection of demand for African unity as opposed to an unwillingness
to tackle the problem of Zimbabwe?
Professor Barber: I think President
Mbeki has problems both at home and abroad if he takes too strong
a line. Robert Mugabe is not regarded in the same light by many
blacks in South Africa as we regard him. For example, when the
foreign minister, Dr Zuma, was here recently, she talked about
righting an historical injustice—that is the land question.
Now, we do not perhaps see it as strongly as "an historical
injustice", so there is that side. I am told when Robert
Mugabe was in Fort Hare some months ago he was greeted as a hero
because he challenges the old colonial structure, so internally
there are people in the ANC who would be critical of Mbeki if
he took too strong a line against Mugabe. Equally internationally,
and the case I quoted in my paper was that some time ago when
Mandela tried to take a very firm stand on Nigeria in the Saro
Wiwa case, that isolated South Africa from the rest of Africa.
It burnt its fingers very badly on the Saro Wiwa case, and I do
not think they have ever forgotten it. Do I need to remind you
of the case?
Q16 Mr Hamilton: No, I remember it very
well, but my question then further to what you have said is this:
surely, when pictures are broadcast—and they must be broadcast
in South Africa—of the repression of the Movement for Democratic
Change, of the economic disaster that has been brought about,
is it simply the case that the South African government blames
the West in some way for what is happening economically to Zimbabwe
and does not see Robert Mugabe as the cause of that economic damage
and the repression that he is using against opposition? Is that
seen simply as a way of putting down people who are supporting
western ideas, or white ideas.
Professor Barber: It is not that
simple. I am sure there is criticism and I am sure Mbeki himself
recognises the dilemma and the damage Mugabe is doing, but I am
trying to explain how he faces that publicly. They have tried
to do it by quiet diplomacy which has failed, of course—and
there are some very strong critics including Mbeki's brother.
He leads a campaign against Mugabe in South Africa and there was
a meeting at the South African Institute of International Affairs
which I attended that was very strongly against what was happening
in Zimbabwe, so there are very strong critics, but if you ask
me why Mbeki behaves as he does, I try to understand.
Professor Simon: I would distinguish
three elements to the answer. One is the issue you have already
alluded to, the allegations of double standards, and here we do
not even need to look to relationships or treatment of different
countries but different stages in respect of Zimbabwe, and Rhodesia
before that, and people draw attention to the fact that, even
though there were international sanctions against the Smith regime
in Rhodesia, as it was at the time, they were not strongly enforced
despite appearances, and some of the key economic linkages were
maintained, that notwithstanding. The second element is the historical
debt that Mbeki personally, and the ANC in general, feels towards
Zimbabwe and the other frontline states for the sheltering and
support during the struggle against apartheid, and in some cases
Mozambique and sometimes Zimbabwe using the territory as a forward
base, certainly giving asylum and refuge to many South Africans.
The third one is that in Africa as a whole, some would say, although
others would draw more tight geographically regionally specific
boundaries, there is a sense that you do not fall out in public,
you do not attack a fellow African leader at these sorts of international
fora but you deal with this quietly within the confines of your
collective home, as it were. That was perhaps the issue I was
alluding to earlier in respect of the Foreign Office versus the
South African relationship and what we saw at CHOGM at the weekend.
But again, as James has said, it is by no means a universal sentiment;
there are many in South Africa who feel just as desperate as the
MDC[10]
supporters in Zimbabwe and many others, particularly on the part
of Africa, but again there are differences. In west Africa my
experience is that many people are much more openly critical of
what Mugabe is doing and will say he is putting all of us under
a cloud, giving us all a bad name. In east Africa there is much
more of the sentiment that James mentioned where people respect
Mugabe as having the guts to stand up against the vested interests
and the existing power structures of the international architecture.
Q17 Mr Hamilton: Surely it is one thing
to stand up against those structures and, as Professor Barber
said, to challenge the old colonial structure, that is accepted,
but when you see Africans starving, when you see that starvation
and food being used as a weapon against African opponents, surely
that is very different to dismantling the old colonial structures?
I still fail to understand why that is not condemned.
Professor Simon: I would agree,
and that is why people I talk to in various parts of west Africa
increasingly are taking the more openly critical view, and we
saw President Obasanjo at the weekend at CHOGM, but I think in
east and southern Africa, the areas where white colonial settlement
was profound and therefore land expropriation most widespread,
that historical consciousness is rather different and there is
a sense, perhaps ironically, in keeping with the UN and OAU[11]charter
that these are domestic affairs of fellow member states in which
you do not intervene, at least not publicly in that way.
Q18 Mr Hamilton: Can I ask either of
you whether you think there is any sign that South Africa's policy
is now changing as things get worse in Zimbabwe?
Professor Simon: I have seen little
evidence thus far, at least on the public side of the policy.
I think there are some intense debates and differences of opinion
fairly high up in Government, and certainly the flip side of that
is that there has been growing concern within South Africa, and
also Namibia, that if the land questions in those two countries
are not successfully dealt with, then Zimbabwe's style scenario
is no longer beyond the realm of possibility in South Africa and
Namibia. There is great concern, and a couple of weeks ago the
Namibian government intervened very forcefully to forestall a
threatened land invasion by people who were members, as it happens,
until very recently of the SWAPO[12]affiliated
trade union.
Q19 Mr Hamilton: Do you think that the
Foreign Office and the British government has failed to understand
the reasons why the South African government cannot act more strongly
against Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe?
Professor Simon: I think there
has been an attempt to understand them. Whether that understanding
is fully fledged, I am not sure, but it also reflects different
positions and the whole question of the universality of human
rights, of the balance between individual human rights and collective
and social rights mediated by these historic inequalities. That
is the nub of the disagreement.
Professor Barber: One may add
to it Mbeki's particular pride in being an African. He is the
one who launched the African renaissance idea and he thinks that
too often black people have been blamed when whites have done
wrong. He is a man who is proud of his ancestry and does not want
to be seen as somebody trying to undermine the black side, black
unity, so there is a personal element coming into it as well.
I am sure he has tried to change Mugabe but he does not want to
be seen as a leader standing out against another black figure
who, as David said, was a major liberation figure.
1 "A pessimist recants: the new South Africa
is working", The Times, 25 October 2003. Back
2
RDP-Reconstruction and Development Programme. Back
3
NePAD-New Economic Partnership for African Development. Back
4
DRC-Democratic Republic of Congo. Back
5
British Military Advisory and Training Team. Back
6
Mr Alexander Erwin, South African Minister of Trade and Industry. Back
7
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. Back
8
Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2002-03, Zimbabwe,
HC 339, paras. 44-48. Back
9
Ibid., para 48. Back
10
Movement for Democratic Change. Back
11
OAU-Organisation of African Unity. Back
12
SWAPO-South West Africa Peoples Organisation. Back
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