Written evidence submitted by Dr. Steve
Kibble, Africa/Yemen Advocacy Officer, Catholic Institute for
International Relations, London
UK, SOUTH AFRICA
AND RELATIONS
WITH ZIMBABWE
The question of Zimbabwe and how South African policy
towards the "failing state" manifests itself is both
a cause for concern and to some extent bewilderment. There has
been an assertion for some time that South Africa was the key
to the problem but "quiet diplomacy" (along with the
previous "megaphone diplomacy" of the West) has failed
to bring a return to stability for Pretoria's troubled neighbour.
However the situation, as with the stalemate inside Zimbabwe,
is far from static, although until recently South Africa appeared
to be moving towards stronger overt support for President Mugabe.
Not only does the three way relationship of London/Pretoria/Harare
complicate matters, but there is a great deal of rhetorical grandstanding
and much no doubt happening behind the scenes.
Once the Harare government had embarked on the
"fast track" land occupation exercise, with its abuses
of human and property rights and the rule of law, it was clear
that the West, particularly the British government, would act.
Following the unfree and unfair general and presidential elections
in 2000 and 2002 respectively, and against a background of violent
land seizures, the EU and the US imposed targeted sanctions on
the ruling party. In 2002 Zimbabwe was also suspended from the
Commonwealth for one year, during which time a Troika comprising
the heads of state of South Africa, Nigeria and Australia, was
tasked with persuading President Mugabe of the need to restore
democracy to Zimbabwe. When no agreement could be reached over
what democratic progress if any had been made, Zimbabwe's suspension
from the Commonwealth was extended to the end of 2003.
For many in the West/North and elsewhere there
are straightforward human rights, humanitarian and economic reasons
why South Africa (and its partners in the Southern African Development
Community—SADC) should act decisively to solve the crisis
in Zimbabwe. The chaos in land and economy obviously has a destabilising
knock-on effect and many expect Pretoria to act (although often
in ways unspecified) not least in its own interest. The viability
of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) initiative,
decline in foreign investment, solidarity with oppressed Africans,
worries over refugees in terms of crime, economic and other forms
of regional destabilisation, xenophobia etc, sensitivities over
the land question have all variously been put forward as reasons
why South Africa should act[1].
Instead despite occasional critical statements, spasmodically
better recognition of the claims of the opposition Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC) and human rights activists" concerns,
visits to "help out" (rather than engage with Zimbabweans
especially civil society), and denial of the SADC vice-chair to
Zimbabwe in 2002[2],
we have had "quiet diplomacy"—seen by Zimbabwean
activists as support for the Mugabe regime. The emphases have
been regional solidarity and "African solutions to African
problems". In essence there has been no concerted regional
pressure, but occasional voices of protest. Why does South Africa,
seem unable or unwilling to act in a decisive (and to some, rational)
manner?
For those seeking to investigate the dynamics
of South Africa—UK relations and its implications for policy
there needs to be a move beyond the simple ahistorical assertion
of a long lasting and unproblematical link between the two nations
based on language, shared democratic values etc. Recognition is
needed of the underlying historical structures stemming from the
repressive and highly inegalitarian experience of settler colonialism
and apartheid. The peculiar intensity of these experiences for
South Africa (and Zimbabwe) now supposedly superseded by notions
of nation-building, rainbow nation and reconciliation are tied
into questions of identity, sovereignty, overcoming past inequalities
and injustices and building a multicultural but African nation
within an unevenly developed region. In particular there are strong
(and often not fully understood by outsiders) resonances especially
when questions of land, race and restoration from historic injustice
are brought together within a Pan-African perspective.
Furthermore these fundamentals are overlaid
by the way that the globalisation agenda of the North has exacerbated
the extremely uneven way that southern Africa, its states and
peoples were historically integrated into the world economy and
polity. In a further complication, the process recently has been
marked by the emergence of new social forces, often referred to
as civil society. These have arisen in part in reaction to new
global trends such as structural adjustment and the failure of
the African state to continue its legitimate postcolonial task
of ending colonial and racial practices and structures (even if
one can fundamentally critique the working out of this project[3]).
States which have only recently emerged from liberation struggles
against colonialism or apartheid now find themselves challenged
by such new social forces, not all of which are coherent and united.
For South Africa, events in Zimbabwe have entered
the crucial (and for Pretoria, vulnerable) domain of Pan Africanism
and African solidarity. As the ZANU-PF government attempted to
deal in its violent and repressive way with the opposition (and
largely urban) forces[4]it
knew that it would face widespread national and international
condemnation in relation to human and property rights, governance,
the rule of law and the illegitimate use of violence. To combat
this the Mugabe government successfully appealed to a wider Pan
Africanist position in order to legitimise itself. This positioned
the land occupation process in terms of redress for colonial injustice,
and African marginalisation in the globalisation process. Leading
Zimbabwean academic and activist Brian Raftopoulos sees Mugabe's
offensive against the opposition as formulating an alternative
discourse around redress for colonial injustice, especially land—"the
land question became the symbol that could distill a simplistic
political binary, in which the ruling party could attempt to conceal
all its post-colonial failings".[5]
By defining the Zimbabwean crisis as one of
anti-colonial redress and legitimate land redistribution, President
Mugabe set the parameters of the subsequent debate, helped by
Western, particularly British, intervention that appeared unaware
of the African and to some extent Third World impact of its statements.
In 1997 the new Secretary of State for International Development,
Clare Short, enunciated the view of the new British government
that it saw itself unbound by previous governments' acceptance
of any responsibility for past colonial injustices in Zimbabwe
and elsewhere. This was then compounded by the Blair government's
subsequent embrace of what has been defined as "liberal imperialism"
in response to "failed states"[6]
"Amongst ourselves we keep the law but when we are operating
in the jungle we must also use the laws of the jungle"[7]
This remained at the theoretical level until the 2003 war in Iraq
with its rhetoric and indeed actuality of enforced regime change.
While Zimbabwe was never the specific target
of "liberal imperialism", its implications were not
lost on authoritarian states, with President Mugabe in particular
asserting the doctrine was an attempt at recolonisation of independent-minded
Third World states[8]South
African receptivity to this in terms of world racism, Western
selectivity/ hypocrisy and its irritability at being asked to
deal with what was seen as a "British problem" is compounded
by the view of regional leaders that the MDC is the catspaw of
white and imperial interests[9]
There are also more practical reasons for South
Africa's stance towards Zimbabwe:
— South Africa (and indeed South Africans)
has tended to see Zimbabwe through its own prism of experience—of
drawing back from the brink through the "miracle" of
its own transition, negotiated settlement, and truth and reconciliation
process.
— Worries over the performance in office
of trade union led parties such as the Movement for Multiparty
Democracy which came to power in Zambia in 1991 defeating the
ANC's longtime ally President Kenneth Kaunda. The trade union
federation in South Africa (Congress of South African Trades Unions—COSATU)
is part of the tripartite alliance with the ANC but has considerable
unease over much of the latter's governing programme—see
point below. Worries over a split in the alliance with the possible
emergence of a trade union and populist opposition mean that a
successful trade union led government in Zimbabwe is not welcome
to Pretoria.
— Pretoria's vulnerability to criticism
from trades unions, churches, NGOs and civil society in general
over lack of transformation (including land reform[10]),
increasing unemployment, attacks on the "failure" of
its economic GEAR policy deemed neo-liberal, particularly in relation
to privatisation of such assets as water.
— Reliance on alliances with other
nation states (particularly middle level/ "regional hegemons"
such as Brazil, India, the Group of (now) 22 at the Cancun World
Trade Organisation talks, and indeed in NEPAD with Nigeria, Algeria
and Senegal) rather than popular movements to change global unfair
economic structures.[11]
— South Africa wishes to pursue African
renewal and solidarity—which makes NEPAD an extremely paradoxical
(and for how long sustainable?) moment. It wants to engage constructively
with Zimbabwe for reasons of solidarity etc without jeopardising
"African Renaissance" principles.
— South African foreign policy prioritising
expedient predictability rather than promoting democratic values[12]
In theory the formation of the African Union
(AU) with its commitments to human rights, and its limiting the
absolute nature of state sovereignty may see forms of intervention
arising, but present performance would not indicate this, given
the southern African representative role given to President Mugabe
at the July 2003 AU Maputo summit and the failure of the AU to
get its Peace and Security Council off the ground. Nor does the
recent agreement at the 23rd SADC summit in late August 2003 to
set up a mutual defence force seem likely to help bring democratic
change in Zimbabwe, given that the same summit committed itself
to opposing sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the Commonwealth,
the European Union and the USA.[13]
Indeed in the NEPAD document arguments for interventions
on behalf of oppressed populations have been superseded by notions
of intervention to protect states' legitimacy and sovereignty.
Both the ANC and ZANU-PF see themselves as the
legitimate inheritors of the anti-colonial struggle with any other
parties (even new ones like the MDC) tainted by association with
previous regimes. For this reason it and other southern Africa
states have been only too ready to accept ZANU-PF's policies as
in some way Pan-African and "anti-imperialist". Strangely,
given the support received by the ANC in exile—hardly quiet
diplomacy—Pretoria has never supported human rights groups
and opposition forces within societies whose governments are undemocratic
and/or human rights violators. Instead, it seems to rely on notions
of the legitimacy of heads of state and of sovereignty, key African
Union (and formerly Organisation of African Unity) positions,
but formalistic concepts nonetheless (especially for Zimbabwe
which cannot feed its own people). Pretoria has less trouble with
the idea of "a just world order" which means equity
amongst nations. Recent events at the failed WTO meeting
in Cancun in September 2003 and the response from the "Group
of 22" of which South Africa is a member illustrate this
strongly.
South Africa at least initially believed that
its model of negotiated settlement and compromise was transferable
to Zimbabwe. It insisted on "quiet diplomacy" for reasons
of regional solidarity and because it would not jump at the behest
of former colonial masters. It pointed to misconceptions about
the extent of its power as the "regional hegemon" saying
it cannot unilaterally reorder the region. Rather it vaunts a
united regional approach based on avoiding confrontation and promoting
multilateralism. Keen to maintain the position of solidarity promoted
by SADC and the AU, President Mbeki was particularly sensitive
to accusations that South Africa played the role of hegemon, only
too aware that Mandela's penchant for unilateral human rights-based
foreign policy initiatives e.g. towards Nigeria and Congo had
for a time isolated Pretoria within SADC. Simultaneously, President
Mbeki has balanced the politics of solidarity (aware of considerable
internal support for Mugabe) with establishing the "good
governance" credentials of NEPAD, the project partly under
his leadership for Africa's development through partnership with
the West. This has led to him negotiating tricky terrain, not
rejecting outright Western attempts for him to play a central
role in helping end the crisis in Zimbabwe, but not promoting
their message either. He also appears to be able to ignore the
constant prevarications and broken promises (to him) emanating
from President Mugabe. That he has managed so far to do this without
losing either American or British (public) support testifies both
to South Africa's regional importance and to Mugabe's astute appreciation
of this geo-political fact[14]
Additionally, while South Africa has leverage
over Zimbabwe in areas of finance, energy and oil, it asserts
that the economies are too closely linked to impose sanctions.
Many Zimbabweans appear to believe that South Africa is not unhappy
as seeing the drying up of investment north of the Limpopo and
South African business being able in the future to get bargains
when Zimbabwean reconstruction occurs (all of which may be incorrect,
but certainly illustrates the bitterness at "quiet diplomacy").
From the end of 2002, President Mbeki seemed
to have moved perceptibly from "quiet diplomacy" towards
Zimbabwe, shown by electricity and fuel subsidies to open endorsement
of its land reform policies[15]
Sustained attempts were made to gain Zimbabwe's readmission to
the Commonwealth despite Harare not even attempting to hide its
non-compliance with the reasons for its year's suspension[16]
At the annual meeting in Geneva of the UN Commission on Human
Rights (UNCHR) on 16 April 2003 a "no action motion"
on Zimbabwe was moved by South Africa and passed by 28 to 24 votes[17]Additionally
South African officials attempted to portray land reform as a
great success, suggested that Zimbabwe's government was genuinely
representative and that Zimbabwe's problems could not be resolved
by removing Mugabe from office since such problems stemmed from
a benevolent elite committed to overturning colonial injustice,
but running into unsustainable social spending[18]Raftopoulos
and Phimister see this as Mbeki sending a signal to those "restive
elements within the Tripartite Alliance (of the ANC, COSATU and
the South African Communist Party—SACP) calling for a relaxation
of the government's neo-liberal economic policies, even as he
bolstered his pan-Africanist credentials by supporting ZANU-PF"[19]
For Raftopoulos and Phimister, the high point
for South African freedom to pursue its own agenda was ironically
enough President Bush's visit to South Africa in July 2003. With
no vital American interests at stake, and with the AU standing
four-square with Mugabe in the face of any Western criticism,
Bush and Powell left it up to Pretoria, despite rhetoric from
the latter politician. President Mbeki, described to his delight
by Bush as "an honest broker" and the "point man
on Zimbabwe", put a pro-Mugabe gloss on events. He claimed
(in defiance of the known facts) that the Zimbabwe crisis was
on the way to being resolved through South African—sponsored
talks between ZANU-PF and the MDC[20]
Since then, matters have moved again, seeming
to necessitate some rethinking in Pretoria.
Changes:
— The internal opposition has become
more effective and coherent with several successful stayaways
called by MDC and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions—ZCTU.
The situation though remains at stalemate (although not stasis
as the balance has swung back and forth); the opposition in its
different elements—MDC, civil society, trade unions, independent
press, farmworkers has gained increased mass support in the past
three years, but its short term strength seems unable to match
the government's hold over political power and the administrative,
bureaucratic and military arms of the state. Government has not
found it possible to crush the opposition. But democratisation
through opposition activity on its own still seems unlikely. The
ZCTU is planning further protests on cash shortages affecting
workers[21]
— There are increasing regional (non-governmental)
concerns from civil society, trade unions, and churches. Whilst
Mugabe retains a populist constituency inside South Africa and
the region, there is an increasingly better-organised regional
opposition to events inside Zimbabwe. Recent events have been
the African Civil Society Consultation on Zimbabwe 6 August 2003
in Botswana[22]and
the Johannesburg Symposium on Zimbabwe from 11-13 August 2003.
These highlight the fact that the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) visited Zimbabwe in June 2002. Its
report was due to be published in October that year, and was then
rescheduled for the AU summit in Maputo in July 2003. Activists
at the two meetings above want it released at its next meeting
in October 2003 and want decisions to be made in line with Article
58 of the ACHPR charter on whether violations have occurred which
would mean a consequent report to the Chair of the AU[23]
Such steps are important, firstly because the report is believed
to have been blocked to protect Zimbabwe's image ahead of the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) and, secondly,
because other human rights organisations' reports such as those
from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have been rejected
by African states who accuse the two of "Western bias".[24]
— Inside South Africa links to regional
constituencies have spread to members of the Tripartite Alliance
with SACP and COSATU questioning "quiet diplomacy" on
behalf of regional allies such as ZCTU. It may be that the strategy
pointed to above by Raftopoulos and Phimister of showing the internal
critics of its neo-liberal international posture its regional
pan-Africanism is beginning to unravel.
— From being merely a few prophetic
voices there has been a manifest growth in churches engagement,[25]
witness against human rights abuse, commitment to peace, reconciliation
and the process of negotiation (especially from the Zimbabwe Catholic
Bishops' pastoral Lenten letter of spring 2003 onwards). Their
attempts at mediation were, however, eventually cold shouldered
by the government and ruling party.
— The Zimbabwe church has been backed
by powerful regional churches. South African and Zimbabwe church
leaders at a recent meeting in Johannesburg jointly condemned
Pretoria and other African leaders for silence on human rights
abuses in Zimbabwe and called for the dismantling of the national
youth service training programme which as South African bishop
Kevin Dowling highlighted has meant major human rights abuses,
corruption of youth including engagement in the 30,000—50,000
tortures, rapes etc.[26]
— The South African Council of Churches
central committee recently called on the South African government
to be more proactive on Zimbabwe[27]
— Increasing evidence that the Harare
government has no idea on how to right matters and is only intent
on staying in power at whatever cost to nation and region. The
recent supplementary budget defied belief. There is a growing
regional awareness that the alternative to immediate significant
political pressure will be eventual military intervention when
the Zimbabwean economy has almost entirely collapsed. Whilst not
unhappy at seeing investment increasingly switch to south of the
Limpopo, Pretoria realises this is not just a zero-sum game, but
there is a wider regional economy and strategy for its progress
at stake. Can this any longer be ridden out with extra international,
regional, and domestic pressure adding to this burden?
— In political terms Mugabe is not
helping out President Mbeki, by concentrating on how ZANU P-F
can retain power and how to orchestrate a succession whilst guaranteeing
himself safety and wealth. Various forces are jockeying for advantage
in any post-Mugabe settlement; important players in ZANU-PF with
no independent power base except Mugabe have been the strongest
voices against any deals with the MDC and outside, preferring
to believe they can tough it out until the next elections in 2005.
— There is strong civil society resistance
inside Zimbabwe for any (Mbeki-preferred) government of national
unity (GNU) that assumes national consensus when there is none,
that is aware of the history of ZANU-PF in swallowing up opposition
voices in the name of national unity as in 1987, and which instead
calls for a broad-based alternative to the present repressive
and corrupt structure of governance and for "transition"
not spurious national unity governments[28]
— The MDC has warned that time is running
out for talks given that their court case on challenges to the
2002 presidential election is scheduled for 3 November 2003. There
is a lack of movement inside Zimbabwe in terms of talks[29]linked
to divisions within ZANU-PF (Young Turks with no independent power
base eg the information and justice ministers, Jonathan Moyo and
Patrick Chinamasa, versus the old guard division). It is also
possible that this posturing is to gain more leverage internally,
and regionally, persuade President Mbeki that negotiations are
still possible. The question is how much longer can Mbeki believe
this when he has other pressures? (Oddly, party chair, John Nkomo,
having along with the rest of ZANU-PF called MDC puppets of the
West said the former should "call off sanctions first")[30]The
seeming belief in Pretoria that Mugabe was genuinely promising
to go by the end of the year appears contradicted by events such
as the building of a new presidential palace[31]Civil
society also wants wider participation in any talks especially
the inclusion of women—disproportionately affected by the
violence[32]
— The undermining of the supposed Pretoria
ultimatum to Harare for it to engage in talks by November 2003
so the former can report tangible progress at CHOGM or otherwise
the latter will face expulsion[33]Constant
South African newspaper criticism points out to Mbeki that Mugabe
has broken every promise the latter has made to Thabo, with many
pointing out that there is a need for stronger sanctions not lifting
the existing ones.
— Increasing awareness that the region
has lost millions in aid because of Zimbabwe including funds for
a regional peacekeeping training centre.
— Perhaps the final straw for "quiet
diplomacy" was the Harare government forcibly shutting down
the Daily News. This dramatically contradicted promises (including
those made to President Mbeki earlier in the year) on reforming
AIPPA[34]and
hopes that Pretoria could show movement by Harare by CHOGM. This
closure of the only daily alternative to the government-controlled
press and media followed several community papers and Joy TV being
forced to close, and foreign journalists forbidden to practise.
The shutdown was the culmination of a process that had seen incessant
state provocation against the newspaper, bombing of its printing
presses, harassment of its journalists and others from the independent
press, de facto banning of the paper in many areas of Zimbabwe
due to sellers being beaten up by youth militia and lorry shipments
disrupted.
— The Supreme Court already under suspicion
of being at the beck and call of government showed its supineness
in a worrying endorsement of AIPPA whose constitutionality was
greatly under question including from influential voices in the
region[35]The
swiftness of the court and subsequent police reactions were equally
worrying given that the Independent Journalists Association of
Zimbabwe case against AIPPA was still being heard, that there
was an immediate forced closure of the Daily News building, and
detention of officials and closure of business without police
producing a court order or explanation of the legal foundation
for their actions. Cynics also point to the increasing economic
unviability of the government-controlled press given that the
Daily News and other independent newspapers were gaining an increasing
market share despite the harassment. The Media Institute of Southern
Africa (MISA—a regional media freedom watchdog) as well
as the South African Press Association and the South African National
Editors" Forum have all protested loudly. The only South
African public response so far has been from Ronnie Mamoepa in
the Department of Foreign Affairs that "we believe in freedom
of the press[36]".
Did this hide a wider concern?
— Time is running out for any movement
in Zimbabwe towards democratisation to be apparent by December
in Abuja. Whilst it is not impossible for Mugabe to pull a rabbit
out of the hat at the ZANU-PF congress just before the Abuja meeting
this is not likely to impress Commonweath heads).
— More interestingly the Nigerian government
(for reasons that were not immediately clear at the time of writing)
appears to have pulled out of the coalition with President Mbeki
and said that neither Zimbabwe nor Pakistan as suspended nations
would be invited to CHOGM. This left the South Africans saying
limply that it was entirely a matter for Abuja as if they had
not been working to get the Zimbabwean government invited to CHOGM.
— There may with the point above be
an awareness that the rhetoric of Mugabe attempting to make his
policies a black and white issue[37]is
increasingly under strain—indications from Ghana, Kenya
and the Caribbean nations show the rhetoric wearing thin.
It is thus an interesting moment for the House
of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee to be asking questions about
the whole nature of UK-South Africa-Zimbabwe relations. I have
no specific policy recommendations on the matters I raise above,
rather the need for all concerned to understand better the current
dynamics of this very complicated relationship.
Recommendations for FAC:
1. It will be important to establish the
current nature of official South African thinking in terms of
policy towards Zimbabwe and what Pretoria thinks it can and cannot
do given the points raised above. This would include its discussions
within the region, the African Union, SADC.
2. How does Pretoria assess the viability
of its "quiet diplomacy" in terms of its vaunted backing
of direct ZANU-PF—MDC negotiations in the light of such
events as the Harare government stalling on talks, dismissing
church initiatives on peace and negotiations, and the closure
of the Daily News?
3. What credibility does Pretoria think
its assurances given to the outside world, including Washington,
London and Abuja that Mugabe would step down and serious negotiations
would commence still hold?
4. In relation to these delicacies, there
is obviously a concern North and South over NEPAD, its peer review
mechanism and good governance criteria. What are Pretoria's strategies
on overcoming the reluctance of donors to engage fully with NEPAD
while (rightly or wrongly) many see Zimbabwe as a test case (even
if Zimbabwe generally opposes NEPAD)?
5. There is a need to establish from Pretoria
what it is about a transition to democracy inside Zimbabwe that
worries them more than the "chaos that they know".
6. It would be useful to ascertain if Pretoria
thinks it helpful for the African Commission on Human and Peoples"
Rights report on Zimbabwe to be released in October 2003 as called
for by Zimbabwean, regional and human rights organisations (as
above).
7. What is the current future of the Mbeki/
Obasanjo/ Muluzi initiative given stalling inside Zimbabwe on
talks and Nigeria not inviting the Zimbabwe government to the
Abuja CHOGM?
8. There needs to be outside support for
those in Zimbabwe and the region who are providing information
about the human rights and general situation inside Zimbabwe,
and those under threat standing up to repression. This in terms
of official British positions is obviously a delicate matter given
what was described in the memo in terms of sovereignty, suspicions
of both "neo-colonialism" and "liberal imperialism".
Other channels do exist, however.
9. In terms of the British government, our
Zimbabwean partners concur that it has been useful recently to
have had a period of silence as opposed to the previous megaphone
diplomacy and for initiatives to have been multilateral and not
seeming like bullying from the ex-colonial master. There are several
matters in which London could help Pretoria if indeed the latter
is shifting its policy. HMG needs to assure all southern Africans
of its support for a transparent, equitable, gender conscious
land reform strategy—financially, in the provision of expertise,
and in engagement with multilateral and other donors. It may be
argued that such potential support is already on record, but the
opportunity to reiterate should not be lost. It would also be
useful to suggest that London's policy in terms of the eventual
reconstruction of Zimbabwe should be imaginative and not restricted
to Bretton Woods formulae rigorously implemented. Continuing food
aid will be vital.
OUTLINE OF
CRISIS IN
ZIMBABWE
According to Chris Alden, Zimbabwe faces multiple
crises—a crisis of legitimacy as its postcolonial
consensus crumbles, a crisis of expectations stemming from
the failure of its economy and polity, a crisis of confidence
in the impartiality of the institutions of the state. Since the
defeat of the Harare government in the February 2000 constitutional
referendum, it is clear that ZANU-PF has attempted to reimpose
its control through a number of inter-related strategies:
— A violent land occupation process
with logistical and coercive support from the state, but without
resolving contradictions in the rural economy by dealing with
questions of access by communal farmers, especially by women (the
majority of such farmers), and former farmworkers to credits and
inputs, tenure questions, the role of chiefs in agrarian transformation.
There also needs to be serious debate on collective forms of ownership
and control.
— The overt and targeted use of a compromised
police and security apparatus against its opponents, including
the use of sexual violence as a tool of retribution (with obvious
implications given the HIV/AIDS pandemic). This is overlaid by
de jure and de facto impunity for formal and informal
agents of the state.
— The use of terror and judicial intimidation
as well as ideological demonisation of the opposition to shut
down space for independent and opposition voices and for access
to justice to be denied to the politically unconnected (helped
in this by the reactions of the Western and ex-colonial powers
with their selective approach and strong echoes of colonial lecturing).
— Widespread torture and intimidation
as national and international human rights bodies have documented.
More than 555,000 cases of serious human rights violations have
been recorded in recent years. In April 2003 there were reports
of 278 cases of unlawful arrest, 75 cases of torture, four death
threats and two attempted murders[38].
To choose one recent moment—following the mass national
strike in June 2003, around 800 supporters of the MDC were arrested,
two were reported to have died and 150 were injured.[39]
— The "restructuring" of
the judiciary, using threats by the state, the "Green Bombers"
and sections of the war veterans movement.
— The co-option or denigration of religious
leadership.
— The re-organisation of ZANU-PF structures
to ensure the promotion of a provincial leadership committed to
a strategy of coercive mobilisation.
— Constant harassment of the independent
media, and legislation to consolidate the monopoly of the ruling
party over the electronic media.
— The continued use of violence as
an election strategy; and the destabilisation of the ZCTU and
other civic bodies.
— The use of the land reform process,
the indigenisation strategy and the politically partisan use of
food as a tool to create a new economic bloc stripping state assets
in order to form a new economic bloc based on party affiliation
and loyalty (although its sustainability is open to question).
— An authoritarian economic nationalist
("anti-imperialist") rhetoric that has resonance in
the region bringing together race, land and historical injustice
in order to demonise the internal opposition and legitimise/ maintain
ZANU-PF's rule through repression.
— Latterly an inconsistent and reversible
call for some form of dialogue under the rubric of "a government
of national unity", whilst continuing the repression and
demanding extremely tough pre-conditions. It is clear that this
relates to divisions within ZANU-PF in turn linked to the question
of succession to President Mugabe and under what terms.
Steve Kibble
Catholic Institute for International Relations, London
October 2003
1 And critics can point to no particularly strong historical
relationship between the African National Congress (ANC) and Zimbabwe
African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)-historically
the ANC was linked with Zimbabwe African Peoples Union-ZAPU),
a history of personal antagonism firstly between Mugabe and Mandela
and then Mbeki,, and disagreements over certain foreign policy
matters such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and indeed NEPAD. Back
2
2 And therefore to the Chair of SADC in 2003. Back
3
The challenge of turning liberation movements into governments
has emerged throughout the region eg South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe,
Angola, and Mozambique. "Social transition in these Southern
African societies shaped by a settler colonial brand . . . can
at best be characterised as a transition from controlled change
to changed control. The result is a new ruling political elite
operating from commanding heights shaped in and based upon the
particular context of the post-Apartheid societies by selective
narratives and memories related to the war(s) of liberation and
hence constructing or inventing new traditions to establish an
exclusive post-colonial legitimacy under the sole authority of
one particular agency of social forces". Henning Melber (2003)
Liberation Movements as Governments: Southern African Experiences-with
special reference to SWAPO and the post colonial political culture
in Namibia. Paper for "Futures for Southern Africa"
symposium organised by CIIR, Institute for Commonwealth Studies,
Nordic Africa Institute and the Southern African Catholic Bishops'
Conference. Windhoek 15-17 September 2003. Back
4
Such forces such as students, trades unions, churches etc were
once part of the nationalist coalition. Back
5
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (2003) Zimbabwe: Moving
towards a Negotiated Transition? Issue Briefing, July. See
also Raftopoulos and Phimister (2003) Zimbabwe Now: Challenging
the Political economy of Crisis and Coercion, forthcoming. Back
6
R. Abrahamsen Blair's Africa: The Politics of Securitisation
and Fear (forthcoming), M. Duffield (2003) "Human Security:
Privatisation, Soft-Power and Global Governance" in Refugee
Studies forthcoming. Back
7
Robert Cooper The Observer, 7 April 2002-Raftopoulos and
Phimister (2003) provided this quotation. Back
8
See for instance The Herald, 9 April 2002. See also The
Star, 2 Sept 2002 for Mugabe's address to the Johannesburg
World Summit on Social Development in September 2002 presenting
his land policies as part of a continuing struggle against colonialism
in defence of independence. "We are not Europeans. We have
not asked for any inch of Europe, any square inch of that territory.
So Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe !".
See New African, April 2003 for Mugabe's speech at the
Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Kuala Lumpur in February 2003,
"no longer willing to subject . . . [its] actions to international
law, rationality or the force of morality, the United States had
one yardstick for its own behaviour and one for the Third World".
See also Cape Times, 5 Aug 2002 and 25 Feb 2003 for similar
attacks. Back
9
Africa Institute of South Africa study conducted by Che Ajulu.
News 24 14.8.03. Back
10
South African market-based land reform has since 1994 managed
to transfer 2% of agricultural land as opposed to a target of
30%. Back
11
Although rather playfully, President Mbeki did say at one point
that maybe the Group of 22 should join the anti-globalisation
protesters on the streets, an interesting difference to the treatment
of demonstrators at the World Summit in Johannesburg in 2002. Back
12
Even when its observer group at the 2002 elections was physically
attacked, the official South African government position was that
the elections were "acceptable"-a hitherto unknown take
on being fair and/or free. South African foreign policy-making
has often been held to be split between "realists" and
"idealists"-a somewhat sterile distinction that Stephen
Gelb believes the NEPAD initiative has gone some way to resolving-S.
Gelb (2001) South Africa's Role and Importance in Africa and
for the Development of the African Agenda. Prepared for DfID.
The Edge Institute, South Africa. Back
13
IRIN 26.8.03. "SADC rallies around Zimbabwe with a call to
lift sanctions". Reports quote Tanzanian (and new SADC) President
Benjamin Mkapa strongly supporting Zimbabwean land reform and
deeming the Zimbabwean media overly critical of the government
(Mail and Guardian 29.8.03) and IRINttp//www.irinnews.org/report/asp?ReportID=36210.
President Mpaka, somewhat missing the point it would seem, stated
"I find it insulting that there are powers and people who
believe food shortages in the region can only be averted when
Africans become servants on white people's land" (SARDC
23.0803). Bizarrely, he continued that the summit's support for
Zimbabwe's land reform should not be "interpreted as [an
apology] for arbitrary, illegal, unlegislated and economically
unproductive and unbalanced restitution". The SADC statement
was despite the EU insisting that sanctions only affected top
government officials and that the suspension of bilateral development
programmes was due to the Zimbabwean government's non-compliance
with conditions. IRIN 18.9.03. See also Amnesty International
statement AI AFR46/027/2003 on SADC leaders needing to place Zimbabwe
on the agenda of the August summit, plus previous ones on repression
in Zimbabwe such as AFR46/012/2003). Back
14
Raftopoulos and Phimister (op cit) p 23. Back
15
Eg with South African Foreign Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma
(seemingly the most openly pro-ZANU-PF minister), endorsing ZANU-PF
claims that Britain had to compensate white Zimbabwean farmers
for land seized by "war veterans", because of colonial
land theft (Financial Gazette 14 Nov 2002). See also Natal
Mercury, 20 Dec 2000 on the ANC inviting ZANU-PF to its Stellenbosch
conference in December 2002. See also Argus, 21 March 2003). Back
16
Or with the fact that the Nigerians and South Africans were not
charged with being "honest brokers" but attempting to
persuade Zimbabwe to comply with the Harare Principles etc. Harare
was supposed to ensure the finalisation of the land reform process,
begin a dialogue with white commercial farmers over compensation,
assist farm workers gain citizenship, reduce violence; look into
concerns over AIPPA, and begin inter-party dialogue. With the
exception of point 3, none of this has happened in any substantial
way. Back
17
See Africa Rights statement africarights@hotmail.com 20.4.03.
Note also Human Rights Watch statement that blamed Western governments
for not pushing hard enough at the UNCHR. IRIN 28.04.03. Back
18
ANC Secretary-General, Kgalema Motlanthe, Star, 22 Jan
2003, Thabo Mbeki ANC Today, 9 May 2003 and The Guardian,
29 May 2003. Needless to say this is not an analysis easily recognised
by Zimbabweans outside ZANU-PF. Back
19
Raftopoulos and Phimister, op cit p 26. Back
20
There were also denials from President Mbeki that he had ever
said that Mugabe had promised to leave office by the end of the
year. Back
21
Daily News 4.9.03. Back
22
Concluding Statement of the African Civil Society Consultation
on Zimbabwe AfricaFiles 12 August 2003 info@africafiles.org Back
23
There are also calls for regional countries party to the Convention
Against Torture to investigate and that SADC should investigate
if Zimbabwe has violated the Windhoek Declaration and other measures
(see Concluding Statement op cit). Back
24
Zimbabwe Independent 22 August 2003. Back
25
See "Crisis Point" and "Churches Speak out"
CIIR News Summer 2003. www.ciir.org. Back
26
National Youth Service in Zimbabwe-a report on the youth militia,
Oct 2000 to August 2003 Solidarity Peace Trust and others IOL
News 7.9.03. Back
27
News 24 14.8.03. Back
28
See "Talks about Talks? Or merely a Waste of Time?"
Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition Discussion Paper. July
2003. Back
29
The agenda for talks is seemingly the same as it was before talks
between MDC and ZANU-PF broke down in May 2002 and are on confidence-building
measures, the constitution, political violence, multipartyism,
sovereignty and economic recovery. Supposedly Mbeki and Obasanjo
were to "underwrite" the deal that emerged and the USA
and other donors would provide a reconstruction package. Back
30
Personal communication from evangelical church activist in Bulawayo. Back
31
Although it remains possible that he will de jure retire
but rule de facto behind the scenes. One could also point
out that funds for this palace could probably only have come from
mining in the Congo. Back
32
www irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID35963. Back
33
Financial Gazette 7-13 August 2003 citing South African ambassador
to Zimbabwe, Jeremiah Ndou. Back
34
The apartheid-era sounding Access to Information and Protection
of Privacy Act of June 2002. Back
35
Harare is a signatory to both the African Carter on Human and
Peoples' Rights and the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights. Back
36
Star 17.9.03. Back
37
Saying on a number of occasions that it would split the Commonwealth
into black and white sections. Back
38
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum. Political Violence Report.
April 2003. Back
39
Amnesty International Press Release AFR 46/027/2003 22 August
2003. Back
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