Examination of Witnesses (Questions 84-99)
27 JANUARY 2004
MR RICHARD
DOWDEN AND
DR STEVE
KIBBLE
Q84 Chairman: This is the second of three
planned sessions of the Foreign Affairs Committee in our inquiry
into the role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in relation
to South Africa. This takes place before the visit to South Africa
planned by the Committee from 9 February to 13 February. Today's
session will divided into two parts. The first was to be on trade
and investment; the second more general with certain regional
issues. Gentlemen, as you have probably heard, one of our witnesses
in the first session is stuck on a train; you have kindly agreed
that we reverse the order. Therefore, may I, on behalf of the
Committee, welcome first Mr Richard Dowden, Director, Royal African
Society and I believe an adviser to the All-party Africa Committee.
Mr Dowden, you have worked as an African journalist covering various
parts of the continent from 1983 to the present. I have had the
privilege to meet you in various parts of Africa. You have worked
for The Times, been Africa Editor of The Independent,
Africa Editor at The Economist latterly from 1995 to 2001,
when you became Director of the Royal African Society. The Society
seeks to: "strengthen links between Africa and Britain and
encourages understanding of Africa and its relations with the
rest of the world". We also welcome Dr Steve Kibble. You
are the Advocacy Officer of the Catholic Institute for International
Relations. The CIIR is a small, campaigning non-governmental organisation
working in the field of development. We know that you have published
extensively on Africa, particularly on southern Africa. Thank
you also for your memorandum to the Committee. Gentlemen, it is
fitting that we have this appraisal now of our links with South
Africa because it is ten years since we had that landmark election
there. I am not sure whether I met you then: I was in Port Elizabeth
heading the international team. I should be grateful to start
with to hear from both of you what you see as the principal achievements
of the country over those ten years.
Mr Dowden: The most obvious one
is the final ending of Apartheid. Even though Apartheid started
coming apart probably at the end of the 1960s as a grand scheme
and was in retreat then for a long time, that election ten years
ago put the gravestone on it. Since then, there was an expectation
that South Africa might simply overturn the economic system which
had existed and instead one of the Government's achievements has
been to put economic stability not before the empowerment of black
people but slightly ahead of it, and has not in any way tried
to destabilise the economy. That has been the main achievement.
Q85 Chairman: Do you think the balance
of the Government has been right?
Mr Dowden: Indeed.
At the same time it has, if slightly erratically, provided housing,
running water, education and other things which were lacking before
and begun on its programme of black empowerment. Those are the
main domestic ones and across the continent they have given the
rest of Africa a boost through their idea of the African renaissance
and, secondly, through the construction of NePAD, the programme
for economic development in Africa and carried that through. Those
are the main achievements of South Africa.
Q86 Chairman: Dr Kibble,
could you take that further?
Dr Kibble: The
maintenance of peace and stability in certain parts of the region,
not all parts of the region, has certainly been a successful part
of the South African strategy. One can point to a number of failures
obviously, but with the inter-Congolese dialogue, the attempt
to negotiate, with some success, in Burundi and after some uncertainties
over Nigeria and Lesotho, South African foreign policy is certainly
becoming rather more coherent, except in the specific case of
Zimbabwe, which I suspect we may touch on later.
Q87 Mr Olner: When we
are talking about NePAD, it has been described as an agenda for
change. Is that fairly accurate? Is it for change in South Africa,
or is it for change in southern Africa? Which is placed higher?
Mr Dowden: It is
a programme for change in the whole of Africa, but originally
it was conceived as those countries which signed up to it. At
the AU summit in 2000, the whole continent adopted it, which meant
you had governments like Zimbabwe's and Libya's, which obviously
had not read the small print, signing up to it. That slightly
weakened it in a way.
Q88 Mr Olner: Having not
read the small print, what are the other countries in NePAD able
to do against those countries which did not read the small print?
Mr Dowden: We are
finding this out at the moment with the peer review mechanism.
This is a concept of a group of countries going around and investigating
countries which are willing to be investigated to see whether
they come up to the NePAD standard. It is not compulsory and I
am told it will not be punitive, but this is still being worked
on.
Dr Kibble: The
exemplary element in NePAD is the one which is constantly being
stressed now. Many people in South African and other civil societies
do have a problem with its lack of consultation, its top-down
approach, its reliance on one particular form of neo-liberalism.
They doubt very much on the one hand that the African leaders
who are human rights abusers can be brought on board and on the
other hand that it will make much significant difference, when
the G8 is a little hesitant about funding it at this precise moment,
when there are so many provisos, so many qualifications to be
worked out, not least the peer review mechanism to which Richard
is referring.
Q89 Mr Olner: It really
does mean something for all people. One side says it is securing
better governance and the other side says it is a means of securing
more aid for African nations. You cannot have it one way on a
Tuesday and the next way on a Wednesday.
Mr Dowden: As I
see it, all the ingredients in NePAD are elements of the existing
relationship between the rich world and Africa and NePAD is the
packaging which has been put round them. This is both good and
bad. It does not offer anything new. Everything has already been
worked out, but if NePAD falls apart, the actual ingredients of
NePAD will remain, perhaps in a more bilateral way, but they are
not going to change. They are: more aid from rich countries and
better governance from Africa. That is the deal. It is both.
Q90 Mr Olner: How is NePAD
viewed by the different "rich" nations? Do the French
have a different view on what NePAD should provide from us, or
the EU, or America? Do all the countries have a different perspective
of what NePAD is?
Dr Kibble: The
way I hear it, the Americans have more or less abandoned it. They
do not think it has any legs on it whatsoever. In a sense it reverts
back to a kind of European ownership within the G8 and that is
unfortunate in some ways. In a sense NePAD was very much geared
to having a sympathetic audience inside the G8 and many people
say it actually arose from discussions which initially took part
in the G8 rather than an internal African conversation. Richard
may have a slightly different view here.
Mr Dowden: No,
that is right, certainly what you say about America. The problem
with it is, that it is like that elephant being investigated by
blind men and some hold the tail and some hold a leg and some
hold the trunk. It is a bit like that. The French see is as water;
that has been their great contribution to it, which was already
one of the things they were doing in Africa and they pursue it
like that. Britain sees it as good governance. African nations
see it as a chance for more aid. They are all in there, just being
selective in the way they pick out what they want from it.
Q91 Mr Chidgey: President
Wade has recently shown a great deal of concern about the effectiveness
of the peer review mechanism, which I find rather surprising,
as he was, of course, one of the original promoters of the whole
concept of NePAD. Does the African peer review mechanism actually
hold the potential to change significantly poor governance in
African nations or will it prove ultimately toothless in your
considered opinion?
Mr Dowden: It will
not do anything for the ones who do not want to change themselves.
It is a key, but the individual countries have to turn that key
in the lock. That would be my image of it. For those countries
which are having problems turning the key and bringing good governance,
but want to do it, it will be very helpful. Countries which have
done well will say "We did this. We did that. This is how
you should do it". It will not do anything at all for the
countries which really just do not want to turn it.
Dr Kibble: It does
slightly remind me of the barons in 1066 And All That,
that there will be this peer review in front of people who will
understand. The lesson of African solidarity, or more precisely
African leadership solidarity, means that there will not be a
significant civil society input into that peer review mechanism
and it will be as much about resisting regime change as it will
be about good governance. That might be a slightly cynical view,
but I remain to be convinced to the contrary.
Q92 Mr Chidgey: That is
very interesting. May I just pursue your point about regime change
for a moment? One of the Western viewpoints on NePAD and its enthusiasm
for it is good governance and tackling corruption, which is not
necessarily the same thing as preventing or encouraging regime
change. How do you see that dichotomy?
Dr Kibble: In a
sense I was being slightly mischevous by talking about regime
change. If I were going to be more precise, I would probably say
changing the patterns and economic accumulation strategies, the
corruption of certain African leaderships, not necessarily changing
the government in power in whatever culture it might be, Kinshasa,
Harare, Mogadishu. The good governance aspect is still something
where people say "Come on board and there are benefits".
There are no sanctions, no ways by which you can force people
to change except by saying "If you go down, we go down"
and there is a kind of regional input into that. I think those
mechanisms are very, very under-strength.
Q93 Mr Chidgey: Is there
anything we, Western nations, could do to make this aspect of
NePAD more effective, the peer review mechanism?
Mr Dowden: We may
come onto this a bit later on, but the character of Mbeki is such
that anything he is told to do, or he thinks the West is telling
Africa to do, he resists quite vehemently. Therefore, while Western
governments could help provide assistance to it, if it were seen
to be pushing a Western agenda, that might lay the way open for
Mbeki particularly to resist it.
Q94 Mr Chidgey: It is
fascinating. On the one hand you are saying, and the perceived
view is, that we in the West should go very softly on this whole
issue, yet the view from the United States, who are obviously
a very major player here, is not just to abandon NePAD, but positively
to oppose it, as you confirmed a moment ago in one of your answers.
What sort of reaction does that provoke in Africa as a whole and
South Africa as a key player when the Americans are producing
their version, which I think is the Millennium Challenge? This
means, "You allow American investors in and we'll look after
the bottom line"; never mind good governance, never mind
any of the other issues we are talking about. You know where I
am coming from on this. Here we have a key player, the USA, actually
positively undermining this attempt by African nations to work
out their own destiny?
Mr Dowden: I would
confirm that the Americans are backing what they see as winners,
American-friendly policies, which would include good governance
and a lot of what is in NePAD. For those countries who do not
follow that, there is nothing whatsoever. It is sorting out sheep
and goats and that has been the problem with a lot of African
policy, trying to sort out sheep and goats in Africa, because,
like human beings, most African leaders and countries are a bit
of both.
Dr Kibble: May I just pursue something
here? Many people have called for a twin approach, which is on
the one hand addressing issues of global inequality, debt, trade
and the rest of it, which is a kind of positive, at the same time
as stressing good governance and democratisation on the other
hand; to be absolutely equitable in both kinds of ways, both human
rights and democracy, but also economics.
Q95 Chairman: How would
you answer those who say that NePAD was in essence a contract?
There were reciprocal obligations. We, the Africans, deliver good
governance: you, the West, deliver trade investment and aid in
various forms. The degree of delivery on either side will coincide.
That is that if we deliver one to that extent the other side will
deliver. Manifestly, by certain actions in certain parts of Africa,
Africa is not delivering and therefore cannot expect that same
full-hearted response from the West, the other party to the contract.
How would you answer that?
Mr Dowden: I would
agree that it is not written into the NePAD document, but there
is a sort of deal there. Do not forget that the donor countries
are also held to account in NePAD, in that there should be a peer
review of the donor policies, getting them co-ordinated and so
on. Frankly, I have not seen a great deal of that. If Africans
say "Well, if you fulfilled your side of the bargain",
they have a point. To some extent, if you look at countries like
Botswana, like Malawi, which is a bit more complicated but the
president has not gone for the third term and tried to change
the constitution, there is some progress in parts of Africa on
these. Kenya is now on a completely different track; Ghana. They
could say that there has been quite a lot of movement in Africa.
The problem is that the only sanction is that nothing happens
and that is what I fear: nobody is actually saying "Come
on. Let's keep it rolling. Let's get on".
Dr Kibble: There
is always a great concern in Africa about Western selectivity
and certain human-rights-abusing governments are not sanctioned[40]and
others are. We are not naíve enough to believe that human
rights always take a primary part in any foreign policy dialogue,
but it is certainly a handle for those who wish to use that to
berate the West. From that stems the mere ability to have the
conversation, particularly with rural Africans, as to what NePAD
could possibly give to them. What does it mean in terms of trickledown
or ending corruption or developmental economics, empowering women,
combating HIV/AIDS and the rest of it? I do not think that conversation
has really even started yet.
Q96 Richard Ottaway: This
Committee has taken quite a close interest in Zimbabwe. President
Mbeki has quite consistently not criticised Zimbabwe. A number
of reasons have been given: solidarity, shared history, Western
double standards. Why has he taken it? Given that the relationship
with Zimbabwe is costing his country money, why has he taken this
line when countries like Botswana are quite prepared to criticise
Zimbabwe?
Mr Dowden: There
are several reasons, some of them to do with his personality,
some of them to do with his politics. He fears a broadly "Africanist"
group in South Africa, the rhetoric which Winnie Mandela has used
on occasions and others. In addition, because of his own history,
that he was not involved in the struggle, but was a diplomat and
here in Britain much of the time, he feels vulnerable to that,
that he was not as much part of the struggle as others. He is
therefore very vulnerable to attack from that side. That is one
thing. There is an issue of land in South Africa as well and he
did not want to exacerbate that. There is a feeling about Mugabe.
Mugabe supported them very strongly over the years and it is hard
to put the knife into someone who has been one of your main supporters.
That is another reason. What several people told me it came down
to at the recent CHOGM was that he just did not want to be told
what to do in Africa by outsiders and it came down to that. If
you read the letter which he published on the ANC website the
following week—I think it is called An Upside-down View
of Africa[41]all
that bitterness; the words "kith and kin" are repeated
over and over again. Basically, he sees racist Britain, which
protected Ian Smith for so long and protected Apartheid for so
long and is now trying to tell him to put the knife into his old
colleague and he simply will not do it. I think that is what it
is about.
Q97 Richard Ottaway: It
is that bad, is it?
Mr Dowden: It is
not bad, but we see it as contradictory in relation to what he
is trying to do on NePAD and what he is trying to do on Burundi
and Congo and we see it as crazy and inconsistent. If you actually
understand the character of the man, it is not inconsistent at
all.
Q98 Richard Ottaway: Is
there anything we could be doing to change it?
Mr Dowden: I am
told that he will not say this in dialogue with Britain but he
is very, very critical of ZANU-PF and Mugabe. He is not as totally
supportive as he appears to be. How do you move him to try to
change things? It is ironic that he did apply incredibly powerful
levers on all the other SADC countries at the CHOGM to vote in
favour of re-admission. He was quite prepared to use levers brutally
on them, but he says when it comes to Zimbabwe that he has no
levers, there is nothing he can do, what do we want him to do,
invade? He just simply will not apply any pressure. What can be
done from the outside? Britain keeping quiet was probably a good
policy and should remain so, because Mugabe was so clever at turning
round every time Britain spoke and playing the old imperial colonial
race card. That means that Britain should do things quietly rather
than publicly.
Q99 Richard Ottaway: Tony
Blair, Jack Straw, racist, imperialist?
Mr Dowden: I agree.
40 Sanctioned as in "subject to sanctions"
rather than "approved". Back
41
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