Letter to the Chairman of the Committee
from the Minister of State for Europe, dated 8 September 2003
ESDP: 29 AUGUST MEETING: UK FOOD FOR THOUGHT
PAPER
You may have seen in the press recently reference
to a UK Food for Thought paper, prepared for an ESDP experts'
meeting hosted by the Italian Presidency in Rome on 29 August.
This paper was drafted jointly by FCO and MOD officials, in response
to a request from the Italian Presidency for Member States' views
prior to the meeting.
I thought your Committee might be interested
to see this paper. It takes as its basis the ESDP principles agreed
at Nice—inclusiveness, transparency and strong EU-NATO links.
It offers ideas on how to improve EU crisis management, focusing
on operations, capabilities, and institutions. The response to
the paper in Rome was good—the majority of EU partners echoed
the same principles in their interventions, and many spoke up
in support of the ideas contained within the paper. These ideas,
as well as others that were discussed in Rome, will now be taken
forward in discussions in the EU.
I will also deposit the document in the Libraries
of both Houses.
I am writing in similar terms to Lord Grenfell,
Chairman of the Lords Select Committee on the European Union and
to Jimmy Hood, Chairman of the House of Commons European Scrutiny
Committee.
Denis MacShane MP
Minister of State for Europe
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
8 September 2003
Annex 1
ESDP 29 AUGUST MEETING: UK FOOD FOR THOUGHT
PAPER
The UK welcomes the Presidency's initiative
in convening this meeting and we welcome the emphasis in the 30
July non-paper on strengthening capabilities, in the UK view,
the key components of a successful ESDP are: a coherent CFSP;
capabilities (military and civil) to conduct successful operations;
the political will to use them; and effective processes for crisis
management. In this paper, therefore, we offer ideas on how to
strengthen the EU's capacity for rapid and effective action, covering
capabilities, operations and institutions.
Capabilities
We all recognise the fundamental importance
of capabilities; the achievement so far; and the need to do more.
This meeting is not the place for a detailed examination of the
issues, but we should aim for a concise, focussed discussion to
establish consensus on taking forward the capabilities agenda
this autumn:
(a) Closing the key capabilities gaps in
the Headline Catalogue (securing new commitments; monitoring of
progress against an agreed timetable);
(b) Developing the Headline Goal (new strategic
context, as reflected in the European Security Strategy; revised
Petersberg Tasks; rapid response; concurrency);
(c) Multi-national co-operation (encouraging
member states to work together on a voluntary basis, including
under the auspices of the Agency, to increase their capabilities
in shortfall areas. The priority must be the ECAP and PCC initiatives.
Joint commands, eg in airlift, could yield benefits once the assets
themselves are in place);
(d) NATO/EU Capability development (adapting
the DPQ; making the Capability Group operational; examining and
encouraging progress in EU and NATO project groups);
(e) Capabilities: (taking forward and establishing
the Agency, with the necessary focus— "capabilities-driven"
as the IAG has agreed).
Operations
Operations are the test of a successful ESDP.
2003 has seen the launch of three operations, including, in Bunia,
an autonomous one prepared and launched at short notice. We need
to recognise what has worked well and identify and act on lessons
learned. The UK would welcome discussion of:
(a) Anticipating crises: improving the EU's
ability to assess areas for potential engagement. The UK would
like to see improved direction and co-ordination of the EU's effort,
perhaps through a cross-Pillar "virtual" task force
approach under the SR/HG, bringing together the expertise of the
Joint SITCEN, Policy Unit, ether existing elements of the Council
Secretariat and EUMS, and the Commission. This would give the
Union a capacity to examine and anticipate opportunities, building
on existing "horizon-scanning" work, to look at actual
and potential conflicts: prospects for stabilisation and reconstruction,
as well as crisis management. It would help strengthen civil-military
coordination, support the Council's efforts to take a holistic
and strategic approach to conflict prevention, crisis management
and reconstruction and allow prioritisation of the EU's limited
resources.
(b) Planning operations: the operational
experience of 2003 validates the agreed arrangements for planning
operations. In Macedonia, where NATO experience and assets were
needed, a Berlin Plus operation was right. In Bunia, a national
HQ, backed up by national resources and expertise and reflecting
the leading role of the nation concerned in the operation, was
right. ESDP's key assets are: NATO'S machinery, to which the EU
has automatic access; national HQs, capable of multinationalisation;
and the EUMS strategic capacity. To develop this collective EUMS
capacity, the UK proposes the creation of a dedicated EU planning
cell at SHAPE, primarily to contribute to planning in the pre-decisional
phase; working to DGEUMS, but operating transparently within SHAPE
in its wider European role, including as reflected in DSACEUR's
responsibilities. Further details can be found at Annex 1.
(c) Strengthening HQ capacity: the UK chairs
the ECAP Project Group on this issue. Work under way includes
identifying and training "primary augmentees", expert
personnel who would be available to go to any national HQ acting
as an EU OHQ. An EU cell at SHAPE could also play a role here.
Augmentees enable all Partners to contribute experienced personnel
directly to the operational level of command, while preserving
the core role of a "live" national HQ in an EU OHQ.
We see this as fundamental to the successful command and conduct
of an operation. For this reason and given the cost and duplication
involved in a permanent structure, the UK would not support a
separate OHQ solely for autonomous EU operations. The Project
Group is developing stronger links between EUMS, national HQs
and SHAPE; and closer co-ordination between national HQs. These
links will be tested in CME 04.
(d) Working in Partnership ESDP involves
co-operation with other international Organisations. We should
develop our ability to produce complementary strategies (eg with
the OSCE on Moldova, NATO on the Western Balkans and the UN on
DRC). Learning from EUPM and Bunia, we should examine how ESDP
can better support UN objectives and operations. With NATO, we
should make a reality of the strategic partnership, while enabling
each organisation to play to its distinctive strengths, on a broad
agenda covering co-operation in the Western Balkans, as agreed,
including Bosnia; Capabilities; Mediterranean issues; terrorism;
and WMD.
Institutions
We regard the institutional arrangements agreed
at Nice and the links to NATO agreed there and in Berlin Plus
as the essential basis for ESDP. The test against which further
institutional development must be judged is whether it would increase
the EU's capacity for rapid and effective action, while maintaining
the fundamentals of the agreed EU/NATO relationship. The latter
depends, of course, on a basis of extensive routine consultation
at all levels. We need to do more, both institutionally and as
nations, to promote and strengthen this.
The UK welcomes the proposals in the draft Treaty
to modernise the Petersberg Tasks, which will clarify and expand
the range of activities relevant to ESDP, and to develop the Agency,
which should give focus and direction to the crucial capabilities
area.
The UK welcomes the proposal for a solidarity
clause to strengthen EU co-operation across the board in response
to the new challenges posed by terrorist attacks and by other
disasters. We also recall the agreement reflected in the Nice
conclusions that NATO remains the basis of the collective defence
of its members.
In considering proposals for different forms
of co-operation, it is worth recalling that, using the Nice arrangements,
the Council has shown itself able to plan, agree, launch and conduct
two military operations, one in particular at short notice. Not
all member states were involved militarily, but all took part
in the decision-making and it was open to all to offer contributions,
based on their national and multi-national capabilities. These
operations demonstrate the flexibility and potential of the Nice
arrangements. The UK is therefore against proposals which would
fundamentally alter the balance achieved at Nice, especially any
which would imply competition, rather than complementarity, with
NATO. We believe the range of options available (from constructive
abstention through to providing forces on the ground, with many
intermediate Stages: supporting but not participating; providing
enablers; providing headquarters staff officers) will mean the
Nice arrangements can work effectively in an EU of 25.
The current inclusive, flexible and transparent
arrangements are proving their value in delivering an operationally
effective and dynamic ESDP. We should now build on them together.
FCO/MOD
August 2003
Annex 2
STRENGTHENING EU CAPACITY FOR OPERATIONS
The UK's ESDP Food for Thought paper included
proposals to strengthen the EU's capacity for conducting crisis
management operations: improving the EU's ability to assess areas
for potential engagement and an EU Planning Cell at SHAPE. This
note sets out our ideas in further detail, recognising that more
work requires to be done on both. We would welcome Partners' views.
EU STUDY OF
AREAS OF
POTENTIAL ENGAGEMENT
The ability of the EU to discern areas of potential
concern worldwide, reflect on their implications, and develop
timely, swift and coherent strategies forms a crucial part of
EU crisis management. Provision of up-to-date information and
intelligence, matched with its collation and assessment capabilities
is clearly important, but must be matched with review, prioritisation
and direction processes and procedures. Many of the institutional
and procedural elements are in place; the "EU Watchlist"
produced by the Joint SitCen is a good starting point, but its
main focus is to inform the programme of detailed intelligence
assessments. We would propose that it should also inform consideration
of the options and possibilities for EU engagement in the areas
highlighted.
Such work should be directed by the PSC, under
the leadership of the SG/HR, and should involve the Joint SITCEN,
Policy Unit, other existing elements of the Council Secretariat
and EUMS, and the Commission as appropriate. No new organisation
need be formed for this task: the intention would be to bring
together in a "virtual taskforce" all the policy actors
concerned with the full range of possible Union actions. It may
be helpful to see this as a more frequent, and strategic, regular
manifestation of the "Crisis Response Co-ordination Team"
which currently forms up to draft the Crisis Management Concept
and other key pol-mil advice. As with the work of the CRCT, the
Presidency would need to have visibility of, and be closely associated
with the work of the taskforce. This work should also support
more regular EU strategic dialogue with other international organisations
such as the UN, NATO and the OSCE.
EU PLANNING CELL
AT SHAPE
The UK proposes the establishment as an element
of the EUMS of an EU Planning Cell (EUPC) at SHAPE. This would
work to the DGEUMS but also involve close working links to DSACEUR.
It would strengthen the EUMS's own capacity to frame strategic
military options, as well as providing a link to subsequent operational
level planning work in a designated EU OHQ. As part of this, it
could second personnel to an EU OHQ (either SHAPE or a national
Headquarters) for the purposes of planning and conducting an EU
operation. It would generally reinforce the capacity of the EUMS
to conduct advanced or strategic planning, including to contribute
to the "virtual task force" referred to above.
The location of this EU cell at SHAPE would
not affect the EU's autonomy of decision-making. It would enable
the EUMS to improve its links with NATO planners, to make full
use of the access to the Alliance's facilities provided by Berlin
Plus, covering not just assured access to operational planning,
but additional specialities such as force planning and exercises.
It would help develop close working level links between DGEUMS
and OSACEUR. The EUPC would operate transparently within SHAPE
and thus support DSACEUR in his role as Strategic Co-ordinator.
It would improve transparency for non-NATO EU Member States and
non-EU NATO members. For EU Member States generally, it would
enhance coherence and coordination of work spanning both the military
strategic and operational levels; and provide a cost-effective
and inclusive way to link the EUMS with the expertise in-depth
that only a working Headquarters can provide.
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