Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)
28 OCTOBER 2003
MR DENIS
MACSHANE
MP, MR DAVID
FROST AND
MR RICHARD
CROWDER
Q20 Mr Chidgey: How do you view the
prospect of the merging of the roles of high representative and
external relations commissioner, because in June the Foreign Secretary
told us that he thought neither was possible or acceptable and
suggested that a new minister might have to have some sort of
special status in the Commission. Is this what you are now pursuing?
Mr MacShane: I am slightly confused
on what exactly you are saying. Our policy is and always has been—I
am quoting what the Foreign Secretary gave as evidence to the
European Scrutiny Committee in September—that it is a good
idea to have these two roles merge but the primary responsibility
for this person has to be to the Council and not to the Commission.
Yes, we want a strong European voice for foreign policy. Bringing
together Solana and Patten makes sense but the chain of command,
the responsibility, has to be very clearly under the Council of
Ministers.
Q21 Mr Chidgey: You have answered
my next question which is to tell us how you see the minister's
work being scrutinised. I think you are saying through the Council
of Ministers but how would we ensure that the new foreign minister
will be held accountable—i.e., solely through the Council?
Mr MacShane: That is one of the
areas where we need some clarification in parts of the text of
the final constitutional treaty, to make it clear that this person—and
I think, by and large, it is a majority view—is someone
who reports to the Council of Ministers. He or she should have
access to the Commission and sit on the Commission, because we
want that person to have some say over how the Commission's external
budget is spent, but on policy decisions it must be clear there
is only one master, as it were, and that is the Council of Ministers.
Q22 Mr Chidgey: This minister, or
whatever name we end up giving him, is according to Article 27
going to contribute to the development of a common foreign policy
in certain areas. Can you give us a steer on what they might be?
Mr MacShane: We have already seen
Messrs Solana and Patten, aided quite often by Lord Robertson,
the Secretary General of NATO, operating very decisively in the
Balkans. They have just chaired a meeting in Vienna that brought
together Kosovans and Serbs for the first bilateral talks that
those two communities have held in the public arena. We have seen
joint approaches on China and Russia. We have taken common foreign
policy positions in relation to Latin America. I would like to
see more work in Latin America. My contacts in that sub-continent
told me that Latin American countries would like to see a stronger,
coherent, common European Union voice. At the same time, we will
be doing things, I am sure, bilaterally or trilaterally. We had
a very good example of European foreign policy in action with
the visit by Mr Straw, Mr Villepin and Mr Fischer to Tehran. That
was not done under the direct aegis of the Council of Ministers
but it shows how Europe can work as one in key areas. There will
be areas as mandated by the Council of Ministers in which we want
to see European common foreign policy develop.
Q23 Mr Chidgey: It is very interesting
that you mentioned Tehran. As you are well aware, the Committee
was there at the same time as the Foreign Secretary. My understanding
certainly was that, however effective or not the meeting was between
the Iranians and the three foreign ministers, there was a negative
reaction from some of the smaller countries in the European Union
because of the exclusivity of the big three in that sense doing
the deal on behalf of the European Union, as they saw it. Is this
not an area which might cause even more concern in the future?
Mr MacShane: I do not think so.
My impression from reading some of the European press is that
people welcome the fact that European foreign ministers have collectively
entered into a very positive dialogue with the Iranian authorities
to reduce the undoubted tension and concerns over the possibility
of Iran constituting itself with nuclear weaponry.
Q24 Mr Chidgey: You are suggesting
that it was totally welcomed without any reaction from any of
the Member States, because that is not what I understood.
Mr MacShane: I am not responsible
for what every politician or minister says in 25 Member States
of the European Union but I think this generally was welcomed.
Q25 Ms Stuart: Could you define to
me what a foreign European policy is because three ministers,
albeit European foreign ministers going together, is that the
same as a European foreign policy? I think that is really the
argument.
Mr MacShane: It is an important
question and one I tried to define for myself by drawing a distinction
between what I call common foreign policy and single foreign policy.
What is difficult to achieve would be a single foreign policy
covering all aspects of what all 25 Member States of the European
Union want to do in terms of their external relations. I think
we managed to get there in some aspects of Balkan policy and we
have got there in other aspects to do with trade, although that
is not necessarily the direct responsibility of a European foreign
affairs representative. What we want to see is more common foreign
policy and those are positions jointly agreed. I think there will
be times when this is done bilaterally, trilaterally, quadrilaterally
and there will be times when these issues are brought to the Council
of Ministers, as I have seen for myself, and discussed and a common
position hammered out. I do not know if that is helpful. My general
view is that in dealing with some of the grave problems we face
around the world the more Europe can speak as one the better.
When Europe is divided, I do not think it strengthens the position
that the democratic regions of the world take face to face with
some of the big issues we all have to solve.
Q26 Mr Hamilton: Where are you going
to draw the line? I accept that the more we have a collective
policy the better but where is that line going to be drawn between
a collective policy and drawing in the foreign policies of the
constituent and component nations of the enlarged European Union?
To use that dreadful term "communitisation", how are
we going to stop the "communitisation" of foreign policy
in Europe with this new foreign minister?
Mr MacShane: Here, we are getting
slightly into the techno-speak of European jargon but my understanding
is that "communitisation" means a competence exercise
by the Commission. The constitutional treaty draft text so far
and certainly the express wish of the majority of Member States
is that the common foreign policy is agreed on an intergovernmental
basis. I do not, for example, see the European foreign affairs
spokesperson in all cases phoning up Mr Straw, Mr Villepin and
Mr Fischer or indeed Mr Frattini or Miss de Palacio saying, "This
is your foreign policy today. Go out and implement it." There
are just too many areas and too many foreign policy obligations
to discharge which in particular require very quick decision making.
I hope the more we debate and discuss this and inform ourselves
of our thinking, we consult, we coordinate, we cooperate, we will
be able to speak more as one but without in any way seeking to
abolish the sovereign right of nation states to express their
policy in terms of external relations.
Q27 Mr Hamilton: Can you not see
a situation where, for example, the European foreign minister,
whatever you want to call that person, is taking one view which
has been discussed and is being contradicted by the foreign minister
of a particular constituent nation? To give an example, given
what we have just been discussing on Tehran, the EU could have
one policy and our foreign minister from the EU could be dealing
with Tehran over nuclear fuel or power stations and a component
nation of the EU—let us pick one out of the hat—the
Poles, for example, could have a completely different policy and
be contradicting what the foreign minister of the EU is doing.
Can you see that happening?
Mr MacShane: No, because I think
that the foreign affairs representative of the EU will express
policy that has already been decided collectively at the Council
of Ministers. That will be his operation area. Believe me, he
will have plenty of work to do. There will be other cases where
individual countries, groups of countries or coalitions of countries
will want to put forward common foreign policy positions. My own
judgment is that this gentleman or this lady will be acting under
mandates given from the Council of Ministers. That will be his
or her area of competence. Hence, Mr Solana, for example, or Mr
Patten did not animadvert on European policy on the question of
how to deal with Iraq because they had no competence to do so
and no decision from the Council of Ministers. During the weeks
and months of that period, believe me, both gentlemen were extremely
busy defending and promoting European common foreign policy in
areas which were not as controversial or sensitive or where the
Member States were divided over Iraq.
Q28 Mr Hamilton: Is it envisaged
that the staff that currently serve Mr Solana and Mr Patten would
effectively be the new staff for the new foreign minister position,
or is that going to be enhanced or developed in any way?
Mr MacShane: At the moment, Mr
Solana has relatively few staff. I understand that the cleaning
bills for the EU buildings in Brussels are greater than his budget.
The proposal is to bring together the people who work for Mr Patten
and Mr Solana to create a European external action service. This
is not to replace national diplomatic services. The constitutional
treaty explicitly states that the external action service shall
work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member
States.
Q29 Mr Hamilton: The next part of
my question was about diplomacy. Presumably, the EU is already
represented in many countries throughout the world. How will the
interplay between the diplomatic representation of the EU and
its foreign minister balance with the individual nations within
the EU and their diplomatic services? Will there be any problem?
Mr MacShane: I do not think so.
I do not think any of our Member States are at any stage looking
to fold their national, diplomatic services into anything that
the European Union does. There are 138 delegation offices representing
the European Commission around the world and indeed with international
organisations. We would like to see those operating under the
authority of the European foreign minister and in very close cooperation
with Member States' diplomatic missions. There are many parts
of the world where European Union individual Member State representation
is relatively small in terms of the number of diplomats each country
has at its disposal to post to smaller countries in far flung
parts of the world. Bringing some of these people together in
closer cooperation with the European Union delegation office could
enhance the common voice. For example, when I was the minister
responsible for Latin America and for parts of Asia, I always
asked our local ambassador to organise a breakfast, lunch or dinner
with all the other EU ambassadors and the delegation office head
in the capital concerned, because I felt it was better to listen,
to learn, to talk. One plus one plus one to the total number of
ambassadors saying the same thing in the same way at the same
time to the same people has much greater impact, always with the
reserve that it will be the autonomous decision of individual
Member States to decide their foreign policy positions, save when
the Council of Ministers collectively says, "This is the
common foreign policy position" and we all go out and defend
it and the European Union foreign affairs spokesman, when he or
she is in place, goes out and promotes it.
Q30 Mr Hamilton: There is no plan
to expand the number of EU missions in other parts of the world?
Mr MacShane: I think not. There
are 138. I think there are about 190 Member States of the United
Nations but some of them perhaps are rather small. I do not want
to be offensive to any country that does not have an EU delegation
office. We would like to see more cross-posting between diplomats.
One of the successes of the Foreign Office is that we exchange
our best and our brightest with Foreign Offices in other countries,
including beyond Europe. My new private secretary, for example,
was a Sherpa for President Chirac at the G8 at Evian because he
was doing a year's work for the Ecole Nationale d'Administration
and when introduced to the Sherpa team I am told the President
of France was told, "This is Mr Boxer. He works at the Foreign
Office." He looked and said, "It is interesting that
a member of the British diplomatic service is working for me.
Nobody is perfect", but he was quite happy with the contribution
that the British diplomat made to the success of the Evian summit.
Q31 Chairman: It is a good name,
the external action service. That is Euro-speak for the diplomatic
service. I guess some will be concerned that this is a step change
towards a far more formalised diplomatic service for the European
Union. Do you share those concerns?
Mr MacShane: I do not. I did read
out a clause in the draft constitutional treaty and it states
in terms, "This service shall work in cooperation with the
diplomatic services of the Member States." It already exists.
The delegation offices help particularly in administering the
overseas aid and development budget of the EU. I see no likelihood
of the Quai d'Orsay or the German Auswaertiges Amt being about
to be abolished. Interestingly, under the French constitution,
France can only be represented by a French citizen. If you like,
with a written constitution and that solemn protection, France
can only be represented by its own citizens working in the French
diplomatic service.
Q32 Richard Ottaway: Can I take you
to defence and particularly the relationship with NATO? I am sure
you will agree that there are good bits and bad bits in the proposals
but in your White Paper you said, "We will not agree to anything
which is contradictory to, or would replace, the security guarantee
established through NATO." What changes would you like to
see to the draft constitution?
Mr MacShane: We had a lengthy
debate on this yesterday in the House, as you know. Our position
remains very clear. Collective and territorial defence is for
NATO. That was agreed at Nice. We welcome European defence initiatives.
We welcome the fact that they are operational in the Balkans and
in the Congo and in effect we want two ways forward. We want NATO
for collective security and NATO are now undertaking new roles
in Afghanistan. I think what is under-estimated is the extraordinary
political contribution NATO now makes to the democratisation and
the understanding that military forces have to be under civilian
control in the incoming and applicant Member States or the countries
that are looking in due course to join the European Union. Yes,
we think that Europe should undertake more responsibility to deal
with military activities when it has been agreed on the basis
of unanimity. What we do not want is to see a third way. That
is to say, European defence in any way being perceived as being
rival or parallel to NATO. I have to say that is very much the
position that the vast majority of the 25 share with us.
Q33 Richard Ottaway: Do you think
we need to have amendments to the draft constitution as it stands
at the moment, to reflect what you have just said?
Mr MacShane: Yes. Those discussions
are on-going at the moment. We want to see clarity in the final
constitutional treaty.
Q34 Richard Ottaway: Any major proposals,
or are you just fine-tuning here for clarity's sake?
Mr MacShane: The word-smiths are
hammering away. There have been discussions, as has been widely
reported, between the Prime Minister, the President of France
and the Chancellor of Germany, but we continue to maintain the
position as set out in the White Paper. One of the sensitive issues
was the proposal to create an operational headquarters in Tervuren
in the suburbs of Brussels, but the Germany defence minister said
in terms, at the end of last week, that this will not happen.
We welcome that, it gets that particular problem, as it were,
out of the way and we will just keep working on words to satisfy
not just our needs. I do stress this, Mr Chairman. That is the
position of our Finnish colleagues (I would refer to a very good
article in the Financial Times today by the Finnish Foreign
Ministry), the incoming Member States from East and Central Europe,
old friends like Portugal, and our Spanish and Italian friends.
Q35 Richard Ottaway: I am aware that
there has been a bit of movement on the headquarters point but
we seem to have conceded that the EU needs some kind of planning
headquarters for independent missions. Do you not think that that
represents an encroachment of NATO's role?
Mr MacShane: No, we have always
said that planning takes place already, and it is taking place
through the EU military staff, it is taking place by the European
Union unit within SHAPE[2]
we have an EU planning cell at SHAPE and we would like to see
the military staff role strengthened. We have to plan—that
has never been in question.
Q36 Richard Ottaway: But it is the
location of where the planning is. If it is inside NATO I think
people can be relaxed; if there is a separate headquarters people
may well see it as a Trojan Horse.
Mr MacShane: That is precisely
why Mr Struck, speaking as Defence Minister for Germany, said
it was not going to happen.
Q37 Richard Ottaway: There is a difference
between the structure and co-operation in defence, which was originally
planned, which seems to have been dropped in favour of these planning
headquarters. Are you saying to me there will not be a separate
building and it will take place within the NATO organisation,
the NATO headquarters?
Mr MacShane: I was quoting the
German minister who knocked on the head the so-called Tervuren
proposal, which was first floated on 29 April. Since Germany was
one of the key players there I think it is important to pray him
in-aid. The British position—and I can only speak for the
British Government—remains as set out in the White Paper.
Planning cells already exist and they may have to be enhanced
as European defence takes on more responsibilities, but we will
do this in full partnership with all of our allies in NATO; it
is NATO that remains the collective security guarantee for all
of Europe. If I can quote Adam Michnik, one of the founding fathers
of the Polish Union Solidarnosc, now editor of the main Polish
paper Gazeta Wyborcza "America is our security, Europe
is our future". I think that is where the vast majority of
European peoples and governments are happy.
Q38 Richard Ottaway: Can I just focus
on the pragmatics here? You have just said you would not do anything
that was not in partnership with the members of NATO. That is
slightly different, that is not within NATO.
Mr MacShane: Clearly there are
members of the European Union that are not in NATO but, oddly
enough, if you read, again, today's Financial Times, one
of them, namely Finland, has a very important article by its foreign
minister, a Social Democratic colleague, making very, very clear
that he and Finland are not happy with anything that goes beyond
the proposals that are currently in place, that is to say the
EU military staff, the planning cells at SHAPE, on one hand, and
NATO on the other. So even neutral countries, as it were, are
working with us. I have certainly had conversations in Helsinki
and found, to my surprise, that our policy, our general approach,
was mirrored in that important country.
Q39 Richard Ottaway: I am still not
sure I am 100 per cent clear, but let us move on to talk about
the relationship with the Americans, which you touched on. I think
as recently as October Nicholas Burns, the US Ambassador to NATO,
said "The plans represent one of the greatest dangers to
the transatlantic relationship." How are you going to reassure
the Americans on this?
Mr MacShane: Mr Chairman, I feel
I am slightly rerunning yesterday's debate. Mr Burns said that
he had no problems with the UK position (I am afraid I am now
quoting from memory because I do not have Hansard in front
of me) and at the NAC[3]
meeting of last Monday all parties and partners there were reassured,
judging from the statements made afterwards. Clearly there is
a discussion that, I fear, will go on for most of the rest of
this century with the United States; America, at times, says "Europe
should be doing more" and, at times, some voices in America
get nervous when Europe proposes to do more. As I say—and
forgive me if I am repeating myself—the vast majority of
European Union countries want to work within NATO, see NATO as
the cornerstone of their collective security, want to sustain
the transatlantic alliance but also want to see, as we do, Europe
accepting, as the United States often in the past has urged Europeans
to do, more responsibility in discharging military capabilities
where it is appropriate for Europe to undertake this action. If
I give a very specific case it might help the Committee to elucidate
this problem. In the middle 1990s it was clear that Albania was
on the point of descending into civil war. The question was raised
whether NATO should intervene to stabilise Albania. I have to
say it was this Government, under a different administration,
that imposed a veto. Luckily, Italy, helped by one or two countries,
decided to intervene on the basis of a coalition of the willing
(the so-called Operation Alba) and that undoubtedly contributed
significantly to stopping what was a very tense situation spilling
into what could have been the most awful civil war. I remember
sitting in a White House mess in 1993 to be told by one of President
Clinton's top people "Denis, there is no way this President
will ever send an American soldier to the Balkans. It is a European
problem, you have to sort it out." My surgery—and I
expect the surgery of many senior colleagues here—is still
living with the aftermath of Europe's failure in the 1990s to
deal with the problem of Milosevic's wars in the former Yugoslavia.
I think that has alerted all of us to the need for Europe to develop
a defence capability and to deploy it where necessary.
2 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Back
3
NATO Advisory Council Back
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