Memorandum submitted by the Institute
for Public Policy Research (IPPR)
INTRODUCTION
1. The IPPR welcomes the publication of
the FCO's Human Rights Annual Report 2003. The Report is a substantial
document that highlights many examples of constructive UK Government
policies and initiatives to protect and promote human rights internationally.
By putting considerable information about these policies into
the public domain, the Report also serves to enhance the quality
of public and parliamentary debate on human rights issues.
2. In this memorandum, we focus our comments
and recommendations on the following areas:
(a)
Joined-up Government;
(e)
military intervention and human rights, particularly
the responsibilities of intervening powers towards civilians in
the countries in which they intervene.
JOINED-UP
GOVERNMENT
3. The second chapter of the Report is entitled
Human Rights: Joined-up Government. The opening paragraph states
that "the FCO rarely works in isolation from other government
departments . . . The FCO's response to the challenge of human
rights violations committed abroad is inextricably linked to the
work of other government departments" (page 62). However,
the Human Rights Report is considerably weakened by being an FCO
Human Rights Report rather than the UK Government's Human Rights
Report. This is much more than an issue of semantics. It raises
important questions about the relative importance that the Government
attaches to economic and social rights, where the Department for
International Development (DFID) is obviously the key department.
It also raises issues about the degree to which UK policy on international
trade, investment, arms exports and defence is consistent with
its policy on international human rights, and the extent to which
the relevant Departments approach these issues from a human rights
perspective.
4. This is the 6th Human Rights Report.
The first two such Reports were produced jointly by the FCO and
DFID and signed off by their respective Secretaries of State.
No adequate explanation was ever provided as to why the Report
then became an FCO Report, signed off only by the Foreign Secretary.
While the Human Rights Report does contain a section on economic
and social rights, the importance of these issues and the contribution
that the UK Government is making to them through the Department
for International Development is not adequately captured in the
Report's new format. The IPPR recommends that the Human Rights
Report should be a genuinely UK Government Human Rights Report,
with balanced coverage of cultural, economic and social rights
as well as political and civil rights. It should be put together
by officials drawn from a number of relevant Government Departments.
This would help to build greater ownership for the Report across
Whitehall. The Report should also be signed off by other Secretaries
of State in addition to the Foreign Secretary, not least the Secretary
of State for International Development.
THE ROLE
OF THE
UNITED NATIONS
5. Chapter 4 of the Report deals with the
human rights role of various multilateral institutions, including
the UN. The Report states, "The United Nations is the single
most important body for promoting human rights worldwide"
(page 109). The UN is indeed a critical institution with a vital
role to play in promoting human rights internationally. However,
the overall impact of the UN on human rights falls well below
its potential. There are two overarching problems. Firstly, human
rights are still not sufficiently central to the mainstream work
of the UN (though some steps have been taken to address this).
Secondly, there is a continuing need to improve the UN's systems
of management and organisation, so that the UN is better able
to deliver on the human rights commitments that it has made. These
problems are compounded by, and reflected in, low levels of funding
for the UN's human rights work, duplication of the work of the
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, politicisation within the UN Commission
on Human Rights and weaknesses within the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights.
6. The share of the regular UN budget spent
on the human rights work of the Office of the High Commissioner
on Human Rights is 24 million dollars, approximately 1.7% of the
total. In practice this means that key figures within the UN itself,
such as the High Commissioner on Human Rights, are forced regularly
to go cap in hand to member states, private benefactors and NGOs
to raise the funds to make their work possible. Moreover, many
of the other human rights activities of the UN—such as its
human rights field operations or work on indigenous peoples—depends
on voluntary contributions from governments. The IPPR recommends
that the UK Government press for a significant increase in the
proportion of the regular UN Budget devoted to human rights.
7. The human rights Treaty Bodies are at
the core of the UN system for the protection of human rights,
and, unlike the Charter bodies, they are dependent upon state
ratification. Every UN member state is a party to one or more
of the six major human rights treaties and 80% of states have
ratified four or more of these. However, the six Treaty Bodies
that monitor and evaluate state policies and practices against
these commitments are weak and poorly funded and many governments
fail to report, or do so very late or superficially. They also
lack a clearly defined relationship with other parts of the UN
human rights system, including the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights. The result has been a burgeoning number of reports, duplication
of procedures, little effort to synchronise outcomes and only
rudimentary follow-up processes. The ippr recommends that the
UK Government promote consolidation of the Treaty Bodies within
the UN system, possibly through requiring state parties to submit
one consolidated report applicable to all treaties they have ratified,
organised on a thematic rather than a treaty basis.
8. The UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is
supposed to be the main UN forum for the discussion of human rights.
However, in recent years, the Commission has become very heavily
politicised, with acrimonious debates, obstructionism and point-scoring.
This has seriously called into question the CHR's efficiency and
effectiveness and its continuing relevance and value. A major
issue at the 59th Session in 2003 was the selection of Libya to
serve as Chair of the Commission, despite its poor human rights
record. Notwithstanding its recent and welcome decision to open
up its WMD programme to international inspection, Libya remains
a wholly inappropriate country to be chairing the CHR. The ippr
recommends that the UK Government press for high standards and
independent monitoring of human rights observance to be a condition
for membership of the CHR. As an interim measure, countries could
be required to make specific commitments in the area of human
rights and, within a specified period, urged to formalise these
declarations.
9. Kofi Annan has identified the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) as a priority for the
human rights work of the UN and has called for significant reforms
to strengthen its capacity to mainstream human rights across the
UN system as a whole, and co-ordinate the work of the Commission
on Human Rights, the treaty bodies and the special rapporteurs.
The IPPR recommends that the UK Government strongly support Kofi
Annan's reform proposals for the OHCHR. A particular priority
should be strengthening the capacity of the OHCHR to support human
rights initiatives on the ground, including through National Human
Rights Commissions.
ARMS EXPORTS
10. The Human Rights Report addresses the issue
of arms exports in Chapter 2 on Joined-Up Government (pages 75-76)
and Chapter 5 on Human Rights and Conflict (page 127). However,
it does so very unsatisfactorily. There are some real contradictions
between the Government's declared commitments on Human Rights
and its policy on arms exports to particular countries, as recorded
in the UK Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls.
11. For example, the FCO Human Rights Report
2003 states that "Indonesia's human rights record continues
to give some cause for concern" (page 41). However, the Government's
Annual Report on Strategic Exports (published in July 2003) reveals
that there has been a twenty-fold increase in the value of arms
sales licensed to Indonesia over the past two years. Licences
granted to Indonesia last year included components for military
training aircraft, tanks, munitions launching equipment and armoured
personnel carriers. Open export licences were also granted for
armoured vehicles.
12. The FCO Human Rights Report 2003 states
that there are "deep concerns about Saudi Arabia's failure
to implement basic human rights norms. Our concerns apply to a
wide range of issues including in relation to aspects of the judicial
system; capital and corporal punishment; torture; discrimination
against women and non-Muslims; and restrictions on freedom of
movement, expression, assembly and worship" (page 45). However,
the Government's Annual Report on Strategic Exports 2003 reveals
that UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia have increased. The value
of licenses granted in 2002 was £29 million. This included
rocket launching equipment and assault rifles, and general purpose
machine guns.
13. The FCO Human Rights Report 2003 raises
serious issues about the human rights situation in Colombia. It
states that "Impunity, particularly for members of the armed
forces accused of human rights abuses, remains a serious concern"
(page 58). However, the Annual Report on Strategic Exports 2003
reveals that individual export licences were granted for Colombia
for equipment including Toxic Chemical Precursors, technology
for the production of toxins, technology for the use of combat
aircraft and components for—torpedoes, surface to air missile
launching equipment, heavy machine guns, combat aircraft, combat
helicopters and small calibre artillery.
14. The FCO Human Rights Report 2003 states
that the UK "remains concerned about the human rights situation
in Kashmir" (page 136). However, the Annual Report on Strategic
Exports 2003 reveals that individual export licences to India
were approved for equipment including components for anti-aircraft
guns, ballistic test equipment, electron beam guns, fast attack
craft, frigates, gun laying equipment, military equipment. Open
export licences were also granted for equipment including components
for combat aircraft, combat helicopters and military transport
aircraft. Export licences were approved for Pakistan for components
for air to air missiles, combat helicopters and frigates. Both
India and Pakistan were granted open licenses for small arms ammunition.
15. Despite the passage of the Export Control
Act (2002), the Government has also failed to introduce adequate
controls over UK arms brokers and traffickers. Many of the weapons
feeding conflict and human rights abuses in Africa and elsewhere
are being supplied by arms brokers, but UK controls will do little
to curb the activity of UK nationals involved in this trade. Despite
a manifesto pledge to "control the activities of arms brokers
and traffickers wherever they are located" the Government
has backed away from comprehensive controls. The Government has
extended controls over arms brokers but only in limited circumstances.
The, new regulations mean that brokering conventional weapons
to destinations not subject to a UN embargo will require a licence
only where part of the deal takes place in the UK. Full extra-territorial
controls on brokering will only be imposed for deals that involve
transfers to embargoed destinations, or transfers of equipment
used in torture and long-range missiles. As a result, UK dealers
could continue to transfer weapons to countries that violate human
rights or threaten regional stability (but where no embargo is
in place) simply by going across the Channel to conduct their
arms brokering deal. Then IPPR recommends that the Government
should implement its manifesto commitment and introduce full extra-territorial
controls over UK arms brokers and traffickers.
THE PRIVATE
SECTOR AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
16. The Government addresses the issue of
the private sector and human rights in the context of its support
for corporate social responsibility (page 152). While the UK Government
considers itself something of a leader on corporate social responsibility
(CSR), its approach to these issues, including human rights, has
been defined— and to a considerable extent constrained—by
its reluctance to go beyond purely voluntary initiatives. There
are three examples of where such an approach is proving inimical
to a stronger UK Government position on the private sector and
human rights.
17. Firstly, the OECD Guidelines on Multinational
Enterprises. These set out a comprehensive list of guidelines
for good corporate behaviour, including on human rights. The Guidelines
contain a mechanism (reporting through national contact points)
to ensure that signatory governments respond to concerns raised
about specific companies, including adverse impacts on human rights.
But this mechanism is weak and ineffective. For example, in October
2002, the UN Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural
Resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo named over 50 OECD
companies as being in breach of the OECD guidelines in its report
to the UN Security Council. A subsequent UN Security Council resolution—
1457— urged "all states . . . to conduct their own
investigations, including as appropriate through judicial means,
in order to clarify credibly the findings of the panel".[1]The
UN Panel included four UK companies and dossiers on them were
forwarded to the national contact point in the UK (which is located
in the DTI). However, the UK Government announced that it had
no intention of investigating the allegations, indeed that it
was not its role to do so. It has taken NGO campaigning and media
pressure to force the Government to agree that it will now follow-up
the panel's evidence with the companies concerned. The ippr recommends
that the UK Government should support a strengthening of the OECD
Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises. Responding to concerns
referred under the National Contact Point system should become
automatic not discretionary, with any findings made public.
18. Another important recent development
is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The
EITI was launched by Tony Blair at the World Summit on Sustainable
Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in September 2002. This announcement
came very much as a response to an international NGO campaign
"Publish what you pay" which called for greater transparency
over the revenue payments made by international oil, mining and
gas companies that invest in developing and transition countries.
The campaign has shown convincingly that a lack of transparency
is damaging to human rights and development and a source of corruption,
conflict and instability in many countries. The aim of the EITI
is to increase transparency over payments and revenues in the
extractives sector. But the scheme is seriously limited by the
fact that it is entirely voluntary. While the best companies are
now beginning to engage with it, there is no guarantee that all
companies will do so, particularly in some of the countries where
greater transparency is needed most. The IPPR recommends that
the UK Government should support the introduction of an industry-wide
mandatory requirement on companies to disclose net revenues to
all national governments, to be implemented through changes to
stock-market listings requirements and national and international
accounting standards.
19. The most serious attempt in recent years
to establish a clearer legal framework for the human rights responsibilities
of companies is the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human
Rights (the Norms). These were adopted unanimously by the UN Sub-Commission
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in August 2003
and have been forwarded to the UN Commission on Human Rights.
Faced with a proliferation of codes developed by NGOs and governments,
the Norms are an attempt to rationalise the existing standards
relating to the human rights responsibilities of companies. The
Norms are based solely on existing international human rights
law and labour standards, drawn, for example, from core ILO conventions,
the UN Global Compact and the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
In December 2003, a group of seven multi-national companies launched
a three-year project, the Business Leaders Initiative on Human
Rights (BLIHR). The project's aim is to test the Norms as a tool
for businesses to use when faced with the conceptual and practical
difficulties of implementing human rights principles at the country
level. Thus far, the UK Government has been lukewarm in its approach
to the Norms: a mistaken approach that overlooks their potential
for strengthening corporate accountability on human rights issues.
The IPPR recommends that the UK Government should support the
UN Norms, as an essential means for establishing a clearer legal
framework of accountability for companies on human rights. It
should also encourage other UK companies to engage with the Norms
and to support the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights.
INTERVENTION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
20. Arguably, the most important international
human rights issue of our time is that of "humanitarian intervention."
The UK Government has been a strong supporter of such intervention,
with the UK having intervened militarily four times since 1997—in
Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq— and having used
"humanitarian" arguments, albeit selectively and to
varying degrees, to justify these interventions. The Government
makes reference to the issue of intervention in Jack Straw's Foreword
to the Human Rights Report and in Chapter 1, in the context of
discussing Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the most difficult issues
morally in relation to intervention concerns the human costs to
civilians in the countries in which it takes place. The Government's
Human Rights Report states, in respect of military action against
Iraq, that "the Coalition launched a successful campaign,
carefully targeted to minimise civilian casualties" (page
20). However, neither in this Report nor elsewhere has the UK
Government been prepared to estimate the number of Iraqi civilians
and military personnel killed or injured as a consequence of the
coalition military action, nor has it provided a satisfactory
argument for why this should not be done. Independent estimates
suggest that there may have been as many as 9,000 deaths in Iraq
as a consequence of coalition military action.[2]
These independent, assessments undermine Government claims that
recording the number of casualties is too difficult to do. This
claim is also undermined by the experience of 9/11 where the US
authorities rightly went to great lengths to record the number
of people killed in the attack on the Twin Towers. "Humanitarian
intervention" is a complex issue, but it must surely involve
some responsibility for ordinary people living in the country
concerned, on whose behalf and in whose interests these interventions
are supposedly being carried out. The ippr recommends that the
UK Government and other countries involved in military interventions
take steps to record and publish the number of people killed or
injured as a consequence of their military action.
21. Intervention on human rights grounds
should also involve responsibility for the families and dependants
of those killed as a result of the military intervention. In the
US, compensation payments have recently been made to the families
of Iraqi civilians killed as a consequence of US military action
that was judged "negligent."[3]
The UK Government has also revealed that compensation payments
will be made to a handful of Iraqi families as a result of negligent
action by UK troops."[4]
The IPPR recommends that the UK Government and other countries
involved in the military intervention in Iraq consider the introduction
of a comprehensive system of compensation for the families and
dependants of those killed as a result of coalition military action.
Institute for Public Policy Research
1 http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/indepth/040lcsr/csr-section1
.pdf Back
2
www://iraqbodycount.net Back
3
Rory McCarthy "US pays up for fatal Iraq blunders,"
the Guardian, November 26, 2003 Back
4
http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm8499l9.html Back
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