Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by Free Tibet Campaign

Free Tibet Campaign stands for the Tibetans' right to determine their own future. It campaigns for an end to the Chinese occupation of Tibet and for the Tibetans' fundamental human rights to be respected. Founded in 1989, Free Tibet Campaign generates active support by educating people about the situation in Tibet. Free Tibet Campaign is an international organisation, funded by its members and supporters. It is independent of all governments, the Tibetan government in exile and all other organisations and groups.

  This memorandum covers the sections of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 2003 Human Rights Annual Report relating to China and Tibet, and additionally offers follow up remarks to both the Committee's recommendations on the 2002 Human Rights Annual Report and Government's response to these recommendations.

1.  THE FUTURE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILATERAL DIALOGUE WITH CHINA

  1.1  In evidence in 2002, the Minister "strongly defended his Government's policy on pursuing the Human Rights Dialogue with China" (para 37 of the Committee's report). The 2003 Annual Report states on page 37 that: "China stated at the UN Commission on Human Rights in April 2003 that international concern over human rights in China was "unimportant, meaningless and irrelevant." This has led to concerns among both other governments and in the NGO community as to the value China places on human rights dialogues." The FCO goes on to state that, despite this, HMG prefers a policy of engagement to isolation. The implication that the only alternative to the bilateral dialogue is isolationism is clearly nonsense, and Free Tibet Campaign is not satisfied that the Government has justified the continued focus on the Dialogue as its primary strategy on human rights in China.

  1.2  The FCO also states (page 38) that "at an NGO seminar in April in Geneva which looked at the successes and failures of the dialogue process and in which Foreign Office officials participated, all participants supported continuing dialogue with China." As a co-organiser of that seminar, I can state that there were NGOs present which did not hold that view, and those that did attached conditions and provisos to this support. A paper by Free Tibet campaign, Human Rights in China and International Campaign for Tibet, which offers analysis and recommendations for China's bilateral Human Rights Dialogue partners (as at April 2003), is attached for the Committee's information.

  1.3  Closely connected to the issues raised in point 1.1 is a statement on page 36 of the FCO report, relating to the cases of Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche and Lobsang Dhondup (see also 3.1). The FCO comments on the failure of the Chinese to keep the EU informed, stating: "we view this as a breach of the trust built up by the dialogue process." Whilst this robust statement is welcomed, Free Tibet Campaign has been unable to determine what action HMG proposes to take to address this "breach of trust." It would be wholly inadequate for this to appear merely as a "throwaway" statement in the Annual Report, without a specific plan to address this problem. Clearly a breach of trust further undermines the case for Dialogue as the Government's predominant strategy.

  1.4  Since the publication of this report there has been one further session between UK and Chinese officials; this took place in November 2003 in Beijing. Although this is outside the period covered by the 2003 Annual Report, it is relevant to highlight some instances which illustrate a lack of progress, or worse. These include:

    —  A refusal by the Chinese delegation to brief the HMG's officials on the progress of "formal contact" between Beijing and representatives of the Dalai Lama. Free Tibet Campaign is concerned that this may demonstrate a loss of momentum, and does not reflect well on China's attitude towards the Government, which has been raising the question of talks between the two sides for many years.

    —  A claim by Chinese officials that the jamming of BBC services was not a human rights issue and that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not the appropriate Ministry with which to raise such questions. Again, the Government has been trying to address this problem through the bilateral Dialogue for a number of years.

2.  ADDITIONAL STRATEGIES: UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER APPROACHES

  2.1  In its reply to the Committee's report on the 2002 Annual Report on Human Rights, concerning the use of a China resolution at UNCHR, the Government stated that "the situation overall [in China] has not deteriorated." This appears at odds, not only with the opinion of many NGOs, but with the view of a senior United States official, who recently stated that in 2003 there was "backsliding" on China's human rights commitments. Lorne Craner, speaking on 29 January 2004 at a conference organised by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC said that although there was "a great deal of co-operation" from China in 2002, improvements related to the Human Rights Dialogue stalled in 2003 (source: International Campaign for Tibet). Mr Craner also ruled out an immediate resumption of the USA's bilateral Human Rights Dialogue with China, asserting "Talks for talk's sake is not enough." He added that the United States was seriously considering sponsoring a resolution on China in 2004 at the 60th UNCHR.

  2.2  Despite the Government's assertion in 2003 that tabling a resolution on China at CHR did not improve the human rights situation in China, it is clear that international pressure has a role in encouraging progress by China. An evaluation conducted by Bern University into the Swiss/China dialogue concluded: "In the early years China was very much prepared to consider certain messages of the Swiss. However, as the pressure from the international community diminished and other countries took up a Human Rights dialogue in institutionalised talks, the dialogue with Switzerland obviously lost much of its importance to China. The readiness to carry out a genuine dialogue waned." Resolutions at UNCHR are an effective way of applying pressure on China; even if there is insufficient support amongst Commission members for such a resolution to be passed, it sends a strong signal to China and ensures high levels of diplomatic activity.

  2.3  Free Tibet Campaign has consistently sought, since 2000, to contribute to the creative development of the Government's China strategy, with the objective of generating new initiatives which promote human rights in China and, specifically, work towards a negotiated settlement on Tibet. A number of proposals have been submitted to the Government but we have yet to see a truly creative process emerge. We understand that a cross-Ministerial group on China has now been established, and we urge the Government to engage all available expertise, and utilise creative fora, in order to improve strategic development of China human rights policy and ensure that human rights is central to all government departments in their dealings with China.

3.  OTHER ISSUES

  3.1  Free Tibet Campaign welcomes the FCO's expressed concern about the cases of Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche and the execution in January 2003 of Lobsang Dhondup (page 36). However, we fail to understand why the Government has not called on China to re-open Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche's case and hold a new trial which conforms to international standards.

  3.2  We welcome the meeting between Bill Rammell and former political prisoner Ngawang Sangdrol, which took place in June 2003 at the request of Free Tibet Campaign. However, we were disappointed that Jack Straw did not accept our invitation to meet Ngawang Sangdrol and it is worth noting that securing a meeting with Mr Rammell proved difficult, as Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing was visiting London at the same time.

  [Note: Chinese officials attempted to have Ngawang Sangdrol banned from speaking at the Royal Institute for International Affairs. In this they were unsuccessful, but Li Zhaoxing withdrew from a speaking engagement at Chatham House shortly afterwards.]

  3.3  Free Tibet Campaign further welcomed the discussions between Tony Blair and Hu Jintao regarding the continuation of contact between Beijing and representatives of the Dalai Lama, which took place during the Prime Minister's visit to China in July 2003. However, we fail to understand why these conversations were veiled in such a high level of secrecy. It took Downing Street nearly two weeks to reveal that the two leaders discussed Tibet, but the conversation did not represent any departure from Government policy on Tibet (but see note below), so the secrecy implies a fear of offending China. If this is the case such fear was misplaced, as China expects Tibet to be raised in such contexts and the FCO has asserted that it favours greater transparency in its human rights dealings with China.

  [Note: Extract from Sunday Times Comment, 16 November 2003, which raises questions about the Prime Minister's record on raising human rights with Chinese leaders:

  "So when I caught Clare Short on a similar yawn-maker the other night, it almost passed for exciting viewing. She let slip, in that helpful way of former ministers, that Tony Blair told a porky. Okay, so where's the story in that? Well, he briefed that he had lectured Jiang Zemin, then China's president, on human rights during his London visit in 1999. As Blair had banned demonstrators (oh, the joys of life in a liberal democracy!) this was his chance to ask China, politely, to desist from mowing down protesters. But Short was there and says Blair never mentioned human rights."]

Alison Reynolds

Director, Free Tibet Campaign

February 2004

 





 
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