Memorandum submitted by Free Tibet Campaign
Free Tibet Campaign stands for the Tibetans' right
to determine their own future. It campaigns for an end to the
Chinese occupation of Tibet and for the Tibetans' fundamental
human rights to be respected. Founded in 1989, Free Tibet Campaign
generates active support by educating people about the situation
in Tibet. Free Tibet Campaign is an international organisation,
funded by its members and supporters. It is independent of all
governments, the Tibetan government in exile and all other organisations
and groups.
This memorandum covers the sections of the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office's 2003 Human Rights Annual Report relating
to China and Tibet, and additionally offers follow up remarks
to both the Committee's recommendations on the 2002 Human Rights
Annual Report and Government's response to these recommendations.
1. THE FUTURE
OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS
BILATERAL DIALOGUE
WITH CHINA
1.1 In evidence in 2002, the Minister "strongly
defended his Government's policy on pursuing the Human Rights
Dialogue with China" (para 37 of the Committee's report).
The 2003 Annual Report states on page 37 that: "China stated
at the UN Commission on Human Rights in April 2003 that international
concern over human rights in China was "unimportant, meaningless
and irrelevant." This has led to concerns among both other
governments and in the NGO community as to the value China places
on human rights dialogues." The FCO goes on to state that,
despite this, HMG prefers a policy of engagement to isolation.
The implication that the only alternative to the bilateral dialogue
is isolationism is clearly nonsense, and Free Tibet Campaign is
not satisfied that the Government has justified the continued
focus on the Dialogue as its primary strategy on human rights
in China.
1.2 The FCO also states (page 38) that "at
an NGO seminar in April in Geneva which looked at the successes
and failures of the dialogue process and in which Foreign Office
officials participated, all participants supported continuing
dialogue with China." As a co-organiser of that seminar,
I can state that there were NGOs present which did not hold that
view, and those that did attached conditions and provisos to this
support. A paper by Free Tibet campaign, Human Rights in China
and International Campaign for Tibet, which offers analysis and
recommendations for China's bilateral Human Rights Dialogue partners
(as at April 2003), is attached for the Committee's information.
1.3 Closely connected to the issues raised
in point 1.1 is a statement on page 36 of the FCO report, relating
to the cases of Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche and Lobsang Dhondup (see
also 3.1). The FCO comments on the failure of the Chinese to keep
the EU informed, stating: "we view this as a breach of the
trust built up by the dialogue process." Whilst this robust
statement is welcomed, Free Tibet Campaign has been unable to
determine what action HMG proposes to take to address this "breach
of trust." It would be wholly inadequate for this to appear
merely as a "throwaway" statement in the Annual Report,
without a specific plan to address this problem. Clearly a breach
of trust further undermines the case for Dialogue as the Government's
predominant strategy.
1.4 Since the publication of this report
there has been one further session between UK and Chinese officials;
this took place in November 2003 in Beijing. Although this is
outside the period covered by the 2003 Annual Report, it is relevant
to highlight some instances which illustrate a lack of progress,
or worse. These include:
— A refusal by the Chinese delegation
to brief the HMG's officials on the progress of "formal contact"
between Beijing and representatives of the Dalai Lama. Free Tibet
Campaign is concerned that this may demonstrate a loss of momentum,
and does not reflect well on China's attitude towards the Government,
which has been raising the question of talks between the two sides
for many years.
— A claim by Chinese officials that
the jamming of BBC services was not a human rights issue and that
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not the appropriate
Ministry with which to raise such questions. Again, the Government
has been trying to address this problem through the bilateral
Dialogue for a number of years.
2. ADDITIONAL
STRATEGIES: UNITED
NATIONS COMMISSION
FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS AND
OTHER APPROACHES
2.1 In its reply to the Committee's report
on the 2002 Annual Report on Human Rights, concerning the use
of a China resolution at UNCHR, the Government stated that "the
situation overall [in China] has not deteriorated." This
appears at odds, not only with the opinion of many NGOs, but with
the view of a senior United States official, who recently stated
that in 2003 there was "backsliding" on China's human
rights commitments. Lorne Craner, speaking on 29 January 2004
at a conference organised by the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace in Washington DC said that although there was "a great
deal of co-operation" from China in 2002, improvements related
to the Human Rights Dialogue stalled in 2003 (source: International
Campaign for Tibet). Mr Craner also ruled out an immediate resumption
of the USA's bilateral Human Rights Dialogue with China, asserting
"Talks for talk's sake is not enough." He added that
the United States was seriously considering sponsoring a resolution
on China in 2004 at the 60th UNCHR.
2.2 Despite the Government's assertion in
2003 that tabling a resolution on China at CHR did not improve
the human rights situation in China, it is clear that international
pressure has a role in encouraging progress by China. An evaluation
conducted by Bern University into the Swiss/China dialogue concluded:
"In the early years China was very much prepared to consider
certain messages of the Swiss. However, as the pressure from the
international community diminished and other countries took up
a Human Rights dialogue in institutionalised talks, the dialogue
with Switzerland obviously lost much of its importance to China.
The readiness to carry out a genuine dialogue waned." Resolutions
at UNCHR are an effective way of applying pressure on China; even
if there is insufficient support amongst Commission members for
such a resolution to be passed, it sends a strong signal to China
and ensures high levels of diplomatic activity.
2.3 Free Tibet Campaign has consistently
sought, since 2000, to contribute to the creative development
of the Government's China strategy, with the objective of generating
new initiatives which promote human rights in China and, specifically,
work towards a negotiated settlement on Tibet. A number of proposals
have been submitted to the Government but we have yet to see a
truly creative process emerge. We understand that a cross-Ministerial
group on China has now been established, and we urge the Government
to engage all available expertise, and utilise creative fora,
in order to improve strategic development of China human rights
policy and ensure that human rights is central to all government
departments in their dealings with China.
3. OTHER ISSUES
3.1 Free Tibet Campaign welcomes the FCO's
expressed concern about the cases of Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche and
the execution in January 2003 of Lobsang Dhondup (page 36). However,
we fail to understand why the Government has not called on China
to re-open Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche's case and hold a new trial which
conforms to international standards.
3.2 We welcome the meeting between Bill
Rammell and former political prisoner Ngawang Sangdrol, which
took place in June 2003 at the request of Free Tibet Campaign.
However, we were disappointed that Jack Straw did not accept our
invitation to meet Ngawang Sangdrol and it is worth noting that
securing a meeting with Mr Rammell proved difficult, as Chinese
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing was visiting London at the same time.
[Note: Chinese officials attempted to have Ngawang
Sangdrol banned from speaking at the Royal Institute for International
Affairs. In this they were unsuccessful, but Li Zhaoxing withdrew
from a speaking engagement at Chatham House shortly afterwards.]
3.3 Free Tibet Campaign further welcomed
the discussions between Tony Blair and Hu Jintao regarding the
continuation of contact between Beijing and representatives of
the Dalai Lama, which took place during the Prime Minister's visit
to China in July 2003. However, we fail to understand why these
conversations were veiled in such a high level of secrecy. It
took Downing Street nearly two weeks to reveal that the two leaders
discussed Tibet, but the conversation did not represent any departure
from Government policy on Tibet (but see note below), so the secrecy
implies a fear of offending China. If this is the case such fear
was misplaced, as China expects Tibet to be raised in such contexts
and the FCO has asserted that it favours greater transparency
in its human rights dealings with China.
[Note: Extract from Sunday Times Comment,
16 November 2003, which raises questions about the Prime Minister's
record on raising human rights with Chinese leaders:
"So when I caught Clare Short on a similar
yawn-maker the other night, it almost passed for exciting viewing.
She let slip, in that helpful way of former ministers, that Tony
Blair told a porky. Okay, so where's the story in that? Well,
he briefed that he had lectured Jiang Zemin, then China's president,
on human rights during his London visit in 1999. As Blair had
banned demonstrators (oh, the joys of life in a liberal democracy!)
this was his chance to ask China, politely, to desist from mowing
down protesters. But Short was there and says Blair never mentioned
human rights."]
Alison Reynolds
Director, Free Tibet Campaign
February 2004
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