Memorandum submitted by West Papua Association
UK (WPA-UK)
We enclose a memorandum for the Committee's
inquiry into the FCO's Human Rights Annual Report 2003. We apologise
for its late arrival.
We would be pleased to provide oral evidence
if the Committee would consider it helpful.
The final recommendation in the memo is a request
for the Committee to conduct an inquiry into the UK's wider relations
with Indonesia. We will be writing to the Committee further on
this, but in the meantime we would be grateful if you would draw
the request to the Committee's attention.
1. This memorandum is provided by the West
Papua Association-UK (WPA-UK), a coalition of individuals and
organisations which supports the people of West Papua in their
struggle for human rights and self-determination. The memorandum
addresses issues raised by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO) at pages 41-43 of its Human Rights Annual Report for 2003.
SUMMARY
2. West Papua has endured 40 years of intense
military repression since it was handed over to Indonesia in the
1960s by western powers, notably the US, and the UN, to suit the
politics of the day and the ambitions of resource extraction multinationals.
It was then abandoned to the rule of a violent and racist regime,
with a conservative estimate of 100,000 West Papuans since being
killed.
3. The UK has substantial economic and strategic
ties with Indonesia and provides significant support for the major
UK-based multinationals—Rio Tinto and BP—which operate
in West Papua. As a result FCO policy on West Papua is determined
primarily by economic and strategic considerations to the detriment
of human rights. By pretending that the situation in Indonesia
is much more positive than the reality: in democracy; in reform
of the military; in reduced human rights abuses, the UK government,
seemingly in the interests of UK based multinationals corporations,
is arguably exacerbating the intolerable situation under which
West Papuans live. WPA-UK believes the FCO should devote far more
attention to promoting the peaceful resolution of the West Papua
conflict and to the protection of West Papuan human rights. It
further believes that FCO must be open-minded about the future
political options for the territory and must maintain regular
dialogue with West Papuan representatives to ensure that its policy-making
properly reflects their wishes.
BACKGROUND
4. West Papua is the western half of the
island of New Guinea, which borders independent Papua New Guinea.
Indigenous West Papuans are primarily Melanesians and the majority
are Christian, as distinct from their Malay, Muslim neighbours
in Indonesia. The territory was previously known as West New Guinea,
West Irian and Irian Jaya and is presently called Papua by Indonesia.
5. Like the rest of present-day Indonesia,
West Papua was formerly part of the Dutch East Indies, but remained
a non-self-governing territory under Dutch rule after Indonesia
gained its independence in 1949. At the beginning of the 1960s
it was being prepared for independence by the Dutch, against strong
opposition from Indonesia. In the context of Cold War politics,
the Dutch were persuaded by the United States to enter into the
`New York Agreement' with Indonesia in August 1962. No West Papuan
representatives were consulted. However, the Agreement stipulated
that all adult Papuans would have the right to participate in
an act of self determination in accordance with international
practice.
6. The Dutch then handed West Papua over
to a temporary UN authority, which stayed only seven months before
handing control to Jakarta. Thereafter, the UN failed to protect
Papuan rights, which were guaranteed by the New York Agreement.
In 1969, a hand-picked group of 1,022 Papuans, out of a population
of around 800,000, were forced to vote unanimously under extreme
duress in a process known as the Act of "Free" Choice
for their country to become part of Indonesia.
7. Chakravarthy Narasimhan, the retired
UN Under-Secretary-General responsible for the UN's role in West
Papua, later admitted that the process was a "whitewash",
and that "The mood at the United Nations was to get rid of
this problem as quickly as possible"[50]
An FCO briefing noted: "Privately, however, we recognise
that the people of West Irian have no desire to be ruled by the
Indonesians who are of an alien (Javanese) race, and that the
process of consultation did not allow a genuinely free choice
to be made."[51]
Opposition to the Act of "Free" Choice and to rule from
Jakarta is today as strong as ever and what the FCO refers to
as a "debate on the legitimacy of the 1969 process"
(p 43) is actually translating into growing international acceptance
of its invalidity.
8. After the international community diverted
its attention from West Papua in 1969, a veil of secrecy fell
over the country, with little news of the tens of thousands killed
and abused allowed out. Indonesia's systematic exploitation of
West Papua's abundant natural resources has been a major cause
of tension and conflict. Extractive operations have involved the
denial of land rights and severe environmental degradation. Some
of the worst human rights violations have been committed in the
vicinity of major enterprises, such as the Freeport copper-and-gold
mine (part owned by Britain's Rio Tinto), which are given corporate-funded
"protection" by the armed forces. BP's investment in
a huge liquid natural gas project, Tangguh, is expected to attract
similar problems.
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT:
OF INDONESIA'S
FAILING TRANSITION
9. Indonesia is currently experiencing a
reversal in its transition from dictatorship to democracy with
a stifling of the reform movement which emerged following the
downfall of President Suharto in May 1998. This has major implications
for West Papua and other areas of conflict. While some progress
was made towards democracy and human rights during the brief presidencies
of Habibie (1998-1999) and Wahid (1999-2001), President Megawati
Sukarnoputri (2001-) has proved an ineffectual leader, who has
allowed the Indonesian military (TNI) to resume its dominance
in security and political affairs, as under the Suharto dictatorship.
WPA-UK believes that the FCO has underplayed this regressive trend
in noting only that the "road to democracy has not been straightforward"
(p 41).
10. The TNI, refusing to submit to civilian
control, is now dictating the national agenda, which includes
applying military solutions to the conflicts in West Papua and
Aceh. It is using the fight against separatism to justify its
enhanced role and to secure its lucrative business interests.
The military's role has been bolstered by western support for
the "war against terror". Economic stagnation, widespread
corruption and the weakness of democratic institutions have accompanied
the TNI's resurgence under Megawati; while civil society has failed
to consolidate its post-Suharto gains.
11. Retired army generals still occupy heavyweight
cabinet positions and many candidates in the forthcoming national
elections are retired military officers. General Wiranto, indicted
on serious crimes charges in East Timor, is a Presidential candidate.
The elections are important, but they cannot on their own establish
Indonesia's democratic credentials, especially as they will take
place under conditions of military repression in West Papua and
Aceh. Current conditions in West Papua make free and fair elections
impossible. With West Papuan national parties banned, most Papuans
will be denied meaningful political representation; and there
is a grave danger of a military crackdown during the elections.
12. There is no evidence that the TNI's
human rights record is any better today and WPA-UK would question
the FCO's assertion that the "reputation and professionalism
of the Indonesian security forces has improved" (p 42). The
FCO's criticism of the ad hoc human rights tribunal for
East Timor as "disappointing" (p 41) is unduly restrained.
The tribunal's proceedings were a travesty, and utterly failed
to provide justice for East Timor. The process has seriously undermined
efforts to end impunity and improve the rule of law in Indonesia
and increased the likelihood of unaccountable violence in conflict
areas. Most disturbingly, two of those implicated in the East
Timor crimes now have now have important roles in West Papua (see
below).
DIVIDE AND
RULE TACTICS
13. Within West Papua, the TNI and military
intelligence appear to have been behind recent provocative attempts
to split the territory into three provinces and destabilise the
area. In October 2001, a Special Autonomy Law (SAL) was passed.[52]
Under this law a Papuan People's Assembly was supposed to have
been set up.[53]
Although special autonomy falls far short of the self-determination
that West Papuans overwhelmingly want, some were prepared to accept
it as a step toward self-determination, while others remained
cynical due to previous experience of Indonesian commitments.
14. However, the SAL has not been implemented.
Instead, a Presidential Instruction ("INPRES") was issued
in January 2003 to split West Papua into three separate Indonesian
provinces. The INPRES harks back to a law passed in 1999, which
was not brought into effect at the time because of strong opposition.
Although the INPRES legally contradicts the SAL, it has been implemented
in the western region of West Papua, but delayed in the central
region. Confusion has been exacerbated by contradictory statements
by the Indonesian government and increased military activity.
In September 2003, the Papuan human rights group ELS-HAM warned
that destabilising violence would result from the deployment of
additional troops to the territory.[54]
15. The position of the UK government throughout
however has been to support the SAL regardless of these contradictions
and regardless of the reality on the ground. The expectation is
that the three-way split will be delayed only until the inconsistency
in the law has been removed. West Papuans are concerned that this
divide-and-rule strategy is to reinforce TNI control of the territory
and eradicate support for independence.[55]
The UK's position thus supports Indonesia's duplicity towards
the people of West Papua, greatly increasing the insecurity, frustration
and terror under which they live.
16. Civil society's response to the tensions
caused by the attempted split and the military's destabilisation
strategy has been the repeated call from interfaith representatives,
the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and Papuan leaders for West Papua
to be a "Zone of Peace". This initiative has also involved
West Papua's governor and former police chief Senior TNI officers,
however, have refused to co-operate, showing that the military
is not part of the solution, but the problem, in West Papua.
EVIDENCE OF
GENOCIDE
17. The human rights situation in West Papua
remains grave. It merits a far more robust response than the FCO's
expression of "some cause for concern" (p 41). A recent
report by Yale University Law School found strong evidence of
genocide in West Papua since the Act of Free Choice in 1969 and
found that the security forces have engaged in "widespread
violence and extrajudicial killings" and `subjected Papuan
men and women to acts of torture, disappearance, rapes and sexual
violence, thus causing serious bodily and mental harm.[56]
18. Recent years have seen the killing of
independence leader, Theys Eluay, referred to by the FCO (p 43),
and numerous other atrocities. The FCO should have done much more
to persuade Indonesia to investigate who ordered the killing of
Theys Eluay, and the chain of command involved. Army chief of
staff, General Ryamizard Ryacudu described the perpetrators as
"heroes"[57]
19. Papuan women are at constant threat
of rape and sexual violence by the military. A 1998 massacre on
Biak island resulted in an unknown number of people being killed,
injured and abused. Dozens of women, some with children, were
"taken out to sea on Indonesian navy ships, where they were
raped, sexually mutilated and thrown overboard". Numerous
mutilated bodies were later washed up on the coast of Biak.[58]
This received scarce international attention and no investigation.
Attempts by islanders to record and support families led to revelations
that the military had been raping women in villages, at will,
since the early 1970s.
20. There is strong evidence, according
to the Indonesian police and human rights organisations, that
Kopassus or other army units were involved in killing one Indonesian
and two American employees of the Freeport mine in August 2002.[59]
This is noted by the FCO (p 43). Reports suggested that the attack
was discussed in advance at the highest level of the army.[60]
It is suspected that it was a warning to Freeport against cutting
the army's profitable security role at the mine.
21. The TNI focus on aggression rather than
peace in West Papua was made clear when Yustinus Murib, a regional
commander of the Free Papua Movement (OPM), and nine other men
were killed by Kopassus, in November 2003. Murib, an active supporter
of the "Zone of Peace" initiative was killed on the
same day that a letter he had signed, to the UN and Indonesian
and Australian governments, calling for peaceful dialogue with
Jakarta, was read out on Australian television.
22. The appointment, late last year, of
Indonesia's former East Timor police chief, Timbul Silaen, as
police chief of West Papua, and reported plans by the notorious
militia leader, Eurico Guterres to set up a new West Papua militia
group prompted fears of increased violence and instability in
West Papua[61].
Guterres was convicted of crimes against humanity by Jakarta's
ad hoc human rights court on East Timor in November 2002.
He was given a minimal sentence of 10 years imprisonment, but
freed pending an appeal. Silaen, East Timor's police chief in
1999, was acquitted by the court, but, along with Guterres, has
been indicted by East Timor's Serious Crimes Unit. Many Papuans
fear that, as with East Timor, militia groups, such as the one
associated with Guterres, will play a deadly role in the TM's
destabilisation strategy. The TNI has already been linked with
the arrival in WP of Laskar Jihad, heavily involved in the recent
inter-communal conflicts in Maluka and Sulawesi, and with the
formation of other pro-Jakarta militia groups there.
THE UK ROLE
23. The UK has substantial economic ties
with Indonesia. Historically, it has been the second largest foreign
investor after Japan, it is a significant trading partner, and
a major strategic partner through the supply of arms and other
forms of military assistance. WPA-UK is concerned that FCO policy
on Indonesia and West Papua is primarily determined by these economic
and strategic considerations while the human rights dimension
is largely ignored.
24. The FCO provides significant diplomatic
support for the major UK-based multinationals—Rio Tinto
and BP—operating in West Papua. This is extremely problematic
in a territory whose people are denied their right to self-determination
and suffer routine abuse of their basic human rights, often in
the vicinity of multinational assets. WPA-UK believes that the
FCO should devote far more attention to promoting the peaceful
resolution of the West Papua conflict and to the protection of
West Papuan human rights. Ultimately that will be to the benefit
of both UK and West Papuan interests, which may coincide in many
respects if West Papuan rights are fully realised.
25. The sale of military equipment to Indonesia
remains hugely contentious. British-made Hawk jets have been used
in West Papua[62]
and British equipment is currently being used in Indonesia's war
in Aceh in breach of "assurances" that it would not
be used for offensive purposes. There is nothing to prevent Indonesia
using British equipment in West Papua again. WPA-UK has joined
others in calling for a military embargo against Indonesia. Given
the resurgence of the TNI and its negative impact on Indonesia's
democratic development, such an embargo is now more necessary
than ever.
26. WPA-UK understands that the FCO is currently
reviewing its policy on West Papua. WPA-UK believes that the FCO
must be open-minded as to the future options for the territory
and must maintain regular dialogue with WP representatives to
ensure that its policy-making properly reflects the wishes of
the West Papuan people.
RECOMMENDATIONS
27. WPA-UK urges the Foreign Affairs Committee
to make the following recommendations to the Government:
(a) To maintain strong pressure—with
its EU partners and through the World Bank and the Consultative
Group on Indonesia donor group—on the Indonesian Government
and its security forces to: fully respect the human rights of
the people of West Papua; start a process of demilitarisation
of the territory; and take steps to ensure that all those implicated
in human rights violations are brought to justice. It should encourage
Indonesia to accept visits to West Papua by UN human rights mechanisms
and parliamentary delegations from the UK and EU. The FCO's own
monitoring and reporting of human rights violations in West Papua
should disaggregate abuses according to the gender of victims.
(b) With its EU partners, to urge the Government
of Indonesia to cancel the divisive three-way split of West Papuan
and to enter into a process of peaceful dialogue with West Papuan
representatives, considering all options for the future of the
territory. The Government should itself maintain a regular dialogue
with West Papuan representatives to ensure that it is properly
informed as to their aspirations. It should help West Papuan leaders
overcome the limitations placed on their own discussions by facilitating
consultations between Papuan leaders from within the country and
in exile.
(c) To support international calls for the
UN Secretary-General to review the UN's conduct in relation to
the Act of "Free" Choice.
(d) To impose an embargo on the supply of
military equipment to Indonesia and to suspend all forms of military
co-operation.
(e) To prioritise the above matters over issues
relating to UK's economic relations with Indonesia.
28. The Committee is also asked to conduct
an inquiry into the UK's wider relations with Indonesia so that
some of the issues raised in this memorandum can be considered
in more detail.
West Papua Association UK
February 2004
50 Historic Vote was a Sham: Ex UN Chiefs Admit, Sydney
Morning Herald, 23 November 2001. Back
51
Public Records Office: FCO 24-449 (FWDl/4) FCO briefing on West
Irian prepared for the UK delegation to the UNGA, 10 September
1969. Back
52
Law No 21/2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua Province. Back
53
MRP (Papuan People's Assembly) with 33% of membership from tribal
communities, 33% from the religious sector, and 33% from women's
organisations. The MRP's exact role and powers are detailed in
Articles 19-25 of the Special Autonomy legislation. Back
54
Indonesian Government Must Abstain From Dc-Stabilizing Violence;
Enter Dialogue to Resolve Chronic and Deadly Conflict in Papua,
press release of ELS-HAM, the Institute for Human Rights Study
and Advocacy, West Papua, 8 September 2003. Back
55
See Military sets Papua agenda, TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights
Campaign, Bulletin 173/174, p 11: http://tapol.gn.apc.org/173-4mil.htm Back
56
Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the
Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control, Allard K
Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School,
November 2003: http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/htmllPublic-Affairs/426/westpapuahrights.pdf Back
57
detik.com, 23 April 2003 (translated by TAPOL). Back
58
See Yale Report, supra note vii, at p 42, and Reviewing the Biak
Massacre, The Jakarta Post, 15 January 2004. Back
59
What's Wrong with Freeport's Security Policy?: Results of Investigation
into the Attack on Freeport Employees in Timika, Papua, Finds
Corporation Allows Impunity of Criminal Acts by Indonesian Armed
Forces, ELS-HAM, 21 October 2002. Back
60
Indonesia Military Allegedly Talked Of Targeting Mine, Washington
Post, 3 November 2002. Back
61
See Danger of violent instability increases in West Papua increases
as rights abusers take on key roles, TAPOL press release, 4 December
2003: http://tapol.gu.apc.org/pr03l204.htm Back
62
See Hawk aircraft terrorise Papua: "East Timor re-visited"
as low-flying jets used in operation to quell independence movement,
TAPOL press release, 2 October 2000. Back
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