Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by West Papua Association UK (WPA-UK)

  We enclose a memorandum for the Committee's inquiry into the FCO's Human Rights Annual Report 2003. We apologise for its late arrival.

  We would be pleased to provide oral evidence if the Committee would consider it helpful.

  The final recommendation in the memo is a request for the Committee to conduct an inquiry into the UK's wider relations with Indonesia. We will be writing to the Committee further on this, but in the meantime we would be grateful if you would draw the request to the Committee's attention.

  1.  This memorandum is provided by the West Papua Association-UK (WPA-UK), a coalition of individuals and organisations which supports the people of West Papua in their struggle for human rights and self-determination. The memorandum addresses issues raised by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) at pages 41-43 of its Human Rights Annual Report for 2003.

SUMMARY

  2.  West Papua has endured 40 years of intense military repression since it was handed over to Indonesia in the 1960s by western powers, notably the US, and the UN, to suit the politics of the day and the ambitions of resource extraction multinationals. It was then abandoned to the rule of a violent and racist regime, with a conservative estimate of 100,000 West Papuans since being killed.

  3.  The UK has substantial economic and strategic ties with Indonesia and provides significant support for the major UK-based multinationals—Rio Tinto and BP—which operate in West Papua. As a result FCO policy on West Papua is determined primarily by economic and strategic considerations to the detriment of human rights. By pretending that the situation in Indonesia is much more positive than the reality: in democracy; in reform of the military; in reduced human rights abuses, the UK government, seemingly in the interests of UK based multinationals corporations, is arguably exacerbating the intolerable situation under which West Papuans live. WPA-UK believes the FCO should devote far more attention to promoting the peaceful resolution of the West Papua conflict and to the protection of West Papuan human rights. It further believes that FCO must be open-minded about the future political options for the territory and must maintain regular dialogue with West Papuan representatives to ensure that its policy-making properly reflects their wishes.

BACKGROUND

  4.  West Papua is the western half of the island of New Guinea, which borders independent Papua New Guinea. Indigenous West Papuans are primarily Melanesians and the majority are Christian, as distinct from their Malay, Muslim neighbours in Indonesia. The territory was previously known as West New Guinea, West Irian and Irian Jaya and is presently called Papua by Indonesia.

  5.  Like the rest of present-day Indonesia, West Papua was formerly part of the Dutch East Indies, but remained a non-self-governing territory under Dutch rule after Indonesia gained its independence in 1949. At the beginning of the 1960s it was being prepared for independence by the Dutch, against strong opposition from Indonesia. In the context of Cold War politics, the Dutch were persuaded by the United States to enter into the `New York Agreement' with Indonesia in August 1962. No West Papuan representatives were consulted. However, the Agreement stipulated that all adult Papuans would have the right to participate in an act of self determination in accordance with international practice.

  6.  The Dutch then handed West Papua over to a temporary UN authority, which stayed only seven months before handing control to Jakarta. Thereafter, the UN failed to protect Papuan rights, which were guaranteed by the New York Agreement. In 1969, a hand-picked group of 1,022 Papuans, out of a population of around 800,000, were forced to vote unanimously under extreme duress in a process known as the Act of "Free" Choice for their country to become part of Indonesia.

  7.  Chakravarthy Narasimhan, the retired UN Under-Secretary-General responsible for the UN's role in West Papua, later admitted that the process was a "whitewash", and that "The mood at the United Nations was to get rid of this problem as quickly as possible"[50] An FCO briefing noted: "Privately, however, we recognise that the people of West Irian have no desire to be ruled by the Indonesians who are of an alien (Javanese) race, and that the process of consultation did not allow a genuinely free choice to be made."[51] Opposition to the Act of "Free" Choice and to rule from Jakarta is today as strong as ever and what the FCO refers to as a "debate on the legitimacy of the 1969 process" (p 43) is actually translating into growing international acceptance of its invalidity.

  8.  After the international community diverted its attention from West Papua in 1969, a veil of secrecy fell over the country, with little news of the tens of thousands killed and abused allowed out. Indonesia's systematic exploitation of West Papua's abundant natural resources has been a major cause of tension and conflict. Extractive operations have involved the denial of land rights and severe environmental degradation. Some of the worst human rights violations have been committed in the vicinity of major enterprises, such as the Freeport copper-and-gold mine (part owned by Britain's Rio Tinto), which are given corporate-funded "protection" by the armed forces. BP's investment in a huge liquid natural gas project, Tangguh, is expected to attract similar problems.

CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT: OF INDONESIA'S FAILING TRANSITION

  9.  Indonesia is currently experiencing a reversal in its transition from dictatorship to democracy with a stifling of the reform movement which emerged following the downfall of President Suharto in May 1998. This has major implications for West Papua and other areas of conflict. While some progress was made towards democracy and human rights during the brief presidencies of Habibie (1998-1999) and Wahid (1999-2001), President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-) has proved an ineffectual leader, who has allowed the Indonesian military (TNI) to resume its dominance in security and political affairs, as under the Suharto dictatorship. WPA-UK believes that the FCO has underplayed this regressive trend in noting only that the "road to democracy has not been straightforward" (p 41).

  10.  The TNI, refusing to submit to civilian control, is now dictating the national agenda, which includes applying military solutions to the conflicts in West Papua and Aceh. It is using the fight against separatism to justify its enhanced role and to secure its lucrative business interests. The military's role has been bolstered by western support for the "war against terror". Economic stagnation, widespread corruption and the weakness of democratic institutions have accompanied the TNI's resurgence under Megawati; while civil society has failed to consolidate its post-Suharto gains.

  11.  Retired army generals still occupy heavyweight cabinet positions and many candidates in the forthcoming national elections are retired military officers. General Wiranto, indicted on serious crimes charges in East Timor, is a Presidential candidate. The elections are important, but they cannot on their own establish Indonesia's democratic credentials, especially as they will take place under conditions of military repression in West Papua and Aceh. Current conditions in West Papua make free and fair elections impossible. With West Papuan national parties banned, most Papuans will be denied meaningful political representation; and there is a grave danger of a military crackdown during the elections.

  12.  There is no evidence that the TNI's human rights record is any better today and WPA-UK would question the FCO's assertion that the "reputation and professionalism of the Indonesian security forces has improved" (p 42). The FCO's criticism of the ad hoc human rights tribunal for East Timor as "disappointing" (p 41) is unduly restrained. The tribunal's proceedings were a travesty, and utterly failed to provide justice for East Timor. The process has seriously undermined efforts to end impunity and improve the rule of law in Indonesia and increased the likelihood of unaccountable violence in conflict areas. Most disturbingly, two of those implicated in the East Timor crimes now have now have important roles in West Papua (see below).

DIVIDE AND RULE TACTICS

  13.  Within West Papua, the TNI and military intelligence appear to have been behind recent provocative attempts to split the territory into three provinces and destabilise the area. In October 2001, a Special Autonomy Law (SAL) was passed.[52] Under this law a Papuan People's Assembly was supposed to have been set up.[53] Although special autonomy falls far short of the self-determination that West Papuans overwhelmingly want, some were prepared to accept it as a step toward self-determination, while others remained cynical due to previous experience of Indonesian commitments.

  14.  However, the SAL has not been implemented. Instead, a Presidential Instruction ("INPRES") was issued in January 2003 to split West Papua into three separate Indonesian provinces. The INPRES harks back to a law passed in 1999, which was not brought into effect at the time because of strong opposition. Although the INPRES legally contradicts the SAL, it has been implemented in the western region of West Papua, but delayed in the central region. Confusion has been exacerbated by contradictory statements by the Indonesian government and increased military activity. In September 2003, the Papuan human rights group ELS-HAM warned that destabilising violence would result from the deployment of additional troops to the territory.[54]

  15.  The position of the UK government throughout however has been to support the SAL regardless of these contradictions and regardless of the reality on the ground. The expectation is that the three-way split will be delayed only until the inconsistency in the law has been removed. West Papuans are concerned that this divide-and-rule strategy is to reinforce TNI control of the territory and eradicate support for independence.[55] The UK's position thus supports Indonesia's duplicity towards the people of West Papua, greatly increasing the insecurity, frustration and terror under which they live.

  16.  Civil society's response to the tensions caused by the attempted split and the military's destabilisation strategy has been the repeated call from interfaith representatives, the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and Papuan leaders for West Papua to be a "Zone of Peace". This initiative has also involved West Papua's governor and former police chief Senior TNI officers, however, have refused to co-operate, showing that the military is not part of the solution, but the problem, in West Papua.

EVIDENCE OF GENOCIDE

  17.  The human rights situation in West Papua remains grave. It merits a far more robust response than the FCO's expression of "some cause for concern" (p 41). A recent report by Yale University Law School found strong evidence of genocide in West Papua since the Act of Free Choice in 1969 and found that the security forces have engaged in "widespread violence and extrajudicial killings" and `subjected Papuan men and women to acts of torture, disappearance, rapes and sexual violence, thus causing serious bodily and mental harm.[56]

  18.  Recent years have seen the killing of independence leader, Theys Eluay, referred to by the FCO (p 43), and numerous other atrocities. The FCO should have done much more to persuade Indonesia to investigate who ordered the killing of Theys Eluay, and the chain of command involved. Army chief of staff, General Ryamizard Ryacudu described the perpetrators as "heroes"[57]

  19.  Papuan women are at constant threat of rape and sexual violence by the military. A 1998 massacre on Biak island resulted in an unknown number of people being killed, injured and abused. Dozens of women, some with children, were "taken out to sea on Indonesian navy ships, where they were raped, sexually mutilated and thrown overboard". Numerous mutilated bodies were later washed up on the coast of Biak.[58] This received scarce international attention and no investigation. Attempts by islanders to record and support families led to revelations that the military had been raping women in villages, at will, since the early 1970s.

  20.  There is strong evidence, according to the Indonesian police and human rights organisations, that Kopassus or other army units were involved in killing one Indonesian and two American employees of the Freeport mine in August 2002.[59] This is noted by the FCO (p 43). Reports suggested that the attack was discussed in advance at the highest level of the army.[60] It is suspected that it was a warning to Freeport against cutting the army's profitable security role at the mine.

  21.  The TNI focus on aggression rather than peace in West Papua was made clear when Yustinus Murib, a regional commander of the Free Papua Movement (OPM), and nine other men were killed by Kopassus, in November 2003. Murib, an active supporter of the "Zone of Peace" initiative was killed on the same day that a letter he had signed, to the UN and Indonesian and Australian governments, calling for peaceful dialogue with Jakarta, was read out on Australian television.

  22.  The appointment, late last year, of Indonesia's former East Timor police chief, Timbul Silaen, as police chief of West Papua, and reported plans by the notorious militia leader, Eurico Guterres to set up a new West Papua militia group prompted fears of increased violence and instability in West Papua[61]. Guterres was convicted of crimes against humanity by Jakarta's ad hoc human rights court on East Timor in November 2002. He was given a minimal sentence of 10 years imprisonment, but freed pending an appeal. Silaen, East Timor's police chief in 1999, was acquitted by the court, but, along with Guterres, has been indicted by East Timor's Serious Crimes Unit. Many Papuans fear that, as with East Timor, militia groups, such as the one associated with Guterres, will play a deadly role in the TM's destabilisation strategy. The TNI has already been linked with the arrival in WP of Laskar Jihad, heavily involved in the recent inter-communal conflicts in Maluka and Sulawesi, and with the formation of other pro-Jakarta militia groups there.

THE UK ROLE

  23.  The UK has substantial economic ties with Indonesia. Historically, it has been the second largest foreign investor after Japan, it is a significant trading partner, and a major strategic partner through the supply of arms and other forms of military assistance. WPA-UK is concerned that FCO policy on Indonesia and West Papua is primarily determined by these economic and strategic considerations while the human rights dimension is largely ignored.

  24.  The FCO provides significant diplomatic support for the major UK-based multinationals—Rio Tinto and BP—operating in West Papua. This is extremely problematic in a territory whose people are denied their right to self-determination and suffer routine abuse of their basic human rights, often in the vicinity of multinational assets. WPA-UK believes that the FCO should devote far more attention to promoting the peaceful resolution of the West Papua conflict and to the protection of West Papuan human rights. Ultimately that will be to the benefit of both UK and West Papuan interests, which may coincide in many respects if West Papuan rights are fully realised.

  25.  The sale of military equipment to Indonesia remains hugely contentious. British-made Hawk jets have been used in West Papua[62] and British equipment is currently being used in Indonesia's war in Aceh in breach of "assurances" that it would not be used for offensive purposes. There is nothing to prevent Indonesia using British equipment in West Papua again. WPA-UK has joined others in calling for a military embargo against Indonesia. Given the resurgence of the TNI and its negative impact on Indonesia's democratic development, such an embargo is now more necessary than ever.

  26.  WPA-UK understands that the FCO is currently reviewing its policy on West Papua. WPA-UK believes that the FCO must be open-minded as to the future options for the territory and must maintain regular dialogue with WP representatives to ensure that its policy-making properly reflects the wishes of the West Papuan people.

RECOMMENDATIONS

  27.  WPA-UK urges the Foreign Affairs Committee to make the following recommendations to the Government:

  (a)  To maintain strong pressure—with its EU partners and through the World Bank and the Consultative Group on Indonesia donor group—on the Indonesian Government and its security forces to: fully respect the human rights of the people of West Papua; start a process of demilitarisation of the territory; and take steps to ensure that all those implicated in human rights violations are brought to justice. It should encourage Indonesia to accept visits to West Papua by UN human rights mechanisms and parliamentary delegations from the UK and EU. The FCO's own monitoring and reporting of human rights violations in West Papua should disaggregate abuses according to the gender of victims.

  (b)  With its EU partners, to urge the Government of Indonesia to cancel the divisive three-way split of West Papuan and to enter into a process of peaceful dialogue with West Papuan representatives, considering all options for the future of the territory. The Government should itself maintain a regular dialogue with West Papuan representatives to ensure that it is properly informed as to their aspirations. It should help West Papuan leaders overcome the limitations placed on their own discussions by facilitating consultations between Papuan leaders from within the country and in exile.

  (c)  To support international calls for the UN Secretary-General to review the UN's conduct in relation to the Act of "Free" Choice.

  (d)  To impose an embargo on the supply of military equipment to Indonesia and to suspend all forms of military co-operation.

  (e) To prioritise the above matters over issues relating to UK's economic relations with Indonesia.

  28.  The Committee is also asked to conduct an inquiry into the UK's wider relations with Indonesia so that some of the issues raised in this memorandum can be considered in more detail.

West Papua Association UK

February 2004


 





50   Historic Vote was a Sham: Ex UN Chiefs Admit, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 November 2001. Back

51   Public Records Office: FCO 24-449 (FWDl/4) FCO briefing on West Irian prepared for the UK delegation to the UNGA, 10 September 1969. Back

52   Law No 21/2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua Province. Back

53   MRP (Papuan People's Assembly) with 33% of membership from tribal communities, 33% from the religious sector, and 33% from women's organisations. The MRP's exact role and powers are detailed in Articles 19-25 of the Special Autonomy legislation. Back

54   Indonesian Government Must Abstain From Dc-Stabilizing Violence; Enter Dialogue to Resolve Chronic and Deadly Conflict in Papua, press release of ELS-HAM, the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy, West Papua, 8 September 2003. Back

55   See Military sets Papua agenda, TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, Bulletin 173/174, p 11: http://tapol.gn.apc.org/173-4mil.htm Back

56   Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control, Allard K Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, November 2003: http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/htmllPublic-Affairs/426/westpapuahrights.pdf Back

57   detik.com, 23 April 2003 (translated by TAPOL). Back

58   See Yale Report, supra note vii, at p 42, and Reviewing the Biak Massacre, The Jakarta Post, 15 January 2004. Back

59   What's Wrong with Freeport's Security Policy?: Results of Investigation into the Attack on Freeport Employees in Timika, Papua, Finds Corporation Allows Impunity of Criminal Acts by Indonesian Armed Forces, ELS-HAM, 21 October 2002. Back

60   Indonesia Military Allegedly Talked Of Targeting Mine, Washington Post, 3 November 2002. Back

61   See Danger of violent instability increases in West Papua increases as rights abusers take on key roles, TAPOL press release, 4 December 2003: http://tapol.gu.apc.org/pr03l204.htm Back

62   See Hawk aircraft terrorise Papua: "East Timor re-visited" as low-flying jets used in operation to quell independence movement, TAPOL press release, 2 October 2000. Back


 
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