Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-59)
24 FEBRUARY 2004
MR BILL
RAMMELL, MS
PHILIPPA DREW
AND MR
JON BENJAMIN
Q40 Sir John Stanley:
If you wish to add to your answer to the Committee, Minister,
I am sure you will do so. In particular, it would be my judgment
that if a British serviceman or servicewoman committed a serious
criminal offence in Iraq, that would not ultimately be determined
by a court martial. Under normal arrangements, I would believe
that such charge would be made against the individual concerned
under the criminal jurisdiction of this country when the individual
reports back to this country. Again, perhaps you could clarify
that for us. You understand the reason I am asking these questions
is that we clearly wholly and absolutely endorse the position
which the Government has taken, that we want to have the highest
possible standards in human rights in Iraq and we most certainly
have to set the appropriate standards ourselves.
Mr Rammell: As
a former Defence Minister, I accept the position from which you
are speaking on these issues. That was my understanding and that
is what I am advised, but I will check it out for you.[7]
Q41 Mr Pope: Could I go
back to Saddam Hussein? I was in Iraq, along with other members
of this Committee, the week after Saddam's capture. One of the
things that struck me on talking to Iraqis was the very strong
desire that Saddam should face justice in Iraq. There was a very
clear view that the Iraqi people were the victims of Saddam's
crimes and therefore he should face justice there. I can understand
that and appreciate it. At the same time, it seems to me to be
of pivotal importance that Saddam is afforded the kind of human
rights which he so conspicuously denied to so many of his fellow
countrymen. How are we going to marry those two? You talked about
a special tribunal. What role will we play in that? How far are
we away from the establishment of a tribunal in Iraq which will
see Saddam face those charges?
Mr Rammell: I certainly
think it is a process that is going to take time. We are talking
about a country that is developing all forms of governance and
judicial structure. Clearly investigations are still going on
into what Saddam did. What you have said was your experience in
Iraq is absolutely, through every channel of communication that
we have, the overwhelming view of Iraqis, that they do want Saddam
to be tried in Iraq. It is the case that non-Iraqi advisers and
observers may be appointed to advise judges and prosecutors on
international law and to monitor the protection of due process.
It is also the case that the United Nations has considerable experience
in this kind of area. I know when Kofi Annan produced a report
back in December, following a discussion with the CPA[8]and
the Iraqi governing council, he made clear that one of the areas
that the UN could work very constructively and cooperatively on
was the area of tribunals. Clearly it is going to be an Iraqi
process but from a number of different sources there is going
to be advice, assistance and training so that we do ensure that
Saddam is brought to justice but we will seek to ensure that he
is brought to justice in such a way that no-body can cry foul
in those circumstances.
Q42 Mr Pope: And what
is the timescale? How far do you think we are away from this?
Mr Rammell: I would
be plucking dates out of the air. I think it is a relatively long
process. If you look at the experience of similar individuals
elsewhere in the world, the Milosevic trial in The Hague is an
example, notwithstanding the understandable desire for these matters
to be progressed, it takes some time.
Q43 Mr Pope: Just going
on to the wider issue of the legal system in Iraq, I notice on
page 24 of the report where it is talking about judicial reform
that the report talks about a judicial review commission checking
on Iraqi judges and prosecutors for links to the Ba'ath Party.
Again, what came across during our visit to Iraq were some of
the dangers in this `de-Ba'athification' process, which is that
if one overdoes it, it is entirely possible that you will remove
an incredibly important level of administrators. Clearly nobody
wants to see judges who were part and parcel of the old regime
administering justice. On the other hand, equally clearly, there
were some people who signed up for membership of the party just
because it was expected of them. They did not have much alternative
and they certainly were not committed to it. I wondered if any
thought had been given about how one finds the balance between
trying to remove elements of the old regime whilst at the same
time understanding that almost everybody at every level in society
had some links to the old regime, even when they were completely
innocent, simply because they had no choice?
Mr Rammell: I think
that is an absolutely valid point. It is worthwhile being totally
open and up-front; it is a difficult balance to establish. I think
you are right, and it is not unique to Iraq. You can look back
to Nazi Germany and see that it was somewhat difficult to operate
in any way, shape or form without some level of adherence to an
overweening, one-party structure. In getting the balance right,
what the Judicial Review Committee has been looking at has been
involvement in corruption, complicity in human rights abuses and
issues such as that. Currently, they have looked at 400 people,
of whom about 120 have been dismissed, and so they are working
at the moment on the basis that about 25% of people have been
dismissed. It is difficult to make judgments without looking at
every one of those cases. Your point is right: if you go too far,
then you remove the civil infrastructure that is necessary for
the country to develop. I think that is what they are grappling
with at the moment.
Q44 Mr Pope: The last
point I wanted to raise on Iraq, hopefully, is the next paragraph
in the report, still on page 24, which is about women's rights.
I cannot, of course, speak for the other members of the Committee,
but when we met members of the interim governing council, I was
hugely impressed by some of the women involved in that. It seems
to me extraordinarily important that when power is handed over
at the end of June that that is done in such a way that we leave
a situation in which women feel able to be involved in the political
process. I notice—and this has come in for some mockery
in the press—that a gender expert has been seconded to the
CPA. I do not think it is a matter of mockery. I think it is really
important. I want to encourage you, Minister, to do more to ensure
that women are enabled and empowered in Iraq by the end of June.
I wondered if you could say a few words about what extra work
the Foreign Office and our colleagues in DfID could be doing on
this important area.
Mr Rammell: I think
you are right; it is a key area. From the beginning of this process,
we have taken a lead in co-ordinating meetings of women within
Baghdad and elsewhere to try and facilitate the involvement of
women within the political processes. You are right about secondment
of gender experts. I think that is a helpful issue. In terms of
the transitional arrangements, it is a choice for the Iraqis whether
a male or female is elected. The transition of administrative
law will be a key one to be drafted by the governing council.
It is important, and I believe this to be the case, that that
does ensure equal rights for all Iraqis in the transitional period.
It is all very well and good having equal rights set down, but
empowering people to undertake that is a concern to us. I know
from discussions that that is being taken seriously in Iraq.
Q45 Chairman: Minister,
it was hoped that post-Saddam Hussein would be a model not only
of democracy but of human rights. There have been one or two disturbing
signs, particularly in respect of freedom of religion, freedom
of non-Muslims in the new Iraq. We are told, for example, that
the position of the religious minorities was better in many ways
under Saddam Hussein, with all his gross human rights violations,
than it is currently and that there has been a number of examples
since the fall of the Saddam regime of escalating attacks by Muslim
extremists against non-Muslims, particularly in the Shia areas.
What is your response to that?
Mr Rammell: That
is obviously a concern to us and we take it seriously and try
to deal with it. If there has been an incredibly repressive regime
for such a long period of time, when the shackles finally come
off there are all sorts of forces and actions, many of which concern
us and many of which we oppose and they will have to be dealt
with. That is part of the situation with which we are dealing
at the moment. That is part of the political process being gone
through to end up at a constitutional settlement where the rights
of all Iraqis are respected. That is where the drafting of the
transitional constitution is important and why, whilst this has
to be a process that is led, initiated and driven by the Iraqis,
there is the fullest possible outside assistance in terms of human
rights norms. If you look at the draft constitution at the moment
in terms of respect for human rights, a lot is well established
that we would support. It is important that, as the process develops,
this is, in a sense, set in tablets of stone and then actually
implemented.
Q46 Chairman: There is
also a lot which causes concern, particularly about the freedom
of non-Muslims. Let me cite, for example, the question of the
fact that the Iraqi Governing Council has already voted to replace
Iraq's civil family law with Islamic Sharia law, a move that will
clearly discriminate against women—and you mentioned to
Mr Pope a little earlier your concern about the status of women—and
also against Christians and other minorities in Iraq. Are you
not concerned that this Sharia family law will in fact be a step
backwards and not a move to that new Iraq which we sought?
Mr Rammell: Certainly
like you, Mr Chairman, we were surprised by the decision of the
Governing Council to adopt Sharia law. My latest understanding
is that there is some confusion about whether in fact that was
the decision that was taken. Certainly Ambassador Bremer, on behalf
of the Coalition Provisional Authority, has made clear that he
does not intend to assign that decision into law for the remainder
of the CPA's executive authority in Iraq. In terms of whether
Iraq ultimately went down the road of Sharia law, I do not think
it is Sharia law per se that is the concern, but the extreme
punishments that come forward under some interpretations of Sharia
law, whether it is stoning, amputations or executions, would be
our very real concern, and we will strongly lobby to seek to ensure
that such an outcome does not happen.
Q47 Chairman: With respect,
it is not just the punishments; it is the position of non-Muslims
in a society under Sharia law and it is the status of women and
the status of those who are non-Muslim in the new family law.
Mr Rammell: I take
that concern on board. We are seeking to push forward the representation
and rights of women within Iraqi society, but there is a balance
to be struck here. If you look at all the debates that we have
had domestically about what happened in Iraq and why it happened,
there has clearly been a consensual view that it is now right
that the Iraqis establish a society and a country for themselves.
Clearly we would want to influence that, but you cannot completely
dictate that process from the outside. Yes, we seek to persuade
and influence and certainly if norms and practices are put in
place that are inconsistent with international humanitarian
norms, then we will argue that case. You cannot structure and
manufacture a society as a replica of the society in which we
live.
Q48 Chairman: It would
be a poor advertisement for the intervention if, at the end of
the day, non-Muslim minorities were in a worse position. Can you
give an assurance that in the debate about the new constitution
you will try to ensure that there is freedom; for example, freedom
for Muslims to convert to other religions and also generally freedoms
to propagate one's faith to others? Otherwise, in terms of human
rights and certainly religious liberties, it would be a major
step backwards.
Mr Rammell: Absolutely,
and we oppose punishment for apostasy wherever it occurs. I am
not for a minute saying that the concerns you are putting forward
are not understandable and that we do not share them. I am just
suggesting that in terms of international human rights standards,
which in a sense are inviolable and for which we world argue,
we will do that. We will also urge other elements within the developing
Iraqi constitutional structure. I am making what I hope is the
reasonable point that you cannot dictate all of that from the
outside.
Q49 Mr Chidgey: On that
point, Chairman, just to clarify this further, Minister, are we
in a position now basically of seeing what was political persecution
and violation of human rights being replaced by religious persecution
and violation of human rights, and does that not beg the whole
question of how we ever got involved in the first place? We all
know the main tenet of American foreign policy is the spreading
of democracy through the world—something I presume we sign
up to because we are partners in this particular venture—but
if at the end of the day we end up with a system which is just
as corrupt, if you like, in terms of human rights, why do we bother?
Mr Rammell: I do
not resile for a minute from saying that where there are human
rights concerns in Iraq at the moment we should contest those,
but your analogy suggests that it is as bad or worse than it was
under Saddam, and I really think people should go back and look
at what the situation under Saddam was when people day in, day
out, week in, week out were being tortured and locked up in a
wholly repressive manner. I do not think we are in that situation.
Do not take my word for it: look at the reputable independent
polls that have been undertaken in Iraq demonstrating overwhelming
support for the change.
Q50 Mr Chidgey: I accept
there are not at the present time the mass killings and tortures
that existed under Saddam Hussein. My concern is they will not
be going down and that we permit, under the laws we produce, the
sort of tortures in significant numbers that we oppose throughout
the world anyway, so whilst at the present moment I agree of course,
we are in charge, we are the ruling body there and are able to
prevent that, we are in danger of seeing a system introduced,
because we do not have any control over it, which could allow
the perpetration of that sort of treatment of civilians in the
future. That is my concern: that we are not in a position to introduce
the reforms that we presumably fought a pre-emptive war to introduce?
Mr Rammell: We
fought a war because there was a final resolution at the UN that
Saddam defied with a whole host of evidence backing it up, but
certainly there are significant human rights concerns that have
been around for decades with regard to Iraq and what is enormously
beneficial is that we now have an opportunity and indeed have
enormously improved that situation, but one of the focuses of
attention as we go through what inevitably is a difficult process
of building a new constitutional structure is that those human
rights concerns are taken on board, and if that is your concern
we are absolutely at one and that is what we are trying to influence.
Chairman: We now turn
to some other countries in the Middle East region. Mr Maples?
Q51 Mr Maples: I would
like to take you to Saudi Arabia for a few minutes, and in particular
to the case of the eight British people who were in prison there
for quite a long time. The case of one of those, Sandy Mitchell,
was set out at some length in a debate on Westminster Hall which
you responded to a few weeks ago and I want to deal with the case
of Bill Sampson. I know this is complicated by the fact he has
dual nationality, but one of those nationalities is British and
what happened to him is typical of happened to many of the other
people who were involved in this, and in the end it was the British
Government that helped secured his release. He has given written
evidence to the Committee and I would just like to take you through
some of that because, when we talk about human rights, one minute
we are talking about whether women are going to be elected to
the Iraqi parliament but here we are talking about systematic
torture, and I do think there are different degrees of human rights
and we ought to be clear about the sort of things we are talking
about. He says here, "I was held in solitary confinement
. . . for two years, seven months, three weeks . . . At the beginning
of my incarceration I was chained upright in my cell, 24 hours
a day and subjected to sleep deprivation. I was punched, kicked,
hung upside down from a metal bar and beaten with a bamboo cane
on the soles of my feet. I was tortured until I confessed to crimes
I did not commit. I was tried in secret without [legal] representation,
convicted and sentenced to death . . . I was tortured into confessing
to being a spy for the British government." And then specifically
that as soon as he was arrested he was handcuffed to a grill in
the door in his cell to stop him from sitting or sleeping; he
was left there for an hour before he was brought upstairs where
the torture began, almost immediately after he had been arrested.
"Six days later, wracked by unbearable pain, I would confess
to two car bombings and to being a British spy." He then
goes on to detail various other things: "They bounced me
around the room as if playing a violent game of pass-the-parcel.
I was pushed to the floor and repeatedly kicked in the backside,
crotch and stomach . . . they threatened me with the use of electric
shocks . . .". One of my torturers would sit me down and
aggressively caress and fondle me as a means of sexual intimidation
he was to use often. Then "began the cycle that I was to
endure for 11 days. Every evening I would be taken from my cell
to the interrogation offices, where I would be tortured. Near
dawn I would be returned to my cell, where I was handcuffed, standing
to the door, unable to sleep." Then he says a week or two
later, ". . . a new form of torture was introduced. I was
made to sit on the floor, draw my knees to my chest and place
my handcuffed arms over my legs. A metal bar was inserted between
the back of my knees and my forearms. The bar was picked up and
placed across two chairs. My body rotated into an upside down
position known as `the chicken'. The Midget—that is the
name he gives to one of his torturers—"began . . .
beating the soles of my feet with the pick-axe handle they had
confiscated from my home. They beat my buttocks with it, and occasionally
the back of my crotch . . . They threatened to lure my father
to the kingdom and treat him as they were treating me." Then,
having got his confession to the car bomb which killed Christopher
Rodway, which he denies he had anything to do with, he says, "They
then began to torture me again . . . and demanded that I admit
to being a British spy." Another incident, and there are
many of these, was that the following Friday, "not long after
dawn I was given western clothes, blindfolded, handcuffed, shackled,
led to a van and one of my torturers told me that I was being
taken back to my execution. I was driven around for some hours
and then brought back to prison." So we are not talking here
about a rough arrest; we are not talking about being beaten up
by policemen who go a little over the top, or prison governors,
or just of secret trials or lack of legal representation—we
are talking here about the systematic torture of British citizens
in Saudi Arabia. Does the British Government accept that this
happened?
Mr Rammell: Let
me say, firstly, the allegations you have just described are appalling,
and I have looked at the detail of those and it does concern me,
and we have always made clear our concern throughout the whole
of this process to the Saudi Government and authorities about
the care, including the treatment and detention, of individuals.
If you look at the track record of what happened whilst these
men were detained, it was raised by the Prime Minister, by the
Foreign Secretary, by other Foreign Office Ministers, by the Defence
Minister, and even by Prince Charles. We took every opportunity
possible to raise and express our concerns. One of the judgments,
and I know this was raised in the adjournment debate you were
referring to, one of the issues we have been challenged on is
the manner in which we undertook that representation because our
judgment, rightly or wrongly, was that the most effective way
to secure the release of these men was to do that privately rather
than to raise the profile of the cases publicly. That was a judgment
we took; it happens to be a judgment that was supported by the
men and the majority of the families and their lawyers, and I
know that is open to criticism but when you are trying to secure
someone's release you have to make a judgment about what is the
most effective way to do it, and that is the judgment we took.
Q52 Mr Maples: I understand
the difficulty of that and I would like to come to that, but I
wanted to make sure I understood that the Government accepted
that these people were not guilty, that they were not spying for
the British Government, and they were tortured in the manner which
they allege?
Mr Rammell: We
would always have a concern about any convictions or incarcerations
that took place simply on the basis of an individual confession
with no other substantiating evidence. That was the case in this
situation; that is why we always made clear our concerns about
the treatment and the conditions within which the men were detained,
and that is why we went to considerable efforts to secure their
release.
Q53 Mr Maples: But you
would know whether or not Dr Sampson was a spy for the British
Government, and the two people he was alleged to be doing it with
in the Saudi Embassy clearly were not.
Mr Rammell: Sure.
Q54 Mr Maples: We do accept,
do we, as a Government that they were tortured in the manner they
allege?
Mr Rammell: Certainly
we know that Mr Sampson was not a British spy. We expressed very
strong concerns about the manner in which the men were detained.
Clearly we were not in a position to judge on a day-to-day basis
exactly what was happening in those circumstances.
Q55 Mr Maples: But now
that they have come out and told their story do you accept that,
give or take a few details certainly, basically they were systematically
tortured?
Mr Rammell: I think
they were very strong accusations that have been made, and we
would expect the Saudi authorities to respond to those.
Q56 Mr Maples: Would you
accept, which I think most people on this Committee would, that
one of the primary duties of the Foreign Office is to look after
the interests of British citizens abroad, and that torture of
any kind is completely unacceptable? Of all the things that one
could list that a foreign government might do in terms of a breach
of human rights, this is about the worst? I suppose executing
would be worse but . . .
Mr Rammell: It
is appalling.
Q57 Mr Maples: . . . it
is absolutely unacceptable. I want to come to this question of
whether doing this in private or making it more public works because
you did eventually, or the Saudi authorities did eventually, release
these people but it took nearly three years during which all these
pretty awful things happened to them, and I do not suppose any
of their lives will ever be the same. Do you think that we can
go on like this simply doing it in private? Saudi Arabia is supposed
to be our main ally in the Gulf; they are supposed to be a friend
of ours, and it seems to me we have to make it clear to them that
we do not expect them to change their justice system just for
us, or introduce votes though I realise there are programmes under
way to try to do that, but that it is absolutely unacceptable
that they treat British citizens in this way, and if they do that
they are going to pay a price. I am not suggesting that we should
shout that threat from the rooftops but have they paid any price
for this at all? Have any official visits been cancelled? Have
any difficulties been made with the Saudi Government over anything?
Mr Rammell: All
I can do is reiterate the statement of fact that this was consistently
compared to many other cases that I look at and very robustly
is raised with the Saudis. I think there is a distinction to be
drawn between the particular and the general, and I still hang
by the judgment that I think in the particular cases we were right
to do this privately because to have raised the profile of the
cases publicly I think could have made the task of releasing the
men more difficult than would have otherwise been the case. However,
on the general criticism, in the evidence session here last year
and in terms of your report and particularly the comments that
were made by Amnesty, we were severely criticised for being lacking
in detail on our general human rights concerns in Saudi Arabia.
If you look at the report this year it has significantly expanded
and that is partly because we have been taking on board some of
what you have been saying.
Mr Maples: I am trying
to nudge you to go a bit further because I agree that it is considerably
better than last year when we had three paragraphs, and this year
I think we have got two pages, but you only have to look at what
the United States' State Department produces—I think it
is 17 pages—and at what Amnesty International or Human Rights
Watch produce, and there is a lot cataloguing the offences of
the Saudi regime. In the section in your most recent report on
torture, I have read it two or three times and I cannot find Saudi
Arabia mentioned there at all. You mention the Philippines, Turkey,
China and Sudan but Saudi Arabia is not mentioned. You must have
been producing this report just after eight British subjects had
come back alleging that they were systematically tortured in Saudi
Arabia and yet Saudi Arabia is not mentioned. There is something
about Saudi Arabia, is there not? The Foreign Office pussyfoots
around Saudi Arabia—I do not know why it is.
Q58 Sir John Stanley: I
cannot imagine!
Mr Rammell: It
is a good argument but I do not think it is valid if you look
at what we did, particularly on these cases. What we demonstrated
last year is that this is not an academic exercise, that we do
listen and respond, and you have acknowledged that we did that
in the way we compiled our comments on Saudi Arabia this year.
Taking on board your view that you would like us to go further,
that is something we will look at for the coming year's publication.
I would want to say, however, that the general issue of human
rights is something we take seriously within the region. There
is a proposal we have had put forward by the Saudi authorities
at the moment to visit prisons in the United Kingdom to try and
look and learn from that experience. I think there are arguments
for and against that but that is something we are currently considering.
Under the Global Opportunities Fund programme I referred to earlier
we are looking for projects throughout the region, particularly
on the issue of prison reform, and the prison reform handbook
that we have now produced twice within the Foreign Office has
been translated into Arabic. I do not want to say that there is
suddenly a huge sense of progress on these concerns within Saudi
Arabia; nevertheless, there are some straws in the wind to the
extent that Saudi Arabia is shortly going to be organising a seminar
to which international governments have been invited on human
rights aspects of legal reforms. That at least indicates to me
that there is a recognition that Saudi Arabia needs to respond
to the concerns, and that is a way forward.
Q59 Mr Maples: May I draw
a distinction? I applaud the Foreign Office's general programme
about human rights and this report adds an awful lot of public
information and is clearly trying to do a lot, but there is a
distinction between trying to promote democracy and the rule of
law in China, or Saudi Arabia for that matter, for Chinese or
Saudi citizens, and a country supposed to be a friend and ally
that systematically tortures confessions for two absolutely ridiculous
charges out of our citizens who happen to be there. Now, I suggest
to you that that should be unacceptable and that Saudi Arabia
should not be able to get away with this without paying a price.
I agree that when you are negotiating a particular case I can
see the argument, "Do we do this in public or private? Do
we consult the families?", and I am not arguing with how
you did it because at the end of the day it succeeded, but I suggest
to you that this will not stop unless you make Saudi Arabia pay
a price, and that is to do with maximum publicity in the UN, the
EU and in this report, and you could have maximised the publicity
of Saudi's torture practices in this report more than you have
done. I think we could issue a statement, now that these people
are released, that this is unacceptable and if this happens again
we will not tolerate it and the relations between our two countries
will not be the same if they do it. It seems to me there are sanctions
we could apply; we could downgrade diplomatic representation and
downgrade the nature of intergovernmental visits, but unless we
do something concrete this will not change. It is no good having
a few Saudi interior ministers over here to study British prison
visiting hours—they are torturing people. You do not need
to study some other country's system to know that is wrong. Their
own ministers must know this is wrong but it is a dictatorship
and one of the few things you can do in a dictatorship is to stop
things like this if you want to. Unless you bring much tougher
pressure you will not solve this problem and I urge you to be
much, much tougher. You can do it in private if you want to, but
there have to be sanctions. There has to be a price that countries
like Saudi Arabia pay if they treat our citizens in this way.
Mr Rammell: I am
partially going to agree with some of what you say but I think
you underestimate the importance of engaging people involved in
the penal system in a programme of reform. I can think of other
countries in the world where, at a governmental level, there has
been a significant change for the better in human rights terms
but where the practitioners on the ground are the people who are
dragging the process because they are used to working in a repressive
and a violent way, and therefore engaging people in a process
of change is important. Nevertheless, I do not think we are fundamentally
disagreeing. We have made clear we have expanded it this year
and I will look at it again for the annual report next year. We
have made abundantly clear that we do have deep concerns—and
that is not shilly-shallying words or evading the issue—about
a wide range of human rights issues in Saudi Arabia across a whole
range of areas. We do robustly put those views forward and will
continue to do that. Within any situation you constantly reflect
upon the channels of communication that you have to best get that
message across.
7 Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submitted
by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ev 36. Back
8
Coalition Provisional Authority. Back
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