Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40
- 59)
TUESDAY 16 MARCH 2004
DR GARY
SAMORE AND
DR ZAFAR
CHEEMA
Q40 Mr Olner: Given that this thing
has surfaced and is now in the public domain, are you satisfied
that Pakistan is now taking sufficient steps to stop anything
like this occurring again?
Dr Samore: I am not sure if I
would go that far. I think that President Musharraf is serious
about putting A Q Khan out of business and at least for now controlling
any further occurrences, but I do not think we can necessarily
be confident that in the future, perhaps under a different leadership,
Pakistan might very well judge again that it is in its interests
to share this technology. I think it is a matter that requires
very close vigilance to try to continue maintaining a political
relationship with Pakistan that puts us in a position to influence
their decisions.
Q41 Mr Illsley: My question follows
straight on from that. Given that Pakistan is outside the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, given that a future government might
have different views to Musharraf, given that perhaps Musharraf
might be embarrassed by any further revelations about Pakistan's
nuclear problem, what else can we, the Western governments, do
to try and prevent and stop any further proliferation by Pakistan?
Dr Cheema: I am very happy to
answer that. One answer is that Pakistan needs to be brought into
the international non-proliferation regime by specifically addressing
two questions. One is that Pakistan is threatened by India, conventionally
as well as from the nuclear point of view. In the past before
this 9-11 alliance with the United States of America, Pakistan
was acutely short of money itself and, secondly, it has been denied
technology and weapons systems by the United States and other
Western countries. These might be the reasons which compelled
Pakistan to follow the kind of problem we are addressing today.
If Pakistan is brought into that non-proliferation framework,
if Pakistan's conventional military capability—and I am
talking purely as a professional, not as someone who has specific
sympathy for Pakistan—has some kind of an equilibrium with
India, it will bring down its level of threat on the use of nuclear
weapons. It immediately resorts to using nuclear weapons because
it does not have sufficient conventional military capability to
deal with India. That is one problem which needs to be addressed.
Dr Samore: Could I add one point?
I completely agree with Dr Cheema that the more Pakistan feels
confident and secure and economically prosperous, the less likely
it is that it will feel the need to resort to further transfers
of nuclear technology. I completely agree with that. But it is
worth remembering that the initial transfers to Iran took place
in the late 1980s at a time when the US and Pakistan were extremely
close, and the US was providing Pakistan with a tremendous amount
of military and economic assistance. Although I think we do need
to try to integrate Pakistan as much as possible, nonetheless
we have to be worried about the possibility that in the future
a Pakistani government or a different Pakistani government might
decide to trade nuclear assets for other things they feel they
need.
Dr Cheema: My assessment is different
to that. If you recall 1988, when General Moazzem Begg was Chief
of Army Staff, in my opinion, it was not the establishment entirely;
the Government of Pakistan was involved in the transfer of this
technology to Iran. General Moazzem Begg happened to be a Shiite,
and a known Shiite with an inclination towards Iran at that time,
and he was openly speaking about the United States of America
and the West. He opposed the first Gulf war and did not allow,
despite permission from the Pakistani Prime Minster, troops to
be sent along with the other allies in the first Gulf war. He
did not permit the Pakistani troops to participate in combat.
It is in that period perhaps that we are talking about the transfer
of technology to Iran taking place. The individual motives of
General Moazzem Begg play as great a role compared with those
of the government or the establishment of Pakistan in that. By
that time, the United States Special Amendment had come into effect
because of the American President certifying that he cannot say
Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapons capability. In my
view, there was a different environment at that time.
Q42 Mr Illsley: I can understand
the arguments about perhaps making Pakistan more secure in regard
to its relations with India but again that is a difficult process,
a historical process, with their not being able to get agreement
over the last 50 years. I could see difficulties in the international
community providing Pakistan with more conventional weaponry on
the basis that it scales down its nuclear weaponry, but again
the objection is that we are just proliferating weapons. Is that
the way forward or do we in the international community need just
simply to put pressure on Pakistan and say, "For God's sake,
stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons"?
Dr Samore: I have worked on Pakistan
for 20 years and the problem about putting pressure on Pakistan
is that it might break. It is a very fragile country. Now it is
armed with nuclear weapons. I really think we have to tread very
carefully. Obviously, Washington and London have decided to put
their eggs in Musharraf's basket for the time being, both because
I think they believe he is serious about ending the nuclear trafficking
and also because he is co-operating against terrorism and with
the peace process with India. I think for now probably our best
bet is to try to support President Musharraf as much as we can.
That is not a guaranteed strategy. We do not know whether President
Musharraf will survive the next attempt on his life. We do not
know what kind of government will emerge if he is gunned down.
Andrew Mackinlay: I understand the last
point you made, Dr Samore, about how fragile and sensitive Pakistan
is. It struck me that when the President of Pakistan said—I
am not sure if these are the correct words he used—"I
have forgiven", from the absence of any sort of anger or
indignation from the big players, from the United States, the
United Kingdom and others, it seemed to me an extraordinary response,
or lack of response. It begs the question of whether or not, and
we have known about it for a long time, the regime change in Pakistan
was because we knew about this. I certainly find the present President
of Pakistan the most favourable one we have had. Nevertheless,
it just seemed to me that this gentleman or others know where
some bodies are buried, for the want of a better term. It is an
extraordinary limp response from the West. I find it incredulous.
Really, I suppose my question is: why did that happen? Is it simply
because of what you said, it is so fragile, or is there something
which we are going to read about 15 or 20 years down the road?
Q43 Chairman: In short, what was
the trade off?
Dr Samore: I think the calculation
in Washington and London was that the most important thing was
to finally end the nuclear trafficking. Washington had been complaining
to Pakistan for at least a few years about A Q Khan's activities.
Finally, that evidence accumulated; Islamabad was so embarrassed
that it finally had to take action. Then Washington decided that
in exchange for a genuine effort on the part of President Musharraf,
to end any further trafficking, Washington was prepared to suspend
disbelief about the story that A Q Khan did this all on his own
and not add to Musharraf's burdens by insisting that he investigate
his predecessors, and perhaps even himself, in terms of who knew
about A Q Khan's activities, particularly in light of the co-operation
Pakistan was providing on counter-terrorism and on the peace process
with India. I think it was a perfectly rational calculation made
for supreme reasons of state. Yes, it would have been nice if
A Q Khan had been punished but, understanding the bigger issues
at stake, it was perfectly reasonable that Washington decided
not to press for that.
Dr Cheema: I think we have to
take into account that Pakistan as a country is one of the most
sanctioned, pro-Western and allied countries of the United States
and the West. In terms of the proliferation versus non-proliferation
debate, the entire pressures and sticks have proved counter-productive.
Pakistan has never, under any regime, no matter what the name
of the regime, whether democratic or military, given up its development
of nuclear weapons capability because it has not found an alternative
for its security. I am saying that if the Pakistani security question
is addressed, in whatever alternative—and I am not suggesting
one particular course—I think that might influence Pakistan
to moderate the development of nuclear and missile capability,
whether that involves finances, politics, economics or technological
issues. That has to be the framework that is taken into account.
Q44 Ms Stuart: Given what you have
just said about Pakistan being one of the most sanctioned countries
and given that somehow at an international level we need to come
up with measures which deal with proliferation, and both the International
and Atomic Energy Authority and President Bush have called for
a tightening, what do you think we should do more at an international
level, given that the kind of focus on individual countries does
not seem to have worked?
Dr Cheema: There are a few international
issues that are much wider than the debate at the moment in which
we are involved and they are pending resolution. For example,
what is the status of India and Pakistan? They are de facto
nuclear weapons states but they are not de jure nuclear
weapons states. If they are incorporated within the NPT[2]
framework, in my opinion they will be more co-operative with the
international non-proliferation regime and will feel: all right,
we have joined the club, we are being offered every kind of assistance
and help, we are part of that now, so let us stop any further
proliferation. That might happen. I am not saying that the proliferation
should be legitimised. I am only saying that reality has taken
place and I am asking how you deal with this reality. The other
aspect is this. Can you force India and Pakistan to draw back
and be non-proliferation countries which do not possess nuclear
weapons? In my opinion, that would be a very difficult proposition.
If India will not give them up, Pakistan will not give them up.
One has to decide that question at the international level: what
kind of involvement are you looking for? That is a very important
question. Where do Pakistan and India each stand in terms of NPT
and CTBT[3],
in terms of the fissile material which might come off in the immediate
future? That is a very important question one has to keep in mind.
The second point of the question is: Pakistan has a significant
militant Islamic element within Islam, within its body politic.
Whenever regular, free and fair elections have taken place in
Pakistan, they have been, except this one, tolerated. Until this
election, they have never had more than 15 to 16 members in the
Pakistan Parliament. This is the only election that has happened.
For me, the impartiality and the entire neutrality of this election
have been questioned by the European Union report, which you might
have seen, and by many international analysts. Given the fact
that the MMA[4]
has now agreed with General Musharraf on the legal framework order,
has allowed them to keep the uniform and has sanctioned the presidential
powers, which tilt the balance of power from the Prime Minister
to the President—I may be wrong—it makes me think
that indicates the MMA is not really a force against Musharraf.
Dr Samore: I think the A Q Khan
network was absolutely unique. By putting it out of business and
by uprooting all the individuals and companies that were involved,
that by itself will contribute more to strengthening the global
regime than any other step you could take.
Q45 Ms Stuart: You seem to have pre-empted
my next question, which is: do you expect we will find a similar
network anywhere other than Pakistan?
Dr Samore: No. I think this is
unique. In my understanding, the Libyans have provided a tremendous
amount of detail about the companies and individuals we are dealing
with and my understanding is that there is a number of different
investigations under way into various companies and citizens who
were involved. I hope that the governments and jurisdictions over
those companies are in a position to take strong legal action.
Q46 Ms Stuart: Do you also subscribe
to Dr Cheema's theory that there is a direct relationship between
the desire to acquire nuclear weapons and what you call conventional
military capacity?
Dr Samore: I think Pakistan has
both. I think Pakistan believes that it must have a nuclear deterrent
to defend itself against a much larger enemy in every way. Even
if you sold Pakistan every single conventional weapon on its wish
list, I do not believe Pakistan would be willing to give up its
nuclear deterrent.
Dr Cheema: I need to clarify my
position. I do not say that if Pakistan is helped to acquire conventional
military capability, it would give up nuclear weapons. No, I am
not saying that. I am only saying that it would moderate itself
and would not so frequently threaten the use of nuclear weapons
or invoke nuclear weapons in a crisis or conflict situation, as
it is currently doing. I am saying that.
Q47 Mr Chidgey: I would like to turn
now to Pakistan and the Taliban. I think both of you are familiar
with the comments of Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld and the
Afghan President, Mr Hamid Karzai, in February when they said:
"We strongly believe there is evidence that they are defeated.
The Taliban movement does not exist any more." That was in
the Herald Tribune, and yet, since August of last year,
over 400 people have been killed, apparently by the Taliban, and
certainly we get the impression it is not safe to travel beyond
Kabul. My question really is: how serious a threat does the Taliban
still pose?
Dr Cheema: If you will kindly
permit me, I would like to be more frank and honest and therefore
I have to go back a little further than you are going.
Q48 Mr Olner: You had better be if
you giving evidence.
Dr Cheema: You can reach a viable
solution only if you are true and honest to yourself and to everybody.
If you are trying to push things under the carpet, you will never
find a solution. Osama bin Laden and the Taliban were a creation
of the policy of the United States of America in 1994/95/96 when
they were looking at an alternative to the Northern Alliance in
Afghanistan, which was being helped by Iran and the Central Asian
states and perhaps to a limited extent by Russia at that time.
Americans put up the money. I am a witness to that. I know the
amount of money being provided but I am sorry I cannot say that.
The Pakistanis provided the training. It was a coalition by both
of them to create the Taliban in 1995/96. The United States of
America had at its disposal a massive information network to say
that Pakistan did this and they did not do that. In a pragmatic,
short-term policy you generate forces which become monstrous later
on and become a problem for you, and that is exactly what the
United States and Pakistan both did in 1995 and 1996, like the
United States again, including Mr Rumsfeld, created Mr Saddam
Hussein when he was fighting a war against Iran at that time.
He was being helped. I am sorry to include Britain in that.
Q49 Mr Chidgey: Dr Cheema, that was
then. What about now?
Dr Cheema: That was then. Now
we take into account that this was a problem not created by Pakistan
alone; it was a product of the politics of Afghanistan. Let us
cumulatively deal with that by a common framework and policies
which can do that. I am sure that President Musharraf is doing
his best to help the international community, Britain and the
United States, to deal with the Taliban as it is, primarily because,
first of all, the Taliban are a threat to his own life.
Q50 Mr Chidgey: May I just summarise
what you have said because I think it wraps up several of the
other questions I was about to ask? Am I right to believe that
you are telling us now that, yes, there were strong links between
Pakistan and the Taliban throughout the Nineties with the support
of whoever?
Dr Cheema: Yes.
Q51 Mr Chidgey: But those links have
now been broken and Pakistan is now doing whatever it can to tackle
the Taliban?
Dr Cheema: It is doing that.
Q52 Mr Chidgey: That leads me back
to my first point. Can you gauge for us how serious the threat
is that the Taliban still pose, given this change of direction,
and do you believe that Pakistan would do any more than it is
doing if there was additional and more international pressure
on Pakistan? In a nutshell, are you telling us that Pakistan has
virtually changed sides, so to speak, and really it is doing everything
it can do to suppress and contain the Taliban, or it is perhaps
just doing enough to convince us that it is doing it?
Dr Cheema: I will be very brief
and very clear. It is a significant threat. Pakistan is doing
its best, but it needs help, international help, to complete the
process it is doing.
Dr Samore: May I make a few brief
points? I think Pakistan believes that its ability to attack the
Taliban will be assisted if the Pushtun community in Afghanistan
believes that it has a legitimate representation in the new government
in Kabul. I think, from Pakistan's standpoint, their ability to
marshal forces against the Taliban depends directly on whether
or not the new Afghan government has a role for the Pushtun community.
Obviously that is a domestic issue for Pakistan as well since
there is a large Pushtun majority group in the north-west. Second,
I think that there is a concern in Pakistan that once the Taliban
is completely defeated and once Osama bin Laden is killed or captured,
the US will once again, in Pakistan's view, have no further need
for Pakistan and will leave them adrift. I think there is a genuine
concern in Islamabad that when the fight is over, the US will
abandon them as, in Pakistan's view, the US has done in the past.
I think part of the reason why Pakistan is stepping up its efforts
right now is in part to try to improve its image in the wake of
the nuclear scandal. I think that certainly to some extent Pakistan
is compensating by trying to demonstrate to the US its greater
co-operation in the war against terrorism.
Q53 Mr Pope: I am getting a confusing
image here about Pakistan and President Musharraf. On the one
hand, it appears that action is being taken. I see in today's
Times it says that thousands of Pakistani troops are prepared
to launch a renewed offensive in the remote region of Waziristan
against al-Qaeda forces, but Musharraf was in Peshawar yesterday
making a speech, a very tough speech, which I am sure will go
down very well with Prime Minister Blair and President Bush. At
the same time, there seems to be a curious lack of action in other
areas. One of the things we know is that the Taliban were able
to flourish in the madrasas of Pakistan, in the religious schools.
A few years ago this was recognised publicly by the Pakistan Government
and yet it seems that absolutely nothing has been done. I wondered
if you could give me a better steer on what appear to be competing
images. One of the things we hear very often is about the gap
between spin and reality. Is some of what President Musharraf
has been involved in just spin to give the West hope that real
action is being taken but actually on the ground not much is really
happening?
Dr Cheema: Let me say that the
last statement of Dr Samore made I agree with 100 per cent. Pakistan
has very genuine concerns vis-a"-vis what happens
in Afghanistan and what kind of policy it has. That has domestic
as well as regional and international implications for Pakistan.
Therefore, Pakistan is very seriously concerned about that. The
Taliban were a threat, a significant threat in my opinion, but
their capability has been again significantly reduced. Pakistan
has very effectively done that, in my opinion, as effectively
as possible, but it depends on how much resources are available
and at the disposal of Pakistan, resources not only in monetary
terms but resources in technological terms, resources in terms
of surveillance intelligence at the international level, and resources
in terms of combating forces being deployed today for that kind
of threat. That is one thing. One has to keep in mind that this
is an issue which has domestic implications for Pakistan and therefore
an element of backfiring might take place. Already the Musharraf
Government is very genuinely sensitive that this issue might backfire
and therefore this has to be done gradually, consistently and
with patience, rather than in a rush to crush the Taliban. The
policy would be slowly and effectively to eliminate their capability,
or whatever, and individual elements which exist at that time,
given the fact that they have connections within the body politic
of Pakistan.
Dr Samore: As far as I can tell,
within the constraints that Dr Cheema has described, Islamabad
is trying to step up its efforts, at least to capture Osama bin
Laden. I think President Musharraf's speech that was reported
in the paper today is an appeal to the tribal leaders of the north-west
area to give him up or face the possibility that they will find
more Pakistani troops in their midst.
Q54 Mr Pope: That is helpful. Could
I go back to the issue of the madrasas because I think this is
a good example? I can understand that there is a problem in the
remote areas where there is some tribal autonomy and it is difficult,
but this is a problem that goes right to the heart of Islamabad
and the major cities of Pakistan, that President Musharraf recognised
that the madrasas were a breeding ground for religious extremism,
jihadism, support for the Taliban. He said that there would be
a crack down. To date, it would appear that absolutely nothing
has been done. This is not really just about resources. It would
not cost anything. He said he would: register the madrasas so
they had a clear idea who was actually running them; regulate
the curriculum so that the curriculum was not run by people who
supported jihad; stop the use of madrasas as centres of political
extremism; establish government-run schools which would become
models of educational excellence. To date, I think, from the figures
I have here, 300 students are in government-run centres of excellence
and 1.5 million students attend unregulated ones. I just cannot
really understand why President Musharraf will not get a grip
on what seems to me a cancer within Pakistani culture.
Dr Samore: President Musharraf
has made a formidable accommodation with the MMA against the two
larger civilian political parties, so I assume that limits his
freedom of action in terms of taking measures against the madrasas.
Q55 Mr Pope: We really are where
we have been before with military rulers in Pakistan. All right,
the rhetoric is "tough on the Taliban and tough on the causes
of the Taliban" but the practicality of it is doing an accommodation
with religious extremists because that is actually domestically
useful in building up a coalition against a secular opposition
to Musharraf.
Dr Samore: President Musharraf
cannot fight on all fronts at once. He has got to pick his battles.
He is in great jeopardy, it seems to me, of antagonising his entire
political base. If he makes a deal with India on Kashmir he angers
the Punjabis, and if he makes a deal with the United States to
crush the Taliban he angers the Pushtuns. Also, he does not want
to take on the very small fraction of population that strongly
supports the fundamentalists. He is a man in a very difficult
position.
Dr Cheema: I have spent 30 years
in the field of education. My view is that Pakistan has to be
convinced, influenced and helped in every way to give up this
dichotomous system of education, that on the one had you have
madrasas teaching people and, on the other hand, you have schools,
colleges and universities teaching people. These are entirely
different and at times there are opposing curricula for teachers.
That has to be given up. There has to be one system of education,
which should also provide religious education. I am not against
religion. I am a Muslim. I am a born Muslim and I my entire being
is Muslim. Therefore, that means that religious education should
be taught in Pakistani institutions but it has to be taught within
the colleges, universities and schools, which is the main educational
system of the country, rather than having a separate system for
teaching religious education. That would greatly help and moderate
the Pakistani society.
Q56 Mr Pope: What then is your judgment
on President Musharraf and almost marks out of 10: is he a steadfast
ally in the war on terrorism or could he do better?
Dr Samore: I think he is doing
about as good as a Pakistani leader can do.
Mr Pope: That was my judgment, too.
The Committee suspended from 3.52 p.m. to 5 p.m.
for a division in the House
Q57 Sir John Stanley: I do not have
any financial interest to declare, but I wish to put on record
that I am a former research associate of the International Institute
for Strategic Studies. I want to ask you, Dr Samore, some questions
about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. I would like to begin
by your own Institute's report of 9 September 2002, your report,
which, I am sure entirely by coincidence, bore exactly the same
title as the Government's as far as the main heading was concerned:
Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. It was, of course,
published 15 days before the Government's own September dossier.
First, were you requested at any point to submit any advance copies
of the drafts of your own dossier to the Government before you
published it?
Dr Samore: In the course of editing
this document I provided drafts to a number of experts inside
and outside government in order to get their personal comments
on the substance of the material, but I never shared drafts with
governments per se.
Q58 Sir John Stanley: Were you at
any point asked by the British Government to provide any advance
drafts?
Dr Samore: No, not that I am aware
of.
Q59 Sir John Stanley: You did, of
course, draw on the expertise of certainly two current civil servants.
One of course was the late Dr Kelly, and it would not be proper
to make any reference to his contribution, but I would like to
refer to the contribution made by the other current civil servant,
who was described as "Mr A" when he gave evidence to
the Hutton Inquiry. Mr A, who gave evidence off the record, without
being seen, described himself as a casually employed civil servant
with the Counter-Proliferation Arms Control Department within
the Ministry of Defence. The question I would like to ask you
is: was Mr A's involvement in the drafting of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies' report on Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction with the Government's approval and consent or was
this involvement one that he was doing in his own spare time?
Dr Samore: I do not know who Mr
A is, to tell you the truth, but all of the individuals I dealt
with I dealt with as individuals, so I have no way of knowing
whether any of them contacted their superiors and informed them
of what they were doing. I sent drafts to officials in the American
Government, the French Government, the British Government, as
well as to people outside government, but I always dealt with
people as individuals. I said, "This is an unclassified document
that we are preparing and I would appreciate any comments you
can provide." I do not have any way of knowing what they
said to their superiors or colleagues in the Government about
the draft that I had sent them for comment.
2 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Back
3
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Back
4
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Back
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