Written evidence submitted by Mr Peter
Marsden MBE
SECURITY
The military intervention of October 2001 resulted
in a reversion to the power holding arrangements that existed
prior to the Taliban takeover. This fragmented power holding situation
has been aggravated by an expansion of the opium trade, by efforts
by the Karzai government to replace governors and chiefs of police,
by the US-led coalition paying various militia groups to assist
them in the war on terror and by growing criminal activity, particularly
banditry. Government control is tenuous in all areas, including
Kabul, where Jamiat-i-Islami remains the effective power holder.
However, the reach of the government is increasing incrementally
through small scale administrative interventions and through efforts
to have funds transmitted from the regions to the centre.
The Taliban have re-emerged in a more radical
form and have shown themselves to be willing to commit terrorist
acts against targets associated with what they perceive as a US-led
state building process. This terrorist activity, which largely
dates from the US intervention in Iraq, has taken a very similar
pattern to one which has been evident in Iraq and manifests itself
in a targeting of those engaged in the reconstruction process,
including aid workers, people working on major reconstruction
projects such as road building and members of the newly created
national army and police force. Afghans have been particularly
targeted although a number of foreigners have also been killed.
Many of the murders have taken the form of summary executions
by shooting.
The Taliban are in a strong position to build
popular support amongst the Pushtun populations astride the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border and across southern Afghanistan. The Pushtuns of Afghanistan
have felt insufficiently represented in the corridors of power
and their fellow Pushtuns in the tribal areas of Pakistan resent
the military activities of the Pakistan army in pursuit of the
war on terror. The methods used by both the US forces and the
Pakistan army will have further alienated the population. The
Committee may wish to note, in this context, a recent report by
Human Rights Watch on the behaviour of US forces in Afghanistan:
"Enduring Freedom Abuses by US forces in Afghanistan".
On the other hand, the recent Constitutional Loya Jirga resulted
in a discernible shift in the balance of power in favour of the
Pushtuns and improved relations with Pakistan may make it less
likely that elements within Pakistan will provide support to a
Taliban insurgency. It is also unlikely that the population at
large would welcome a return of the Taliban to power, because
they are seen as too extreme, even if there is a willingness to
provide protection to Taliban fighters from US forces.
A related issue is how the West is viewed in
Afghanistan. There has always been a profound ambivalence within
the rural population to any Western presence because of a fear
that Western values might undermine Islam or traditional Afghan
values. In recent years, we have also seen the emergence of a
population of students of Quranic schools or madrasahs, of which
the Taliban were a manifestation, which have taken a political
stance vis a" vis the West. Issues such as Palestine
and the US military presence in Saudi Arabia which influenced
radicals in the Middle East did not greatly concern those in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. However, the US intervention in Iraq has aroused
strong feelings in the region and, combined with statements made
by the US government and by more evangelical elements in the USA,
has led to a widely held view that the West is engaged in a crusade
against Islam. The existence of the internet and the highly politicised
nature of Afghan and Pakistani societies has meant that statements
of an anti-Islamic nature made in the West are very widely disseminated.
These further fuel the view that the West is engaged in a crusade.
Particular care must therefore be taken by all those making statements
in the popular domain.
In response to the adverse security situation,
the US-led coalition forces have established what are termed Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. These are intended to improve the security
situation in the areas where they are located. However, they have
proved extremely difficult to define. What is clear is that they
are not resourced to intervene militarily in order to calm a deterioration
in security. At best, their purpose is to seek to understand local
dynamics and negotiate an improvement in security through contact
with the various parties. This has been the focus of the Mazar
PRT, which is led by the British Government. At worst, they have
focused on winning the hearts and minds of the population by digging
wells and building schools in the hope of securing information
on Taliban and Al-Qaida activity. The involvement of PRTs in reconstruction
programmes is of serious concern to NGOs operating in Afghanistan
because it has blurred the boundary between coalition forces and
humanitarian and development agencies, both in the eyes of the
population and of those engaged in terrorism. NGO staff have thus
become targets and it has proved necessary for NGOs to withdraw
from much of southern Afghanistan. British NGOs were consulted
by the British government in the planning stage of the Mazar PRT
and are pleased with the strong focus on security and the respect
for NGO concerns with regard to any involvement in reconstruction
activity. However, they have not felt that their concerns have
been taken seriously by the US government.
It is thus proving increasingly difficult for
NGOs to maintain an image of humanitarian impartiality and neutrality
alongside a Western military presence which is focused on the
war on terror. The UN-mandated International Security Assistance
Force which has, hitherto, largely been confined to Kabul, is
facing equal difficulties differentiating itself from the coalition
forces and ISAF forces have been the targets of a number of suicide
bombings.
We understand that the British government is
developing a plan with NATO allies in Brussels to expand ISAF
country-wide in the form of PRTs and that guidelines and blueprints
are being drawn up which draw on the Mazar model. It is hoped,
therefore, that the PRTs which come under the ISAF mandate will
focus strongly on a negotiation of security, together with security
sector reform, with due respect for the involvement of NGOs and
other actors in reconstruction activity.
The other major issue relating to security is
that of security sector reform. Efforts to rebuild the national
army, police force and judiciary remain at an embryonic stage,
in spite of determined efforts by the international community,
and a climate of impunity continues to prevail, even in Kabul.
The decision of the British government to forcibly return Afghan
asylum seekers is of serious concern in this regard. Given that
Afghans did not arrive in the UK in any numbers until August 1998
and that this was a consequence of increased radicalism within
the Taliban generated by the US air strikes on Afghanistan of
that month, it is premature to return those who fled the Taliban
to a situation in which the Taliban continue to represent a threat.
The absence of an effective rule of law also means that those
who feel vulnerable to one or other power holder in Afghanistan
by virtue of their previous affiliations have no means of securing
protection.
Progress on disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration is extremely slow but is having an impact in some
areas, notably Mazar-i-Sharif. It is still too early to say whether
the current process of disarmament of the various militia operating
in Kabul will be effective.
RECONSTRUCTION
Progress on the reconstruction front has been
slow but is now beginning to pick up. The USA completed initial
resurfacing of the Kabul to Kandahar highway at the end of last
year and the World Bank has supported the major repair of the
Salang Tunnel to the north of Kabul. Iran has rebuilt the road
from Herat to the Iranian border. A European Commission-funded
programme to restore the Kabul to Jalalabad highway is about to
commence. Work is also ongoing on many secondary roads. Timely
relief programmes significantly alleviated the impact of the drought
of 1999-2002 but it will take time for farmers to recover in spite
of improved rains. The nomadic population has been severely affected
by the decimation of livestock herds. High priority has been given
to investment in education with a strong focus on education for
girls. However, the capacity of the government and the aid community
to deliver education and other services has been seriously constrained
by the adverse security situation in many areas, particularly
in the south.
The efforts of the Afghan government to rebuild
the infrastructure and the economy have not been helped by the
return, under pressure, of over two million refugees from Pakistan
and Iran. It should be noted that, although this large-scale return
is often cited as an indicator of the success of the Bonn Agreement,
the return process was a consequence of measures taken by the
Pakistan and Iranian governments to withdraw rights and entitlements
and to also put the squeeze on refugees through increased police
harassment and strong media messages.
A high proportion of returnees have gone to
Kabul where the population is now approaching three million. The
infrastructure of basic housing, health, water supply and sanitation
services is not equipped to cope with this number and there are
serious public health risks.
DRUGS
Opium production was relatively high in 2003
but not as high as the 4,600 tonnes reached before the Taliban
imposed a total ban on production. Production is much more widespread
than before which is largely a reflection of the efforts of farmers
across the country to recover from the drought. However, high
market prices have meant that some of those orchestrating the
trade have become wealthy, thus generating what is referred to
as the narco mafia. There is concern that disputes within this
mafia are generating local conflict, that the mafia have significant
political influence and that investment by them in the property
market is fuelling housing prices in the capital.
Measures to combat drug production involve a
balance between enforcement action and the creation of alternative
livelihoods. The economy is only picking up relatively slowly
and has to also accommodate the needs of returning refugees and
demobilised soldiers, together with those dismissed from the civil
service as a consequence of a downsizing process. The government
has to be careful not to use too much enforcement in case it alienates
sections of the population whose support it needs. The question
of resources is a difficult one in a situation in which the vast
majority of drugs escape detection and the funds needed to generate
increased livelihoods on a sufficient scale are significantly
above the levels that donors are willing to provide.
ELECTIONS
With only one million out of a potential electorate
of 10 million registered to date since the process began at the
beginning of December and with much of the country too insecure
for election officials to operate in, it looks extremely unlikely
that free and fair elections can be held in June, as planned.
However, there are strong pressures from the US government and
others to accelerate the registration process so that elections
can be held without more than a few months delay. The indications
are that presidential elections will be held first and parliamentary
elections delayed until 2005. This is viewed with concern by particular
elements within the government who fear that the President will
enjoy excessive power without the checks that a parliament would
create.
President Karzai enjoys popular support to the
extent that people see him as better than the alternatives. There
is concern, however, over what is perceived as undue US influence
over his government. There are clear tensions within the government
between those who stayed in Afghanistan to fight in the jihad
and those who have returned from the West, having worked as professionals,
to take up key positions. Although Karzai alternated between the
USA and Pakistan/Afghanistan, he is primarily identified with
the exile group. However, he remains a strong contender for the
position of President when elections are finally held.
There is a risk that interest in registering
for the elections will be affected by a view that the outcome
of the elections has already been determined. However, others
have hinted that they may put themselves forward for election
and this may encourage participation by their supporters.
THE LEVEL
OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMITMENT
The British government has maintained a steady
course in providing funding for Afghanistan since 1989. The European
Commission has been equally steady, as have the Scandinavian governments
and Japan. The US government has been quite erratic but has provided
funding on a large scale when it has allocated resources for Afghanistan.
The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have recently started
to embark on large spending programmes. The overall level of funding
for Afghanistan, however, has been very much less than in many
other recent recovery situations such as Iraq, the Balkans and
East Timor. This has been viewed with concern by the Afghan government
among others, which has faced serious cash flow problems over
certain periods. The time-frame for international commitment to
Afghanistan needs to be a minimum of 10 years and, ideally, 20
years.
Peter Marsden, MBE
Project Coordinator
British Agencies Afghanistan Group
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