Annex 1
Q1. The Committee
notes your comments on 30 March about the hand-over of sovereignty
in Iraq on 30 June and the role of the UN as a means of "leverage",
and wishes to receive further details of how the United Kingdom
will seek to influence the Iraqi interim government following
1 July. What degree of co-ordination will there be with the US?
When the CPA comes to an end, we shall meet
our objectives in Iraq, including developing and maintaining close
relations with the Iraqi interim government, through traditional
diplomatic means. We are intending to establish an Embassy in
Baghdad, a Consulate-General in Basra, and a very small Consulate
in Kirkuk. The missions in Baghdad and Basra will both consist
of around 80 staff, including staff from FCO, DFID, MOD, and UKTI,
and also the British Council, DFID consultants and trainers for
the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and police. This will enable us
to maintain close links with the Iraqi Government, as well as
providing expert advice to a number of the Iraqi Ministries. The
US are also intending to establish an Embassy in Baghdad, and
smaller missions elsewhere. We are discussing with the US how
best to ensure that we maintain a high level of co-ordination
with them after transition.
Q2. The Committee would like to know what
the UK is doing to prevent terrorists from entering Iraq across
its porous borders. How far have Iraq's neighbours co-operated
in these efforts?
We are accelerating border security efforts
with increased personnel, new technology and tighter procedures.
Some $107 million has been allocated to the reconstruction of
facilities and a review is underway of the number and location
of Border Posts. There are now over 8,000 Iraqi Border Police
and the CPA plans to double this number. This will help stop terrorist
infiltration. Furthermore as well as Multinational forces there
are approximately 131,000 Iraqis involved in security across the
country. Iraqi customs and immigration controls were restored
on 1 April. The PISCES Immigration IT system has been installed
in prioritised border points and training for new customs and
immigration staff began on 29 March.
Senior staff from the Iraqi Department for Border
Enforcement, with advice from UK advisors from CPA Baghdad, have
held talks with neighbouring countries about border security.
The CPA is in the process of tightening control of the Iran-Iraq
border, reducing the number of ports of entry. Over the past year
we have sought closer contact with Iran on Iraq-related matters.
We welcome greater contacts between the Iranian and Iraqi authorities.
Though we have seen some improvement in Syria's performance, we
still have concerns about the flow of jihadis across the Syria/Iraq
border, which we have raised with the Syrians at the highest level.
Limiting the freedom of movement of those determined to attack
the Coalition and Iraqis should be a priority for Syria—a
stable Iraq is in their interests too. We have encouraged meetings
of Iraq's neighbours to discuss ways in which they can co-operate
over this issue.
Q3. The Committee wishes to know what is being
done to prevent stockpiles of ammunition and weaponry from falling
into terrorist hands in Iraq?
There is an extremely large amount of weapons
and ammunition in Iraq. This includes those held by private individuals,
organised militias, criminal organisations and stockpiles which
were abandoned by Saddam's security forces or others. The CPA
recognises that weapons control is necessary in order to ensure
a secure environment for the people of Iraq and to promote public
order and safety, whilst recognising the ingrained tradition of
gun ownership in Iraq. Our aim in the long term is to reform the
gun culture in Iraq. For immediate reasons of safety it is the
policy of the CPA that no person other than members of the security
forces may carry small arms in public. A process of integration
and disbanding of militias is underway and under the terms of
the Transitional Administrative Law all militias will be illegal
from 1 July 2004.
The Multinational Force is utilising all means
at its disposal to prevent abandoned munitions being used by those
opposed to democracy in Iraq. This is an enormous task. In the
UK area of operations alone there are well over one thousand sites
of varying size which contain arms of some kind. When a new site
is discovered its contents are taken to one of several consolidated
sites which are guarded by UK forces. These weapons are issued
to the Iraqi police or armed forces where appropriate or otherwise
destroyed. It will inevitably take some time before all of the
minor sites are cleared and would in any case not solve the problem
of the ready availability of weapons in Iraq. Only by addressing
wider cultural issues, increasing the capability of Iraqi security
forces and improving the economic and political situation will
the role of weapons in Iraqi society be reduced.
Q4. The committee notes your comments on 30
March about efforts to train the Iraqi police and wishes to know
the number of Iraqi Police who have completed their training,
are currently in training, and are expected to be trained The
committee would also like to receive details of the wastage rate
of trainees.
According to statistics provided by the Coalition
Police Assistance Training Team, there are 78,224 Iraqi Police
Officers on duty. In total, 14,746 officers have completed police
training to date. This figure comprises 12,422 who have completed
refresher training for serving officers through the Transitional
Integration Programme (TIP), and 2,324 students who have completed
the eight week new recruit training. There are a further 2,003
students currently attending TIP training, and 1,837 on new recruit
training, totalling 3,840 students. It is anticipated that an
additional 50,000 will be trained. Figures for the wastage rate
of trainees are not centrally collated.
Q5. The Committee notes your comments on 30
March about the Iraq Special Tribunal and wishes to know more
about the United Kingdom's involvement in it, with particular
reference to the death penalty.
On 10 December the Governing Council announced
the establishment of an Iraq Special Tribunal (IST) to prosecute
senior members of the former regime suspected of the worst crimes
against humanity. All cases will be tried by Iraqi judges, which
is only right given that most of the crimes were committed against
the Iraqi people, although the Statute includes provision for
expert international involvement. The Rules of Procedure and Elements
of Crime are currently being drafted. There is now a small pre-investigation
team in Baghdad working on the development of infrastructure for
investigations (rather than gathering information). They include
an evidence custodian from the UK. The US is now considering sending
out a sizeable team of investigators that will include non-US
nationals.
The UK has seconded a total of 10 officials
to the CPA Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice (OHRTJ)
including the Head of the Office of Human Rights. There are currently
eight in Iraq. This is an area where the UK has made a significant
contribution. Prior to his departure, the former UK Head of the
Investigations Unit within the Office of Transitional Justice
developed the investigations strategy for the IST and trained
Iraqi judges for the Tribunal. He is now assisting HMG and the
US with identifying suitable qualified investigators. The former
UK legal adviser to the Investigations Unit supported the drafting
of the Statute and Rules of Procedure for the IST. He is now assisting
with the redrafting of the Rules of Procedure and the drafting
of Elements of Crime. The UK has a further six staff in the Office
of Human Rights who are establishing systems for storing and analysing
documentation retrieved from the former regime and co-ordinating
the forensic exhumation process. In collaboration with the relevant
ministries, they are developing training programmes to build Iraqi
capacity to take testimonies and witness statements and to analyse
regime documentation.
Following the promulgation of the Statute for
the Special Tribunal on 10 December 2003, when it became clear
that the Tribunal may pass death sentences at an undetermined
future date, we decided to review our assistance to the process.
Following Ministerial discussion we decided that we could in principle
provide assistance in a number of keys areas in line with our
obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Our
assistance in these areas will of course depend on available resources,
but we would like to provide at least some assistance in some
of the following areas:
— Public education and outreach
— Victim and witness counselling
— International observers
We are also encouraging other EU partners to
consider favourably requests for assistance from the Iraqis.
Q6. The Committee notes your comments on 30
March about Iraqi detainees and wished to know whether it is anticipated
that any detainees will remain in the custody of Coalition forces
on 30 June.
The UK and US are responsible for security internees
and prisoners of war. The UK and US also arrest those suspected
of criminal activity, known as criminal detainees, before handing
them over to the Iraqi police. The case of each security internee
is reviewed regularly in order to determine whether they continue
to pose an imperative threat to security. The right of the UK
and US and to hold detainees stems from our position as Occupying
Powers. We take very seriously our legal obligations as Occupying
Powers for the correct treatment of detainees and have investigated
allegations of maltreatment, taking disciplinary action in those
cases where allegations have been substantiated. The treatment
of detainees is reviewed by the ICRC, who make regular visits
to all coalition detention facilities. Under the terms of the
Transitional Administrative Law the US and UK will no longer be
Occupying Powers from 30 June. If on 30 June we are detaining
people who still pose a threat to the multinational force, including
UK forces, we will want to make sure that they continue to be
detained and are unable to realise that threat. Until the political
arrangements for the transition of power are finalised, we are
not able to say exactly how this will be done.
Q7. The Committee would like to know whether
the United Kingdom believes that Israel's assassination of Hamas
leader Ahmed Yassin has hindered positive moves in the Arab world
towards peace.
The UK believes that the assassinations of Sheikh
Ahmed Yassin and Abdul Aziz al-Rantissi have had a negative impact.
They have intensified anger and may make progress more difficult.
You will have seen my statements on 22 March and 17 April following
the killings. As I said, we understand Israel's need to defend
itself. But it must act in accordance with international law.
Assassinations are illegal, unjustified and counter-productive.
We have repeatedly called for an end to the use of force by both
sides. Violence achieves nothing. Only the resumption of political
negotiations can provide a path to a permanent settlement that
will bring peace to both peoples.
Q8. The Committee would like to know if the
United Kingdom believes that a more active US role at this stage
could achieve progress on the Israel-Palestine conflict.
The US has played an important and high profile
role in the roadmap process, and its role remains critical. We
welcome this. At the same time we share the US view that the Quartet
must lead the international effort to ensure Israel's withdrawal
from Gaza is a success. We expect Quartet Foreign Ministers will
meet in May.
Q9. The Committee wishes to know if the UK
would regard a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as contributing
to a peaceful settlement with the Palestinians.
Prime Minister Sharon's proposals to withdraw
all Gaza settlements and some in the West Bank, in line with their
roadmap commitments, are to be welcomed. We have encouraged Israel
to make withdrawal from Gaza as full as possible and will continue
to do so. Currently it appears that Prime Minister Sharon is not
planning to withdraw from the Gaza/Egypt border. We hope the plan
will develop further to include this. We will discuss with Israel,
the Palestinian Authority and Egypt ways the international community
can help achieve this.
Q10. The Committee would like to know what
the UK is doing to allay concerns, both among Palestinians and
in neighbouring countries, that Israel's unilateral withdrawal
from areas of occupied territories will lead to a de facto annexation
of Palestinian land.
The Prime Minister has made clear that all final
status issues, including borders and refugees, must be agreed
in negotiations between the two parties. He also reiterated the
need to get back to the roadmap, which offers the best route to
the vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by
side in peace. We have reiterated this with our EU partners and
hope that the forthcoming Quartet meeting will do the same.
Q11. The Committee wishes to know if the Palestinian
Authority is taking steps to fight terrorism, and if it is, what
are they?
The UK has encouraged Palestinian action in
areas where they could deliver a visible improvement in the security
situation. This is in line with Palestinian commitments on security
under the roadmap. We have offered practical help where the Palestinian
Authority requests it. We are beginning to see encouraging signs,
but there is some way to go before we can conclude that the Palestinian
Authority is exerting 100% effort on security.
Q12. The Committee wishes to know what the
United Kingdom is doing to achieve reform in the Arab world? What
progress has been made and what progress is expected this year?
The FCO last year established a new team in
London and in the region dedicated to furthering reform in the
Arab world. It also established a £1.5 million Engaging the
Islamic World programme to support this policy by assisting indigenous-led
change and modernisation in the areas of governance, rule of law
and issues surrounding women. The programme fund was increased
to £3 million this financial year and extended to Islamic
countries beyond the Arab world. The British Government is also
using its influence in multilateral organisations to support regional
reform. We expect agreement at the G8 Summit in Sea Island to
a menu of activity that assists reform in the region. We are contributing
to the development of an EU Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean
and the Middle East, to be considered at the June European Council.
This international engagement supports recent regional demands
for change and modernisation, such as the Sana'a and Alexandria
inter-governmental and nongovernmental declarations earlier this
year.
Q13. The Committee would like to know if the
United Kingdom believes that there is a real understanding among
Arab governments of the need for both political and economic reform.
All Arab governments have spoken of the importance
of economic reform and most of the need for accompanying political
change. The Gulf Co-operation Council and the Arab League have
discussed proposals for regional reform initiatives. The British
Government continues to encourage governments in the region to
implement broad-based reform programmes, with international assistance
as necessary, that address the challenges facing the region, as
identified by Arab authors in two recent UNDP Arab Human Development
reports.
Q14. The Committee would like to know if the
United Kingdom is satisfied with the measures Pakistan has taken
to prevent further proliferation and if full co-operation has
been obtained in this field.
The UK, together with other countries, remains
in contact with the Government of Pakistan over the action it
is taking to ensure there is no further proliferation of nuclear
technology. In particular, we are calling on Pakistan to introduce
effective export controls including an end-use control. We are
ready to work with Pakistan to develop effective legislation and
implementation mechanisms.
We have also offered assistance with safety
and physical security measures for Pakistan's nuclear facilities
as foreseen in the Bradshaw Statement of 15 March 2002.
In addition to our contacts with Pakistan we
have put proposals to India to develop cooperation on export controls
and nuclear safety, building on India's existing good record of
controlling the export of sensitive technology.
Q15. The Committee wishes to know what kind
of international restraints the United Kingdom believes should
be put in place to prevent further proliferation.
There is no "one-size-fits-all" policy
we can apply to counter the threat posed by the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). All proliferators pose a
challenge to the international community, but our response must
be tailored to the circumstances of each one.
In pursuing our goal of the elimination of WMD,
the Government uses the tools that it judges will be most effective
in each case. There are a number of tools at our disposal, including:
— Bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.
For example, UK/US work with Libya; and negotiations in New York
to agree a UN Security Council resolution on non-proliferation
(the first ever such resolution).
— International treaties and regimes
(eg Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, and their associated compliance
and inspection regimes) which help establish international norms
that deter and raise the political cost of pursuing WMD.
— Inspection regimes coupled to the
international treaties (eg IAEA, OPCW) which can also help raise
the economic cost of proliferation by forcing proliferators to
act covertly.
— Ad hoc inspection regimes established
under UN mandate, such as UNSCOM/UNMOVIC, and the UN Secretary
General's CBW alleged use investigations system.
— Effective export controls drawing
on common multilateral standards (such as Nuclear Suppliers Group,
Missile Technology Control Regime).
— Preventing the transfer of sensitive
intellectual property.
— Co-operative threat reduction programmes
(eg decommissioning WMD facilities, alternative employment for
former WMD scientists), supported bilaterally and multilaterally
(EU, G8).
— Efforts to prevent trafficking in
WMD, and encouraging others to do likewise (eg through the Proliferation
Security Initiative).
— Political and economic pressure (eg
lobbying, arms embargoes, sanctions) either bilaterally or-preferably-multilaterally.
At UK prompting, in December the EU agreed a strategy to prevent
WMD proliferation; as part of this, the EU has agreed to include
a model non-proliferation clause in all mixed agreements with
third countries.
— Efforts to address the regional and
global security concerns which often lie behind proliferation.
We continue to assess and reassess this framework,
to see if we can apply these tools more effectively, or whether
additional tools are required. The Foreign Secretary's statement
to Parliament of 25 February outlined some further measures which
we are actively exploring.
Q16. The Committee wishes to know whether
the United Kingdom believes that Iran's declaration to the IAEA
was complete? Is Iran continuing to conduct Uranium enrichment?
The Government continues to work with Iran and
with the IAEA to ensure Iran makes a full declaration covering
the full scope of its nuclear and nuclear-related activities as
required under the Additional Protocol. Iran has undertaken to
make this declaration by mid-May.
Iran has undertaken voluntarily to suspend all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities in Iran. The IAEA
has reported that Iran has not introduced further feed material
into the centrifuges installed at the Natanz Pilot Feuel Enrichment
Plant (PFEP), and has withdrawn the feed material already introduced.
The PFEP is the only facility where Iran has declared the introduction
of Uranium Hexafluoride feed material. We continue to work closely
with the IAEA to monitor ongoing Iranian activity.
The UK, France and Germany issued a joint media
statement in response to Iran's announcement it intended to commence
operation of parts of its Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan.
We believe that this action will not contribute to Iran's efforts
to rebuild international confidence in its nuclear intentions.
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