Examination of Witnesses (Questions 240
- 256)
WEDNESDAY 5 MAY 2004
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR JOHN
BUCK AND
MS JAN
THOMPSON
Q240 Mr Mackay: Foreign Secretary,
whilst accepting that fact can I just quote from Major General
Martin Dempsey who of course is the commander of the US Army's
First Armoured Division. He recently told reporters within the
last week after a particularly bad incident, and he is talking
about the Iraqi security forces: "About 50% of the security
forces which we have built up over the past year stood tall and
stood firm, about 40% of them walked off the job because they
were intimidated, and about 10% actually worked against us,"
so the situation is pretty dire and I think we have to accept
what the General says.
Mr Straw: Does that not make my
point on this issue of de-Baathification? There was no perfect
way of doing this but if it had simply been decided to rebadge
a Saddam Army we could have had more problems than we solved by
that.
Q241 Mr Mackay: Many of us think
the complete opposite. Just one final point, against that backdrop,
is 30 June really practical any longer or is it just something
that is convenient to an American President come the fall?
Mr Straw: No, it is not only practical
but it is essential and we are going to stick to it. We are two
months away now and a lot of work is going in to secure the transfer
of sovereignty, including a Security Council Resolution.
Q242 Mr Hamilton: Foreign Secretary,
I think you would agree that a major factor in Middle Eastern
terrorism and violence is the situation in Israel and the Palestinian
Territories. I noted of course that you and the British Government
condemned the assassination by the Israelis of Sheikh Yassin in
March and more recently Dr Rantissi, two of the leaders of the
terror group Hamas. You said of course, and I think many of us
would agree, that it was not helpful to the peace process. Can
you understand the rationale that the Israelis have employed in
these targeted assassinations? After all, here were two men who
sanctioned the use of violence and murder against innocent Jewish
citizens of Israel. Can you understand the rationale in doing
what they did?
Mr Straw: Yes is the answer because
I always seek to understand the rationale of people whether or
not I agree with them so of course I understand the rationale,
and I may say that I not only did I condemn that but I condemned
in very round terms this morning the terror that occurs from rejectionist
terrorist groups against Israelis, including this absolutely appalling
attack on Sunday against a woman who was many months pregnant
and her four children which was disgusting and disgraceful, but
the issue here is a hard one for all countries which are members
of the international community which is how do you respond to
terror. We faced nothing like as bad challenges in Northern Ireland
but we faced some pretty difficult challenges and I believe that
the response has to be one that is justifiable. Part of the problem
with the Israeli response is that so many times entirely innocent
women and children, and men too, are killed as a consequence of
these attacks on these individuals.
Q243 Mr Hamilton: Would you agree
though that the assassinations have disrupted the violence perpetrated
by Hamas in Israel?
Mr Straw: I cannot offer you a
judgment about that. What I said is what I and the British Government
believe, which is that assassinations or killings of this kind
are unjustified, they are not lawful, and they are counter-productive.
I discussed our approach in a very friendly terms this morning
when I saw Silvan Shalom, the Israeli Foreign Minister. Of course
I comprehend why the Israeli government has decided to go down
this path but my judgment is my judgment on this.
Q244 Mr Hamilton: My final question
then, Foreign Secretary, is why is the killing of Hamas leaders
by Israel condemned—and I agree with the points that you
make—by all Western governments including the United States
when if, say, Osama bin Laden had been cornered and killed by
western forces that would be universally praised in the West?
Is that not a dual standard?
Mr Straw: It is not a dual standard.
It is about proportionality. It depends in what circumstances.
If you are asking me this direct question—and I know it
is a matter that is often raised—if Osama bin Laden was
killed whilst involved in military action, say, in the border
areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan where he is most likely
to have been and he failed to give himself up and the other casualties
were people who were also involved in insurgency I think people
would say that was horrible but acceptable. On the other hand,
if in the course of seeking to kill him quite a number of entirely
innocent people were killed because of where he was, I think different
considerations would apply there. These judgments have to be made
all the time, I am afraid, but if you are saying there is a double
standard here I do not happen to believe that there is. We fully
and absolutely understand not just the concern but the terrorisation
of the Israeli population by the rejectionist terrorists and we
condemn that. The other side of this is that we will never get
to a solution between Israel and Palestine unless there is an
understanding of both sides. The fact is that very large numbers
of entirely innocent Palestinians as well have lost their lives
in recent years. We have to seek ways of ending this spiral of
violence and we have got to ensure that we follow a consistent
pattern about the application of the rule of law in proportionate
responses however difficult the military circumstances may be.
Q245 Mr Illsley: Foreign Secretary,
the Committee has received evidence and opinions that in all practical
terms that handover on 30 June will not mean a great deal to many
Iraqis who will still see the American forces as an occupying
power and there has been a suggestion that the level of insurgency
will continue after 30 June perhaps through until (hopefully)
elections next January. Given the reaction of Spain, who have
confirmed their decision to pull their troops out, do we have
any plans to try and internationalise the situation quickly, to
try and remove this focus on America, to try and bring other troops
in perhaps with a United Nations Resolution as a fallback in case
the situation continues to deteriorate even after 30 June?
Mr Straw: First of all, sovereignty
will be handed over to the Iraqi people on 30 June. Let's be clear
about that. Do not under-estimate the symbolic importance of this.
Symbols are very important in politics as in life and the transfer
of sovereignty of power is very important and it will also be
a real transfer of power as well. Occupation is something which
most Iraqis regard as necessary but they do not regard it as particularly
desirable and they want to see the occupation, where decisions
have been taken effectively otherwise on behalf of a sovereign
government by the occupying powers, ended, so that will end. Yes,
there will be Coalition forces in Iraq after that but they are
there for a purpose, essentially to support the sovereign government
of Iraq, and the Iraqi people are the first to recognise that
you cannot just pull out the Coalition forces and leave a vacuum
and we are working very hard to build up their own internal security
forces. We are internationalising it as far as we can. Bear in
mind that since the military action that finished in Iraq last
April there have been three Security Council Resolutions, 1483,
1500 and 1511. We are seeking a further Resolution and have been
discussing elements of the language with our international partners
and those discussions are going on at the moment. I have a reasonable
belief that they will be completed satisfactorily and if we get
the resolution we want it will provide international endorsement
for the new sovereign Iraq and in terms of getting other forces
there there are 30 countries with forces on the ground in Iraq.
South Korea is currently in the process of sending a large contingent
of forces and for sure we would like to see other countries providing
well-trained forces obviously post-30 June at the invitation of
the Iraqi sovereign government.
Q246 Mr Illsley: What is the likelihood
of other countries putting troops into Iraq in substantial numbers
given the deterioration in the security situation?
Mr Straw: For the time being South
Korea is the only country with a large-scale contingent in hand.
I think having 30 countries represented there is very good and
that includes quite a large number of Europe countries with substantial
contingents, I may say including Poland whose President is here
for a state visit today. Security, Mr Illsley, as you are indicating,
is the fundamental problem faced by Iraq at the moment. As the
security situation eases so it will be easier in turn to get security
forces whether they are armed forces, paramilitary police or police
to do some peace-keeping operations into Iraq and also obviously
easier to get civilians in.
Q247 Mr Illsley: In evidence yesterday
one of the suggestions put to us, which we discussed, was we are
now seeing in Iraq following the disbanding of the Iraqi Army—and
you mentioned a figure of 78,000 Iraqi security personnel being
re-employed and we have been given a figure that some 400,000
were effectively demobilised towards the middle of last year—the
actual formation, if you like, of resistance by former loyalists,
by former members of the military which is now organising itself
into the military defence of Iraq that perhaps we did not see
too clearly last April. Are you concerned that we are seeing a
re-establishment of a credible military force to attack our Coalition
forces?
Mr Straw: Not in the sense of
the formation of an alternative Army, no.
Q248 Mr Illsley: In terms of the
organisation and the effectiveness of the attempt?
Mr Straw: Are there groups operating
in parts of Iraq who have access to as well as small arms quite
substantial weaponry like rocket-propelled grenades and small-scale
surface-to-air missiles, yes, because there is too much material
which is unaccounted for in Iraq. Have they been causing insurgency?
Yes. Are the Coalition forces determined to get on top of it?
Yes too, because that is essential for a relatively smooth transition
through 30 June. There will still be some insurgency, let's be
clear about this, after 30 June for a period and that will continue
until there are stable political institutions.
Q249 Mr Maples: Foreign Secretary,
I want to bring you back to the transition and if I could deal
with the civil part of it first and then the military bit. Do
you believe it is necessary from an international law point of
view to have a further United Nations Security Council Resolution
to confer legitimacy on the new Iraqi government after 30 June,
and if you do not believe it is legally necessary in what way
will it help the CPA and Mr Brahimi to do their job to have that
Resolution?
Mr Straw: I would not describe
it as a legal necessity because I think that Resolution 1511 and
1483 set out pretty clearly—I have got 1511 in front of
me—what the programme was, including "the establishment
of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq". I
think it is very desirable and politically important to get a
new Resolution as an endorsement of the international community
of the new arrangement and I think it is particularly important
from the point of view of the Iraqis who will be responsible for
the caretaker government and responsible for setting up this conference
and running it. It gives them more legitimacy with a small "l".
Q250 Mr Maples: So you will be looking
for the United Nations Security Council Resolution after Brahimi
and the CPA have come to a conclusion to confer legitimacy on
it? How can you confer legitimacy in advance?
Mr Straw: We are looking for a
Security Council Resolution hopefully before the end of this month,
May, but certainly if it is at all possible before the end of
next month, the 30 June, to provide international endorsement
for the arrangements. You are asking me a chicken and egg point
as it were, in who is going to appoint the caretaker government?
The caretaker government will have to emerge. How else can this
happen? It is there as a caretaker government to run the country
and to be involved in the organisation of the elections which
should take place by the end of January of next year. As you will
be aware, what Brahimi also proposes is that there should be a
national conference of about 1,000 representatives which would
nominate a constituent assembly which would act as the interim
parliament and would also be serving to legitimise the emerging
political institutions.
Q251 Mr Maples: So it is really to
confer international legitimacy on whatever arrangements they
come up with but it is not, strictly speaking, legally necessary
if you have got enough cover in 1511?
Mr Straw: We think so although
it would be highly desirable. The legal advice is for others but
we think so.
Q252 Mr Maples: Can I turn to the
military side. Presumably the purpose of a new United Nations
Security Council as far as the military and security side is concerned
would be to try to get greater international participation in
the peace keeping or security forces that are in Iraq after 1
July. So far, the various resolutions—and we have had the
three you mention and there may even have been more than that—have
not succeeded in getting more forces. We may have plenty of countries
participating but the bulk of the forces are still ours and the
United States'. Do you think that there is a realistic possibility
of security forces in Iraq after 1 July relying less on us and
the Americans and really having a significant military presence
from other countries, which clearly would be desirable because
it seems that the Americans at least have outstayed their welcome
and perhaps we have too?
Mr Straw: It is very hard to say.
I think in practice what is as important in determining whether
country X is willing to provide forces is the inherent security
of the situation.
Q253 Mr Maples: Chicken and egg again.
Mr Straw: It is very much chicken
and egg because the more difficult the security situation the
less likely the country is to provide forces. If their armed forces
have similar experience and a similar culture to the British forces
it is one thing and also, let me say, a similar background support
from their population, but we are a very unusual country in that
respect, we just are, and most countries' armed forces have not
been particularly active for many years except for the odd bit
of internal paramilitary policing, so there is obviously some
anxiety about it.
Q254 Mr Maples: You must have heard
the criticism that there are not enough forces there. The Rand
Corporation estimated we needed 400,000 or 500,000 troops to do
this. That seems improbable but nevertheless 137,000 and mostly
Americans perhaps seems too few. I am disappointed in a way but
not surprised that you cannot give greater assurance that you
think there will a) more troops in view of there being various
resistance groups who appear to be trying to frustrate a solution
rather than facilitate one b) particularly in the light of the
allegations this week about torture us because the Americans are
perhaps not the people who should b providing the bulk of the
security force if an alternative force is possible? Can I bring
you back, do you think with a UNSCR will come greater international
security support?
Mr Straw: I am sorry to give you
a disappointing reply.
Q255 Mr Maples: I would rather have
your honest reply.
Mr Straw: Yes, you would rather
have a straightforward reply. You are not going to see the American
contribution nor ours replaced by anything except, over time,
indigenous Iraqi forces. No one has the capability nor the political
will to be a substitute for the American forces. I can only think
of two other countries who could even match to get to the starting
blocks in terms of the Americans' capability. As I say, it is
a chicken and egg situation. In one sense the less that forces
are needed from other countries the easier it will be to recruit
them.
Q256 Chairman: Foreign Secretary,
we are summoned by bells. May I just say this is another consequence
of this change of hours.
Mr Straw: It is high time, if
I may say so, that the House did something about it!
Chairman: May I thank you and your colleagues
on behalf of the Committee.
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