CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Iraq
1. We
conclude that the violence in Iraq stems from a number of sources,
including members of the former regime, local Islamists, criminal
gangs and al Qaeda. Iraq has become a 'battle ground' for al Qaeda,
with appalling consequences for the Iraqi people. However, we
also conclude that the Coalition's failure to bring law and order
to parts of Iraq created a vacuum into which criminal elements
and militias have stepped. We recommend that the Government give
all possible assistance to the Iraqi government in its efforts
to step up security so that the quality of life of ordinary Iraqis
may be improved and the country may continue along its path towards
democracy. (Paragraph 20)
2. We
conclude that the insufficient number of troops in Iraq has contributed
to the deterioration in security. We further conclude that the
failure of countries other than the US and United Kingdom to send
significant numbers of troops has had serious and regrettable
consequences, not only for Iraqis but also in terms of the burden
placed on United Kingdom resources and perceptions of the legitimacy
of operations in Iraq. We commend the Government for its work
achieving diplomatic consensus around UNSCR 1546. It is disappointing
that so many countries have decided against committing forces
to Iraq. We recommend that the Government renew its efforts to
encourage other countries, including Islamic countries, to send
troops to Iraq. (Paragraph 26)
3. We
conclude that the increase in the use of private military or security
companies in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last two years has added
to the case for regulation of these companies, where appropriate,
by the British Government. We recommend that the Government either
bring forward legislation to introduce a regulatory regime for
private military companies, or explain in full its reasons for
not doing so. (Paragraph 31)
4. We
conclude that the Government's condemnation of the Iranian Government's
treatment of the British servicemen recently detained in Iran
is wholly justified. We recommend that in its response to this
Report the Government set out what it is doing to ensure the return
of the marine equipment and weapons still held by the Iranian
authorities. (Paragraph 34)
5. We
commend the Government for its work assisting the formation of
the Iraqi security forces. However, we conclude that the Iraqi
police and army remain a long way from being able to maintain
security. We recommend that in its response to this Report the
Government set out what it regards as the minimum and optimum
numbers of Iraqi armed forces, police, Civil Defence Corps and
border police; what is the timetable envisaged for achieving these
numbers; and what is being done to meet that timetable. (Paragraph
41)
6. We
recommend that the Government set out in its response to this
Report its understanding of how the United Kingdom's role in Iraq
has altered following the transfer of sovereignty and the signing
into law of provisions for emergency measures. (Paragraph 43)
7. We
are very concerned that key information on intelligence and on
alleged human rights violations by British personnel was withheld
from senior FCO officials and from Ministers. We welcome the assurances
given by the Permanent Under-Secretary and we recommend that in
its response to this Report the FCO set out in detail what measures
have been put in place to ensure that sensitive or important information
is (a) shared between Departments of State as appropriate, (b)
always passed to an appropriate senior official level in the FCO
and (c) always put to Ministers if of policy or presentational
significance. (Paragraph 54)
8. We
conclude that the provision of basic services in Iraq is not yet
satisfactory and that the failure to meet Iraqi expectations,
whether realistic or not, risks damaging the credibility of the
United Kingdom in Iraq and Iraqi goodwill towards it. We recommend
that in its response to this Report, the Government set out the
current level of water and electricity provision, the targets
for the coming year, and what steps it is taking to achieve these
targets. We further recommend that the Government set out what
steps it is taking following the handover of sovereignty in the
Basrah area to assist reconstruction efforts and to ensure Iraqi
involvement in these efforts, together with an update on the disbursement
of funds pledged to Iraq. (Paragraph 64)
9. We
note the progress made by the Iraqi judiciary and commend the
Government for its role in assisting this. We conclude that the
judiciary, and in particular the Iraqi Special Tribunal, will
continue to require international assistance. We recommend that
the Government provide in its response to this Report an update
on what the Government is doing to support the Iraqi Special Tribunal,
the establishment of fair systems of criminal and civil justice
in Iraq, and the new Iraqi government's efforts to ensure that
human rights are respected. (Paragraph 70)
10. We
recommend that in its response to this Report the Government outline
how it plans to assist economic reform following the handover
of sovereignty. We further recommend that the Government set out
what progress has been made towards an IMF programme for Iraq
and agreement with Iraq's various creditors, as well as the anticipated
timeframe for agreement. (Paragraph 74)
11. We
recommend that in its response to this Report the Government provide
full details of the assistance it is providing the Iraqi oil industry
as well as its efforts to assist economic diversification. (Paragraph
78)
12. We
are concerned at reports of irregularities in the handling of
the Development Fund for Iraq. We recommend that the Government
inform us of its understanding of these allegations and the role
played by the United Kingdom in managing the Fund. (Paragraph
80)
13. We
recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set
out its understanding of the legal position of foreign contractors
and subcontractors working in Iraq, now that the CPA has been
dissolved, including any plans to waive immunity from Iraqi legal
process. (Paragraph 85)
14. We
are concerned that the documents given to the United Kingdom Government
relating to the Oil-for-Food Programme corruption allegations
name a small number of United Kingdom individuals and entities.
We are glad to have been assured by the FCO that none of the individuals
or entities is connected with the United Kingdom Government. We
recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
provide further information on the progress of the inquiry into
allegations of corruption in the Oil-for-Food programme, including
any further information on United Kingdom involvement. (Paragraph
88)
15. We
commend the Government's efforts to address the unemployment problem
in Basrah. However, we conclude that considerable further progress
is required. We recommend that in its response to this Report,
the Government set out what steps it is taking in the Basrah area
following the handover of sovereignty to assist job creation and
economic regeneration. (Paragraph 92)
16. We
recommend that in its response to this Report the Government provide
the latest figures for United Kingdom personnel working with Iraqi
ministries following the handover of sovereignty, including details
of the timeframe of their involvement. (Paragraph 95)
17. We
conclude that the process of wide-ranging consultation overseen
by the UN played an important role in the formation of the interim
Government on 1 June. While it is too early to judge the performance
of the interim Government, its successful establishment and assumption
of sovereignty on 28 June underline the importance of UN engagement
in Iraq. We conclude that it is crucial that the sovereignty of
the new government is respected and that foreign governments should
not interfere in its decision making. (Paragraph 115)
18. We
conclude that UN engagement in the political transition was critical
to the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1546. However, although the
unanimous adoption of the Resolution reflects improved international
consensus regarding Iraq, many states continue to hold back from
assisting the country. We recommend that the Government set out
in its response to this Report its understanding of what security
assistance will be provided to the UN to facilitate its return
to the country. (Paragraph 121)
19. We
conclude that it is highly desirable that elections proceed on
schedule in order to foster Iraqi engagement and confidence in
the political transition. However, we are concerned about the
impact that the security situation could have on the validity
of the election process. We recommend that the Government set
out in its response to this Report what plans it has, bilaterally
with Iraq, and in conjunction with the US and UN, for providing
security specifically for the elections. We further recommend
that the Government encourage states that remain reluctant to
commit troops to counter-insurgency operations in Iraq to send
forces to assist with the elections. (Paragraph 127)
20. We
conclude that the United Kingdom Government should join with the
US government to make clear that the Iraqi government is sovereign
in reality as well as in name. (Paragraph 130)
21. We
recommend that the Government set out in its response to this
Report what lessons have been learned from the mistreatment of
detainees and what safeguards are being put in place to prevent
a recurrence of such appalling incidents. (Paragraph 138)
22. We
recommend that in its response to this Report the Government inform
us of how many Iraqi detainees or prisoners of war it held on
28 June and on the most recent date for which figures are available,
including details of their status and location and the likely
future of their detention. (Paragraph 141)
23. We
recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
set out what arrangements have been put in place regulating the
presence of United Kingdom forces in Iraq, including details of
powers of arrest and rules of engagement. We further recommend
that the Government set out why it has not reached a separate
status of forces agreement with the Iraqi government. (Paragraph
151)
24. We
recommend that the Government set out in its response to this
Report what steps it is taking to ensure that there is a sufficient
body of expertise in the United Kingdom to enable better communication
with the Arab and Islamic world. (Paragraph 157)
25. We
recommend that the Government set out in its response to this
Report what steps it is taking following the handover of sovereignty
in Iraq to ensure the safety of United Kingdom personnel. (Paragraph
164)
26. We
recommend that the Government update us in its response to this
Report on the current status of United Kingdom representation
in Iraq. We further recommend that the Government inform us of
its understanding of the constraints imposed by the security situation
on the operations of United Kingdom personnel, including their
ability to move around the country. (Paragraph 165)
27. We
conclude that the alternative to a positive outcome in Iraq may
be a failed state and regional instability. It is therefore of
the utmost importance that current problems are resolved in favour
of the forces of order and that those who seek to impede Iraq's
transition to a free and democratic state are defeated. (Paragraph
167)
Afghanistan
28. We
conclude that the contribution being made by United Kingdom diplomatic,
aid and military personnel in Afghanistan, working in challenging
and dangerous conditions, is out of all proportion to their small
numbers. We recommend that the Government do what it can to improve
the conditions in which its personnel live and work in Afghanistan.
(Paragraph 169)
29. We
conclude that it is important for Afghanistan that the presidential
elections planned for October 2004 should proceed, unless the
United Nations judges that the level of voter registration has
been so low as to damage the credibility of the process, or the
security situation has deteriorated to a point where the dangers
posed to human life—or the threat to voter turnout—are
unacceptably high. We further conclude that the cause of democracy
in Afghanistan requires that parliamentary elections be held as
soon as possible after the presidential elections and we recommend
that the Government offer every assistance to the Afghan and UN
authorities to enable this to happen. We further recommend that
in its response to this Report the Government provide a detailed
breakdown of what funding for the electoral process in Afghanistan
has been pledged by UN member states; and what has been delivered.
(Paragraph 180)
30. The
British Army has an excellent, probably unrivalled, record in
sensitive patrolling of potentially hostile areas and building
confidence and trust. We conclude that these are among the most
important tasks for PRTs in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 191)
31. We
conclude that the Provincial Reconstruction Teams are one of the
success stories of international engagement in Afghanistan and
that their expansion should be regarded as a priority. However,
there are real differences between the approaches adopted by the
various PRTs as well as between Afghan perceptions of NATO's ISAF
forces and those which are part of Operation Enduring Freedom.
We recommend that all PRTs be placed under ISAF control as soon
as possible. (Paragraph 192)
32. We
conclude that there is little, if any, sign of the war on drugs
being won, and every indication that the situation is likely to
deteriorate, at least in the short term. We recommend that the
Government, which is in the lead on the counter-narcotics strategy
in Afghanistan, explain in its response to this Report exactly
how it proposes to meet the targets of reducing opium poppy cultivation
by 75 percent by 2008, and eradicating it completely by 2013.
(Paragraph 204)
33. We
conclude that improving security for the civilian population is
one of the highest priority needs in Afghanistan. We recommend
that the Government set out in its response to this Report what
further contributions the United Kingdom will be making to improve
security for the Afghan people. (Paragraph 209)
34. We
conclude that Afghanistan's 'warlords' or commanders are both
a large part of the problem and an essential part of the solution.
We recommend that the Government use its good offices to assist
the Afghan Transitional Administration to ensure that the political
process is as inclusive as possible, while avoiding the corruption
and abuses of power which have been evident in some parts of central
and local government. We conclude that, until this process is
complete and has become irreversible, and until the Afghan National
Army has developed its own capacity, the international forces
in Afghanistan must retain the option and therefore the capability
of assisting the Afghan authorities to deal militarily with commanders
who persist in operating outside the rule of law. (Paragraph 220)
35. We
conclude that the most urgent and pressing need for Afghanistan
is to achieve disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. We
recommend that the Government and its allies devote greater resources
to achieving this goal. We further recommend that as an essential
first step reliable data should be assembled on how many fighters
serve with the militias, what arms they have, and to whom they
are responsible; only then will the true scale of the task be
fully apparent. (Paragraph 225)
36. We
conclude that, welcome though the Istanbul declaration of limited
further support for Afghanistan is, fine communiqués and
ringing declarations are no substitute for delivery of the forces
and equipment which Afghanistan needs on the ground. We agree
with President Karzai that the need for more resources for ISAF
is urgent. There is a real danger if these resources are not provided
soon that Afghanistan—a fragile state in one of the most
sensitive and volatile regions of the world—could implode,
with terrible consequences. We recommend that the Government impress
upon its NATO allies the need to deliver on their promises to
help Afghanistan before it is too late, both for the credibility
of the Alliance and, more importantly, for the people of Afghanistan.
(Paragraph 232)
Pakistan
37. We
conclude that Pakistan is making a meaningful and welcome contribution
to the war against terrorism. However, we also recognise the domestic
difficulties faced by Pakistan and we are concerned that Pakistan
and President Musharraf in particular are being targeted by al
Qaeda as a result of their co-operation with the war against terrorism.
We recommend that the Government make clear its appreciation for
Pakistan's efforts and the courage of President Musharraf and
consider what further assistance it can offer to assist these
efforts. (Paragraph 243)
38. We
are concerned that insufficient progress has been made on reforming
Pakistan's education system. The situation is urgent given the
need to combat the dangerous nexus of poverty and extremism. We
recommend that the Government give its full support to Pakistan's
efforts to reform the education system, including providing financial
and administrative assistance. (Paragraph 248)
39. We
conclude that progress of development efforts in Pakistan's tribal
areas has been disappointingly slow. These efforts are critical
to successfully addressing the root causes of extremism as well
as tackling the drug problem. We recommend that the Government
give serious consideration to increasing its support for development
efforts in these areas, including financial and administrative
assistance. (Paragraph 254)
40. We
conclude that the conflict over Kashmir is a potential catalyst
for extremism. The conflict is made more serious by the fact that
both parties are nuclear powers. However, we welcome the constructive
approach being taken by both governments. We recommend that the
Government encourage both parties to prioritise their work towards
a resolution. We further recommend that the Government ensure
that the US remains fully seized of the importance of resolving
the Kashmir problem. (Paragraph 256)
41. We
welcome the Pakistani government's co-operation on proliferation
following the alarming revelations about the AQ Khan network.
We recommend that the United Kingdom Government continue to work
closely with Pakistan to pursue the trail of Dr Khan's proliferation
activities and to prevent further proliferation. (Paragraph 269)
42. We
recognise the progress that Pakistan has made towards restoring
democracy and welcome Pakistan's readmission to the Commonwealth.
However, we are concerned about the slow progress of democratisation
and in particular the dominant role of the army in the country,
which we believe is detrimental to the democratic process. We
recommend that the Government work with Pakistan to encourage
democratic reform, and also provide assistance in institution-building.
(Paragraph 276)
43. We
conclude that the human rights situation in Pakistan remains unacceptable.
We commend the work of the Foreign Office to tackle the problem
of forced marriage in Pakistan involving United Kingdom citizens.
However, we recommend that the Government encourage Pakistan to
adhere to international human rights standards and guarantee the
rights of all Pakistani citizens. We further recommend that the
Government offer Pakistan assistance in capacity-building and
training with regard to law enforcement, the criminal justice
system and human rights. (Paragraph 279)
The Russian Federation
44. We
conclude that the latest diplomatic efforts have re-engaged Russia
on Iraq and are contributing to a less divisive climate. We commend
the Government for its work on the latest United Nations Security
Council Resolution on Iraq, but we also recommend that the Government
continue to consult the Russians closely so that it is in a position
to take account of their concerns in Iraq and the broader Middle
East. (Paragraph 289)
45. We
conclude that the Russian Federation's support for efforts to
bring peace and democracy to Afghanistan is valuable, but that
support for the reconstruction process is being damaged by the
slow progress on the counter-narcotics strategy. (Paragraph 293)
46. We
conclude that reform of the military and security services in
Russia would contribute to the international struggle against
terrorism. We therefore recommend that the Government continue
its support for Russian efforts to reform its military and its
contribution to mutual understanding by increasing exchanges of
military personnel between the United Kingdom and the Russian
Federation. We recommend that in its response to this Report the
Government set out how it intends to strengthen military ties
with the Russian Federation. (Paragraph 298)
47. We
conclude that the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) is an essential tool
to improve the political and military engagement between Russia
and the alliance members. We recommend that the Government encourage
its fellow members of NATO to expand co-operation through the
NRC in order to alleviate concerns in Moscow about NATO's expansion
into eastern Europe and to prevent a 'Great Game' between Russia
and NATO in Central Asia. We also recommend that in its response
to this Report the Government set out its plans to develop the
NRC as a tool in the war against terrorism. (Paragraph 305)
48. We
conclude that links exist between the Chechen rebels and the international
network of terrorists affiliated to al Qaeda, but that the conflict
is not purely a terrorist insurgency. We further conclude that
Chechnya has great importance as a rallying cry for Islamist insurgency
throughout the Muslim world, and that the heavy handed approach
of the Russian authorities, including repeated human rights abuses,
risks further radicalising the Chechen population and spreading
the conflict in the North Caucasus. We recommend that the Government
engage the Russian Federation on Chechnya, and comment on Russian
policy in the region—in private if necessary. We also recommend
that the United Kingdom encourage the Russian authorities to increase
the role of the international community in the secessionist region,
and that in its response to this Report the Government set out
how it will seek to encourage the Russians both to expand the
OSCE and Council of Europe mandates in Chechnya and to consult
with the ordinary people of Chechnya. (Paragraph 319)
49. We
conclude that Russian support for Iran's nuclear activities could
risk contributing to the spread of WMD capabilities in the Middle
East by advancing the Iranian nuclear programme. We recommend
that the Government, together with its EU and US partners, seek
to persuade the Russians to ensure that their support for the
Bushehr nuclear plant does not extend to assistance with activity
consistent with a nuclear weapons development programme. (Paragraph
326)
50. We
conclude that international efforts, such as the CTR programme,
to counter the proliferation of the Soviet Union's WMD legacy
are essential work. However, we also conclude that while the efforts
of the EU are welcome, its contribution to non-proliferation efforts
neither takes account of the scale and threat of the task, nor
of the EU's economic importance. We recommend that the Government
encourage its partners in Europe to increase the EU's contribution
to non-proliferation efforts in the Russian Federation. (Paragraph
330)
51. We
conclude that the G8 Global Partnership makes an essential contribution
to the reduction of the threat of proliferation of WMD, although
certain difficulties remain between Russia and the other members.
We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government
set out how it has resolved the differences over liability for
future damages, the tax status of donor funds, and issues over
access to the sites, as well as how it is working with the USA
to help overcome American differences with the Russian authorities.
(Paragraph 334)
52. We
conclude that progress on the destruction of the Russian Federation's
chemical weapons stocks is most welcome but unfortunately is well
behind the planned timetable. We recommend that in its response
to this Report the Government set out how it will encourage the
Russian authorities to speed the destruction process and outline
its plans for work at the destruction facility at Shchuch'ye.
(Paragraph 338)
53. We
conclude that the destruction of biological weapons material in
the Russian Federation should be a priority, and recommend that
the Government set out how it will engage its Russian counterparts
more directly on its biological weapons stocks and the employment
of Russian scientists. We further conclude that the security of
stocks of pathogens and the proliferation of expertise of Russian
scientists present serious challenges for the international community.
(Paragraph 339)
54. We
conclude that the work carried out by the G8 Global Partnership
on the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy is a most valuable contribution
to non-proliferation efforts and the war against terrorism. However,
we are concerned that some projects, such as the plutonium disposition
programme, are proceeding less effectively than others, like the
submarine decommissioning programme in North West Russia. We recommend
that the Government maintain the momentum of its efforts, and
set out in its response to this Report how it will resolve the
current difficulties with the Russian authorities, so as to accelerate
the programmes. (Paragraph 343)
55. We
conclude that the Russian Federation is a valuable ally in the
war against terrorism, although different perceptions of the conflict
have an impact on relations between the United Kingdom and Russia.
We recommend that the Government maintain its engagement with
Russia in order to ensure its commitment to the war against terrorism,
by allaying Russian concerns about Afghanistan, Iraq and NATO,
by maintaining a critical dialogue on Russian policy in Chechnya,
and by engaging the Russian Federation on the threat of WMD proliferation.
We conclude that continued engagement with the Russian Federation
on matters of mutual concern offers opportunities to make an important
contribution to success in the war against terrorism. (Paragraph
344)
Israel-Palestine Conflict
56. We
conclude that resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict must remain
a United Kingdom foreign policy priority. We reiterate our previous
conclusion that resolution of this conflict is an essential component
in the wider US-led campaign to defeat Islamist terrorism and
to promote reform in the Middle East region. (Paragraph 393)
57. We
support the position taken by the Government in welcoming Israel's
planned withdrawal from Gaza while insisting that all aspects
of the final settlement remain open for negotiation. However,
we conclude that it is important that the withdrawal from Gaza
should be followed by withdrawals from the West Bank. (Paragraph
394)
58. We
recommend that the Government work with Israel, the Palestinian
Authority and the Quartet to facilitate Israel's 'disengagement'
from Gaza, to encourage Israel to make further withdrawals, to
bring an end to Palestinian suicide attacks, and to aid reconstruction
and security efforts in the Palestinian territories. We further
recommend that the Government, in its response to this Report,
set out in detail what steps it is taking to ensure that Israel's
plan for 'disengagement' from Gaza is fully consistent with a
durable solution to the wider Israel-Palestine problem, including
details of any steps being taken with regard to post-withdrawal
peace keeping. (Paragraph 395)
59. We
reiterate our previous conclusion that the case for building a
barrier along the Green Line would be strong and understandable,
but to build it within the West Bank is neither justifiable nor
acceptable and gives rise to fears that Israel intends to annex
this land. We recommend that the Government make it clear to Israel
that efforts unilaterally to change facts on the ground in occupied
territory are illegal under international law. We are encouraged
by the recent decisions by the Israeli high court halting construction
of the barrier, but reiterate our previous conclusion that Israeli
maintenance and expansion of illegal settlements combined with
the construction of the barrier on Palestinian land constitute
a severe impediment to efforts to secure a peace agreement between
Israel and the Palestinian Authority and to the creation of a
viable Palestinian state. We recommend that the Government make
this position absolutely and unequivocally clear in its public
pronouncements, as well as in its diplomatic exchanges with the
United States and Israel. We conclude that actions taken so far
have failed to stop Israel's construction of the barrier in occupied
territory. We further conclude that the United Nations General
Assembly Resolution ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004, passed overwhelmingly
and with the support of the British Government and all EU Member
states, regarding the barrier, is to be welcomed. We recommend
that the Government set out in its response to this Report what
it is doing bilaterally and with the EU, the US and the Quartet
to stop construction of the barrier in occupied territory. (Paragraph
396)
60. The
high level of violence suffered by both peoples makes a resolution
of the Israel-Palestine conflict urgent. This urgency is increased
by the serious deterioration in living conditions in the Palestinian
territories. It is critical that, as well as putting pressure
on the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority to do
more to stop the violence, efforts are made to 'de-radicalise'
the Palestinian population, by addressing the conditions of extreme
poverty in which many of them live. (Paragraph 397)
61. We
conclude with regret that the Road Map is stalled, possibly fatally.
We further conclude that there is little likelihood of the two
parties reaching a negotiated settlement of their own accord in
the short term, and that time is fast running out for a viable
two-state solution to be achieved. Nevertheless, we believe that
a resolution of the conflict along the lines discussed at Taba
in January 2001 is not unattainable. (Paragraph 398)
62. We
once again recommend that the Government work to encourage the
US to send a high-level emissary to the Middle East with the dedicated
aim of resolving this long-standing conflict. While recognising
Israel's mistrust of European policy in the region, we also conclude
that Europe, including the United Kingdom, could be playing a
more influential role. In order to overcome this mistrust, we
recommend that the Government consider how to engage Israel more
positively, both bilaterally and through the EU. (Paragraph 399)
63. We
recommend that its response to this Report the Government set
out its response to the question the Prime Minister asked in his
Sedgefield constituency speech on 5 March 2004, when he said:
"It may well be that under international law as presently
constituted, a regime can systematically brutalise and oppress
its people and there is nothing anyone can do, when dialogue,
diplomacy and even sanctions fail, unless it comes within the
definition of a humanitarian catastrophe…This may be the
law, but should it be?" (Paragraph 406)
64. We
conclude that the debate about the role of the United Nations
Security Council in collective use of force is part of the case
for reform of the Security Council, and we await with interest
the conclusions of the Panel of Eminent Persons examining the
case for reform in the United Nations. We recommend that in its
response to this Report the Government outline and explain its
proposals for reform of the United Nations. We also conclude that
any reforms must not undermine the system of collective security
or threaten the paramountcy of the United Nations in the international
legal system. (Paragraph 414)
65. We
conclude that the concept of 'imminence' in anticipatory self-defence
may require reassessment in the light of the WMD threat but that
the Government should be very cautious to limit the application
of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence so as to prevent
its abuse by states pursuing their national interest. We recommend
that in its response to this Report the Government set out how,
in the event of the legitimisation of the doctrine of anticipatory
self-defence, it will persuade its allies to limit the use of
the doctrine to a "threat of catastrophic attack". We
also recommend that the Government explain its position on the
'proportionality' of a response to a catastrophic attack, and
how to curtail the abuse of that principle in the event of the
acceptance of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence by the
international community. (Paragraph 429)
66. We
conclude that a doctrine of humanitarian intervention appears
to be emerging, but that its application in the context of the
war against terrorism raises difficult questions of interpretation
and embodies significant risk. We recommend that the Government
work to establish a consensus on when intervention on humanitarian
grounds is permissible, in order to prevent its abuse by states
pursing their national interest. (Paragraph 433)
International Co-operation to Tackle Terrorism
67. We
conclude that al Qaeda continues to pose a very serious threat
to the United Kingdom and its interests. As a result, fighting
the threat of international terrorism must remain a top foreign
policy priority. (Paragraph 444)
68. We
welcome the efforts to reform the UN's Counter-Terrorism Committee
in order to make it more effective. We commend the Government's
role in the reform process and its continued commitment to the
Counter-Terrorism Committee. We further commend the work of the
FCO to assist countries to build their counter-terrorism capacity
through the Global Opportunity Fund. We recommend that in its
response to this Report the Government provide a further update
on the FCO's work in this area, the progress achieved to date
and any area of concern. We further recommend that the Government
seek to ensure that human rights concerns are incorporated in
the work of the CTC and inform us of what progress has been made
in this regard. (Paragraph 453)
69. We
conclude that there remains considerable cause for concern that
terrorist groups retain access to significant sources of funding.
We recommend that the Government redouble its efforts in this
field, and that in its response to this Report it set out what
progress has been achieved to date in this field, what are the
main areas of difficulty, and what proposals it has to achieve
further progress. (Paragraph 459)
70. We
conclude that it remains of the utmost importance that the United
Kingdom work with its partners in the EU as well as the United
States to combat the international threat posed by terrorism.
We commend the Government for supporting the developments within
the EU to facilitate more effective co-operation. However, we
conclude that significant further steps are required for EU anti-terrorism
action to be effective. We recommend that the Government in its
response to this Report explain in detail what it is doing to
encourage more effective European co-operation against terrorism.
(Paragraph 465)
71. We
conclude that the expansion of membership of the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) to include new members such as Russia
and the willingness of Panama and Liberia to allow searches of
their ships is most welcome, and we commend the Government's efforts
to encourage other states to agree to the interdiction of their
shipping. However, we recommend that the Government work for a
United Nations Security Council Resolution which would resolve
the legal difficulties over PSI. We also recommend that the Government
set out in its response to this Report what amendments to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation 1988 are under consideration and who has
proposed them, and how the Government will draw a distinction
between the legitimate and illegitimate transport of WMD by sea.
(Paragraph 474)
72.
We give a cautious welcome to Libya's agreement to comply with
international non-proliferation initiatives. We recommend that
the Government continue working to integrate Libya into the international
community, and that it set out in its response to this Report
what it is doing to encourage a degree of economic reform or political
liberalisation in Libya, particularly in association with the
European Union. (Paragraph 479)
73. We
conclude that Iran's nuclear programme continues to pose an intense
challenge for the international community, and that the continued
exertion of diplomatic pressure by the European troika, the US
and the Russian Federation is essential to its resolution. We
recommend that the Government persevere with its strategy towards
Iran's nuclear programme and make clear to the authorities in
Tehran the benefits of compliance. (Paragraph 485)
74. There
is a clear need for reform throughout the Arab world. However,
we conclude that it is important not to seek to impose reform
on the region but to encourage and support domestic initiatives
where appropriate. We agree with the Foreign Secretary that Arab
reform must be home-grown and we commend the work of the Foreign
Office in support of regional and national reform initiatives.
We also welcome the work of the BBC World Service and British
Council in the region. We recommend that in its response to this
Report the Government provide a fully up-dated report on the work
it is doing in this area. (Paragraph 497)
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