Nuclear proliferation
257. For years, Pakistan denied spreading nuclear
technology and claimed that its nuclear arsenal was safe from
extremists. However, documents provided by Iran to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in November 2003 exposed a significant
procurement network, which some have called a "nuclear Wal-Mart".[342]
Notably, the Butler Inquiry praised the work of the intelligence
communities in uncovering and dismantling the AQ Khan network.[343]
258. Discussing the extent of Pakistani proliferation,
Dr Gary Samore told us: "Certainly in the case of Libya,
Iran and North Korea, there is no question that Pakistan provided
significant nuclear weapons systems, although I think there are
still some uncertainties about exactly what Iran and North Korea
acquired."[344]
Dr Samore also mentioned reports that the 'father of the Pakistani
nuclear programme', A Q Khan, or his representatives, approached
Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria, but that these countries did not
pursue the contact. "I think we have to assume that A Q Khan
knocked on every door. We may very well learn that he had contacts
with other governments in the Middle East but whether anybody
actually bought anything, at this point in time, I am not aware."[345]
259. The revelations about nuclear transfer from
Pakistan have prompted concern that nuclear technology could have
been passed to terrorist groups. In his speech on the continuing
global terror threat on 5 March 2004, the Prime Minister said:
We knew that Al Qaida sought the capability to
use WMD in their attacks. Bin Laden has called it a "duty"
to obtain nuclear weapons. His networks have experimented with
chemicals and toxins for use in attacks. He received advice from
at least two Pakistani scientists on the design of nuclear weapons.[346]
260. In 2001, two Pakistani nuclear scientists
were detained and questioned about links with the Taliban and
al Qaeda. They were subsequently cleared of all charges and released
in December 2001. Dr Samore told us that:
As far as I know, there is no information that
A Q Khan was in touch with any non-state actors. The package that
he was offering was centrifuge designs and components, nuclear
weapons designs and some feed material, either natural or low
enriched uranium hexafluoride. That package would be of little
use to a terrorist group. For a terrorist group to acquire nuclear
weapons, they would either need to obtain ready-made weapons or
sufficient highly enriched uranium to make a crude nuclear bomb.
I am less worried about non-state actors, even if they did get
access to the package that A Q Khan was offering.[347]
261. Under international pressure, Pakistan launched
an inquiry into its nuclear scientists, including Dr Khan. On
January 23 2004, President Musharraf admitted that individuals
in Pakistan's nuclear programme might have profited from an international
black market for nuclear technology. However, Pakistan continues
to insist that the government never authorised nuclear transactions
with any other country. On 4 February 2004, Dr Khan publicly confessed
to transferring nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea
during the 1980s and 1990s. Dr Khan, who received a full pardon
from President Musharraf for the offences to which he had confessed,
also said that his activities were not authorised by Islamabad.
"There was never, ever, any kind of authorisation for these
activities by the government. I take full responsibility for my
actions and seek [the Pakistani people's] pardon."[348]
262. In March the Prime Minister expressed confidence
that "the A Q Khan network is being shut down, its trade
slowly but surely being eliminated".[349]
Similarly, the Foreign Secretary expressed his satisfaction that
progress is being made in the investigation into proliferation
at a press conference during his visit to Pakistan in March 2004.[350]
263. However, suggestions that the A Q Khan network
operated without government knowledge have been met with some
scepticism, while President Musharraf's decision to pardon Dr
Khan rather than prosecute him has prompted concern that Pakistan
is not dealing sufficiently rigorously with the problem of proliferation.
The Committee heard from Dr Samore that: "it is very difficult
to analyse A Q Khan's activities as an individual scientist and
his close coterie of friends acting on a freelance basis. I think
it is much more likely that what we are witnessing is proliferation
as a matter of state policy".[351]
264. Nevertheless, Dr Samore is confident about
President Musharraf's commitment to tackling proliferation:
I think that President Musharraf is serious about
putting A Q Khan out of business and at least for now controlling
any further occurrences, but I do not think we can necessarily
be confident that in the future, perhaps under a different leadership,
Pakistan might very well judge again that it is in its interests
to share this technology. I think it is a matter that requires
very close vigilance to try to continue maintaining a political
relationship with Pakistan that puts us in a position to influence
their decisions.[352]
265. Moreover, Dr Samore believes that the A
Q Khan network was unique and that: "putting it out of business
and by uprooting all the individuals and companies that were involved,
that by itself will contribute more to strengthening the global
regime than any other step you could take."[353]
266. However, there are clear difficulties in
ensuring that Pakistan does not continue to proliferate. Pakistan
is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
is therefore under no international obligation to co-operate with
IAEA investigations. Moreover, there are limits to what can be
achieved by means of pressure. As Dr Samore told us:
[T]he problem about putting pressure on Pakistan
is that it might break. It is a very fragile country. Now it is
armed with nuclear weapons. I really think we have to tread very
carefully. … I think for now probably our best bet is to
try to support President Musharraf as much as we can. That is
not a guaranteed strategy. We do not know whether President Musharraf
will survive the next attempt on his life. We do not know what
kind of government will emerge if he is gunned down.[354]
Indeed, President Musharraf's decision to pardon
Dr Khan reflects his limited room for domestic manoeuvre: Dr Khan
is a national hero—moves against him prompted popular protests
and strikes.[355]
267. In May, the FCO wrote to us about what it
is doing to prevent further proliferation:
The UK, together with other countries, remains
in contact with the Government of Pakistan over the action it
is taking to ensure there is no further proliferation of nuclear
technology. In particular, we are calling on Pakistan to introduce
effective export controls including an end-use control. We are
ready to work with Pakistan to develop effective legislation and
implementation mechanisms.
We have also offered assistance with safety and
physical security measures for Pakistan's nuclear facilities as
foreseen in the Bradshaw Statement of 15 March 2002.
In addition to our contacts with Pakistan we
have put proposals to India to develop cooperation on export controls
and nuclear safety, building on India's existing good record of
controlling the export of sensitive technology.[356]
268. Our witnesses also noted the importance
of addressing Pakistan's regional concerns as a means of containing
the threat of proliferation. Dr Samore told us:
the more Pakistan feels confident and secure
and economically prosperous, the less likely it is that it will
feel the need to resort to further transfers of nuclear technology.
I completely agree with that…. Although I think we do need
to try to integrate Pakistan as much as possible, nonetheless
we have to be worried about the possibility that in the future
a Pakistani government or a different Pakistani government might
decide to trade nuclear assets for other things they feel they
need.[357]
However, Dr Samore does not believe that Pakistan
can be persuaded to relinquish its nuclear ambitions and sign
the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state:
I think Pakistan believes that it must have a
nuclear deterrent to defend itself against a much larger enemy
in every way. Even if you sold Pakistan every single conventional
weapon on its wish list, I do not believe Pakistan would be willing
to give up its nuclear deterrent.[358]
269. We welcome the Pakistani government's
co-operation on proliferation following the alarming revelations
about the AQ Khan network. We recommend that the United Kingdom
Government continue to work closely with Pakistan to pursue the
trail of Dr Khan's proliferation activities and to prevent further
proliferation.
Democratisation and Human Rights
270. We now turn to consider the issue of democracy
and President Musharraf's seizure of power. In October 1999, army
Chief of Staff General Pervez Musharraf overthrew Prime Minister
Nawaz Shariz in a bloodless coup. The national and provincial
assemblies were dissolved and the constitution suspended. General
Musharraf proclaimed himself Chief Executive, pledging to return
power to parliament once he had reduced the corruption associated
with the Sharif and Bhutto governments; he appointed himself President
nine months after the coup. In April 2002, President Musharraf
held a referendum on his role and secured a further five years
as president with 98% of the vote on a 70% turnout. Pakistan's
political parties, human rights groups and media claimed that
there were widespread electoral abuses.[359]
271. General elections were held in October 2002.
However, these were also criticised, with the EU Observation Mission
reporting serious misgivings about some aspects of the poll. Its
strongest criticism was directed at the restrictions placed on
the nomination of candidates, the enactment of legislation aimed
at preventing some candidates from standing, the institutionalisation
of the role of the army in governing the country, and the apparent
departure from a parliamentary form of democracy to a presidential
system. The EU Observation Mission considered these to constitute
"unjustified interference in the electoral process".[360]
272. More recently, moves to entrench further
the position of the President have prompted concern. In December
2003, the National Assembly passed a bill on constitutional amendments
allowing President Musharraf to remain in power until 2007, subject
to a vote of confidence, and to remain Army Chief of Staff until
the end of 2004. President Musharraf won the vote of confidence
on 1 January 2004; he promised not to use his power to dismiss
parliament early, but pushed through a bill establishing a National
Security Council that enshrines the military's role at the centre
of Pakistani politics. The National Security Council will consist
of 13 members, four of whom come from the military, the rest being
civilian leaders, and will advise the government on matters of
importance to the state, including national security.
273. The army remains the most powerful institution
in Pakistan, overshadowing the weak institutions of civilian government
and politics.[361]
The weakness of the government has been underlined by the powerlessness
of the prime minister. Prior to his resignation in June, Prime
Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali was widely regarded as weak and
ineffective—memorably he referred to President Musharraf
as his 'boss'.[362]
During our visit to Pakistan, some of those we met were sceptical
about the President's pledge to stand down as Chief of Staff.
However, others downplayed the importance of the pledge given
the institutionalised role of the army in politics. The Committee
also heard about serious concerns that the military has stunted
the growth of democratic institutions, causing long-term damage
to the independence of the judiciary and parliament. The Committee
did not hear any suggestions as to how this situation might be
reversed.
274. Pakistan was suspended from the Commonwealth
following the coup in 1999. In November 2001, Commonwealth ministers
decided that pending further progress towards democracy, Pakistan's
status should not change. However, in May 2003, the Commonwealth
Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) welcomed the progress made by
Pakistan in setting up democratic institutions, but noted that
parliament was deadlocked over the status of the Legal Framework
Order (LFO). In September 2003, CMAG linked readmission to the
Commonwealth with a constitutional resolution of the LFO and agreed
to review Pakistan's suspension at their meeting in Spring 2004.
275. At its meeting on 21-22 May 2004, CMAG noted
the adoption by Parliament of the LFO and welcomed the country's
progress restoring democracy, rebuilding democratic institutions
and restoring the Constitution. As a result, CMAG decided to readmit
Pakistan to the Commonwealth.[363]
Nevertheless, CMAG noted "continuing concerns over strengthening
the democratic process" and Secretary-General Don McKinnon
made it clear that Pakistan's readmission was contingent upon
continued progress towards democratisation as well as President
Musharraf's adherence to his pledge to stand down as military
leader by the end of the year.[364]
President Musharraf reacted angrily to these conditions, saying
that he would not be dictated to by the Commonwealth: "We
will take steps that are in the interests of Pakistan, not of
the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth should be proud of having a
country like Pakistan joining it, therefore we don't accept such
conditional ties."[365]
Pakistan will remain on the CMAG agenda.
276. We recognise the progress that Pakistan
has made towards restoring democracy and welcome Pakistan's readmission
to the Commonwealth. However, we are concerned about the slow
progress of democratisation and in particular the dominant role
of the army in the country, which we believe is detrimental to
the democratic process. We recommend that the Government work
with Pakistan to encourage democratic reform, and also provide
assistance in institution-building.
277. There is also concern about the human rights
situation in Pakistan. In an open letter sent to President Musharraf
in October 2003, Human Rights Watch cited its concerns about the
torture and mistreatment of political opponents and journalists,
the failure to meet internationally recognised standards of due
process and legal discrimination against and mistreatment of women
and religious minorities.[366]
278. We are also concerned about evidence of
continuing cases of forced marriage between United Kingdom and
Pakistani individuals, although during our visit to Pakistan we
heard about important co-operation between the United Kingdom
High Commission and the local authorities as well as local non-governmental
organisations to address this problem. We were also deeply concerned
by what we heard about legal discrimination against religious
minorities, bonded labour and the inadequacies of law enforcement
and criminal justice capacity and procedure. With regard to women's
rights, the application of the hudood ordinances and honour
killings are the main problems. Although some work has been done
to address these issues, progress is hindered by objections from
religious parties. The position of women is worsened by their
generally low socio-economic position, which makes them vulnerable
to a range of abuses. On a more positive note, we also heard about
the effectiveness of international advocacy in addressing such
problems.
279. We conclude that the human rights situation
in Pakistan remains unacceptable. We commend the work of the Foreign
Office to tackle the problem of forced marriage in Pakistan involving
United Kingdom citizens. However, we recommend that the Government
encourage Pakistan to adhere to international human rights standards
and guarantee the rights of all Pakistani citizens. We further
recommend that the Government offer Pakistan assistance in capacity-building
and training with regard to law enforcement, the criminal justice
system and human rights.
339 See para 235 Back
340
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/pakistan/en/country_profile.html Back
341
We commented on the Kashmir dispute in our Second Report of Session
2001-02, HC327, 'British-US Relations', paras 171-74 Back
342
'Nuclear program in Iran tied to Pakistan', Washington Post,
21 December 2003. Back
343
HC (2003-04) 898, para 74. Back
344
Q33 Back
345
Q34 [Samore] Back
346
'PM warms of continuing global terror threat', 5 March 2004, available
at: http://www.number-10.gov.uk Back
347
Q38 Back
348
'Pakistani who shared secrets is pardoned', 6 February 2004, International
Herald Tribune. Back
349
'PM warms of continuing global terror threat', 5 March 2004, available
at: http://www.number-10.gov.uk Back
350
'Straw 'satisfied' after WMD talks', BBC, 4 March 2004. Back
351
Q37 Back
352
Q40 Back
353
Q44 [Samore] Back
354
Q42 Back
355
'Strike held for nuclear scientist', BBC, 6 February 2004. Back
356
Ev 70 Back
357
Q41 [Samore] Back
358
Q46 [Samore] Back
359
'Pakistan national and provincial assembly election, 10 October
2002', European Union Election Observation Mission, Final Report,
p 5-6. Back
360
'Pakistan national and provincial assembly election, 10 October
2002', European Union Election Observation Mission, Final Report,
p 6-7. Back
361
'Pakistan's future and U.S policy options', Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington, March 2004, p 6-8. Back
362
'Pakistan's prime minister resigns', BBC, 26 June 2004. Back
363
'Twenty-third meeting of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group
on the Harare Declaration (CMAG), Marlborough House, London, 21-22
May 2004, concluding statement', Commonwealth news release, 22
May 2004, p 2. Back
364
'Musharraf defies Commonwealth', The Times, 26 May 2004. Back
365
Ibid Back
366
'Return Pakistan to Civilian Rule', letter to General Pervez Musharraf
from Human Rights Watch, 10 October 2003. Back
