5 THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (continued)
341. The United Kingdom has four main programmes
in the G8 Partnership's efforts to prevent proliferation in Russia:
the North West Russia submarine dismantlement and spent nuclear
fuel programme; the Nuclear Safety Programme; the Plutonium Disposition
Programme; and the United Kingdom-Russian Federation Closed Nuclear
Cities Partnership, combined with a programme on the social consequences
of nuclear power plant closure projects.[445]
The DTI runs the programmes with a budget of £32.5 million
in close association with the FCO and MOD.[446]
In Moscow, we learnt that the North West Russia submarine decommissioning
project has taken about 90 submarines out of service. Other efforts
in North West Russia include improving security facilities in
Andreeva Bay and Murmansk, and upgrading the physical security
of nuclear icebreakers.[447]
We heard that the Nuclear Safety Programme has had successes,
most notably in Murmansk where the United Kingdom funded security
improvements for a major storage facility. However, security risks
remain paramount across the Russian Federation.[448]
Reflecting this concern, Baroness Symons told the House of Lords
on 15 January 2004 that the Government will spend about £1
million per annum on programmes securing nuclear materials.[449]
342. The Closed Nuclear Cities Project's (CNCP)
"goal is to promote international security by reducing the
risk of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. It aims to
meet this objective by promoting alternative civil sector employment
opportunities for former nuclear weapons scientists and technicians,
and by supporting the long-term economic viability of the Closed
Nuclear Cities."[450]
The plutonium disposition programme, an effort to reduce excess
weapons grade plutonium in the Russian Federation, has stalled
because of disputes about the legal framework.
343. We conclude that the work carried out
by the G8 Global Partnership on the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy
is a most valuable contribution to non-proliferation efforts and
the war against terrorism. However, we are concerned that some
projects, such as the plutonium disposition programme, are proceeding
less effectively than others, like the submarine decommissioning
programme in North West Russia. We recommend that the Government
maintain the momentum of its efforts, and set out in its response
to this Report how it will resolve the current difficulties with
the Russian authorities, so as to accelerate the programmes.
Conclusion
344. We conclude that the Russian Federation
is a valuable ally in the war against terrorism, although different
perceptions of the conflict have an impact on relations between
the United Kingdom and Russia. We recommend that the Government
maintain its engagement with Russia in order to ensure its commitment
to the war against terrorism, by allaying Russian concerns about
Afghanistan, Iraq and NATO, by maintaining a critical dialogue
on Russian policy in Chechnya, and by engaging the Russian Federation
on the threat of WMD proliferation. We conclude that continued
engagement with the Russian Federation on matters of mutual concern
offers opportunities to make an important contribution to success
in the war against terrorism.
445 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department of
Trade and Industry and Ministry of Defence, The G8 Global Partnership:
First Annual Report 2003 p 11 Back
446
Department of Trade and Industry, Closed Nuclear Cities Partnership,
2003/04 Annual Report Back
447
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department of Trade and Industry
and Ministry of Defence, The G8 Global Partnership: First Annual
Report 2003 p 26 Back
448
Ibid Back
449
HL Deb, 15 January 2004, col WA100 Back
450
Department of Trade and Industry, Closed Nuclear Cities Partnership,
2003/04 Annual Report Back
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